Arguments
Philosophy’s structured arguments, from the cosmological argument to the Chinese room: find one by name or browse by question, subject, thinker, tradition or letter.
On this page
441 structured arguments. Each sets out the argument’s steps, the main objections and the replies, with the questions, thinkers and traditions it belongs to.
Find or filter the arguments
Arguments A to Z
441 arguments, A to Z.
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Absent qualia objection
The objection to functionalism that a system could be organised exactly like a human mind, state for causal state, yet have no experiences at all.
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Abū Bakr al-Rāzī's argument against prophecy
The argument, reported by his Ismāʿīlī opponent Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī, that because God gives reason equally to all, singling out prophets would be unjust, needless and divisive; whether Abu Bakr al-Razi actually held it is disputed.
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Adams's argument on horrendous evils
Marilyn McCord Adams's argument that a good God must not merely balance evils globally but defeat each horrendous evil within the life of the person who suffers it, by integrating it into a relationship with God great enough to make that life a great good to the person on the whole.
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Agrippa's trilemma
The Pyrrhonian argument that no belief is justified, because every attempted justification must end in an unsupported assumption, go round in a circle or regress without end.
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AI control problem
The problem of how human beings could keep control of an artificial system far more capable than themselves; it rests on contested arguments about superintelligence, the orthogonality of intelligence and goals, and instrumental convergence.
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Akrasia
Acting freely and deliberately against your own judgement about what is best: weakness of will.
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Albo's argument for three principles of divine law
Joseph Albo's argument in the Book of Principles (Sefer ha-ʿIqqarim) that any divine law must rest on exactly three roots, the existence of God, revelation and reward and punishment, against Maimonides' thirteen principles.
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Al-Fārābī's account of prophecy through the imagination
Al-Fārābī's argument, in The Virtuous City and The Political Regime, that prophecy is the natural perfection of a person whose intellect and imagination both receive the emanation of the Active Intellect, the imagination turning intelligible truths and knowledge of particulars into symbols for the many.
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Al-Fārābī's argument that poetics is a part of logic
Al-Fārābī's case, inherited from the late ancient syllabus that placed Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in the Organon, that poetry belongs to logic because it works through a weak form of syllogism, bringing hearers to states of mind by exciting the imagination rather than by demonstration.
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Al-Ghazālī's argument against necessary causation
The argument of the seventeenth discussion of al-Ghazālī's Incoherence of the Philosophers that the connection between what we take to be a cause and its effect is not necessary, so that miracles are possible.
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Al-Ghazālī's argument from the eternal will
Al-Ghazali's reply, in the first discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers, to the claim that an eternal God must have an eternal effect: God could will from eternity that the world begin at a particular moment, because the essential function of will is to choose among indiscernibles.
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Al-Ghazālī's sceptical argument in the Deliverance from Error
Al-Ghazali's argument, in his autobiography Deliverance from Error, that neither the senses nor reason can certify themselves, because the senses are corrected by reason and reason might be corrected by a higher state, as dreams are by waking.
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Alienation objection
The objection that impartial moral theories, consequentialist and Kantian alike, cannot accommodate the motives proper to love and friendship, so that an agent who acts from them is estranged from the people closest to them.
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Al-Kindī's argument for the finitude of time
Al-Kindi's argument in On First Philosophy that because the body of the cosmos is finite and time is predicated of it, time too must be finite, so that the world had a first moment and is not eternal.
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Allais paradox
Maurice Allais's pair of choices between lotteries in which many people's preferences cannot be represented as maximising expected utility, because they violate the independence axiom and Savage's sure-thing principle.
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Alston's argument from mystical perception
William Alston's argument in Perceiving God (1991) that forming beliefs about God on the basis of experiences of God is a doxastic practice with the same claim to rational acceptance as sense perception; its hardest test is religious diversity.
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Ambedkar's argument against caste
B. R. Ambedkar's argument in Annihilation of Caste (1936) that caste is not a division of labour but a graded division of labourers fixed by birth, that it makes a common social life, public spirit and shared morality impossible, and that, because people keep caste out of belief in the sanctity of the Shastras, it can be ended only by destroying that religious authority; Gandhi replied in 1936 and Ambedkar answered him.
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Amoralist challenge
The argument that someone could sincerely judge an act right yet be wholly unmoved by that judgement, so that moral judgement is not necessarily connected to motivation.
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Amo's argument for the impassivity of the human mind
Anton Wilhelm Amo's case, in his Wittenberg dissertation On the Impassivity of the Human Mind (1734), that the mind, as a purely active immaterial spirit, cannot be acted upon, so that sensation belongs not to the mind but to the living, organic body.
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Anselm's Proslogion II ontological argument
Anselm's argument in Proslogion chapter II that God, understood as that than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone and therefore exists in reality as well.
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Apoha
The Buddhist theory, originated by Dignāga and reworked by Dharmakīrti, that words and concepts pick out things not through real universals but by excluding what is other: 'cow' means, in effect, 'not non-cow'.
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Appiah's argument against races
Kwame Anthony Appiah's argument that, since nothing in the world answers to the biological notion of race that ordinary racial talk presupposes, there are no races, though there are racial identities with real social effects.
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Aquinas's argument against Maimonides on the divine names
Thomas Aquinas's reply, in Summa Theologiae I.13.2, to the view he attributes to 'Rabbi Moses' that names such as 'living' and 'good' say of God only what God is not, or what God causes: Aquinas argues that they signify the divine substance, though imperfectly.
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Aquinas's argument against the unity of the intellect
Thomas Aquinas's case, in On the Unity of the Intellect, that the Averroist thesis of one separate intellect for all humans cannot explain the evident fact that this individual human being thinks, and would make all humans a single thinker; each person therefore has an intellect of his or her own.
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Aquinas's argument that God knows future contingents in eternity
Thomas Aquinas's argument (Summa Theologiae I.14.13) that God knows contingent events infallibly because all of time is present to his eternity, while those events stay contingent in relation to their own proximate causes.
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Aquinas's argument that natural law is participation in the eternal law
Thomas Aquinas's argument (Summa Theologiae I-II.91.2, developed in 94.2) that, since all things are ruled by God's eternal law, rational creatures share in it in a distinctive way, through the light of natural reason by which they discern good and evil; that rational share is the natural law.
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Aquinas's argument that the world's beginning cannot be demonstrated
Thomas Aquinas's case, in Summa Theologiae I.46 and the treatise On the Eternity of the World, that reason can prove neither that the world always existed nor that it began: its beginning is held by faith, and a world created by God yet without a beginning involves no contradiction.
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Aquinas's five ways
Thomas Aquinas's five short arguments in Summa theologiae I, q. 2, a. 3, from motion, efficient causation, possibility and necessity, degrees of perfection and the ordering of nature, each concluding to a first being that people call God.
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Aquinas's Third Way
The third of Thomas Aquinas's five ways in Summa Theologiae I, q. 2, a. 3: because things that can be and not be cannot account for existence by themselves, there must be a being necessary of itself. Its step from 'each thing can not-be' to 'at one time nothing existed' is the most disputed in the argument.
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The argument for pessimism about aesthetic testimony
The argument that, unlike ordinary testimony, pure aesthetic testimony cannot legitimately ground an aesthetic judgement, because such judgements must rest on first-hand experience (Wollheim's acquaintance principle), and the optimist replies to it.
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Argument from consciousness (theistic)
The argument, defended by Richard Swinburne, Robert Adams and J. P. Moreland, that the existence of consciousness and its regular correlation with brain states is best explained by God.
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Argument from contingency
The cosmological argument from the existence of contingent things, by way of the principle of sufficient reason, to a necessary being.
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Argument from hallucination
The argument that because a hallucination could be indistinguishable from a genuine perception and of the same fundamental kind, we are never directly presented with ordinary objects, even when we perceive them.
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Argument from illusion
The classic argument that, because in illusions something appears to have a quality the ordinary object lacks, we are never directly presented with ordinary objects, even in veridical perception.
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Argument from inductive risk
Richard Rudner's argument that because accepting a hypothesis always risks error, and how much evidence is enough depends on how bad an error would be, scientists as scientists must make value judgements.
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Argument from moral disagreement
The argument that deep and persistent moral disagreement across cultures is better explained by differing ways of life than by objective moral facts, used to support moral error theory, relativism or non-cognitivism.
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Argument from queerness
J. L. Mackie's argument that objective moral values would be metaphysically and epistemically strange, unlike anything else we know, so that we should not believe in them.
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Argument from the laws of countries
An ancient argument against astrological determinism: whole peoples keep uniform laws and customs whatever the horoscopes of their members, so customs and free choice, not the stars, govern human conduct. Best known from the Syriac Book of the Laws of Countries, written down by Bardaisan's pupil Philip.
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Argument from vagueness (composition)
The argument, due to David Lewis and developed by Theodore Sider, that composition cannot be a vague matter, so that either every collection of objects composes something or none does.
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Aristotle's argument that the happy need friends
Aristotle's argument in Nicomachean Ethics IX.9 that even a happy, virtuous person needs friends, because a friend is 'another self' whose good actions one can perceive and share; its success is disputed.
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Aristotle's defence of the principle of non-contradiction
Aristotle's argument in Metaphysics Gamma that the principle of non-contradiction cannot be demonstrated but cannot coherently be denied either, because anyone who says something meaningful already relies on it.
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Aristotle's function argument
Aristotle's argument in Nicomachean Ethics I.7 that the human good is activity of the rational soul in accordance with virtue, because the good of anything with a characteristic function lies in performing that function well.
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Arrow's impossibility theorem
Kenneth Arrow's 1951 proof that, with three or more alternatives, no procedure for turning individual preference rankings into a social ranking can satisfy unrestricted domain, social ordering, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorship together.
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Ascent of love (Plato)
Diotima's account in Plato's Symposium of love rising from one beautiful body through souls, laws and knowledge to beauty itself; criticised for treating individuals as mere stepping-stones, a reading its defenders reject.
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Asymmetry argument (disability)
The argument that disability must be bad for the person who has it, because if it were neutral it would be as permissible to cause disability as it is to prevent or remove it, and causing it is not permissible.
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Augustine's si fallor, sum argument
Augustine's anti-sceptical argument, stated in The City of God 11.26, that even if I am in error I must exist, since whoever errs exists; he extended it to the certainty of one's own living, loving and willing. Often compared with Descartes's cogito.
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Austin's argument against the performative–constative distinction
J. L. Austin's argument in How to Do Things with Words that the contrast between performative utterances (doing something) and constative ones (stating something true or false) cannot be maintained, leading to his general theory of illocutionary acts.
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Backward induction paradox
The puzzle that reasoning backwards from the last move of a finite game, under common knowledge of rationality, seems to prescribe uncooperative play from the start, yet the reasoning appears to undermine its own assumptions at moves that rational players would never reach.
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Bar-Hillel–Carnap paradox
The result that, on Bar-Hillel and Carnap's probabilistic theory of semantic information, a contradiction carries maximal information.
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Basic argument
Galen Strawson's argument that true moral responsibility is impossible, because it would require us to be the causes of ourselves, which nothing can be.
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Beauvoir's argument that freedom is situated and shared
Simone de Beauvoir's argument, in The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex, that human freedom is always exercised in a situation and needs the freedom of others, so that 'woman' is a situation one becomes, not a natural essence.
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Benacerraf's epistemological challenge
The objection, from Paul Benacerraf's 'Mathematical Truth' (1973) and Hartry Field's reformulation, that if mathematical objects are abstract and causally inert, our reliable knowledge of them is inexplicable.
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Benacerraf's identification problem
Paul Benacerraf's 1965 argument that, because the natural numbers can be identified equally well with different sequences of sets, they are not identical with any of them, and perhaps are not objects at all.
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Benatar's asymmetry argument
David Benatar's argument for anti-natalism: because the absence of pain is good even if no one enjoys it, while the absence of pleasure is not bad unless someone is deprived, coming into existence is always a harm.
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Berkovits's argument from the hiding of the face
Eliezer Berkovits's argument in Faith after the Holocaust (1973) that God's hiddenness (hester panim) is the necessary reverse of divine patience and self-restraint, which make human freedom and history possible, so that the Holocaust is human evil God permitted but did not will.
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Berlin's argument against positive liberty
Isaiah Berlin's argument in "Two Concepts of Liberty" (1958) that the positive ideal of freedom as self-mastery, once the self is divided into a higher rational self and a lower empirical one and the higher self is identified with a collective or with reason's single answer, can be turned into a justification for coercing people in the name of their own freedom; value pluralism removes the main rationale for that coercion.
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Berry's paradox
The paradox of 'the least number that cannot be referred to by a description of fewer than 100 symbols', a description that itself has fewer than 100 symbols.
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Boethius's argument from the eternal present
Boethius's answer, in Book V of The Consolation of Philosophy, to the worry that infallible divine foreknowledge makes every event necessary: God knows all things in the manner of an eternal present, and knowing something as present imposes only a non-constraining, conditional necessity.
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Boltzmann brain
A brain-like observer arising from a random thermal fluctuation rather than from evolution; cosmological models predicting that such observers vastly outnumber ordinary ones face a sceptical problem.
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Bonaventure's argument against an eternal world
Bonaventure's case, in his Commentary on the Sentences (II, d.1, p.1, a.1, q.2), that a world created from nothing cannot have existed from eternity, supported by arguments against an actual infinite such as the impossibility of adding to or traversing an infinite past.
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BonJour's clairvoyance cases
Laurence BonJour's 1980 cases, above all Norman the reliable clairvoyant, meant to show that a reliably produced true belief held without any reasons is not justified, and so that externalism about justification is false.
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Bootstrapping problem
The objection, made vivid by Jonathan Vogel's gas-gauge case, that reliabilism and similar views let a person establish a source's reliability simply by repeatedly trusting it.
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Bradley's regress
F. H. Bradley's argument, in Appearance and Reality (1893), that relations cannot unite their terms without generating an endless series of further relations, so that relations are mere appearance.
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Brain in a vat
A modern sceptical scenario: for all you can tell, you might be a disembodied brain kept alive in a vat and fed experiences by a computer. If you cannot rule this out, it seems you cannot know you have hands.
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Brave officer paradox
Thomas Reid's objection to Locke: by a memory criterion a general is the boy who was flogged, through a chain of memories, and also is not, because he cannot remember the flogging.
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Burge's arthritis argument
Tyler Burge's 1979 thought experiment arguing that the contents of a person's beliefs depend partly on the linguistic practices of their community: a patient who wrongly believes he has arthritis in his thigh would, with no individual difference, have a different belief in a community that used 'arthritis' more broadly.
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Burke's argument that the sublime arises from the passions of self-preservation
Edmund Burke's argument in the Philosophical Enquiry (1757) that the sublime excites passions of self-preservation, which turn on pain, and is felt as astonishment when pain threatens from a safe distance, so that the sublime and the beautiful have different foundations.
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Butler's circularity objection
Joseph Butler's objection that a memory or consciousness criterion of personal identity presupposes the identity it is meant to explain.
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Butler's performativity argument
Judith Butler's argument, in Gender Trouble (1990), that gender is not an inner identity expressed in acts but is produced by the stylised repetition of acts, and that sex is no less culturally constituted than gender.
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Camus's argument that the absurd does not justify suicide
Albert Camus's argument in The Myth of Sisyphus that the clash between our demand for meaning and a silent world calls neither for suicide nor for hope, but for lucid revolt.
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Carlson's argument for scientific cognitivism
Allen Carlson's argument, from an analogy with the appreciation of art, that appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature requires knowledge supplied by the natural sciences (his 'natural environmental model').
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Carroll's common reason argument
Noël Carroll's argument for moderate moralism: sometimes the very feature that makes a work morally flawed, such as an immoral perspective that blocks the response the work seeks, also makes it aesthetically flawed.
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Carroll's regress
The regress in Lewis Carroll's dialogue 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles', in which every attempt to state the link between premises and conclusion as a further premise creates a new gap.
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Cartesian circle
The objection that Descartes argues in a circle in the Meditations, using clear and distinct perception to prove that God exists and then appealing to God to guarantee that clear and distinct perception is true.
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Cārvāka critique of inference
The Cārvāka (Lokāyata) argument, known mainly from opponents' and doxographers' reports, that inference is not an independent means of knowledge because the universal pervasion (vyāpti) it needs cannot be known by perception, inference, testimony or comparison; older reports show the school accepting everyday, perception-based inference.
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Causal exclusion argument
The argument, refined by Jaegwon Kim, that if every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, mental properties distinct from physical ones are left with no causal work to do. It is the main challenge to non-reductive physicalism.
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Causal inefficacy objection
The objection that an individual's purchase or abstention makes no difference to large systems of production, so cannot be required on consequentialist grounds; replies appeal to expected consequences, free-riding and non-causal principles.
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Child-at-the-well argument
Mencius's argument (Mengzi 2A6) that anyone who suddenly saw a child about to fall into a well would feel alarm and compassion without ulterior motive, showing an innate sprout of benevolence.
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Chinese nation argument
Block's thought experiment in which the population of China, passing messages partly by satellite and controlling an artificial body, reproduces the functional organisation of a brain; it seems implausible that the whole system would feel anything.
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Chinese room argument
John Searle's 1980 thought experiment and argument that running a program cannot by itself produce understanding, because programs are purely syntactic and syntax is not sufficient for semantics.
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Chrysippus's cylinder argument
Chrysippus's argument, known through Cicero's De Fato 39-43 and Gellius's Attic Nights 7.2, that although everything happens by fate through antecedent causes, assent and action are up to us, because external causes only start the motion while the agent's own nature, like a pushed cylinder's shape, determines it.
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Clifford's ethics-of-belief argument
W. K. Clifford's argument in "The Ethics of Belief" (1877) that, because beliefs guide action, are held in common and shape the believer's and society's habits of inquiry, it is morally wrong for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.
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The closure argument for scepticism
The argument that we are not justified in ordinary beliefs about the external world because, by the closure principle, such justification would also justify rejecting sceptical hypotheses, which we cannot do.
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Collingridge dilemma
David Collingridge's problem for governing new technologies: early on, a technology can be controlled but its harms cannot be foreseen; by the time the harms are clear, the technology is entrenched and control is costly and slow.
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Combination problem
The central objection to panpsychism: if the smallest constituents of matter have experiences of their own, how do they combine into the unified consciousness of a human being?
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Common consent argument
The argument that the widespread belief in God across peoples and ages is itself evidence that God exists; defended in modest evidential form by Thomas Kelly.
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Communicative theory of punishment
The view that legal punishment is justified as the communication of deserved censure to offenders, aiming at their repentance, reform and reparation.
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Condorcet jury theorem
Condorcet's 1785 result that if voters are independent and each more likely than not to be right on a yes-or-no question, a majority is more reliable than any one of them and becomes almost certainly right as the group grows; the founding argument of epistemic democracy.
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The consent argument for political obligation
The argument that citizens are obliged to obey the state because, and to the extent that, they have consented to its authority, expressly or tacitly.
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Consequence argument
An argument for incompatibilism, widely regarded as the best one: if determinism is true, our acts are consequences of the laws of nature and the remote past, neither of which is up to us, so our acts are not up to us either.
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Contrary-to-duty paradox
Roderick Chisholm's 1963 puzzle showing that standard deontic logic cannot consistently and independently represent obligations that come into force once another obligation has been violated.
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Curry's paradox
A family of paradoxes in which a sentence or set says, in effect, 'if this is true, then anything', and a few plausible rules then prove any claim whatever, without any use of negation.
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Dalīl al-ʿināya (argument from providence)
Ibn Rushd's argument, in al-Kashf ʿan manāhij al-adilla, from the purposive order of the world to a Maker who exercises providential care; offered as a proof fit for ordinary believers and philosophers alike, in place of the theologians' proofs.
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Daniels's fair equality of opportunity argument for health care
Norman Daniels's argument that because health, understood as normal functioning, protects the range of opportunities open to a person, a theory of justice that protects fair equality of opportunity grounds obligations to protect and promote health, including universal access to a reasonable array of health care and public health measures.
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Danto's argument from indiscernible counterparts
Arthur Danto's argument, prompted by Warhol's Brillo Boxes, that because an artwork can have a perceptually indiscernible counterpart that is not art, or differs in artistic value, neither art status nor artistic value can consist in perceptible or aesthetic properties.
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Deductive-nomological model
Hempel and Oppenheim's account of scientific explanation: to explain a phenomenon is to deduce a statement of it from true premises that include at least one law of nature.
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Definite descriptions
Phrases of the form 'the so-and-so', such as 'the author of Waverley' or 'the present King of France'. Russell's theory analyses them not as names but as quantifier phrases, and the debate over that analysis shaped analytic philosophy of language.
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Demandingness objection
The objection that consequentialism, by requiring us always to do the most good, asks far too much, leaving almost no room for personal projects, relationships or permissible self-interest.
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Demarcation problem
The problem of distinguishing science from non-science, and especially from pseudoscience: doctrines that are not scientific but are presented as if they were.
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Democratic boundary problem
The problem of who should belong to the people that makes democratic decisions; democracy itself seems unable to settle its own membership.
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Descartes's cogito argument
Descartes's reasoning in the Second Meditation that 'I am, I exist' is necessarily true whenever he puts it forward or conceives it, so that his own existence survives even the most extreme doubt.
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Descartes's ontological argument
Descartes's a priori argument, chiefly in the Fifth Meditation, that God exists because necessary existence is clearly and distinctly perceived to belong to the idea of a supremely perfect being.
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Dickie's argument against the aesthetic attitude
George Dickie's argument in 'The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude' (1964) that alleged cases of interested attention are really inattention, and that a difference of motive need not make a difference of attention, so there is no special aesthetic attitude.
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Dignāga's memory argument for reflexive awareness
Dignāga's argument, in Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti) 1.11-12, that because we later remember our cognitions as well as their objects, and nothing unexperienced is remembered, each cognition must have been aware of itself; explaining that awareness by a further cognition would lead to an infinite regress.
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Disability paradox
The finding that many disabled people report a good quality of life, often far better than non-disabled people predict; its interpretation is central to debates about disability, well-being and health care priorities.
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Disappearing agent objection
Derk Pereboom's objection that, on event-causal libertarianism, nothing about the agent settles which undetermined decision occurs, so the agent 'disappears' just where control is needed.
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Divine immutability
The doctrine that God cannot change, defended from perfection, pure actuality and simplicity (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I.9) and challenged by arguments from tensed knowledge, relation, freedom and responsiveness; distinct from impassibility, eternity and simplicity.
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Divisibility argument
René Descartes' argument in the Sixth Meditation that mind and body are distinct substances because the body is by nature divisible and the mind is not.
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Dogmatism paradox
Saul Kripke's puzzle that, if I know something, I seem entitled to dismiss all future evidence against it as misleading.
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Draper's argument from pain and pleasure
Paul Draper's 1989 argument that the observed pattern of pain and pleasure among sentient beings is much more probable on a 'hypothesis of indifference' than on theism, and therefore makes theism less probable than not.
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Dream argument
The sceptical argument, made famous by Descartes's First Meditation, that because dreams can seem like waking experience, we cannot be sure from the inside that our sensory beliefs are not dream beliefs.
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Drowning child argument
Peter Singer's 1972 argument that, just as one ought to save a child drowning in a shallow pond at trivial cost, affluent people ought to give to prevent deaths from poverty.
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Du Bois's conservation-of-races argument
W. E. B. Du Bois's argument in 'The Conservation of Races' (1897) that races are historically and spiritually, not merely physically, distinct groups, each with a message for humanity, so that African Americans should conserve their racial identity and organisations.
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Duhem's argument against crucial experiments
Pierre Duhem's argument that no experiment in physics can refute an isolated hypothesis or decisively establish one of two rival hypotheses, because predictions follow only from whole groups of hypotheses.
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Dummett's manifestation argument
Michael Dummett's argument that, because understanding must be manifest in use, a speaker cannot grasp truth-conditions that transcend all possible evidence, so bivalence and classical logic should be given up for undecidable statements.
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Durkheim's argument for social facts
Émile Durkheim's argument, in The Rules of Sociological Method (1895), that there are social facts which are external to individuals and constrain them, so that sociology has its own subject matter not reducible to psychology.
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Dussel's argument from exteriority
Enrique Dussel's argument in Philosophy of Liberation (1977) that the philosophy of the centre thinks only a totality that justifies domination, that the oppressed Other stands outside every such totality and calls it to justice, and that philosophy must therefore begin from that exteriority.
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Dutch book argument
The argument, going back to Frank Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti, that credences violating the probability axioms expose an agent to a set of bets guaranteeing a loss, and so are irrational.
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Dworkin's argument for the authority of advance directives
Ronald Dworkin's argument in Life's Dominion (1993) that a directive made by a competent person should govern her care after dementia has removed her capacity for autonomy, because it expresses her critical interests and respects her autonomy understood as integrity.
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Edwards's argument against libertarian freedom
Jonathan Edwards's argument in Freedom of the Will (1754) that a libertarian, self-determining will is incoherent and unnecessary for responsibility: liberty is the power to do as one wills, choices follow the strongest motive, divine foreknowledge excludes contingency, and moral necessity is compatible with praise and blame.
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Ellsberg paradox
A choice problem using an urn of unknown composition in which many people prefer bets with known odds, in a pattern that no single precise probability assignment combined with expected-utility maximisation can explain.
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Ellul's argument for the autonomy of technique
Jacques Ellul's argument, in La Technique (1954; English The Technological Society, 1964), that technique, the drive for the most efficient method in every field, has become self-directing and no longer answers to politics, economics, ethics or religion.
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Epistemic circularity
William Alston's term, in its now-standard sense, for arguments that support the reliability of a belief source, such as perception, using premises that themselves depend on that source; whether such arguments can justify is disputed.
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Epistemic democracy
The family of views that justify democracy, wholly or partly, by its capacity to track truth or reach good decisions, through majority aggregation, cognitive diversity or experimental correction.
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Epistocracy
Rule by the knowledgeable: any system that distributes political power according to competence or political knowledge rather than equally among citizens.
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EPR argument
The 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen that, if distant systems cannot influence one another, quantum mechanics must give an incomplete description of physical reality.
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Euthyphro dilemma
The question, first posed in Plato's Euthyphro, whether something is good or right because God (or the gods) commands or loves it, or whether God commands or loves it because it is good or right. It is the classic challenge to divine command theory.
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Evidential argument from evil
The argument that evil, especially intense and apparently pointless suffering, makes the existence of God improbable even if it is logically consistent with it.
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Evolutionary argument against naturalism
Alvin Plantinga's argument that anyone who accepts both naturalism and unguided evolution has a defeater for the reliability of their own cognitive faculties, so that the conjunction is self-defeating.
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Evolutionary debunking argument
An argument that because natural selection shaped our moral beliefs without regard to moral truth, realists cannot claim that those beliefs track independent moral facts.
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Existential risk
A risk that threatens the premature extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential; Nick Bostrom argues that reducing such risks should be a global priority.
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Experience machine
Robert Nozick's thought experiment: would you plug into a machine that gave you any experiences you wanted, indistinguishable from real life? Most people say no, which is taken to show that something besides experience matters to well-being.
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Explanatory gap
Joseph Levine's name for the apparent absence of any intelligible link between physical or neural processes and the felt character of conscious experience.
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Expressivist objection (prenatal testing)
The argument from disability scholarship that prenatal testing followed by selective abortion expresses a demeaning message about everyone who lives with the tested-for condition; not to be confused with expressivism in metaethics.
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Fackenheim's argument for the 614th commandment
Emil Fackenheim's argument, first stated in 1967, that since no explanation of Auschwitz is adequate, the only authentic response is existential: Jews are forbidden to hand Hitler a posthumous victory, a commanding imperative he called the 614th commandment.
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Fairness argument against doping
The argument that performance-enhancing drugs should be banned because they give users an unfair advantage; opponents reply that natural and financial inequalities already tilt the field and that permitting enhancement for all could level it.
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Fake barn case
The thought experiment, first given by Carl Ginet and published by Alvin Goldman in 1976, in which a driver truly and justifiably believes he sees a barn in a district full of barn façades, yet seems not to know it.
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Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's argument that conceptions are not acquired
Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's argument, using a version of Meno's paradox and a four-way division, that no conception (taṣawwur) of a thing is gained by deliberate inquiry, so that definitions only analyse the meanings of names.
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Feuerbach's argument that God is the objectified human essence
Ludwig Feuerbach's reasoning in The Essence of Christianity (1841) that the divine predicates are human predicates freed from individual limits, so that God is the essence of the human species made objective and revered as another being, and theology is at bottom anthropology.
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Fine-tuning argument
The argument that the sensitivity of life to the values of physical constants, laws and initial conditions is evidence for a designer; a modern version of the teleological argument, rivalled by multiverse explanations.
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Fission problem
The puzzle about personal identity raised by imagining a person whose brain hemispheres are transplanted into two bodies: each resulting person seems to have equal claim to be the original, yet the original cannot be both.
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Fitch's paradox of knowability
A short proof that if every truth is knowable then every truth is known; it threatens anti-realist theories that tie truth to the possibility of knowledge.
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Flying man argument
Ibn Sina's thought experiment of a human being created fully formed in the air, cut off from all sensation, who would still grasp that he exists without grasping that he has a body.
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Food immoralism
The view, defended by Shen-yi Liao and Aaron Meskin, that a moral defect in a food's history can sometimes make that food aesthetically better precisely because of the defect.
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Frame problem
Originally the problem in logic-based AI of representing the effects of actions without listing everything they leave unchanged; in philosophy, the wider problem of how a thinker determines what is relevant when updating beliefs.
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Frankfurt cases
Thought experiments, introduced by Harry Frankfurt in 1969, in which an agent seems morally responsible for an action although a hidden intervener would have ensured that she could not have done otherwise.
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Free will defence
Alvin Plantinga's argument that God and evil are logically compatible, because God may have had to permit evil in order to create creatures with morally significant freedom.
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Fregean argument for mathematical platonism
The argument that, because mathematical singular terms purport to refer and most accepted theorems are true, mathematical objects exist; the main template for arguing for object realism in mathematics.
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Frege–Geach problem
The challenge, pressed by Peter Geach after Frege, that non-cognitivist theories of moral language cannot explain the meaning of moral sentences in embedded contexts or the validity of ordinary moral arguments.
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Fricker's argument that testimonial injustice wrongs a speaker as a knower
Miranda Fricker's argument that when identity prejudice deflates the credibility a hearer gives a speaker, the speaker suffers a distinctively epistemic wrong: denial of their standing as a knower, over and above any practical harm.
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Friedman's argument against corporate social responsibility
Milton Friedman's 1970 case that managers, as agents of the shareholders who own the firm, should maximise shareholder wealth rather than spend corporate resources on social goals.
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Frye's birdcage argument
Marilyn Frye's argument in 'Oppression' (The Politics of Reality, 1983) that oppression is a network of barriers that are each small and seemingly harmless when examined one at a time, like the wires of a birdcage, but together confine a group.
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Fungibility problem (love)
The objection that if love is justified by the beloved's valuable properties, anyone with the same or better properties would serve as well, making beloveds replaceable and 'trading up' rational.
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Future contingents
Statements about future events that are neither impossible nor inevitable, such as 'there will be a sea battle tomorrow', and the problem of whether, and how, they are true or false now.
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Gadamer's argument that understanding is shaped by tradition
Hans-Georg Gadamer's argument in Truth and Method that all understanding works through pre-judgements inherited from tradition, so that interpretation is a fusion of horizons rather than the recovery of a meaning free of history.
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Gaut's merited response argument
Berys Gaut's argument for ethicism: a work that prescribes unethical, and therefore unmerited, responses to what it depicts fails on its own terms, and because prescribed responses are aesthetically relevant, that failure is a pro tanto aesthetic defect.
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Generality problem
The problem for reliabilism of saying which of the many process types a belief-forming process belongs to determines its reliability; types described too narrowly or too broadly give the wrong results.
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Gersonides' argument that God knows particulars only as ordered
Gersonides' argument in The Wars of the Lord that God knows particular things only insofar as they are ordered, and knows that human choices may or may not be made, but not which alternative will be realised, since prior knowledge of a contingent would abolish its contingency.
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Gettier problem
The problem, posed by Edmund Gettier in 1963, that a justified true belief can be true by luck and still not be knowledge, so that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowing.
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Good Samaritan paradox
Arthur Prior's 1958 puzzle that, in standard deontic logic, an obligation to help a robbery victim seems to imply that the robbery itself is obligatory.
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Grandfather paradox
The argument that backward time travel is impossible because a time traveller could kill her grandfather, or her younger self, before her own trip, undermining her existence.
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Grelling's paradox
The paradox of the predicate 'heterological', true of predicates that do not apply to themselves: it seems to be heterological if and only if it is not.
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Gyekye's argument for moderate communitarianism
Kwame Gyekye's argument that the community is morally central but does not wholly constitute the person: individuals bring capacities the community nurtures, can evaluate and reject communal narratives, and keep rights even when judged morally deficient.
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Habermas's argument from communicative action to discourse ethics
Jürgen Habermas's argument that speech oriented to reaching understanding raises claims to truth, rightness and sincerity, and that moral norms are valid only if all affected could agree to them in practical discourse.
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Halevi's argument from public revelation
Judah Halevi's case in the Kuzari that the revelation at Sinai, witnessed by a whole people and handed down by unbroken tradition, gives firmer grounds than philosophical demonstration; the modern 'Kuzari principle' of Dovid Gottlieb and Tyron Goldschmidt is a distinct argument attributed to them.
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Han Fei's average-ruler argument
Han Fei's argument that because sage rulers are rare, government must rest on impersonal standards (fa) and techniques that work even under an average ruler.
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Happy fish debate
The exchange in the Zhuangzi in which Hui Shi challenges Zhuangzi's claim to know that the fish below a bridge are at leisure, a classic text on knowing other minds and on perspective.
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Harm principle
John Stuart Mill's principle in On Liberty that the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over a member of a civilised community against their will is to prevent harm to others; a person's own good is not a sufficient warrant.
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Harman's explanatory challenge to moral realism
Gilbert Harman's argument (1977) that moral facts, unlike physical facts, play no role in explaining our observations or what happens in the world, so we have no reason to believe in them.
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Hart's critique of the command theory
H. L. A. Hart's argument, chiefly in The Concept of Law, that law cannot be understood as the commands of a habitually obeyed sovereign backed by threats, but must be understood as a system of social rules.
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Haslanger's ameliorative argument
Sally Haslanger's argument that the concepts of gender and race should be defined by asking what concepts best serve legitimate feminist and antiracist aims, yielding definitions of woman, man and race in terms of social position, subordination and privilege.
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Heidegger's argument that being-in-the-world comes before the subject–object relation
Martin Heidegger's argument in Being and Time that we first encounter things as equipment within a world of practical involvements, so that the Cartesian picture of a subject facing objects is derivative.
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Heinz dilemma
Kohlberg's moral-development scenario, asking whether Heinz should steal an overpriced drug to save his wife, which Carol Gilligan used to argue that a 'care perspective' is a distinct and equally legitimate form of moral reasoning.
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Hempel's covering-law argument for history
Carl Hempel's argument, in 'The Function of General Laws in History', that historical explanations, like scientific ones, explain only by subsuming events under general laws.
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Hempel's dilemma
The objection that physicalism defined by current physics is false, while physicalism defined by a future or ideal physics is trivial, so the thesis has no clear content.
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Hobbes's state-of-nature argument
Thomas Hobbes's argument in Leviathan that, without a common power, rough equality, competition, distrust and glory produce a war of all against all, so rational people should covenant to authorise an absolute sovereign.
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Horkheimer and Adorno's argument that enlightenment reverts to myth
Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno's argument in Dialectic of Enlightenment that the reason which freed humanity from myth, by becoming instrumental and dominating nature, turns into a new form of domination.
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Hountondji's argument against ethnophilosophy
Paulin Hountondji's argument, in African Philosophy: Myth and Reality (1976; English 1983), that a collective, unconscious world-view ascribed to a whole people cannot be a philosophy, because philosophy is explicit discourse by accountable individuals open to criticism; ethnophilosophy is therefore ethnology, not philosophy.
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Hume's argument against belief in miracles
David Hume's argument in Section X of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding that testimony can make a miracle credible only if its falsehood would be more miraculous than the event reported, and that no actual testimony has ever met that standard well enough to found a religion.
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Hume's argument against the original contract
David Hume's argument in 'Of the Original Contract' (1748) that the duty to obey government cannot rest on an original or tacit contract, since nearly all governments began in usurpation or conquest, residence is not free consent, and allegiance, like promise-keeping, is grounded directly in the necessities of society.
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Hume's argument for a standard of taste
David Hume's argument in 'Of the Standard of Taste' (1757) that, although beauty is a matter of sentiment, some verdicts of taste are better than others, and that the standard is the joint verdict of true judges.
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Hume's argument that inferences from experience are not founded on reasoning
David Hume's argument, in Treatise 1.3.6 and Enquiry IV–V, that inferences from observed to unobserved cases rest on the supposition that the future resembles the past, which neither demonstrative nor probable reasoning can establish without circularity; custom, not reason, produces them. 'Problem of induction' is a later label.
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Husserl's argument for the phenomenological reduction
Edmund Husserl's case for suspending the everyday assumption that the world exists (the epoché) so that philosophy can study how anything comes to be given to consciousness at all.
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Ibn Daud's argument from possibility for human freedom
Abraham ibn Daud's argument in The Exalted Faith that some events are possible because God created them as open to two contraries, so that human choice is genuine and God does not know its outcome in advance, which he denies is a form of ignorance.
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Ibn Khaldun's argument for a science of ʿumrān
Ibn Khaldun's argument in the Muqaddimah (1377) that historical reports can be verified only against knowledge of the regular nature of human social organisation (ʿumrān), which therefore requires a new, rational science of its own.
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Ibn Rushd's argument that the Law commands philosophy
The argument of Ibn Rushd's Decisive Treatise that the religious Law, by commanding reflection on creation, commands demonstrative philosophy for those able to pursue it, since truth does not oppose truth.
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Ibn Rushd's reply to al-Ghazālī on the eternal will
Ibn Rushd's counter-argument, in the First Discussion of The Incoherence of the Incoherence, that an unchanging First Cause whose conditions for acting are complete cannot delay its effect, that 'will' is said of God and humans non-univocally, and that the world is therefore eternally produced though caused.
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Ibn Sīnā's argument that God knows particulars in a universal way
Ibn Sina's argument that a pure, simple and immaterial God has no direct epistemic relation to individual things and so knows them 'in a universal way', through their universal qualities and causes; al-Ghazali condemned the view as a denial of God's knowledge of particulars.
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Ibn Sīnā's argument that time has no beginning
Ibn Sina's reductio against a first moment of time: if motion had a first instant, the Creator could have extended it further back, so a capacity for motion, and hence time, would precede the supposed first moment, which is absurd.
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Ibn Taymiyya's critique of the syllogism
Ibn Taymiyya's argument, in his Refutation of the Logicians, that Aristotelian definition yields no new concepts and that the demonstrative syllogism is unnecessary for certain knowledge, since universals exist only in minds and syllogism is no more certain than analogy.
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Idle argument
An ancient argument that if outcomes are fated, effort such as consulting a doctor is futile; Chrysippus replied that outcomes may be fated together with their means.
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Imaginative resistance
The difficulty readers have in imagining, or accepting as true in a fiction, certain contents, especially morally deviant ones, even though they readily imagine dragons and time travel.
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Implicature
What a speaker means or suggests beyond what the words literally say, as when 'I have to work' conveys 'I am not coming to the party'. Paul Grice distinguished conversational implicature, which depends on context, from conventional implicature, which is fixed by particular words such as 'but' or 'therefore'.
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Indeterminacy of translation
W. V. O. Quine's thesis that rival translations of a language can fit all possible behavioural evidence equally well, with no further fact making one of them correct. It covers both the reference of terms and the translation of whole sentences.
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Indispensability argument
The argument that we ought to believe in mathematical objects because they are indispensable to our best scientific theories; one of the main arguments for mathematical platonism.
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Inference problem (laws of nature)
Bas van Fraassen's challenge to the Dretske–Tooley–Armstrong theory of laws: if a law is a necessitation relation between universals, nothing explains why that relation guarantees the corresponding regularity.
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Integrity objection
Bernard Williams's objection that utilitarianism, by treating agents as channels for producing the best overall state of affairs, cannot make sense of a person's own projects and commitments, and so attacks integrity.
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Interaction problem
The objection to interactionist dualism that an unextended, non-physical mind could not move a body or be affected by it. It was pressed against Descartes by Gassendi and Elisabeth of Bohemia.
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Inverse gambler's fallacy objection
The objection, named from Ian Hacking's 1987 analysis and applied by Roger White, that inferring many universes from the life-permitting character of ours repeats the error of inferring many earlier dice throws from one remarkable throw.
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Inverted spectrum
The hypothesis that someone might see colours systematically swapped relative to another person, say red where the other sees green, with no difference in behaviour; used against functionalism and representationalism.
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Isolation objection (coherentism)
The objection that, because coherence is a purely internal relation among beliefs, a coherent system could be wholly cut off from the world, so coherence gives no reason to think beliefs are true.
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Īśvarakṛṣṇa's five reasons for satkāryavāda
The five-part argument of Sāṃkhyakārikā 9 that an effect already exists in its material cause before it is produced, with the Nyāya and Buddhist counter-arguments it provoked.
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Is–ought problem
Hume's observation that moral writers move from statements about what is to conclusions about what ought to be without explaining how.
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James's will-to-believe argument
William James's argument in "The Will to Believe" (1896) that when an option between hypotheses is genuine (living, forced and momentous) and cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds, it is lawful, and unavoidable, for our passional nature to decide it.
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Jayarāśi's argument against the means of knowledge
Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa's critique, in the Tattvopaplavasiṃha, of every proposed definition of the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), carried out by reductio from his opponents' own premises without asserting a thesis of his own.
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Jeong Do-jeon's argument against Buddhist ethics
The case made in Jeong Do-jeon's Array of Critiques of Buddhism (Bulssi japbyeon, 1398) that Buddhism cultivates the inner mind while abandoning kinship and social obligation, and so cannot ground an ethics; answered after his death by the Seon monk Gihwa in the Exposition of the Correct (Hyeonjeong non).
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Jonas's argument against divine omnipotence after Auschwitz
Hans Jonas's argument in 'The Concept of God after Auschwitz' that God's goodness, power and intelligibility cannot all be held after Auschwitz, and that omnipotence must be given up: God did not intervene because he could not.
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Jørgensen's dilemma
The problem, noted by Jørgen Jørgensen in 1937, that norms and imperatives seem to be neither true nor false, so cannot stand in logical relations, and yet some normative inferences seem plainly valid.
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Kalām cosmological argument
The argument that whatever begins to exist has a cause, that the universe began to exist because an infinite past is impossible, and that the universe therefore has a cause.
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Kant's argument for the mathematical and dynamical sublime
Immanuel Kant's argument (Critique of the Power of Judgment §§23–29) that the sublime is felt when imagination fails before magnitude or might, revealing a power of reason that surpasses nature, so that sublimity lies in the mind rather than in nature.
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Kant's argument that judgements of taste are disinterested
Immanuel Kant's argument in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (§§1–5) that the pleasure grounding a judgement of beauty neither depends on nor produces a desire for the object, which separates the beautiful from the agreeable and the good.
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Kant's deduction of judgements of taste
Kant's argument in the Critique of the Power of Judgment that a judgement of beauty, though based on feeling rather than a concept, is entitled to demand everyone's agreement.
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Kant's Formula of Universal Law test
The procedure Kant draws from the first formulation of the categorical imperative (Groundwork 4:421): test a maxim by asking whether it could be conceived, and willed, as a universal law, so that failing yields a perfect or an imperfect duty.
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Kant's moral argument from the highest good
Immanuel Kant's argument in the Critique of Practical Reason that, because we are morally required to promote the highest good, happiness in proportion to virtue, we must postulate a God who makes it possible: a postulate of pure practical reason and an object of practical faith, not a theoretical proof.
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Kasb (acquisition)
The Ashʿarite doctrine that God creates every human act together with a temporary created power for it, which the human being 'acquires'; it was meant to keep divine omnipotence while leaving room for responsibility.
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Ki Daeseung's argument against separating the Four and the Seven
The objection that Ki Daeseung (Gobong, 1527–1572) pressed in letters to Yi Hwang (Toegye) from 1559: since principle (i) and vital force (ki) are inseparable in actual feelings, the Four Sprouts cannot issue from principle alone; they are those of the Seven Feelings that issue in due measure.
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Kierkegaard's leap
The idea, worked out through Kierkegaard's pseudonyms, that the transition to Christian faith cannot be reached by demonstration, historical evidence or endless reflection, but requires a qualitative leap, because its object, the incarnation, is an absolute paradox to reason.
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Killing robbers is not killing people
The later Mohist argument, in the Lesser Selection, that although robbers are people, killing robbers is not killing people, defended by parallels with accepted sentence patterns.
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King's argument from just and unjust laws
Martin Luther King Jr.'s argument in the "Letter from Birmingham Jail" (16 April 1963) that a law out of harmony with the moral law is unjust and need not be obeyed, with tests for injustice (conflict with the moral law, degrading personality, a majority binding a minority but not itself, enactment without the minority's vote, unjust application), so that urging obedience to just law while disobeying segregation ordinances is consistent.
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Knapp and Michaels' argument against theory
Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels's argument (1982) that a text's meaning simply is what its author intended, so that literary theory, which imagines a gap between the two, has no work to do; known for its example of a poem found written in the sand.
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Knower paradox
David Kaplan and Richard Montague's paradox of a sentence that says of itself that it is known to be false, showing that innocent-looking principles about knowledge are inconsistent with self-reference.
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Knowledge argument
Frank Jackson's argument that physicalism is incomplete: a scientist who knows every physical fact about colour vision, but has never seen colour, seems to learn something new when she first sees red.
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Kripke's modal argument against the identity theory
Saul Kripke's argument in Naming and Necessity that pain cannot be identical with a brain state such as C-fibre stimulation, because identities between rigid designators are necessary and the appearance that they could come apart cannot be explained away.
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Kumārila's argument against an omniscient person
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's argument, in the Codanā chapter of his Ślokavārttika, that no means of knowledge can establish that any person, such as the Buddha, is omniscient, so that knowledge of dharma must rest on the authorless Veda rather than on a human teacher.
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Kumārila's circularity objection to apoha
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's objection, in the Apohavāda chapter of his Ślokavārttika, to Dignāga's theory that words mean the exclusion of others: to exclude 'non-cow' one must already know 'cow', so meaning by exclusion is circular, and our grasp of 'cow' is positive in any case.
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Kymlicka's argument for minority cultural rights
Will Kymlicka's liberal argument that, because individual autonomy depends on secure access to a societal culture and states cannot be culturally neutral, justice requires group-differentiated rights for national minorities and fair accommodation for immigrant groups.
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Labour-mixing argument
John Locke's argument that a person who mixes his own labour with something unowned thereby makes it his property, with limits, on many readings, concerning spoilage and leaving enough and as good for others.
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Leibniz's mill
Leibniz's argument, in Monadology section 17, that perception cannot be explained mechanically: walk through a thinking machine enlarged like a mill and you would find only parts pushing one another.
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Levelling-down objection
Derek Parfit's objection to egalitarianism: if inequality is bad in itself, making the better-off worse off with no gain to anyone must be in one respect an improvement.
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Levinas's argument that ethics is first philosophy
Emmanuel Levinas's claim, developed in Totality and Infinity (1961) and Otherwise than Being (1974), that the encounter with another person precedes and conditions all knowledge and ontology, so that ethics, not metaphysics, is first philosophy.
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Lewis's argument from theoretical utility
David Lewis's cost–benefit case for believing in a plurality of concrete possible worlds: they so improve the analysis of modality, counterfactuals, content and properties that the offence to common sense is a price worth paying.
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Liar paradox
The paradox of a sentence that says of itself that it is false: if it is true, it is false, and if it is false, it is true. It is the central problem for theories of truth.
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Liberal paradox
Amartya Sen's 1970 result that no rule for social decision can satisfy universal domain, acyclicity, the weak Pareto principle and a minimal form of liberalism together: respecting even two people's rights over private matters can conflict with unanimous preference.
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Libertarian paternalism
The policy approach of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein that steers people towards choices that serve their own ends by designing the 'choice architecture' (defaults, framing, ordering) while leaving all options open. Its tools are called nudges.
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Locke's argument that personal identity consists in consciousness
John Locke's argument, in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II.xxvii (added in 1694), that a person, a thinking being that can consider itself as itself, extends back as far as consciousness reaches, so that personal identity consists in consciousness rather than in sameness of substance or of man; 'person' is a forensic term.
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Logic of the larder
The argument that eating meat benefits farmed animals because, without the demand for meat, they would never have existed; it depends on contested assumptions in population ethics.
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Logical problem of evil
The argument that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good God.
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Lottery paradox
The puzzle that in a large fair lottery it seems rational to believe of each ticket that it will lose, although one knows that some ticket will win, so that rational beliefs appear to form an inconsistent set.
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Lucas–Penrose argument
The argument, from J. R. Lucas (1961) and Roger Penrose (1989, 1994), that Gödel's incompleteness theorem shows the human mind cannot be a machine or formal system; widely judged to fail, but still defended and debated.
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Luck egalitarianism
The family of theories of distributive justice on which inequalities are unjust when they result from bad brute luck rather than from people's responsible choices.
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Luck objection
The objection that if a choice is undetermined by everything prior to it, then which choice occurs is a matter of luck, so indeterminism undermines rather than secures freedom and responsibility.
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Luther's argument against free choice
Martin Luther's case, in The Bondage of the Will (De servo arbitrio) against Erasmus, that in matters of salvation the fallen human will has no free choice: what God foreknows happens necessarily, the will is never neutral, and free choice is properly attributed only to God.
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Maimonides' argument against positive divine attributes
Maimonides' reasoning in the Guide of the Perplexed (I.50-60) that God's absolute unity rules out any positive attribute of God's essence, so that true statements about God are either negations or descriptions of God's actions.
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Maimonides' argument for creation from the heavens
Maimonides' case in the Guide of the Perplexed (II.19-24) that the unexplained diversity of the heavens is better explained by a God who chooses than by necessary emanation, so that creation is preferable to eternity though not demonstrable.
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Maimon's sceptical challenge to Kant
Salomon Maimon's argument, from the Essay on Transcendental Philosophy (1790) onwards, that Kant cannot show that the categories actually apply to what is given in experience, which reopens Hume's scepticism; framed by Kant's questions quid juris and quid facti.
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Manipulation argument
An argument for incompatibilism: an agent covertly manipulated into acting is not free or responsible, and there is no relevant difference between such an agent and an ordinary determined agent.
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Mardānfarrox's argument that evil requires an independent principle
The case made in the ninth-century Middle Persian Škand-gumānīg wizār (chapters 7–12) that good and evil are opposed in nature, that a wholly good creator cannot be the source of evil, and that evil must therefore have its own origin; with dilemmas against monotheist theology.
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Mariátegui's argument that the problem of the Indian is the problem of land
José Carlos Mariátegui's argument, in Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality (1928), that every administrative, legal, racial, humanitarian, religious or educational remedy for the oppression of Indigenous Peruvians fails while the system of landholding (gamonalismo and the latifundium) remains.
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Marquis's future-like-ours argument
Don Marquis's argument in 'Why Abortion is Immoral' (1989) that killing is wrong chiefly because it deprives the victim of a valuable future, and that since a fetus has a future like ours, abortion is prima facie seriously wrong.
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Master Argument
Diodorus Cronus's argument, known through Epictetus, that three plausible theses about past truth and possibility are inconsistent, used to conclude that nothing is possible which neither is nor will be true.
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McTaggart's argument against the reality of time
J. M. E. McTaggart's argument that time requires the A-series of past, present and future, that this series is contradictory, and that time is therefore unreal.
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Measurement problem
The problem that quantum theory's linear dynamics, applied to a measurement, yields a superposition of different outcomes rather than the single definite result we observe; interpretations of quantum mechanics are largely rival solutions.
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Mencius against Gaozi: the willow and water analogies
Mencius's replies, in Mencius 6A1–2, to Gaozi's claims that making people good is like carving cups from willow wood and that human nature, like whirling water, is indifferent between good and bad: carving does violence to the willow, and water, though indifferent to east and west, always tends downward.
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Mencius's argument that killing a tyrant is not regicide
Mencius's reply to King Xuan of Qi (Mencius 1B8) that King Wu's killing of the tyrant Zhou was not the killing of a ruler: one who outrages benevolence and righteousness is a 'mere fellow', not a sovereign, so his death is punishment, not regicide.
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Mencius's critique of Yang Zhu and Mozi
Mencius's polemic (Mengzi 3B9, 3A5) against Yang Zhu's 'for oneself' and the Mohists' impartial caring, defending graded concern that begins with family and is extended outward.
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Mendelssohn's argument against religious coercion
Moses Mendelssohn's argument in Jerusalem (1783) that neither state nor religion may coerce convictions, because religion acts only by teaching and persuasion, so that religious bodies have no right to compel belief or to excommunicate.
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Menkiti's argument that personhood is achieved
Ifeanyi Menkiti's argument, in 'Person and Community in African Traditional Thought' (1984), that in African traditional thought personhood is not given with being human but attained through incorporation into community and the discharge of communal obligations.
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Meno's paradox
The challenge raised in Plato's Meno (80d-e) that inquiry is impossible, since one cannot search for what one already knows, nor for what one does not know at all.
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Mere addition paradox
Derek Parfit's argument that two apparently innocent steps, adding worthwhile lives and then equalising, lead by repetition to the repugnant conclusion.
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Merleau-Ponty's argument that perception is bodily
Maurice Merleau-Ponty's argument in Phenomenology of Perception that both empiricism and intellectualism misdescribe perception, which is the work of a living body that inhabits space as an 'I can', not of a mind adding judgements to sensations.
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Methodology of scientific research programmes
Imre Lakatos's account of theory appraisal: science consists of research programmes with a protected hard core and an adjustable belt of auxiliary hypotheses, judged progressive or degenerating by their novel predictions.
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Metz's argument for an ubuntu-based moral theory
Thaddeus Metz's argument that the southern African ideal of ubuntu is best captured by a principle prizing harmonious relationships, understood as sharing a sense of identity and acting for one another's sake, which can ground dignity and rights.
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Mill's argument from analogy for other minds
John Stuart Mill's argument, in An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865), ch. XII, that since in my own case bodily changes cause feelings and feelings cause behaviour, the bodies and behaviour of others oblige me to infer an intermediate link of feeling in them too; offered against Reid's charge that his theory of matter implies solipsism.
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Mill's objection that the syllogism begs the question
The charge, pressed by John Stuart Mill in A System of Logic and reported much earlier by Sextus Empiricus, that a syllogism cannot prove anything not already assumed, because its universal premise already contains the conclusion.
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Mills's racial contract argument
Charles W. Mills's argument in The Racial Contract (1997) that the real agreement underlying modern Western polities was a racial contract among whites to exclude non-whites from full personhood and to exploit them, a contract that is political, moral and epistemological, so that the raceless social contract of mainstream theory misdescribes the actual order and normative theory must begin from that non-ideal reality.
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Mind–body problem
The problem of how the mind is related to the body: how thoughts and experiences can arise from, or act on, physical events such as those in the brain.
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Miners paradox
A puzzle about deliberative 'ought' under uncertainty, made famous by Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane: four plausible claims about rescuing trapped miners appear to entail a contradiction by modus ponens.
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Mohist argument against fatalism
The Mohist case, judged by three standards (root, source and use), that the doctrine of fate is unsupported by history, unattested by the senses and harmful in practice.
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Moore's paradox
The absurdity of saying or believing something of the form 'p, but I do not believe that p', although such a statement may be true and is not a contradiction.
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Moral argument for God
A family of arguments that the existence or character of morality, such as objective obligation, moral knowledge or human dignity, is best explained by, or practically requires, the existence of God.
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Moral equality of combatants
The thesis that soldiers who fight within the rules of discrimination, proportionality and necessity act permissibly whichever side they fight for, so that the justice of a war's cause makes no difference to what its combatants may do.
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Moral luck
Being morally judged for things that depend on factors beyond one's control, such as how one's actions happen to turn out.
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Moral Twin Earth argument
Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons's thought experiment against Cornell moral realism: communities whose moral words are causally regulated by different properties seem to disagree rather than to talk past each other.
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Mozi's argument for identifying upward
The Mohist argument of Mozi Books 11-13 that, because a world without government contains as many standards of righteousness (yi) as people and so falls into disorder, order requires a hierarchy of the worthiest in which everyone identifies upward with superiors' judgements and finally with Heaven's.
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Mullā Ṣadrā's argument for substantial motion
Mullā Ṣadrā's argument that change occurs in the substance of existence itself, not only in accidents, so that existents are continually renewed and time is a dimension of existence.
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Mullā Ṣadrā's argument for the primacy of existence
Mullā Ṣadrā's case that existence, not quiddity (essence), is what is fundamentally real in things, with quiddities derivative limits posited by the mind, reversing the priority he took to be implied by treating existence as superadded to essence.
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Multiple realizability
The thesis that a single mental kind, such as pain, could be realised by many different physical kinds, in brains of different species, in computers or in alien physiology. It was the main argument against the mind–brain identity theory.
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Multiverse hypothesis
The hypothesis that our universe is one of a vast ensemble across which laws or constants vary, offered as an explanation of fine-tuning for life; contested over the inverse gambler's fallacy and testability.
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Murderer at the door
Kant's case, from his reply to Benjamin Constant, of whether one may lie to a would-be murderer who asks where his intended victim is; the standard test of whether a duty-based ethics can treat truthfulness as exceptionless.
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Nāgārjuna's argument against causation
Nagarjuna's argument that nothing with intrinsic nature (svabhāva) can be produced from itself, from something else, from both or from neither, so that cause and effect must be mutually dependent and empty.
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Nagel's argument for the absurd
Thomas Nagel's argument, in 'The Absurd' (1971), that life is absurd not because we are small or mortal but because we cannot help taking our lives seriously while always being able to step back and see that seriousness as arbitrary.
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The natural duty argument for political obligation
The argument that citizens are bound to obey their state not because they consented but because everyone has a natural duty to support and comply with just institutions that apply to them.
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New evil demon problem
An objection to reliabilism and other externalist theories: a deceived subject internally just like us seems as justified as we are, even though her belief-forming processes are unreliable.
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New riddle of induction
Nelson Goodman's problem that the same evidence equally supports 'all emeralds are green' and 'all emeralds are grue', so induction needs a principled way to decide which predicates may be projected.
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Newcomb's problem
A decision puzzle in which a reliable predictor has filled an opaque box according to what it predicted you would choose; dominance reasoning says take both boxes, expected-utility reasoning seems to say take only one.
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Nishida's argument for pure experience
Nishida Kitarō's argument in An Inquiry into the Good (1911) that experience prior to the split between subject and object is the one reality, from which knower and known, judgement, thinking and willing are later differentiated.
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No-miracles argument
An argument for scientific realism: the predictive and explanatory success of our best theories would be a miracle unless those theories were at least approximately true.
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Non-identity problem
The puzzle, developed by Derek Parfit, that choices which seem clearly wrong, such as depleting resources or conceiving a child in poor circumstances, may make no one worse off, because the people affected would not otherwise have existed.
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Nyāya argument for testimony as a distinct pramāṇa
The classical Nyāya case, against Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist reductionists, that knowledge from the word of a trustworthy speaker (śabda) is an independent means of knowledge and not a kind of inference.
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Nyāya arguments for Īśvara
The classical Nyāya arguments, most fully set out by Udayana, that the world's products and the Vedas require an intelligent, omniscient maker (Īśvara), and the Buddhist and Mīmāṃsā critiques they provoked.
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Nyāya five-membered inference
The Nyāya form for presenting an inference to convince another person (Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.32–39): thesis, reason, example, application and conclusion, illustrated by inferring fire on a hill from smoke.
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Ockham's argument that moral value depends on the divine will
William of Ockham's reasoning, from a passage in his theological works, that acts such as theft or adultery involve evil insofar as the agent is bound by a divine command to the opposite, and could even be meritorious if God commanded them; scholars dispute how this fits his ethics of right reason.
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Okin's argument that justice must extend to the family
Susan Moller Okin's argument in Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989) that Rawls assumed families to be just although his theory relies on them to form citizens' sense of justice, that the gender-structured family violates equal opportunity and cannot teach justice, and that a theory of justice must therefore apply to the family; Rawls replied in 1997 and Okin answered him in 2004.
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Open question argument
G. E. Moore's argument against defining 'good': for any proposed natural definition, a competent speaker can still sensibly ask whether something with that property is good, so the definition cannot be correct.
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Original position
John Rawls's hypothetical choice situation in which representatives of free and equal persons, behind a veil of ignorance, choose principles of justice for the basic structure of society. The veil of ignorance is one of its conditions, not the whole device.
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Oruka's argument from philosophic sagacity
H. Odera Oruka's argument that dialogues with philosophic sages show critical, individual reflection on fundamental questions in African societies independently of literacy and academic training, answering the charge that African thought is only anonymous collective belief.
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Ownerless suffering argument (Śāntideva)
Śāntideva's argument in the Bodhicaryāvatāra that, since there is no real self to whom suffering belongs, suffering should be prevented simply because it is suffering, whoever's it is.
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Pairing problem
An objection to interactionist substance dualism, associated with Jaegwon Kim: if souls are not in space, nothing seems able to make a particular soul causally paired with one particular body rather than another.
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Paley's watchmaker/design argument
William Paley's argument in Natural Theology (1802), chapters 1–3, that just as the contrivance of a watch proves that it had a maker, the greater contrivance of organisms such as the eye proves an intelligent designer of nature.
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Paradox of analysis
The puzzle of how a philosophical analysis can be both correct and informative: if analysandum and analysans mean the same, the analysis seems trivial; if they do not, it seems incorrect.
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Paradox of deontology
The puzzle that deontological constraints forbid an agent to violate one person's rights even to prevent several equally serious violations by others, although more violations seem worse than fewer.
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Paradox of fiction
The puzzle, whose modern debate began with Colin Radford's paper of 1975, of how we can be genuinely moved by characters and events we know do not exist.
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Paradox of free choice permission
The puzzle that 'You may have soup or salad' seems to imply 'You may have soup and you may have salad', although adding that inference to standard modal logic leads to absurd results.
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Paradox of horror
The puzzle, posed by Noël Carroll in The Philosophy of Horror (1990), of why people seek out fictions designed to frighten and disgust them; Carroll's answer appeals to curiosity about the monster, and remains disputed.
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Paradox of suspense
The puzzle of how readers and viewers who already know a story's outcome can still feel suspense, given that suspense seems to require uncertainty.
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Paradox of the stone
The dilemma whether an omnipotent being can create a stone too heavy for it to lift: either answer seems to name something it cannot do.
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Paradox of tragedy
The puzzle of how audiences can take pleasure in tragic and other painful art whose proper appreciation involves distressing emotions such as pity, fear and grief.
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Paradox of voting
The puzzle, named by Anthony Downs, that for most individuals the expected costs of voting appear to exceed its expected benefits, so that it is hard to see why rational people vote.
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The paradoxes of material implication
The awkward consequences of reading 'if A, then B' as the material conditional, true whenever A is false or B is true, and the main attempts to defend or replace that reading.
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Paradoxes of toleration
Three puzzles in the concept of toleration: whether prejudice can ground toleration, why it could be right to tolerate what is wrong, and how toleration can set limits without becoming intolerant.
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Pascal's mugging
A decision-theoretic puzzle, published by Nick Bostrom in 2009, in which expected-utility reasoning seems to require handing one's wallet to a mugger who promises an astronomically large but wildly improbable reward.
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Pascal's wager
Blaise Pascal's argument that it is rational to wager for God, because the possible infinite gain of doing so outweighs any finite cost, whatever the evidence; an early contribution to decision theory.
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Pateman's sexual contract argument
Carole Pateman's argument in The Sexual Contract (1988) that the original social contract presupposes a sexual contract among men securing their access to and command over women, so that modern civil society transforms paternal into fraternal patriarchy, and that contracts which alienate the use of a person's capacities, such as marriage and employment, create subordination rather than freedom.
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Penal abolitionism
The position that legal punishment, or some major form of it such as imprisonment, should be abolished rather than reformed, because it cannot be justified.
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Pessimistic meta-induction
An argument against scientific realism: since many successful theories in the history of science were later rejected as false, our current successful theories are probably false too.
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Petitionary prayer
Prayer in which someone asks God for something; philosophically, the problem of how such requests can make a difference to a God who is perfectly good, omniscient and unchanging.
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Philosophical anarchism
The thesis that no state, or no existing state, has legitimate authority or a claim to its subjects' obedience, held without the further conclusion that states must be resisted or abolished.
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Plantinga's modal ontological argument
Alvin Plantinga's 1974 version of the ontological argument: if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then, given his definition of maximal greatness and the logic of possible worlds, such a being exists in every possible world, and therefore actually exists.
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Plato's argument against imitative poetry
The case made in Book 10 of Plato's Republic that imitative poetry and painting produce mere images of appearance, require no knowledge and strengthen the irrational part of the soul.
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Plato's argument at the end of Republic V
Plato's argument in Republic V (474b–480a) that knowledge and belief (doxa) are different capacities, distinguished by what each is set over and what each achieves, so that the lovers of sights and sounds who deny Forms have belief, not knowledge.
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Plato's argument that rhetoric is a knack
The argument Plato gives to Socrates in the Gorgias that rhetoric is not a craft but a knack, a form of flattery that aims at pleasure without knowledge of the good.
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Pogge's argument that the global order harms the poor
Thomas Pogge's argument, in World Poverty and Human Rights (2002), that the affluent countries' citizens, by taking part in imposing a global institutional order that predictably produces severe poverty when a feasible alternative exists, violate a negative duty not to harm the global poor; the duty is not merely one of assistance.
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Popper's falsifiability criterion of demarcation
Karl Popper's argument, in Logik der Forschung (1935) and The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), that since universal theories cannot be verified but can contradict observation, empirical science is marked by falsifiability, upheld by methodological rules against ad hoc rescue, with surviving theories corroborated, never proved.
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The positivist argument that religious language is meaningless
The logical positivists' argument, popularised by A. J. Ayer (1936), that statements about God are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable and so lack cognitive meaning, which makes theism, atheism and agnosticism equally empty.
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Preface paradox
The puzzle of an author who rationally believes every claim in her book and also rationally believes, as her preface admits, that at least one of them is false.
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Priest's argument for dialetheism from the liar
Graham Priest's argument that the liar paradox shows some contradictions to be true, since every consistent solution generates a 'revenge' paradox, so that the right response is a paraconsistent logic rather than abandoning naive truth.
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Principle of fair play
The principle that those who benefit from a cooperative scheme sustained by others' restraint owe similar restraint in return; a leading but contested ground of political obligation.
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Prisoner's dilemma
A two-person game in which each player does better by defecting whatever the other does, yet both do worse if both defect than if both cooperate. It is the standard model of conflict between individual and collective rationality.
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Private language argument
Wittgenstein's argument that there could not be a language whose words refer to what only the speaker can know, such as her own immediate sensations, because such words could have no standard of correct use.
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Privation theory of evil
The view, Neoplatonic in origin and made central to Christian thought by Augustine, that evil is not a substance or positive property but the lack of a good that ought to be present, so that God, who creates only what exists, creates no evil. Contested above all by the objection from pain.
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Problem of animal suffering
The form of the problem of evil that turns on the vast suffering of non-human animals over evolutionary time, much of it long before humans existed.
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Problem of easy knowledge
Stewart Cohen's objection that any theory allowing knowledge from a source before one knows the source is reliable lets us reach anti-sceptical or reliability conclusions far too cheaply.
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Problem of evil
The question whether the evil in the world makes it unreasonable to believe in a God who is all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good. Theodicies and defences are responses to it; the problem itself is the challenge they answer.
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Problem of hell
The difficulty of reconciling the doctrine that some persons suffer separation from God for ever with God's perfect love, justice and power.
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Problem of logical omniscience
The problem that standard possible-worlds epistemic logic implies that agents know every logical truth and every logical consequence of what they know, which no finite thinker does.
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Problem of material constitution
The puzzle of how a statue relates to the clay it is made of: they share their matter and location, yet seem to differ in their histories or modal properties and so seem to be two things.
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Problem of multiple generality
The problem of analysing sentences with more than one expression of generality, such as 'everyone loves someone', and the inferences that depend on them; Frege's quantifier-variable logic solved it in a way the syllogistic and Boole's algebra did not.
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Problem of no best world
The argument that if every world God could create could be bettered, no creator could be essentially unsurpassable, since whatever it made it could have made better.
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Problem of old evidence
A difficulty for Bayesian confirmation theory: evidence that is already known has probability one and so seems unable to confirm a new theory, yet known facts plainly can confirm theories.
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Problem of other minds
The problem of how we know, or can even make sense of the idea, that beings other than ourselves have thoughts and feelings, given that we observe only their bodies and behaviour.
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Problem of temporary intrinsics
David Lewis's argument that one thing cannot have incompatible intrinsic properties at different times unless it has distinct temporal parts, used to support perdurantism.
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Problem of the criterion
The puzzle that we seem unable to say which things we know without a criterion of knowledge, and unable to find or test a criterion without already knowing which things we know.
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Problem of the many
Peter Unger's puzzle that, because ordinary objects such as clouds have fuzzy boundaries, there seem to be many equally good candidates for being the one cloud we see.
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Procreation asymmetry
The pair of judgements that creating a miserable person is wrong and makes things worse, while not creating a happy person is permissible and does not make things worse.
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Procreative beneficence
Julian Savulescu's principle (2001) that people choosing which of their possible children to have should select the child expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, on the relevant available information.
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Rachels's argument about active and passive euthanasia
James Rachels's argument in 'Active and Passive Euthanasia' (1975) that killing is not in itself worse than letting die, shown by a pair of cases differing only in that respect; the paper, as its title says, applies the point to active and passive euthanasia.
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Radical interpretation
Donald Davidson's thought experiment of interpreting a wholly unknown language from scratch, using only evidence about which sentences speakers hold true in which circumstances, constrained by the principle of charity. David Lewis developed a rival version.
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Ratnakīrti's formulation of the proof of momentariness
Ratnakīrti's systematic statement, in his two Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi treatises, of the Buddhist inference that whatever exists is momentary because existing is being causally capable; he reorganises arguments found in Dharmakīrti and his teacher Jñānaśrīmitra rather than inventing them.
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Raven paradox
Carl Hempel's puzzle that, given two plausible principles of confirmation, observing a green apple confirms that all ravens are black.
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Rawls's argument for the difference principle
Rawls's argument that free and equal persons choosing principles of justice behind a veil of ignorance would permit social and economic inequalities only if they benefit the least advantaged.
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Raz's service conception of authority
Joseph Raz's argument that a directive is legitimately authoritative for someone when following it would help them conform better to reasons that already apply to them than trying to act on those reasons directly.
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Reduplication argument
Bernard Williams's argument that, because two people could equally inherit a dead man's apparent memories and two people cannot be one, psychological continuity cannot by itself secure personal identity.
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Regress problem
The problem that if every justified belief must be supported by another justified belief, the chain of reasons must go on for ever, loop back on itself, or stop somewhere; and each option seems unsatisfactory.
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Replaceability argument
The argument, associated with Peter Singer, that killing a non-self-conscious animal need not be wrong if it lived a good life, dies painlessly and is replaced by another animal with a comparably good life.
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Repugnant conclusion
Derek Parfit's name for the implication that, for any very large population with excellent lives, some much larger population whose members have lives barely worth living would be better.
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Responsibility gap
The worry, stated by Andreas Matthias, that learning and autonomous machines can produce harmful outcomes for which no human can fairly be held morally responsible.
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Retributivism
The theory that punishment is justified because, and to the extent that, wrongdoers deserve it: those who commit serious wrongs deserve proportionate punishment, and the innocent may never be punished.
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Revenge problem
The recurring difficulty that the very notions a theory uses to solve the Liar paradox can be used to build a new Liar that the theory cannot handle.
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Rigid designation
The property of a term that designates the same object in every possible world in which that object exists, and nothing else, as proper names do according to Saul Kripke, unlike most descriptions.
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Rollback argument
Peter van Inwagen's argument that if a choice is undetermined, replaying the universe many times would reveal a stable ratio of outcomes, showing the choice to be a matter of chance and so not free.
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Ross's paradox
Alf Ross's 1941 observation that if obligation is closed under logical consequence, an obligation to mail a letter yields an obligation to mail it or burn it.
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Rousseau's argument for legitimate authority
Rousseau's argument in The Social Contract (1762) that political authority is legitimate only if it is the authority of the general will, in which each citizen, uniting with all, obeys only himself.
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Rule-following paradox
Saul Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein: no fact about a speaker's past behaviour or mind settles whether she meant addition or some deviant function by 'plus', so it seems there is no fact about what anyone means.
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Russell's paradox
The contradiction that arises from the set of all sets that are not members of themselves: it is a member of itself if and only if it is not. It showed that naive set theory and Frege's logical foundations of arithmetic were inconsistent.
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Saadia's four proofs of creation
Saadia Gaon's four arguments, in the First Treatise of The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, that the world had a beginning: from the finitude of heaven and earth, from composition, from accidents, and from the impossibility of traversing an infinite past.
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Sadistic conclusion
Gustaf Arrhenius's name for the implication of some population theories that adding lives with negative welfare can be better than adding lives with positive welfare.
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Sahopalambhaniyama argument
Dharmakīrti's argument that, because an object such as blue and the cognition of it are invariably apprehended together, they are not different; it was read as supporting Yogācāra idealism.
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Salazar Bondy's argument from dependency to inauthenticity
Augusto Salazar Bondy's argument in ¿Existe una filosofía de nuestra América? (1968) that a culture formed under dependence and domination produces imitative, inauthentic philosophy, so that authentic Latin American philosophy awaits a transformation of the conditions that produce dependence; Leopoldo Zea's circumstantialist reply is its principal objection.
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Sandel's argument from giftedness
Michael Sandel's argument that genetic and other enhancement is objectionable even when safe, fair and freely chosen, because it expresses a drive to mastery that fails to appreciate the gifted character of human powers and achievements.
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Śāntarakṣita's neither-one-nor-many argument
Śāntarakṣita's argument, in the Ornament of the Middle Way, that nothing has an intrinsic nature because nothing is in reality either truly one or truly many, and these two options are exhaustive.
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Sartre's argument that bad faith needs no unconscious
Jean-Paul Sartre's argument in Being and Nothingness that self-deception cannot be explained by an unconscious censor, and must be understood instead through the double structure of human reality as facticity and transcendence.
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Scandal of deduction
The problem that standard theories of semantic information assign logical truths, and so valid deductions, no information at all, although deduction seems to tell us something.
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Sceptical theism
A family of responses to arguments from evil: we have little reason to expect to see God's reasons for permitting evil, so our failure to see them is weak evidence that there are none.
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Schellenberg's argument from nonresistant nonbelief
J. L. Schellenberg's argument, in its mature form (2007, 2015), that a perfectly loving God would always be open to a conscious relationship with every capable person, so that no one would be a nonbeliever without resisting God; since some people are nonresistant nonbelievers, there is no such God.
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Scotus's argument for an infinite being
John Duns Scotus's demonstration, in the Ordinatio and A Treatise on God as First Principle, that there is a being first in efficient causality, finality and pre-eminence, that this being is infinite and that there is only one; its modal version argues from the possibility of a first cause to its actual existence.
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Searle's account of institutional facts
John Searle's argument that institutional facts, such as money, borders and property, exist because of collective acceptance of status functions under constitutive rules of the form 'X counts as Y in C', which carry rights and duties.
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Sense and reference
Frege's distinction between what an expression picks out (its reference) and the way it presents that thing (its sense), introduced to explain informative identity statements.
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Ship of Theseus
The ancient puzzle of a ship whose planks are replaced one by one: is the repaired ship the original? If the old planks are reassembled, which of the two ships is Theseus's? It is the classic test case for theories of identity, persistence and constitution.
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Situationism (moral psychology)
The position, drawn from social psychology, that features of situations explain much more of people's behaviour than is usually supposed and robust character traits correspondingly less; a challenge to virtue ethics.
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Sleeping Beauty problem
A puzzle about self-locating belief: Beauty is woken once if a fair coin lands heads and twice, with memory erased, if it lands tails. On waking, should her credence in heads be one half or one third?
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Slingshot argument
An argument, made famous by Donald Davidson, that if true sentences correspond to facts at all, they all correspond to one and the same 'Great Fact'.
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Socrates's argument from the Laws in the Crito
The argument Plato gives Socrates in the Crito for refusing to escape his death sentence: by living in Athens he agreed to obey its laws, owes them the debt of a child, and must either persuade them or obey.
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Sor Juana's argument for women's learning
The case Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz made in her Response to Sor Filotea (1691) that a woman may rightly devote herself to study, and that women may study, write and teach, drawing on scripture, scholastic philosophy and the example of learned women.
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Sorites paradox
The argument that, since removing one grain never turns a heap into a non-heap, a single grain is a heap; or, run upwards, that a million grains are not. It turns on the tolerance of vague terms.
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Soul-making theodicy
The theodicy, given its classic modern form by John Hick in Evil and the God of Love, that God permits suffering and wrongdoing because a world of real challenges is needed for free creatures to grow from moral immaturity towards goodness and fellowship with God. Hick named its type after Irenaeus.
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Speaker meaning
What a speaker means by an utterance on a particular occasion, as distinct from what the words mean in the language. Paul Grice analysed it in terms of intentions aimed at being recognised by the hearer.
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Species problem
The problem of saying what species are, given that biologists use more than twenty competing species concepts and that species seem to be evolving lineages rather than kinds defined by essences.
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Sphoṭa
In Indian philosophy of language, especially in the grammarian Bhartrhari, the meaning-bearing linguistic unit, as opposed to the passing sounds that reveal it. For Bhartrhari, the sentence is grasped as a single, undivided whole.
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Spinoza's argument on prophecy and Scripture
Baruch Spinoza's argument in the Theological-Political Treatise (1670) that the prophets excelled in imagination rather than intellect, so that Scripture teaches obedience and charity, not speculative truth, and philosophy must be free.
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St Petersburg paradox
The puzzle of a coin-tossing game whose expected monetary value is infinite, so that expected-value reasoning seems to recommend paying any finite price to play, although almost every actual payoff is small.
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Strawson's argument from the reactive attitudes
P. F. Strawson's argument in 'Freedom and Resentment' (1962) that holding people responsible consists in reactive attitudes such as resentment and gratitude, which the practice withdraws only on grounds of excuse or exemption; since determinism would not make either ground hold universally, and abandoning the attitudes wholesale is not a human option, determinism does not threaten responsibility.
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Suhrawardī's argument for knowledge by presence
Suhrawardī's argument that self-awareness is not mediated by any representation or form of the self, so that some knowledge consists in the immediate presence of the known to the knower, a model he extends to vision and to God's knowledge.
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Suhrawardī's critique of Peripatetic definition
Suhrawardi's argument, in The Philosophy of Illumination, that no human being can frame an essential definition by genus and differentia as Aristotle and Ibn Sina required, so that knowledge of what a thing is must rest on direct acquaintance.
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Surprise examination paradox
The puzzle of a teacher who announces a surprise test next week, and a student who argues by elimination that no day is possible, although a test given midweek still surprises him.
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Swampman
Donald Davidson's imagined molecule-for-molecule duplicate of himself, created by chance in a swamp, with no history; it tests theories on which mental content depends on evolutionary or learning history.
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Symbol grounding problem
Stevan Harnad's problem of how the symbols of a formal system can have meaning intrinsic to the system, rather than meaning that depends wholly on interpretation by an outside mind.
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Szasz's myth-of-mental-illness argument
Thomas Szasz's argument, first published in 1960, that genuine disease requires a bodily lesion, so that what psychiatry calls mental illness is a metaphor for problems in living and moral conflict.
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Tarski's semantic conception of truth
Alfred Tarski's account (1933-35; 1944) of what an adequate definition of truth must achieve, material adequacy (Convention T) and formal correctness, together with his argument from the Liar that a language containing its own truth predicate and obeying classical logic is inconsistent, so that truth must be defined in a richer metalanguage.
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Teleological suspension of the ethical
The possibility, explored in Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling through Abraham's readiness to sacrifice Isaac, that the ethical understood as the universal may be suspended for a higher end: the individual's absolute relation to God.
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Teletransportation thought experiment
Derek Parfit's case of a machine that records a person's exact state, destroys the body and builds a duplicate on Mars: is the person who steps out on Mars the person who stepped in?
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Third Man argument
An argument in Plato's Parmenides (132a-b) that the principles behind the theory of Forms generate an infinite regress of Forms of Largeness; the name comes from Aristotle.
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Thomson's violinist argument
Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument in 'A Defense of Abortion' (1971) that even if the fetus has a right to life, that right does not include a right to the use of another person's body, so abortion is not always unjust.
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Toegye's argument for the alternate issuance of the Four and the Seven
Yi Hwang (Toegye)'s argument, developed in letters with Ki Taesŭng (Kobong) from 1559, that the Four Sprouts arise when principle (i) issues and vital force (ki) follows, and the Seven Emotions when vital force issues and principle follows it.
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Too many thinkers problem
The objection that if we are not human animals, then wherever a person is there are two thinkers, the person and the animal that shares her brain.
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Transcendental argument
An argument that something the sceptic doubts must be the case, because it is a necessary condition of something the sceptic accepts, such as having experience, thought or language.
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Transplant objection
The leading objection to animalism: if your cerebrum were transplanted into another head, you would seem to go with it, leaving the organism behind, so you are not that organism.
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Trolley problem
The puzzle, first posed by Philippa Foot and reshaped by Judith Jarvis Thomson, of why it seems permissible to divert a runaway trolley so that it kills one person instead of five, when killing one to save five is usually thought wrong.
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Turing test
Alan Turing's 1950 proposal to replace the question 'Can machines think?' with a game in which an interrogator, conversing by text, tries to tell a machine from a human; passing is offered as evidence of intelligence.
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Twin Earth
Hilary Putnam's imagined planet, identical to Earth except that the watery stuff is not H2O; it is used to argue that meaning and mental content are not fixed by what is in the head.
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Two-envelope paradox
The puzzle that, given two envelopes one holding twice as much as the other, expected-value reasoning seems to recommend switching whichever envelope one holds, although the situation is symmetrical.
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Unity of knowing and acting (zhixing heyi)
Wang Yangming's thesis that genuine knowing and acting are one: anyone who truly knows the good is already moved to do it, so knowing without acting is not yet real knowing.
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Unity of the intellect
Ibn Rushd's thesis, argued in his Long Commentary on Aristotle's De anima, that there is one separate material intellect for all human beings, and the controversy it provoked in Latin philosophy.
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Utility monster
Robert Nozick's imagined being that gains far more utility from resources than others lose, used to argue that utilitarianism would require everyone to be sacrificed to it.
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Valladolid debate
The 1550-51 dispute between Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda and Bartolomé de las Casas over whether Spain could justly make war on the Indigenous peoples of the Americas.
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Vasubandhu's dream argument
Vasubandhu's defence, in the Twenty Verses, of the thesis that experience is appearance only: dreams and shared visions show that mental appearances can have every feature realists claim only external objects can have.
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Vasubandhu's refutation of the self
Vasubandhu's argument, in the final chapter of his Commentary on the Treasury of Abhidharma, that no self or person exists over and above the five aggregates: only what has causes is real, and 'I' is a convenient designation for a causal continuum of momentary events.
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Vātsyāyana's argument for atoms from the limits of division
Vātsyāyana's argument, in his Nyāyabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra 4.2.16–17, that the division of a material thing must end in a smallest partless part, the atom, because otherwise the first compound could not exist and all things would consist of equally innumerable parts.
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Vātsyāyana's argument for the self from desire, aversion and knowledge
Vātsyāyana's case, in his Nyāyabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra 1.1.5 and 1.1.10, that desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition reveal a single enduring self: they are qualities that need a bearer, and desire in particular requires one subject who perceived before and remembers now.
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Veil of ignorance
Rawls's thought experiment: choose principles of justice without knowing what position you will hold in society.
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Very repugnant conclusion
A strengthened form of the repugnant conclusion: a population containing very many lives of severe suffering, together with enough lives barely worth living, could be better than one in which everyone flourishes.
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Villoro's argument that knowing requires objectively sufficient reasons
Luis Villoro's argument in Creer, saber, conocer (1982) that the truth clause should be dropped from the definition of knowledge: to know that p is to believe that p on reasons that are objectively sufficient for one's epistemic community, reasons that are fallible, so that knowledge is socially conditioned; Guillermo Hurtado objected (2003) that the argument grants the sceptic a false premise.
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Vitoria's argument for Amerindian dominium
Francisco de Vitoria's argument in the relectio De Indis (1539) that the Indigenous peoples of the Americas were true owners and rulers despite unbelief, sin or alleged irrationality, so that papal grant, discovery and their sins gave Spain no title; his accepted 'just titles', grounded in the law of nations, have been read as a restrictive rationalisation of conquest.
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Wang Chong's argument against a purposive Heaven
Wang Chong's case in the Lunheng (first century CE) that Heaven (tian) produces things spontaneously (ziran) and without intention, so that calamities and anomalies are not Heaven's reprimands to rulers.
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Watsuji's argument that the person is betweenness
Watsuji Tetsurō's argument that a human being (ningen) is at once individual and social, existing in the 'betweenness' (aidagara) of relationships, so that ethics is the study of how people stand to one another, through a double negation of individual and group.
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Weitz's open-concept argument
Morris Weitz's 1956 argument that art is an open concept, always liable to be extended to unforeseen cases, and so cannot be defined by necessary and sufficient conditions.
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Whewell's argument from the consilience of inductions
Whewell's argument, in The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, that when an induction obtained from one class of facts also explains a different class of facts it was not designed for, this consilience is a test of the theory's truth.
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White Horse Dialogue
Gongsun Long's dialogue defending the sophistical thesis 'white horse is not horse' through five arguments, whose logic remains one of the most debated puzzles of early Chinese philosophy.
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Wilt Chamberlain argument
Robert Nozick's argument in Anarchy, State, and Utopia that voluntary transfers from any favoured distribution will upset it, so that maintaining a pattern of justice requires continual interference with liberty.
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Winch's argument against a natural science of society
Peter Winch's Wittgensteinian argument that social life consists in rule-governed, meaningful action, so that understanding a society is closer to philosophy than to natural science and other cultures must be understood by their own standards of intelligibility.
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Wiredu's argument for conceptual decolonization
Kwasi Wiredu's argument that philosophical concepts absorbed through colonial languages should be tested against an African language, such as Akan, so that uncritically assimilated Western frameworks can be identified and either justified or set aside.
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Wiredu's argument for consensual democracy
Kwasi Wiredu's argument that a non-party democracy based on consensus, drawing on traditional Akan practice, would represent citizens better than majoritarian multiparty politics.
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Wolf's fitting-fulfilment argument
Susan Wolf's argument that neither subjective attitudes alone nor objective value alone can account for meaning in life, so that meaning arises when a person is actively engaged with, and attracted to, projects that are genuinely worthwhile.
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Xunzi's argument that human nature is bad
Xunzi's argument, in chapter 23 of the Xunzi (rendered by Goldin as 'Human Nature is Evil'), that inborn desires followed without reflection lead to strife, so that goodness must come from deliberate effort guided by ritual.
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Yablo's paradox
Stephen Yablo's infinite sequence of sentences, each saying that all later ones are untrue, which generates a Liar-like contradiction while apparently avoiding self-reference.
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Young's argument that oppression has five faces
Iris Marion Young's argument that oppression is structural and plural: a group is oppressed if it suffers any of five conditions, exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism or systematic violence, which the distributive model of justice cannot capture.
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Yulgok's argument that vital force issues and principle rides on it
Yi I (Yulgok)'s argument, in his 1572 exchange with Sŏng Hon (Ugye), against Toegye's alternate issuance: only vital force issues, principle rides on it, and the Seven Emotions include the Four Sprouts.
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Zea's culturalist reply on Latin American philosophy
Leopoldo Zea's position, set against Augusto Salazar Bondy's, that philosophy is always developed from a historical and cultural perspective, so that Latin American philosophy need not prove originality by European standards to be philosophy.
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Zeno's paradoxes
Arguments by Zeno of Elea, such as the Dichotomy, Achilles and the tortoise and the Arrow, which aim to show that plurality and motion lead to absurdity, in defence of Parmenides' view that reality is one and unchanging.
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Zhengming (rectification of names)
The Confucian demand that names and titles match the realities they stand for, beginning with social roles.
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Zhuangzi's argument on adjudicating disputes
The argument in chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi that winning a disputation does not show one is right, and that no judge could settle a dispute without already taking a side.
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Zombie argument
An argument against physicalism: a being physically identical to a human but with no conscious experience (a philosophical zombie) seems conceivable; if it is therefore possible, consciousness is something over and above the physical.