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Arguments

Philosophy’s structured arguments, from the cosmological argument to the Chinese room: find one by name or browse by question, subject, thinker, tradition or letter.

Updated 19 November 2026

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  2. Arguments A to Z

441 structured arguments. Each sets out the argument’s steps, the main objections and the replies, with the questions, thinkers and traditions it belongs to.

Find or filter the arguments

Arguments A to Z

441 arguments, A to Z.

  • Absent qualia objection

    The objection to functionalism that a system could be organised exactly like a human mind, state for causal state, yet have no experiences at all.

    Coordinates: 1.3.4 1.3.1Daniel Dennett, David Chalmers

  • Abū Bakr al-Rāzī's argument against prophecy

    The argument, reported by his Ismāʿīlī opponent Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī, that because God gives reason equally to all, singling out prophets would be unjust, needless and divisive; whether Abu Bakr al-Razi actually held it is disputed.

    Coordinates: 2.2.5 6.1Abu Bakr al-Razi, Al-Juwayni, Al-Ghazali

  • Adams's argument on horrendous evils

    Marilyn McCord Adams's argument that a good God must not merely balance evils globally but defeat each horrendous evil within the life of the person who suffers it, by integrating it into a relationship with God great enough to make that life a great good to the person on the whole.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8 6.21Marilyn McCord Adams, G. E. Moore, Richard Swinburne

  • Agrippa's trilemma

    The Pyrrhonian argument that no belief is justified, because every attempted justification must end in an unsupported assumption, go round in a circle or regress without end.

    Coordinates: 2.4 2.3 2.3.1Sextus Empiricus, Roderick Chisholm, Ludwig Wittgenstein

  • AI control problem

    The problem of how human beings could keep control of an artificial system far more capable than themselves; it rests on contested arguments about superintelligence, the orthogonality of intelligence and goals, and instrumental convergence.

    Coordinates: 6.17 3.3.4Nick Bostrom, Luciano Floridi

  • Akrasia

    Acting freely and deliberately against your own judgement about what is best: weakness of will.

    Coordinates: 3.4 6.24 3.1.4Socrates, Aristotle, Donald Davidson

  • Albo's argument for three principles of divine law

    Joseph Albo's argument in the Book of Principles (Sefer ha-ʿIqqarim) that any divine law must rest on exactly three roots, the existence of God, revelation and reward and punishment, against Maimonides' thirteen principles.

    Coordinates: 6.1 2.2.5 6.2Joseph Albo, Maimonides, Hasdai Crescas

  • Al-Fārābī's account of prophecy through the imagination

    Al-Fārābī's argument, in The Virtuous City and The Political Regime, that prophecy is the natural perfection of a person whose intellect and imagination both receive the emanation of the Active Intellect, the imagination turning intelligible truths and knowledge of particulars into symbols for the many.

    Coordinates: 2.2.5 6.1 6.4Al-Farabi, Al-Ghazali, Al-Juwayni

  • Al-Fārābī's argument that poetics is a part of logic

    Al-Fārābī's case, inherited from the late ancient syllabus that placed Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in the Organon, that poetry belongs to logic because it works through a weak form of syllogism, bringing hearers to states of mind by exciting the imagination rather than by demonstration.

    Coordinates: 5.8 4.2Al-Farabi, Aristotle

  • Al-Ghazālī's argument against necessary causation

    The argument of the seventeenth discussion of al-Ghazālī's Incoherence of the Philosophers that the connection between what we take to be a cause and its effect is not necessary, so that miracles are possible.

    Coordinates: 1.4.2 1.9 6.1Al-Ghazali, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd

  • Al-Ghazālī's argument from the eternal will

    Al-Ghazali's reply, in the first discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers, to the claim that an eternal God must have an eternal effect: God could will from eternity that the world begin at a particular moment, because the essential function of will is to choose among indiscernibles.

    Coordinates: 1.2.1 1.8 1.4Al-Ghazali, Ibn Sina, Al-Farabi

  • Al-Ghazālī's sceptical argument in the Deliverance from Error

    Al-Ghazali's argument, in his autobiography Deliverance from Error, that neither the senses nor reason can certify themselves, because the senses are corrected by reason and reason might be corrected by a higher state, as dreams are by waking.

    Coordinates: 2.4 2.4.1 2.2.1Al-Ghazali, Augustine of Hippo, René Descartes

  • Alienation objection

    The objection that impartial moral theories, consequentialist and Kantian alike, cannot accommodate the motives proper to love and friendship, so that an agent who acts from them is estranged from the people closest to them.

    Coordinates: 3.2.1 6.19Bernard Williams, Frank Jackson

  • Al-Kindī's argument for the finitude of time

    Al-Kindi's argument in On First Philosophy that because the body of the cosmos is finite and time is predicated of it, time too must be finite, so that the world had a first moment and is not eternal.

    Coordinates: 1.4 1.2.1 1.8Al-Kindi, John Philoponus, Aristotle

  • Allais paradox

    Maurice Allais's pair of choices between lotteries in which many people's preferences cannot be represented as maximising expected utility, because they violate the independence axiom and Savage's sure-thing principle.

    Coordinates: 2.6 6.5

  • Alston's argument from mystical perception

    William Alston's argument in Perceiving God (1991) that forming beliefs about God on the basis of experiences of God is a doxastic practice with the same claim to rational acceptance as sense perception; its hardest test is religious diversity.

    Coordinates: 6.1.1 6.1William Alston, Richard Swinburne, John Hick

  • Ambedkar's argument against caste

    B. R. Ambedkar's argument in Annihilation of Caste (1936) that caste is not a division of labour but a graded division of labourers fixed by birth, that it makes a common social life, public spirit and shared morality impossible, and that, because people keep caste out of belief in the sanctity of the Shastras, it can be ended only by destroying that religious authority; Gandhi replied in 1936 and Ambedkar answered him.

    Coordinates: 6.4 6.4.2B. R. Ambedkar, Mahatma Gandhi, John Dewey

  • Amoralist challenge

    The argument that someone could sincerely judge an act right yet be wholly unmoved by that judgement, so that moral judgement is not necessarily connected to motivation.

    Coordinates: 3.1.4R. M. Hare, Michael Smith

  • Amo's argument for the impassivity of the human mind

    Anton Wilhelm Amo's case, in his Wittenberg dissertation On the Impassivity of the Human Mind (1734), that the mind, as a purely active immaterial spirit, cannot be acted upon, so that sensation belongs not to the mind but to the living, organic body.

    Coordinates: 1.3.1 1.3 2.2.1Anton Wilhelm Amo, René Descartes, Elisabeth of Bohemia

  • Anselm's Proslogion II ontological argument

    Anselm's argument in Proslogion chapter II that God, understood as that than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone and therefore exists in reality as well.

    Coordinates: 1.8 6.1Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant

  • Apoha

    The Buddhist theory, originated by Dignāga and reworked by Dharmakīrti, that words and concepts pick out things not through real universals but by excluding what is other: 'cow' means, in effect, 'not non-cow'.

    Coordinates: 1.1.2 6.10 6.10.1Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa

  • Appiah's argument against races

    Kwame Anthony Appiah's argument that, since nothing in the world answers to the biological notion of race that ordinary racial talk presupposes, there are no races, though there are racial identities with real social effects.

    Coordinates: 6.30Kwame Anthony Appiah, W. E. B. Du Bois, Lucius Outlaw

  • Aquinas's argument against Maimonides on the divine names

    Thomas Aquinas's reply, in Summa Theologiae I.13.2, to the view he attributes to 'Rabbi Moses' that names such as 'living' and 'good' say of God only what God is not, or what God causes: Aquinas argues that they signify the divine substance, though imperfectly.

    Coordinates: 6.1 6.10 1.8Thomas Aquinas, Maimonides, William Alston

  • Aquinas's argument against the unity of the intellect

    Thomas Aquinas's case, in On the Unity of the Intellect, that the Averroist thesis of one separate intellect for all humans cannot explain the evident fact that this individual human being thinks, and would make all humans a single thinker; each person therefore has an intellect of his or her own.

    Coordinates: 1.3 1.3.2 6.20Thomas Aquinas, Ibn Rushd, Aristotle

  • Aquinas's argument that God knows future contingents in eternity

    Thomas Aquinas's argument (Summa Theologiae I.14.13) that God knows contingent events infallibly because all of time is present to his eternity, while those events stay contingent in relation to their own proximate causes.

    Coordinates: 1.7 6.1 1.6Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham

  • Aquinas's argument that natural law is participation in the eternal law

    Thomas Aquinas's argument (Summa Theologiae I-II.91.2, developed in 94.2) that, since all things are ruled by God's eternal law, rational creatures share in it in a distinctive way, through the light of natural reason by which they discern good and evil; that rational share is the natural law.

    Coordinates: 3.1.3 6.2Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Duns Scotus

  • Aquinas's argument that the world's beginning cannot be demonstrated

    Thomas Aquinas's case, in Summa Theologiae I.46 and the treatise On the Eternity of the World, that reason can prove neither that the world always existed nor that it began: its beginning is held by faith, and a world created by God yet without a beginning involves no contradiction.

    Coordinates: 1.2.1 1.8 1.4Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle, Maimonides

  • Aquinas's five ways

    Thomas Aquinas's five short arguments in Summa theologiae I, q. 2, a. 3, from motion, efficient causation, possibility and necessity, degrees of perfection and the ordering of nature, each concluding to a first being that people call God.

    Coordinates: 1.8 1.2.1 6.1Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle, Ibn Sina

  • Aquinas's Third Way

    The third of Thomas Aquinas's five ways in Summa Theologiae I, q. 2, a. 3: because things that can be and not be cannot account for existence by themselves, there must be a being necessary of itself. Its step from 'each thing can not-be' to 'at one time nothing existed' is the most disputed in the argument.

    Coordinates: 1.8 1.2.1 1.6Thomas Aquinas, Ibn Sina, William Rowe

  • The argument for pessimism about aesthetic testimony

    The argument that, unlike ordinary testimony, pure aesthetic testimony cannot legitimately ground an aesthetic judgement, because such judgements must rest on first-hand experience (Wollheim's acquaintance principle), and the optimist replies to it.

    Coordinates: 5.3 2.2.4Immanuel Kant, Richard Wollheim, C. Thi Nguyen

  • Argument from consciousness (theistic)

    The argument, defended by Richard Swinburne, Robert Adams and J. P. Moreland, that the existence of consciousness and its regular correlation with brain states is best explained by God.

    Coordinates: 1.8 1.3.4 6.1Richard Swinburne, Robert Adams, Daniel Dennett

  • Argument from contingency

    The cosmological argument from the existence of contingent things, by way of the principle of sufficient reason, to a necessary being.

    Coordinates: 1.8 1.2.1G. W. Leibniz, Samuel Clarke, Thomas Aquinas

  • Argument from hallucination

    The argument that because a hallucination could be indistinguishable from a genuine perception and of the same fundamental kind, we are never directly presented with ordinary objects, even when we perceive them.

    Coordinates: 2.2.1G. E. Moore, C. D. Broad

  • Argument from illusion

    The classic argument that, because in illusions something appears to have a quality the ordinary object lacks, we are never directly presented with ordinary objects, even in veridical perception.

    Coordinates: 2.2.1C. D. Broad, A. J. Ayer, Elizabeth Anscombe

  • Argument from inductive risk

    Richard Rudner's argument that because accepting a hypothesis always risks error, and how much evidence is enough depends on how bad an error would be, scientists as scientists must make value judgements.

    Coordinates: 6.8 2.6Carl Hempel, Richard Jeffrey, Elizabeth Anderson

  • Argument from moral disagreement

    The argument that deep and persistent moral disagreement across cultures is better explained by differing ways of life than by objective moral facts, used to support moral error theory, relativism or non-cognitivism.

    Coordinates: 3.1 3.1.1J. L. Mackie, Simon Blackburn, Donald Davidson

  • Argument from queerness

    J. L. Mackie's argument that objective moral values would be metaphysically and epistemically strange, unlike anything else we know, so that we should not believe in them.

    Coordinates: 3.1.1 3.1.4 3.1.3J. L. Mackie, John McDowell, Simon Blackburn

  • Argument from the laws of countries

    An ancient argument against astrological determinism: whole peoples keep uniform laws and customs whatever the horoscopes of their members, so customs and free choice, not the stars, govern human conduct. Best known from the Syriac Book of the Laws of Countries, written down by Bardaisan's pupil Philip.

    Coordinates: 1.7 6.31Bardaisan, Carneades, Philo of Alexandria

  • Argument from vagueness (composition)

    The argument, due to David Lewis and developed by Theodore Sider, that composition cannot be a vague matter, so that either every collection of objects composes something or none does.

    Coordinates: 1.1.3 4.4.1 1.1Peter van Inwagen, David Lewis, Theodore Sider

  • Aristotle's argument that the happy need friends

    Aristotle's argument in Nicomachean Ethics IX.9 that even a happy, virtuous person needs friends, because a friend is 'another self' whose good actions one can perceive and share; its success is disputed.

    Coordinates: 6.19 3.2.3Aristotle

  • Aristotle's defence of the principle of non-contradiction

    Aristotle's argument in Metaphysics Gamma that the principle of non-contradiction cannot be demonstrated but cannot coherently be denied either, because anyone who says something meaningful already relies on it.

    Coordinates: 4.4.2 4.5Aristotle, Protagoras, Heraclitus

  • Aristotle's function argument

    Aristotle's argument in Nicomachean Ethics I.7 that the human good is activity of the rational soul in accordance with virtue, because the good of anything with a characteristic function lies in performing that function well.

    Coordinates: 3.2.3 3.5 3.2Aristotle, Plato

  • Arrow's impossibility theorem

    Kenneth Arrow's 1951 proof that, with three or more alternatives, no procedure for turning individual preference rankings into a social ranking can satisfy unrestricted domain, social ordering, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorship together.

    Coordinates: 6.4 6.5Marquis de Condorcet, Amartya Sen

  • Ascent of love (Plato)

    Diotima's account in Plato's Symposium of love rising from one beautiful body through souls, laws and knowledge to beauty itself; criticised for treating individuals as mere stepping-stones, a reading its defenders reject.

    Coordinates: 6.19 5.1Plato, Socrates

  • Asymmetry argument (disability)

    The argument that disability must be bad for the person who has it, because if it were neutral it would be as permissible to cause disability as it is to prevent or remove it, and causing it is not permissible.

    Coordinates: 6.28 3.3.1Elizabeth Barnes, Peter Singer, Jeff McMahan

  • Augustine's si fallor, sum argument

    Augustine's anti-sceptical argument, stated in The City of God 11.26, that even if I am in error I must exist, since whoever errs exists; he extended it to the certainty of one's own living, loving and willing. Often compared with Descartes's cogito.

    Coordinates: 2.4 2.4.1 2.2.2Augustine of Hippo, René Descartes

  • Austin's argument against the performative–constative distinction

    J. L. Austin's argument in How to Do Things with Words that the contrast between performative utterances (doing something) and constative ones (stating something true or false) cannot be maintained, leading to his general theory of illocutionary acts.

    Coordinates: 6.10.2 6.10J. L. Austin, Jacques Derrida, John Searle

  • Backward induction paradox

    The puzzle that reasoning backwards from the last move of a finite game, under common knowledge of rationality, seems to prescribe uncooperative play from the start, yet the reasoning appears to undermine its own assumptions at moves that rational players would never reach.

    Coordinates: 2.6 6.5 4.3.2Philip Pettit, Robert Aumann

  • Bar-Hillel–Carnap paradox

    The result that, on Bar-Hillel and Carnap's probabilistic theory of semantic information, a contradiction carries maximal information.

    Coordinates: 6.18 2.8Rudolf Carnap, Luciano Floridi, Fred Dretske

  • Basic argument

    Galen Strawson's argument that true moral responsibility is impossible, because it would require us to be the causes of ourselves, which nothing can be.

    Coordinates: 1.7Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom

  • Beauvoir's argument that freedom is situated and shared

    Simone de Beauvoir's argument, in The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex, that human freedom is always exercised in a situation and needs the freedom of others, so that 'woman' is a situation one becomes, not a natural essence.

    Coordinates: 6.29 1.7 3.2.5Simone de Beauvoir, Jean-Paul Sartre

  • Benacerraf's epistemological challenge

    The objection, from Paul Benacerraf's 'Mathematical Truth' (1973) and Hartry Field's reformulation, that if mathematical objects are abstract and causally inert, our reliable knowledge of them is inexplicable.

    Coordinates: 6.9 1.1.4 2.2.2Paul Benacerraf, Hartry Field, David Lewis

  • Benacerraf's identification problem

    Paul Benacerraf's 1965 argument that, because the natural numbers can be identified equally well with different sequences of sets, they are not identical with any of them, and perhaps are not objects at all.

    Coordinates: 6.9 1.1.4Paul Benacerraf, Gottlob Frege, Stewart Shapiro

  • Benatar's asymmetry argument

    David Benatar's argument for anti-natalism: because the absence of pain is good even if no one enjoys it, while the absence of pleasure is not bad unless someone is deprived, coming into existence is always a harm.

    Coordinates: 3.5 3.3.1David Benatar

  • Berkovits's argument from the hiding of the face

    Eliezer Berkovits's argument in Faith after the Holocaust (1973) that God's hiddenness (hester panim) is the necessary reverse of divine patience and self-restraint, which make human freedom and history possible, so that the Holocaust is human evil God permitted but did not will.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8 1.7Richard L. Rubenstein, Eliezer Berkovits

  • Berlin's argument against positive liberty

    Isaiah Berlin's argument in "Two Concepts of Liberty" (1958) that the positive ideal of freedom as self-mastery, once the self is divided into a higher rational self and a lower empirical one and the higher self is identified with a collective or with reason's single answer, can be turned into a justification for coercing people in the name of their own freedom; value pluralism removes the main rationale for that coercion.

    Coordinates: 6.4.2 6.4Isaiah Berlin, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Charles Taylor

  • Berry's paradox

    The paradox of 'the least number that cannot be referred to by a description of fewer than 100 symbols', a description that itself has fewer than 100 symbols.

    Coordinates: 4.5 6.9Bertrand Russell, Alfred Tarski, Saul Kripke

  • Boethius's argument from the eternal present

    Boethius's answer, in Book V of The Consolation of Philosophy, to the worry that infallible divine foreknowledge makes every event necessary: God knows all things in the manner of an eternal present, and knowing something as present imposes only a non-constraining, conditional necessity.

    Coordinates: 1.7 6.1 1.4Boethius, Proclus, Linda Zagzebski

  • Boltzmann brain

    A brain-like observer arising from a random thermal fluctuation rather than from evolution; cosmological models predicting that such observers vastly outnumber ordinary ones face a sceptical problem.

    Coordinates: 1.2.2 1.2 2.4

  • Bonaventure's argument against an eternal world

    Bonaventure's case, in his Commentary on the Sentences (II, d.1, p.1, a.1, q.2), that a world created from nothing cannot have existed from eternity, supported by arguments against an actual infinite such as the impossibility of adding to or traversing an infinite past.

    Coordinates: 1.2.1 1.8 1.4Bonaventure, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas

  • BonJour's clairvoyance cases

    Laurence BonJour's 1980 cases, above all Norman the reliable clairvoyant, meant to show that a reliably produced true belief held without any reasons is not justified, and so that externalism about justification is false.

    Coordinates: 2.3.2 2.3Laurence BonJour, Ernest Sosa, Amia Srinivasan

  • Bootstrapping problem

    The objection, made vivid by Jonathan Vogel's gas-gauge case, that reliabilism and similar views let a person establish a source's reliability simply by repeatedly trusting it.

    Coordinates: 2.3.2 2.8

  • Bradley's regress

    F. H. Bradley's argument, in Appearance and Reality (1893), that relations cannot unite their terms without generating an endless series of further relations, so that relations are mere appearance.

    Coordinates: 1.1 1.1.2 1.10F. H. Bradley, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore

  • Brain in a vat

    A modern sceptical scenario: for all you can tell, you might be a disembodied brain kept alive in a vat and fed experiences by a computer. If you cannot rule this out, it seems you cannot know you have hands.

    Coordinates: 2.4.1 2.4 6.10.1René Descartes, Fred Dretske, Robert Nozick

  • Brave officer paradox

    Thomas Reid's objection to Locke: by a memory criterion a general is the boy who was flogged, through a chain of memories, and also is not, because he cannot remember the flogging.

    Coordinates: 1.3.2 2.2.3Thomas Reid, John Locke, Joseph Butler

  • Burge's arthritis argument

    Tyler Burge's 1979 thought experiment arguing that the contents of a person's beliefs depend partly on the linguistic practices of their community: a patient who wrongly believes he has arthritis in his thigh would, with no individual difference, have a different belief in a community that used 'arthritis' more broadly.

    Coordinates: 1.3.3 6.10 6.10.1Tyler Burge, Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor

  • Burke's argument that the sublime arises from the passions of self-preservation

    Edmund Burke's argument in the Philosophical Enquiry (1757) that the sublime excites passions of self-preservation, which turn on pain, and is felt as astonishment when pain threatens from a safe distance, so that the sublime and the beautiful have different foundations.

    Coordinates: 5.4 5.1Edmund Burke

  • Butler's circularity objection

    Joseph Butler's objection that a memory or consciousness criterion of personal identity presupposes the identity it is meant to explain.

    Coordinates: 1.3.2 2.2.3John Locke, Joseph Butler, Thomas Reid

  • Butler's performativity argument

    Judith Butler's argument, in Gender Trouble (1990), that gender is not an inner identity expressed in acts but is produced by the stylised repetition of acts, and that sex is no less culturally constituted than gender.

    Coordinates: 6.29Judith Butler

  • Camus's argument that the absurd does not justify suicide

    Albert Camus's argument in The Myth of Sisyphus that the clash between our demand for meaning and a silent world calls neither for suicide nor for hope, but for lucid revolt.

    Coordinates: 6.21 6.20Albert Camus, Søren Kierkegaard, Karl Jaspers

  • Carlson's argument for scientific cognitivism

    Allen Carlson's argument, from an analogy with the appreciation of art, that appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature requires knowledge supplied by the natural sciences (his 'natural environmental model').

    Coordinates: 5.7Allen Carlson, Kendall Walton, Noël Carroll

  • Carroll's common reason argument

    Noël Carroll's argument for moderate moralism: sometimes the very feature that makes a work morally flawed, such as an immoral perspective that blocks the response the work seeks, also makes it aesthetically flawed.

    Coordinates: 5.6 5.5Noël Carroll, Berys Gaut

  • Carroll's regress

    The regress in Lewis Carroll's dialogue 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles', in which every attempt to state the link between premises and conclusion as a further premise creates a new gap.

    Coordinates: 4.5 4.1.1 2.2.2

  • Cartesian circle

    The objection that Descartes argues in a circle in the Meditations, using clear and distinct perception to prove that God exists and then appealing to God to guarantee that clear and distinct perception is true.

    Coordinates: 2.3 2.4 2.2.2René Descartes, Ernest Sosa

  • Cārvāka critique of inference

    The Cārvāka (Lokāyata) argument, known mainly from opponents' and doxographers' reports, that inference is not an independent means of knowledge because the universal pervasion (vyāpti) it needs cannot be known by perception, inference, testimony or comparison; older reports show the school accepting everyday, perception-based inference.

    Coordinates: 2.2 2.4 2.4.1Kamalaśīla, Śāntarakṣita, Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa

  • Causal exclusion argument

    The argument, refined by Jaegwon Kim, that if every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, mental properties distinct from physical ones are left with no causal work to do. It is the main challenge to non-reductive physicalism.

    Coordinates: 1.3.1 1.11 1.4.2Jaegwon Kim, Frank Jackson, Jerry Fodor

  • Causal inefficacy objection

    The objection that an individual's purchase or abstention makes no difference to large systems of production, so cannot be required on consequentialist grounds; replies appeal to expected consequences, free-riding and non-causal principles.

    Coordinates: 6.26 3.3.6 3.3.2Peter Singer, Shelly Kagan

  • Child-at-the-well argument

    Mencius's argument (Mengzi 2A6) that anyone who suddenly saw a child about to fall into a well would feel alarm and compassion without ulterior motive, showing an innate sprout of benevolence.

    Coordinates: 3.4 3.2.3 3.1.4Mencius, Xunzi, Bryan W. Van Norden

  • Chinese nation argument

    Block's thought experiment in which the population of China, passing messages partly by satellite and controlling an artificial body, reproduces the functional organisation of a brain; it seems implausible that the whole system would feel anything.

    Coordinates: 1.3.1 1.3.4 6.17Daniel Dennett, John Searle

  • Chinese room argument

    John Searle's 1980 thought experiment and argument that running a program cannot by itself produce understanding, because programs are purely syntactic and syntax is not sufficient for semantics.

    Coordinates: 6.17 1.3.3 1.3John Searle, Paul Churchland, Daniel Dennett

  • Chrysippus's cylinder argument

    Chrysippus's argument, known through Cicero's De Fato 39-43 and Gellius's Attic Nights 7.2, that although everything happens by fate through antecedent causes, assent and action are up to us, because external causes only start the motion while the agent's own nature, like a pushed cylinder's shape, determines it.

    Coordinates: 1.7 6.24 1.4.2Chrysippus, Cicero

  • Clifford's ethics-of-belief argument

    W. K. Clifford's argument in "The Ethics of Belief" (1877) that, because beliefs guide action, are held in common and shape the believer's and society's habits of inquiry, it is morally wrong for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.

    Coordinates: 2.6 2.2.4 6.1W. K. Clifford, Peter van Inwagen, Alvin Plantinga

  • The closure argument for scepticism

    The argument that we are not justified in ordinary beliefs about the external world because, by the closure principle, such justification would also justify rejecting sceptical hypotheses, which we cannot do.

    Coordinates: 2.4 2.4.1 2.3.2René Descartes, G. E. Moore, Fred Dretske

  • Collingridge dilemma

    David Collingridge's problem for governing new technologies: early on, a technology can be controlled but its harms cannot be foreseen; by the time the harms are clear, the technology is entrenched and control is costly and slow.

    Coordinates: 6.16 3.3.4Karl Popper

  • Combination problem

    The central objection to panpsychism: if the smallest constituents of matter have experiences of their own, how do they combine into the unified consciousness of a human being?

    Coordinates: 1.3.4Philip Goff, Immanuel Kant, G. W. Leibniz

  • Common consent argument

    The argument that the widespread belief in God across peoples and ages is itself evidence that God exists; defended in modest evidential form by Thomas Kelly.

    Coordinates: 1.8 6.1 2.7.1Thomas Kelly, Plato, Cicero

  • Communicative theory of punishment

    The view that legal punishment is justified as the communication of deserved censure to offenders, aiming at their repentance, reform and reparation.

    Coordinates: 6.2 6.4

  • Condorcet jury theorem

    Condorcet's 1785 result that if voters are independent and each more likely than not to be right on a yes-or-no question, a majority is more reliable than any one of them and becomes almost certainly right as the group grows; the founding argument of epistemic democracy.

    Coordinates: 2.7 6.4Marquis de Condorcet

  • The consent argument for political obligation

    The argument that citizens are obliged to obey the state because, and to the extent that, they have consented to its authority, expressly or tacitly.

    Coordinates: 6.4.3 3.2.4 6.4John Locke, David Hume, Ronald Dworkin

  • Consequence argument

    An argument for incompatibilism, widely regarded as the best one: if determinism is true, our acts are consequences of the laws of nature and the remote past, neither of which is up to us, so our acts are not up to us either.

    Coordinates: 1.7Peter van Inwagen, David Lewis

  • Contrary-to-duty paradox

    Roderick Chisholm's 1963 puzzle showing that standard deontic logic cannot consistently and independently represent obligations that come into force once another obligation has been violated.

    Coordinates: 4.3.1 3.2.2Roderick Chisholm, Robert Stalnaker, David Lewis

  • Curry's paradox

    A family of paradoxes in which a sentence or set says, in effect, 'if this is true, then anything', and a few plausible rules then prove any claim whatever, without any use of negation.

    Coordinates: 4.4.2 4.5Arthur Prior, Alfred Tarski, J. C. Beall

  • Dalīl al-ʿināya (argument from providence)

    Ibn Rushd's argument, in al-Kashf ʿan manāhij al-adilla, from the purposive order of the world to a Maker who exercises providential care; offered as a proof fit for ordinary believers and philosophers alike, in place of the theologians' proofs.

    Coordinates: 1.2.2 1.8 6.1Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sina, Al-Farabi

  • Daniels's fair equality of opportunity argument for health care

    Norman Daniels's argument that because health, understood as normal functioning, protects the range of opportunities open to a person, a theory of justice that protects fair equality of opportunity grounds obligations to protect and promote health, including universal access to a reasonable array of health care and public health measures.

    Coordinates: 3.3.1 6.4.1 6.13John Rawls, Amartya Sen

  • Danto's argument from indiscernible counterparts

    Arthur Danto's argument, prompted by Warhol's Brillo Boxes, that because an artwork can have a perceptually indiscernible counterpart that is not art, or differs in artistic value, neither art status nor artistic value can consist in perceptible or aesthetic properties.

    Coordinates: 5.2.1 5.2Arthur Danto, Kendall Walton

  • Deductive-nomological model

    Hempel and Oppenheim's account of scientific explanation: to explain a phenomenon is to deduce a statement of it from true premises that include at least one law of nature.

    Coordinates: 6.8.1 1.9Carl Hempel, Wesley Salmon, Philip Kitcher

  • Definite descriptions

    Phrases of the form 'the so-and-so', such as 'the author of Waverley' or 'the present King of France'. Russell's theory analyses them not as names but as quantifier phrases, and the debate over that analysis shaped analytic philosophy of language.

    Coordinates: 6.10.1 6.10 4.1.2Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege, Peter Strawson

  • Demandingness objection

    The objection that consequentialism, by requiring us always to do the most good, asks far too much, leaving almost no room for personal projects, relationships or permissible self-interest.

    Coordinates: 3.2.1Peter Singer, Shelly Kagan, John Stuart Mill

  • Demarcation problem

    The problem of distinguishing science from non-science, and especially from pseudoscience: doctrines that are not scientific but are presented as if they were.

    Coordinates: 6.8 6.8.3Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos

  • Democratic boundary problem

    The problem of who should belong to the people that makes democratic decisions; democracy itself seems unable to settle its own membership.

    Coordinates: 6.4 6.4.3

  • Descartes's cogito argument

    Descartes's reasoning in the Second Meditation that 'I am, I exist' is necessarily true whenever he puts it forward or conceives it, so that his own existence survives even the most extreme doubt.

    Coordinates: 2.4 2.2.2 2.3.1René Descartes, Augustine of Hippo, Bertrand Russell

  • Descartes's ontological argument

    Descartes's a priori argument, chiefly in the Fifth Meditation, that God exists because necessary existence is clearly and distinctly perceived to belong to the idea of a supremely perfect being.

    Coordinates: 1.8 6.1René Descartes, Pierre Gassendi, G. W. Leibniz

  • Dickie's argument against the aesthetic attitude

    George Dickie's argument in 'The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude' (1964) that alleged cases of interested attention are really inattention, and that a difference of motive need not make a difference of attention, so there is no special aesthetic attitude.

    Coordinates: 5.5 5.3George Dickie, Edward Bullough

  • Dignāga's memory argument for reflexive awareness

    Dignāga's argument, in Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti) 1.11-12, that because we later remember our cognitions as well as their objects, and nothing unexperienced is remembered, each cognition must have been aware of itself; explaining that awareness by a further cognition would lead to an infinite regress.

    Coordinates: 1.3 2.2.3Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa

  • Disability paradox

    The finding that many disabled people report a good quality of life, often far better than non-disabled people predict; its interpretation is central to debates about disability, well-being and health care priorities.

    Coordinates: 6.28 3.5 6.13Elizabeth Barnes

  • Disappearing agent objection

    Derk Pereboom's objection that, on event-causal libertarianism, nothing about the agent settles which undetermined decision occurs, so the agent 'disappears' just where control is needed.

    Coordinates: 1.7 6.24Derk Pereboom, Robert Kane

  • Divine immutability

    The doctrine that God cannot change, defended from perfection, pure actuality and simplicity (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I.9) and challenged by arguments from tensed knowledge, relation, freedom and responsiveness; distinct from impassibility, eternity and simplicity.

    Coordinates: 1.8 6.1 1.4Plato, Aristotle, Philo of Alexandria

  • Divisibility argument

    René Descartes' argument in the Sixth Meditation that mind and body are distinct substances because the body is by nature divisible and the mind is not.

    Coordinates: 1.3.1René Descartes

  • Dogmatism paradox

    Saul Kripke's puzzle that, if I know something, I seem entitled to dismiss all future evidence against it as misleading.

    Coordinates: 2.4 2.6Saul Kripke, Gilbert Harman

  • Draper's argument from pain and pleasure

    Paul Draper's 1989 argument that the observed pattern of pain and pleasure among sentient beings is much more probable on a 'hypothesis of indifference' than on theism, and therefore makes theism less probable than not.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8David Hume, William Rowe, Peter van Inwagen

  • Dream argument

    The sceptical argument, made famous by Descartes's First Meditation, that because dreams can seem like waking experience, we cannot be sure from the inside that our sensory beliefs are not dream beliefs.

    Coordinates: 2.4 2.4.1 2.2.1René Descartes, Plato, J. L. Austin

  • Drowning child argument

    Peter Singer's 1972 argument that, just as one ought to save a child drowning in a shallow pond at trivial cost, affluent people ought to give to prevent deaths from poverty.

    Coordinates: 3.3 3.2.1 6.4.1Peter Singer

  • Du Bois's conservation-of-races argument

    W. E. B. Du Bois's argument in 'The Conservation of Races' (1897) that races are historically and spiritually, not merely physically, distinct groups, each with a message for humanity, so that African Americans should conserve their racial identity and organisations.

    Coordinates: 6.30 6.31W. E. B. Du Bois, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Lucius Outlaw

  • Duhem's argument against crucial experiments

    Pierre Duhem's argument that no experiment in physics can refute an isolated hypothesis or decisively establish one of two rival hypotheses, because predictions follow only from whole groups of hypotheses.

    Coordinates: 6.8.3 6.8 6.11Pierre Duhem, W. V. O. Quine

  • Dummett's manifestation argument

    Michael Dummett's argument that, because understanding must be manifest in use, a speaker cannot grasp truth-conditions that transcend all possible evidence, so bivalence and classical logic should be given up for undecidable statements.

    Coordinates: 4.4 4.5 6.10Michael Dummett, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Crispin Wright

  • Durkheim's argument for social facts

    Émile Durkheim's argument, in The Rules of Sociological Method (1895), that there are social facts which are external to individuals and constrain them, so that sociology has its own subject matter not reducible to psychology.

    Coordinates: 6.15 6.7Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, Friedrich Hayek

  • Dussel's argument from exteriority

    Enrique Dussel's argument in Philosophy of Liberation (1977) that the philosophy of the centre thinks only a totality that justifies domination, that the oppressed Other stands outside every such totality and calls it to justice, and that philosophy must therefore begin from that exteriority.

    Coordinates: 6.4 3.2 6.31Enrique Dussel, Parmenides, Emmanuel Levinas

  • Dutch book argument

    The argument, going back to Frank Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti, that credences violating the probability axioms expose an agent to a set of bets guaranteeing a loss, and so are irrational.

    Coordinates: 2.8 2.6Frank Ramsey, Bruno de Finetti, David Lewis

  • Dworkin's argument for the authority of advance directives

    Ronald Dworkin's argument in Life's Dominion (1993) that a directive made by a competent person should govern her care after dementia has removed her capacity for autonomy, because it expresses her critical interests and respects her autonomy understood as integrity.

    Coordinates: 3.3.1 6.13 6.4.2Ronald Dworkin, Jeff McMahan

  • Edwards's argument against libertarian freedom

    Jonathan Edwards's argument in Freedom of the Will (1754) that a libertarian, self-determining will is incoherent and unnecessary for responsibility: liberty is the power to do as one wills, choices follow the strongest motive, divine foreknowledge excludes contingency, and moral necessity is compatible with praise and blame.

    Coordinates: 1.7 6.1Jonathan Edwards, Thomas Hobbes

  • Ellsberg paradox

    A choice problem using an urn of unknown composition in which many people prefer bets with known odds, in a pattern that no single precise probability assignment combined with expected-utility maximisation can explain.

    Coordinates: 2.6 6.5Adam Elga

  • Ellul's argument for the autonomy of technique

    Jacques Ellul's argument, in La Technique (1954; English The Technological Society, 1964), that technique, the drive for the most efficient method in every field, has become self-directing and no longer answers to politics, economics, ethics or religion.

    Coordinates: 6.16 3.3.4Jacques Ellul, Don Ihde, Langdon Winner

  • Epistemic circularity

    William Alston's term, in its now-standard sense, for arguments that support the reliability of a belief source, such as perception, using premises that themselves depend on that source; whether such arguments can justify is disputed.

    Coordinates: 2.3 2.4 2.2.1William Alston, Thomas Reid, Ludwig Wittgenstein

  • Epistemic democracy

    The family of views that justify democracy, wholly or partly, by its capacity to track truth or reach good decisions, through majority aggregation, cognitive diversity or experimental correction.

    Coordinates: 2.7 6.4 6.4.3Elizabeth Anderson, Marquis de Condorcet, Aristotle

  • Epistocracy

    Rule by the knowledgeable: any system that distributes political power according to competence or political knowledge rather than equally among citizens.

    Coordinates: 6.4 2.7 2.7.1Plato, John Stuart Mill, Jason Brennan

  • EPR argument

    The 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen that, if distant systems cannot influence one another, quantum mechanics must give an incomplete description of physical reality.

    Coordinates: 6.11 6.8.2Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, David Bohm

  • Euthyphro dilemma

    The question, first posed in Plato's Euthyphro, whether something is good or right because God (or the gods) commands or loves it, or whether God commands or loves it because it is good or right. It is the classic challenge to divine command theory.

    Coordinates: 3.2.6 3.1 3.1.1Plato, Socrates, William of Ockham

  • Evidential argument from evil

    The argument that evil, especially intense and apparently pointless suffering, makes the existence of God improbable even if it is logically consistent with it.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8William Rowe, David Hume, G. E. Moore

  • Evolutionary argument against naturalism

    Alvin Plantinga's argument that anyone who accepts both naturalism and unguided evolution has a defeater for the reliability of their own cognitive faculties, so that the conjunction is self-defeating.

    Coordinates: 1.8 6.1 2.4Alvin Plantinga

  • Evolutionary debunking argument

    An argument that because natural selection shaped our moral beliefs without regard to moral truth, realists cannot claim that those beliefs track independent moral facts.

    Coordinates: 3.1.3 3.1.1 6.12Charles Darwin

  • Existential risk

    A risk that threatens the premature extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential; Nick Bostrom argues that reducing such risks should be a global priority.

    Coordinates: 3.3.4 3.2.1 6.20Nick Bostrom, Toby Ord, Derek Parfit

  • Experience machine

    Robert Nozick's thought experiment: would you plug into a machine that gave you any experiences you wanted, indistinguishable from real life? Most people say no, which is taken to show that something besides experience matters to well-being.

    Coordinates: 3.5 6.21Robert Nozick, Thomas Nagel

  • Explanatory gap

    Joseph Levine's name for the apparent absence of any intelligible link between physical or neural processes and the felt character of conscious experience.

    Coordinates: 1.3.4 1.3.1 1.11Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, Ned Block

  • Expressivist objection (prenatal testing)

    The argument from disability scholarship that prenatal testing followed by selective abortion expresses a demeaning message about everyone who lives with the tested-for condition; not to be confused with expressivism in metaethics.

    Coordinates: 3.3.1 6.28

  • Fackenheim's argument for the 614th commandment

    Emil Fackenheim's argument, first stated in 1967, that since no explanation of Auschwitz is adequate, the only authentic response is existential: Jews are forbidden to hand Hitler a posthumous victory, a commanding imperative he called the 614th commandment.

    Coordinates: 6.1 3.2.6 6.6Richard L. Rubenstein, Emil Fackenheim, Martin Buber

  • Fairness argument against doping

    The argument that performance-enhancing drugs should be banned because they give users an unfair advantage; opponents reply that natural and financial inequalities already tilt the field and that permitting enhancement for all could level it.

    Coordinates: 6.25

  • Fake barn case

    The thought experiment, first given by Carl Ginet and published by Alvin Goldman in 1976, in which a driver truly and justifiably believes he sees a barn in a district full of barn façades, yet seems not to know it.

    Coordinates: 2.1.1 2.1Alvin Goldman, Edmund Gettier, Saul Kripke

  • Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's argument that conceptions are not acquired

    Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's argument, using a version of Meno's paradox and a four-way division, that no conception (taṣawwur) of a thing is gained by deliberate inquiry, so that definitions only analyse the meanings of names.

    Coordinates: 2.1 2.2.2 6.10Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Plato, Ibn Sina

  • Feuerbach's argument that God is the objectified human essence

    Ludwig Feuerbach's reasoning in The Essence of Christianity (1841) that the divine predicates are human predicates freed from individual limits, so that God is the essence of the human species made objective and revered as another being, and theology is at bottom anthropology.

    Coordinates: 6.1Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels

  • Fine-tuning argument

    The argument that the sensitivity of life to the values of physical constants, laws and initial conditions is evidence for a designer; a modern version of the teleological argument, rivalled by multiverse explanations.

    Coordinates: 1.2.2 1.2 1.8Charles Darwin, Richard Swinburne, Ian Hacking

  • Fission problem

    The puzzle about personal identity raised by imagining a person whose brain hemispheres are transplanted into two bodies: each resulting person seems to have equal claim to be the original, yet the original cannot be both.

    Coordinates: 1.3.2 1.4.1Derek Parfit, Robert Nozick, David Lewis

  • Fitch's paradox of knowability

    A short proof that if every truth is knowable then every truth is known; it threatens anti-realist theories that tie truth to the possibility of knowledge.

    Coordinates: 4.3.2 2.5Hilary Putnam, C. S. Peirce, Immanuel Kant

  • Flying man argument

    Ibn Sina's thought experiment of a human being created fully formed in the air, cut off from all sensation, who would still grasp that he exists without grasping that he has a body.

    Coordinates: 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.3Ibn Sina, Aristotle, René Descartes

  • Food immoralism

    The view, defended by Shen-yi Liao and Aaron Meskin, that a moral defect in a food's history can sometimes make that food aesthetically better precisely because of the defect.

    Coordinates: 6.26 5.6Berys Gaut, Noël Carroll, Carolyn Korsmeyer

  • Frame problem

    Originally the problem in logic-based AI of representing the effects of actions without listing everything they leave unchanged; in philosophy, the wider problem of how a thinker determines what is relevant when updating beliefs.

    Coordinates: 6.17Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, Nelson Goodman

  • Frankfurt cases

    Thought experiments, introduced by Harry Frankfurt in 1969, in which an agent seems morally responsible for an action although a hidden intervener would have ensured that she could not have done otherwise.

    Coordinates: 1.7 6.24Harry Frankfurt, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom

  • Free will defence

    Alvin Plantinga's argument that God and evil are logically compatible, because God may have had to permit evil in order to create creatures with morally significant freedom.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8 1.7Alvin Plantinga, J. L. Mackie, John Hick

  • Fregean argument for mathematical platonism

    The argument that, because mathematical singular terms purport to refer and most accepted theorems are true, mathematical objects exist; the main template for arguing for object realism in mathematics.

    Coordinates: 1.1.4 6.9Gottlob Frege, W. V. O. Quine, Hilary Putnam

  • Frege–Geach problem

    The challenge, pressed by Peter Geach after Frege, that non-cognitivist theories of moral language cannot explain the meaning of moral sentences in embedded contexts or the validity of ordinary moral arguments.

    Coordinates: 3.1.2 6.10Peter Geach, Gottlob Frege, John Searle

  • Fricker's argument that testimonial injustice wrongs a speaker as a knower

    Miranda Fricker's argument that when identity prejudice deflates the credibility a hearer gives a speaker, the speaker suffers a distinctively epistemic wrong: denial of their standing as a knower, over and above any practical harm.

    Coordinates: 2.7 2.2.4Miranda Fricker, Elizabeth Anderson

  • Friedman's argument against corporate social responsibility

    Milton Friedman's 1970 case that managers, as agents of the shareholders who own the firm, should maximise shareholder wealth rather than spend corporate resources on social goals.

    Coordinates: 3.3.3 3.3Milton Friedman, R. Edward Freeman

  • Frye's birdcage argument

    Marilyn Frye's argument in 'Oppression' (The Politics of Reality, 1983) that oppression is a network of barriers that are each small and seemingly harmless when examined one at a time, like the wires of a birdcage, but together confine a group.

    Coordinates: 6.29 6.7Marilyn Frye

  • Fungibility problem (love)

    The objection that if love is justified by the beloved's valuable properties, anyone with the same or better properties would serve as well, making beloveds replaceable and 'trading up' rational.

    Coordinates: 6.19 3.5 6.23Robert Nozick, Niko Kolodny

  • Future contingents

    Statements about future events that are neither impossible nor inevitable, such as 'there will be a sea battle tomorrow', and the problem of whether, and how, they are true or false now.

    Coordinates: 4.3.3 1.4 1.7Aristotle, Diodorus Cronus, Jan Łukasiewicz

  • Gadamer's argument that understanding is shaped by tradition

    Hans-Georg Gadamer's argument in Truth and Method that all understanding works through pre-judgements inherited from tradition, so that interpretation is a fusion of horizons rather than the recovery of a meaning free of history.

    Coordinates: 5.2.3 6.31 6.6Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, Jacques Derrida

  • Gaut's merited response argument

    Berys Gaut's argument for ethicism: a work that prescribes unethical, and therefore unmerited, responses to what it depicts fails on its own terms, and because prescribed responses are aesthetically relevant, that failure is a pro tanto aesthetic defect.

    Coordinates: 5.6 5.3Berys Gaut, Noël Carroll

  • Generality problem

    The problem for reliabilism of saying which of the many process types a belief-forming process belongs to determines its reliability; types described too narrowly or too broadly give the wrong results.

    Coordinates: 2.3.2 2.1Alvin Goldman

  • Gersonides' argument that God knows particulars only as ordered

    Gersonides' argument in The Wars of the Lord that God knows particular things only insofar as they are ordered, and knows that human choices may or may not be made, but not which alternative will be realised, since prior knowledge of a contingent would abolish its contingency.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.7Gersonides, Aristotle, Maimonides

  • Gettier problem

    The problem, posed by Edmund Gettier in 1963, that a justified true belief can be true by luck and still not be knowledge, so that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowing.

    Coordinates: 2.1.1 2.1Edmund Gettier, Dharmottara, Alvin Goldman

  • Good Samaritan paradox

    Arthur Prior's 1958 puzzle that, in standard deontic logic, an obligation to help a robbery victim seems to imply that the robbery itself is obligatory.

    Coordinates: 4.3.1 3.2.2Arthur Prior

  • Grandfather paradox

    The argument that backward time travel is impossible because a time traveller could kill her grandfather, or her younger self, before her own trip, undermining her existence.

    Coordinates: 1.4 1.4.2 1.7David Lewis

  • Grelling's paradox

    The paradox of the predicate 'heterological', true of predicates that do not apply to themselves: it seems to be heterological if and only if it is not.

    Coordinates: 4.5 6.10Bertrand Russell, Saul Kripke, Graham Priest

  • Gyekye's argument for moderate communitarianism

    Kwame Gyekye's argument that the community is morally central but does not wholly constitute the person: individuals bring capacities the community nurtures, can evaluate and reject communal narratives, and keep rights even when judged morally deficient.

    Coordinates: 3.2.5 6.4.2Kwame Gyekye, Ifeanyi Menkiti, Alasdair MacIntyre

  • Habermas's argument from communicative action to discourse ethics

    Jürgen Habermas's argument that speech oriented to reaching understanding raises claims to truth, rightness and sincerity, and that moral norms are valid only if all affected could agree to them in practical discourse.

    Coordinates: 3.1 6.4 6.15Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth

  • Halevi's argument from public revelation

    Judah Halevi's case in the Kuzari that the revelation at Sinai, witnessed by a whole people and handed down by unbroken tradition, gives firmer grounds than philosophical demonstration; the modern 'Kuzari principle' of Dovid Gottlieb and Tyron Goldschmidt is a distinct argument attributed to them.

    Coordinates: 2.2.5 2.2.4 6.1Judah Halevi, Leo Strauss

  • Han Fei's average-ruler argument

    Han Fei's argument that because sage rulers are rare, government must rest on impersonal standards (fa) and techniques that work even under an average ruler.

    Coordinates: 6.4.3 6.4Han Feizi, Xunzi

  • Happy fish debate

    The exchange in the Zhuangzi in which Hui Shi challenges Zhuangzi's claim to know that the fish below a bridge are at leisure, a classic text on knowing other minds and on perspective.

    Coordinates: 2.4 2.1 1.3Zhuangzi, Hui Shi

  • Harm principle

    John Stuart Mill's principle in On Liberty that the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over a member of a civilised community against their will is to prevent harm to others; a person's own good is not a sufficient warrant.

    Coordinates: 6.4.2 6.2John Stuart Mill, H. L. A. Hart, Joseph Raz

  • Harman's explanatory challenge to moral realism

    Gilbert Harman's argument (1977) that moral facts, unlike physical facts, play no role in explaining our observations or what happens in the world, so we have no reason to believe in them.

    Coordinates: 3.1.1 3.1.3 3.1Gilbert Harman, J. L. Mackie

  • Hart's critique of the command theory

    H. L. A. Hart's argument, chiefly in The Concept of Law, that law cannot be understood as the commands of a habitually obeyed sovereign backed by threats, but must be understood as a system of social rules.

    Coordinates: 6.2H. L. A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin

  • Haslanger's ameliorative argument

    Sally Haslanger's argument that the concepts of gender and race should be defined by asking what concepts best serve legitimate feminist and antiracist aims, yielding definitions of woman, man and race in terms of social position, subordination and privilege.

    Coordinates: 6.29 6.30Sally Haslanger, Talia Mae Bettcher

  • Heidegger's argument that being-in-the-world comes before the subject–object relation

    Martin Heidegger's argument in Being and Time that we first encounter things as equipment within a world of practical involvements, so that the Cartesian picture of a subject facing objects is derivative.

    Coordinates: 1.3 1.1 2.4Martin Heidegger, René Descartes, Hubert Dreyfus

  • Heinz dilemma

    Kohlberg's moral-development scenario, asking whether Heinz should steal an overpriced drug to save his wife, which Carol Gilligan used to argue that a 'care perspective' is a distinct and equally legitimate form of moral reasoning.

    Coordinates: 3.2.5 3.4Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, Virginia Held

  • Hempel's covering-law argument for history

    Carl Hempel's argument, in 'The Function of General Laws in History', that historical explanations, like scientific ones, explain only by subsuming events under general laws.

    Coordinates: 6.6 6.8.1Carl Hempel, Wilhelm Dilthey, R. G. Collingwood

  • Hempel's dilemma

    The objection that physicalism defined by current physics is false, while physicalism defined by a future or ideal physics is trivial, so the thesis has no clear content.

    Coordinates: 1.3.1 1.11Carl Hempel, J. J. C. Smart, David Lewis

  • Hobbes's state-of-nature argument

    Thomas Hobbes's argument in Leviathan that, without a common power, rough equality, competition, distrust and glory produce a war of all against all, so rational people should covenant to authorise an absolute sovereign.

    Coordinates: 3.2.4 6.4 6.4.3Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau

  • Horkheimer and Adorno's argument that enlightenment reverts to myth

    Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno's argument in Dialectic of Enlightenment that the reason which freed humanity from myth, by becoming instrumental and dominating nature, turns into a new form of domination.

    Coordinates: 6.15 6.16 6.6Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Jürgen Habermas

  • Hountondji's argument against ethnophilosophy

    Paulin Hountondji's argument, in African Philosophy: Myth and Reality (1976; English 1983), that a collective, unconscious world-view ascribed to a whole people cannot be a philosophy, because philosophy is explicit discourse by accountable individuals open to criticism; ethnophilosophy is therefore ethnology, not philosophy.

    Coordinates: 6.31 6.15Paulin Hountondji, Placide Tempels, Alexis Kagame

  • Hume's argument against belief in miracles

    David Hume's argument in Section X of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding that testimony can make a miracle credible only if its falsehood would be more miraculous than the event reported, and that no actual testimony has ever met that standard well enough to found a religion.

    Coordinates: 2.2.4 1.9 6.1David Hume

  • Hume's argument against the original contract

    David Hume's argument in 'Of the Original Contract' (1748) that the duty to obey government cannot rest on an original or tacit contract, since nearly all governments began in usurpation or conquest, residence is not free consent, and allegiance, like promise-keeping, is grounded directly in the necessities of society.

    Coordinates: 6.4.3 3.2.4 6.4David Hume, John Locke

  • Hume's argument for a standard of taste

    David Hume's argument in 'Of the Standard of Taste' (1757) that, although beauty is a matter of sentiment, some verdicts of taste are better than others, and that the standard is the joint verdict of true judges.

    Coordinates: 5.3 5.1David Hume, Peter Kivy, Jerrold Levinson

  • Hume's argument that inferences from experience are not founded on reasoning

    David Hume's argument, in Treatise 1.3.6 and Enquiry IV–V, that inferences from observed to unobserved cases rest on the supposition that the future resembles the past, which neither demonstrative nor probable reasoning can establish without circularity; custom, not reason, produces them. 'Problem of induction' is a later label.

    Coordinates: 6.8 2.1David Hume, John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant

  • Husserl's argument for the phenomenological reduction

    Edmund Husserl's case for suspending the everyday assumption that the world exists (the epoché) so that philosophy can study how anything comes to be given to consciousness at all.

    Coordinates: 1.3.3 2.4 1.10Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty

  • Ibn Daud's argument from possibility for human freedom

    Abraham ibn Daud's argument in The Exalted Faith that some events are possible because God created them as open to two contraries, so that human choice is genuine and God does not know its outcome in advance, which he denies is a form of ignorance.

    Coordinates: 1.7 6.1 1.6Abraham ibn Daud, Judah Halevi, Ibn Sina

  • Ibn Khaldun's argument for a science of ʿumrān

    Ibn Khaldun's argument in the Muqaddimah (1377) that historical reports can be verified only against knowledge of the regular nature of human social organisation (ʿumrān), which therefore requires a new, rational science of its own.

    Coordinates: 6.15Ibn Khaldun, Aristotle, Al-Farabi

  • Ibn Rushd's argument that the Law commands philosophy

    The argument of Ibn Rushd's Decisive Treatise that the religious Law, by commanding reflection on creation, commands demonstrative philosophy for those able to pursue it, since truth does not oppose truth.

    Coordinates: 2.2.5 6.1 6.2Ibn Rushd, Al-Ghazali, Al-Farabi

  • Ibn Rushd's reply to al-Ghazālī on the eternal will

    Ibn Rushd's counter-argument, in the First Discussion of The Incoherence of the Incoherence, that an unchanging First Cause whose conditions for acting are complete cannot delay its effect, that 'will' is said of God and humans non-univocally, and that the world is therefore eternally produced though caused.

    Coordinates: 1.2.1 1.8 1.4Ibn Rushd, Al-Ghazali, Maimonides

  • Ibn Sīnā's argument that God knows particulars in a universal way

    Ibn Sina's argument that a pure, simple and immaterial God has no direct epistemic relation to individual things and so knows them 'in a universal way', through their universal qualities and causes; al-Ghazali condemned the view as a denial of God's knowledge of particulars.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8 1.6Ibn Sina, Al-Ghazali, Ibn Rushd

  • Ibn Sīnā's argument that time has no beginning

    Ibn Sina's reductio against a first moment of time: if motion had a first instant, the Creator could have extended it further back, so a capacity for motion, and hence time, would precede the supposed first moment, which is absurd.

    Coordinates: 1.4 1.2.1Ibn Sina, Al-Kindi, Al-Ghazali

  • Ibn Taymiyya's critique of the syllogism

    Ibn Taymiyya's argument, in his Refutation of the Logicians, that Aristotelian definition yields no new concepts and that the demonstrative syllogism is unnecessary for certain knowledge, since universals exist only in minds and syllogism is no more certain than analogy.

    Coordinates: 4.1.3 1.1.2 2.2Ibn Taymiyya, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, John Stuart Mill

  • Idle argument

    An ancient argument that if outcomes are fated, effort such as consulting a doctor is futile; Chrysippus replied that outcomes may be fated together with their means.

    Coordinates: 1.7 6.24 4.3.3Aristotle, Chrysippus

  • Imaginative resistance

    The difficulty readers have in imagining, or accepting as true in a fiction, certain contents, especially morally deviant ones, even though they readily imagine dragons and time travel.

    Coordinates: 5.6 5.8David Hume, Kendall Walton

  • Implicature

    What a speaker means or suggests beyond what the words literally say, as when 'I have to work' conveys 'I am not coming to the party'. Paul Grice distinguished conversational implicature, which depends on context, from conventional implicature, which is fixed by particular words such as 'but' or 'therefore'.

    Coordinates: 6.10 6.10.2Paul Grice

  • Indeterminacy of translation

    W. V. O. Quine's thesis that rival translations of a language can fit all possible behavioural evidence equally well, with no further fact making one of them correct. It covers both the reference of terms and the translation of whole sentences.

    Coordinates: 6.10W. V. O. Quine, John Searle, Donald Davidson

  • Indispensability argument

    The argument that we ought to believe in mathematical objects because they are indispensable to our best scientific theories; one of the main arguments for mathematical platonism.

    Coordinates: 6.9 1.1.4W. V. O. Quine, Hilary Putnam, Hartry Field

  • Inference problem (laws of nature)

    Bas van Fraassen's challenge to the Dretske–Tooley–Armstrong theory of laws: if a law is a necessitation relation between universals, nothing explains why that relation guarantees the corresponding regularity.

    Coordinates: 1.9 6.8David Armstrong, Fred Dretske, Bas van Fraassen

  • Integrity objection

    Bernard Williams's objection that utilitarianism, by treating agents as channels for producing the best overall state of affairs, cannot make sense of a person's own projects and commitments, and so attacks integrity.

    Coordinates: 3.2.1 3.4Bernard Williams, J. J. C. Smart, Amartya Sen

  • Interaction problem

    The objection to interactionist dualism that an unextended, non-physical mind could not move a body or be affected by it. It was pressed against Descartes by Gassendi and Elisabeth of Bohemia.

    Coordinates: 1.3.1 1.4.2René Descartes, Pierre Gassendi, Elisabeth of Bohemia

  • Inverse gambler's fallacy objection

    The objection, named from Ian Hacking's 1987 analysis and applied by Roger White, that inferring many universes from the life-permitting character of ours repeats the error of inferring many earlier dice throws from one remarkable throw.

    Coordinates: 1.2.2 1.2 1.8Ian Hacking, Nick Bostrom

  • Inverted spectrum

    The hypothesis that someone might see colours systematically swapped relative to another person, say red where the other sees green, with no difference in behaviour; used against functionalism and representationalism.

    Coordinates: 1.3.4 1.3.1John Locke, Nicolas Malebranche, Ludwig Wittgenstein

  • Isolation objection (coherentism)

    The objection that, because coherence is a purely internal relation among beliefs, a coherent system could be wholly cut off from the world, so coherence gives no reason to think beliefs are true.

    Coordinates: 2.3.1 2.3C. I. Lewis, Laurence BonJour, Susan Haack

  • Īśvarakṛṣṇa's five reasons for satkāryavāda

    The five-part argument of Sāṃkhyakārikā 9 that an effect already exists in its material cause before it is produced, with the Nyāya and Buddhist counter-arguments it provoked.

    Coordinates: 1.4.2 1.4.1Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Gautama (Akṣapāda), Vātsyāyana

  • Is–ought problem

    Hume's observation that moral writers move from statements about what is to conclusions about what ought to be without explaining how.

    Coordinates: 3.1 3.1.3 3.1.2David Hume, R. M. Hare, Alasdair MacIntyre

  • James's will-to-believe argument

    William James's argument in "The Will to Believe" (1896) that when an option between hypotheses is genuine (living, forced and momentous) and cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds, it is lawful, and unavoidable, for our passional nature to decide it.

    Coordinates: 2.6 6.1W. K. Clifford, Blaise Pascal, Bertrand Russell

  • Jayarāśi's argument against the means of knowledge

    Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa's critique, in the Tattvopaplavasiṃha, of every proposed definition of the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), carried out by reductio from his opponents' own premises without asserting a thesis of his own.

    Coordinates: 2.4 2.4.1 2.2Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, Nagarjuna, Dharmottara

  • Jeong Do-jeon's argument against Buddhist ethics

    The case made in Jeong Do-jeon's Array of Critiques of Buddhism (Bulssi japbyeon, 1398) that Buddhism cultivates the inner mind while abandoning kinship and social obligation, and so cannot ground an ethics; answered after his death by the Seon monk Gihwa in the Exposition of the Correct (Hyeonjeong non).

    Coordinates: 3.2.5 6.1 3.2Jeong Do-jeon, Cheng Yi, Cheng Hao

  • Jonas's argument against divine omnipotence after Auschwitz

    Hans Jonas's argument in 'The Concept of God after Auschwitz' that God's goodness, power and intelligibility cannot all be held after Auschwitz, and that omnipotence must be given up: God did not intervene because he could not.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8Hans Jonas, Isaac Luria, Peter Geach

  • Jørgensen's dilemma

    The problem, noted by Jørgen Jørgensen in 1937, that norms and imperatives seem to be neither true nor false, so cannot stand in logical relations, and yet some normative inferences seem plainly valid.

    Coordinates: 4.3.1 3.1.2 6.2G. H. von Wright

  • Kalām cosmological argument

    The argument that whatever begins to exist has a cause, that the universe began to exist because an infinite past is impossible, and that the universe therefore has a cause.

    Coordinates: 1.8 1.2.1Al-Ghazali, John Philoponus, Bonaventure

  • Kant's argument for the mathematical and dynamical sublime

    Immanuel Kant's argument (Critique of the Power of Judgment §§23–29) that the sublime is felt when imagination fails before magnitude or might, revealing a power of reason that surpasses nature, so that sublimity lies in the mind rather than in nature.

    Coordinates: 5.4 5.7Immanuel Kant

  • Kant's argument that judgements of taste are disinterested

    Immanuel Kant's argument in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (§§1–5) that the pleasure grounding a judgement of beauty neither depends on nor produces a desire for the object, which separates the beautiful from the agreeable and the good.

    Coordinates: 5.3 5.5Immanuel Kant, George Dickie

  • Kant's deduction of judgements of taste

    Kant's argument in the Critique of the Power of Judgment that a judgement of beauty, though based on feeling rather than a concept, is entitled to demand everyone's agreement.

    Coordinates: 5.3Immanuel Kant

  • Kant's Formula of Universal Law test

    The procedure Kant draws from the first formulation of the categorical imperative (Groundwork 4:421): test a maxim by asking whether it could be conceived, and willed, as a universal law, so that failing yields a perfect or an imperfect duty.

    Coordinates: 3.2.2 3.1 3.2Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, John Stuart Mill

  • Kant's moral argument from the highest good

    Immanuel Kant's argument in the Critique of Practical Reason that, because we are morally required to promote the highest good, happiness in proportion to virtue, we must postulate a God who makes it possible: a postulate of pure practical reason and an object of practical faith, not a theoretical proof.

    Coordinates: 1.8 6.1Immanuel Kant

  • Kasb (acquisition)

    The Ashʿarite doctrine that God creates every human act together with a temporary created power for it, which the human being 'acquires'; it was meant to keep divine omnipotence while leaving room for responsibility.

    Coordinates: 1.7 1.4.2 6.24Al-Ash’ari, Al-Ghazali, Al-Juwayni

  • Ki Daeseung's argument against separating the Four and the Seven

    The objection that Ki Daeseung (Gobong, 1527–1572) pressed in letters to Yi Hwang (Toegye) from 1559: since principle (i) and vital force (ki) are inseparable in actual feelings, the Four Sprouts cannot issue from principle alone; they are those of the Seven Feelings that issue in due measure.

    Coordinates: 3.4 6.23Yi Hwang (Toegye), Yi I, Mencius

  • Kierkegaard's leap

    The idea, worked out through Kierkegaard's pseudonyms, that the transition to Christian faith cannot be reached by demonstration, historical evidence or endless reflection, but requires a qualitative leap, because its object, the incarnation, is an absolute paradox to reason.

    Coordinates: 2.2.5 6.1 2.6Søren Kierkegaard, G. W. F. Hegel

  • Killing robbers is not killing people

    The later Mohist argument, in the Lesser Selection, that although robbers are people, killing robbers is not killing people, defended by parallels with accepted sentence patterns.

    Coordinates: 4.2.2 6.10 3.2.1Xunzi

  • King's argument from just and unjust laws

    Martin Luther King Jr.'s argument in the "Letter from Birmingham Jail" (16 April 1963) that a law out of harmony with the moral law is unjust and need not be obeyed, with tests for injustice (conflict with the moral law, degrading personality, a majority binding a minority but not itself, enactment without the minority's vote, unjust application), so that urging obedience to just law while disobeying segregation ordinances is consistent.

    Coordinates: 6.2 6.4 6.4.3Martin Luther King Jr., Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas

  • Knapp and Michaels' argument against theory

    Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels's argument (1982) that a text's meaning simply is what its author intended, so that literary theory, which imagines a gap between the two, has no work to do; known for its example of a poem found written in the sand.

    Coordinates: 5.2.3 5.2.2E. D. Hirsch, Richard Rorty, Hans-Georg Gadamer

  • Knower paradox

    David Kaplan and Richard Montague's paradox of a sentence that says of itself that it is known to be false, showing that innocent-looking principles about knowledge are inconsistent with self-reference.

    Coordinates: 4.3.2 4.5Kurt Gödel

  • Knowledge argument

    Frank Jackson's argument that physicalism is incomplete: a scientist who knows every physical fact about colour vision, but has never seen colour, seems to learn something new when she first sees red.

    Coordinates: 1.3.4 1.3.1Frank Jackson, C. D. Broad, Thomas Nagel

  • Kripke's modal argument against the identity theory

    Saul Kripke's argument in Naming and Necessity that pain cannot be identical with a brain state such as C-fibre stimulation, because identities between rigid designators are necessary and the appearance that they could come apart cannot be explained away.

    Coordinates: 1.3.1 1.6 6.10.1Saul Kripke, Scott Soames, U. T. Place

  • Kumārila's argument against an omniscient person

    Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's argument, in the Codanā chapter of his Ślokavārttika, that no means of knowledge can establish that any person, such as the Buddha, is omniscient, so that knowledge of dharma must rest on the authorless Veda rather than on a human teacher.

    Coordinates: 2.2.5 2.2.4 6.1Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Jaimini, Śabara

  • Kumārila's circularity objection to apoha

    Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's objection, in the Apohavāda chapter of his Ślokavārttika, to Dignāga's theory that words mean the exclusion of others: to exclude 'non-cow' one must already know 'cow', so meaning by exclusion is circular, and our grasp of 'cow' is positive in any case.

    Coordinates: 1.1.2 6.10 6.10.1Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Dignāga, Uddyotakara

  • Kymlicka's argument for minority cultural rights

    Will Kymlicka's liberal argument that, because individual autonomy depends on secure access to a societal culture and states cannot be culturally neutral, justice requires group-differentiated rights for national minorities and fair accommodation for immigrant groups.

    Coordinates: 6.31 6.4Will Kymlicka, John Rawls, Joseph Raz

  • Labour-mixing argument

    John Locke's argument that a person who mixes his own labour with something unowned thereby makes it his property, with limits, on many readings, concerning spoilage and leaving enough and as good for others.

    Coordinates: 6.4.2 6.22John Locke, Robert Nozick

  • Leibniz's mill

    Leibniz's argument, in Monadology section 17, that perception cannot be explained mechanically: walk through a thinking machine enlarged like a mill and you would find only parts pushing one another.

    Coordinates: 1.3.1 1.3.4G. W. Leibniz, Richard Rorty, Paul Churchland

  • Levelling-down objection

    Derek Parfit's objection to egalitarianism: if inequality is bad in itself, making the better-off worse off with no gain to anyone must be in one respect an improvement.

    Coordinates: 6.4.1 3.5Derek Parfit

  • Levinas's argument that ethics is first philosophy

    Emmanuel Levinas's claim, developed in Totality and Infinity (1961) and Otherwise than Being (1974), that the encounter with another person precedes and conditions all knowledge and ontology, so that ethics, not metaphysics, is first philosophy.

    Coordinates: 3.1 1.1 3.2.5Emmanuel Levinas, Martin Heidegger, René Descartes

  • Lewis's argument from theoretical utility

    David Lewis's cost–benefit case for believing in a plurality of concrete possible worlds: they so improve the analysis of modality, counterfactuals, content and properties that the offence to common sense is a price worth paying.

    Coordinates: 1.6.1 1.6David Lewis, Robert Stalnaker, David Armstrong

  • Liar paradox

    The paradox of a sentence that says of itself that it is false: if it is true, it is false, and if it is false, it is true. It is the central problem for theories of truth.

    Coordinates: 4.4.2 2.5 4.5Aristotle, Cicero, Alfred Tarski

  • Liberal paradox

    Amartya Sen's 1970 result that no rule for social decision can satisfy universal domain, acyclicity, the weak Pareto principle and a minimal form of liberalism together: respecting even two people's rights over private matters can conflict with unanimous preference.

    Coordinates: 6.4.2 6.5Amartya Sen

  • Libertarian paternalism

    The policy approach of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein that steers people towards choices that serve their own ends by designing the 'choice architecture' (defaults, framing, ordering) while leaving all options open. Its tools are called nudges.

    Coordinates: 6.4.2 6.5 3.3.3John Stuart Mill

  • Locke's argument that personal identity consists in consciousness

    John Locke's argument, in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II.xxvii (added in 1694), that a person, a thinking being that can consider itself as itself, extends back as far as consciousness reaches, so that personal identity consists in consciousness rather than in sameness of substance or of man; 'person' is a forensic term.

    Coordinates: 1.3.2John Locke, G. W. Leibniz, Catharine Trotter Cockburn

  • Logic of the larder

    The argument that eating meat benefits farmed animals because, without the demand for meat, they would never have existed; it depends on contested assumptions in population ethics.

    Coordinates: 6.26 3.3.6R. M. Hare

  • Logical problem of evil

    The argument that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good God.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8J. L. Mackie, Alvin Plantinga, John Hick

  • Lottery paradox

    The puzzle that in a large fair lottery it seems rational to believe of each ticket that it will lose, although one knows that some ticket will win, so that rational beliefs appear to form an inconsistent set.

    Coordinates: 2.8 2.6Gilbert Harman, Arcesilaus

  • Lucas–Penrose argument

    The argument, from J. R. Lucas (1961) and Roger Penrose (1989, 1994), that Gödel's incompleteness theorem shows the human mind cannot be a machine or formal system; widely judged to fail, but still defended and debated.

    Coordinates: 6.17 1.3 6.9Kurt Gödel, David Chalmers, Hilary Putnam

  • Luck egalitarianism

    The family of theories of distributive justice on which inequalities are unjust when they result from bad brute luck rather than from people's responsible choices.

    Coordinates: 6.4.1Ronald Dworkin, G. A. Cohen, Elizabeth Anderson

  • Luck objection

    The objection that if a choice is undetermined by everything prior to it, then which choice occurs is a matter of luck, so indeterminism undermines rather than secures freedom and responsibility.

    Coordinates: 1.7Peter van Inwagen, Robert Kane

  • Luther's argument against free choice

    Martin Luther's case, in The Bondage of the Will (De servo arbitrio) against Erasmus, that in matters of salvation the fallen human will has no free choice: what God foreknows happens necessarily, the will is never neutral, and free choice is properly attributed only to God.

    Coordinates: 1.7 6.1 3.2.6Martin Luther, Desiderius Erasmus, Augustine of Hippo

  • Maimonides' argument against positive divine attributes

    Maimonides' reasoning in the Guide of the Perplexed (I.50-60) that God's absolute unity rules out any positive attribute of God's essence, so that true statements about God are either negations or descriptions of God's actions.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8 6.10Maimonides, Abraham ibn Daud, Thomas Aquinas

  • Maimonides' argument for creation from the heavens

    Maimonides' case in the Guide of the Perplexed (II.19-24) that the unexplained diversity of the heavens is better explained by a God who chooses than by necessary emanation, so that creation is preferable to eternity though not demonstrable.

    Coordinates: 1.2.1 1.8Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle

  • Maimon's sceptical challenge to Kant

    Salomon Maimon's argument, from the Essay on Transcendental Philosophy (1790) onwards, that Kant cannot show that the categories actually apply to what is given in experience, which reopens Hume's scepticism; framed by Kant's questions quid juris and quid facti.

    Coordinates: 2.4 2.1 1.4.2Salomon Maimon, Immanuel Kant, David Hume

  • Manipulation argument

    An argument for incompatibilism: an agent covertly manipulated into acting is not free or responsible, and there is no relevant difference between such an agent and an ordinary determined agent.

    Coordinates: 1.7 6.24Derk Pereboom

  • Mardānfarrox's argument that evil requires an independent principle

    The case made in the ninth-century Middle Persian Škand-gumānīg wizār (chapters 7–12) that good and evil are opposed in nature, that a wholly good creator cannot be the source of evil, and that evil must therefore have its own origin; with dilemmas against monotheist theology.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8

  • Mariátegui's argument that the problem of the Indian is the problem of land

    José Carlos Mariátegui's argument, in Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality (1928), that every administrative, legal, racial, humanitarian, religious or educational remedy for the oppression of Indigenous Peruvians fails while the system of landholding (gamonalismo and the latifundium) remains.

    Coordinates: 6.4.1 6.5 6.30José Carlos Mariátegui

  • Marquis's future-like-ours argument

    Don Marquis's argument in 'Why Abortion is Immoral' (1989) that killing is wrong chiefly because it deprives the victim of a valuable future, and that since a fetus has a future like ours, abortion is prima facie seriously wrong.

    Coordinates: 3.3.1 3.3

  • Master Argument

    Diodorus Cronus's argument, known through Epictetus, that three plausible theses about past truth and possibility are inconsistent, used to conclude that nothing is possible which neither is nor will be true.

    Coordinates: 4.3.3 1.6 1.7Diodorus Cronus, Epictetus, Chrysippus

  • McTaggart's argument against the reality of time

    J. M. E. McTaggart's argument that time requires the A-series of past, present and future, that this series is contradictory, and that time is therefore unreal.

    Coordinates: 1.4 1.4.1J. M. E. McTaggart, Bertrand Russell

  • Measurement problem

    The problem that quantum theory's linear dynamics, applied to a measurement, yields a superposition of different outcomes rather than the single definite result we observe; interpretations of quantum mechanics are largely rival solutions.

    Coordinates: 6.11John Bell, David Bohm, Hugh Everett III

  • Mencius against Gaozi: the willow and water analogies

    Mencius's replies, in Mencius 6A1–2, to Gaozi's claims that making people good is like carving cups from willow wood and that human nature, like whirling water, is indifferent between good and bad: carving does violence to the willow, and water, though indifferent to east and west, always tends downward.

    Coordinates: 3.4 3.2.3 4.2.2Mencius, Xunzi, Dong Zhongshu

  • Mencius's argument that killing a tyrant is not regicide

    Mencius's reply to King Xuan of Qi (Mencius 1B8) that King Wu's killing of the tyrant Zhou was not the killing of a ruler: one who outrages benevolence and righteousness is a 'mere fellow', not a sovereign, so his death is punishment, not regicide.

    Coordinates: 6.4 6.4.3 6.10Mencius, Han Feizi

  • Mencius's critique of Yang Zhu and Mozi

    Mencius's polemic (Mengzi 3B9, 3A5) against Yang Zhu's 'for oneself' and the Mohists' impartial caring, defending graded concern that begins with family and is extended outward.

    Coordinates: 3.2 3.2.1 3.2.5Mencius, Mozi, Bryan W. Van Norden

  • Mendelssohn's argument against religious coercion

    Moses Mendelssohn's argument in Jerusalem (1783) that neither state nor religion may coerce convictions, because religion acts only by teaching and persuasion, so that religious bodies have no right to compel belief or to excommunicate.

    Coordinates: 6.4.2 6.1 6.4.3Moses Mendelssohn, John Locke, Immanuel Kant

  • Menkiti's argument that personhood is achieved

    Ifeanyi Menkiti's argument, in 'Person and Community in African Traditional Thought' (1984), that in African traditional thought personhood is not given with being human but attained through incorporation into community and the discharge of communal obligations.

    Coordinates: 3.2.5 1.3.2 6.4.2Ifeanyi Menkiti, John Mbiti, Kwame Gyekye

  • Meno's paradox

    The challenge raised in Plato's Meno (80d-e) that inquiry is impossible, since one cannot search for what one already knows, nor for what one does not know at all.

    Coordinates: 2.1 2.2.2Plato, Socrates

  • Mere addition paradox

    Derek Parfit's argument that two apparently innocent steps, adding worthwhile lives and then equalising, lead by repetition to the repugnant conclusion.

    Coordinates: 3.5 3.2.1Derek Parfit

  • Merleau-Ponty's argument that perception is bodily

    Maurice Merleau-Ponty's argument in Phenomenology of Perception that both empiricism and intellectualism misdescribe perception, which is the work of a living body that inhabits space as an 'I can', not of a mind adding judgements to sensations.

    Coordinates: 2.2.1 1.3.1 1.3Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl

  • Methodology of scientific research programmes

    Imre Lakatos's account of theory appraisal: science consists of research programmes with a protected hard core and an adjustable belt of auxiliary hypotheses, judged progressive or degenerating by their novel predictions.

    Coordinates: 6.8.3 6.8Imre Lakatos, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn

  • Metz's argument for an ubuntu-based moral theory

    Thaddeus Metz's argument that the southern African ideal of ubuntu is best captured by a principle prizing harmonious relationships, understood as sharing a sense of identity and acting for one another's sake, which can ground dignity and rights.

    Coordinates: 3.2.5 3.2Thaddeus Metz, Mogobe Ramose, Kwasi Wiredu

  • Mill's argument from analogy for other minds

    John Stuart Mill's argument, in An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865), ch. XII, that since in my own case bodily changes cause feelings and feelings cause behaviour, the bodies and behaviour of others oblige me to infer an intermediate link of feeling in them too; offered against Reid's charge that his theory of matter implies solipsism.

    Coordinates: 1.3 2.4.1John Stuart Mill, Thomas Reid, A. J. Ayer

  • Mill's objection that the syllogism begs the question

    The charge, pressed by John Stuart Mill in A System of Logic and reported much earlier by Sextus Empiricus, that a syllogism cannot prove anything not already assumed, because its universal premise already contains the conclusion.

    Coordinates: 4.1.3 4.2.1John Stuart Mill, Sextus Empiricus

  • Mills's racial contract argument

    Charles W. Mills's argument in The Racial Contract (1997) that the real agreement underlying modern Western polities was a racial contract among whites to exclude non-whites from full personhood and to exploit them, a contract that is political, moral and epistemological, so that the raceless social contract of mainstream theory misdescribes the actual order and normative theory must begin from that non-ideal reality.

    Coordinates: 6.30 3.2.4 6.4Charles W. Mills, Carole Pateman, John Rawls

  • Mind–body problem

    The problem of how the mind is related to the body: how thoughts and experiences can arise from, or act on, physical events such as those in the brain.

    Coordinates: 1.3.1 1.3René Descartes, Elisabeth of Bohemia, G. W. Leibniz

  • Miners paradox

    A puzzle about deliberative 'ought' under uncertainty, made famous by Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane: four plausible claims about rescuing trapped miners appear to entail a contradiction by modus ponens.

    Coordinates: 4.3.1 2.6Niko Kolodny, Derek Parfit, Frank Jackson

  • Mohist argument against fatalism

    The Mohist case, judged by three standards (root, source and use), that the doctrine of fate is unsupported by history, unattested by the senses and harmful in practice.

    Coordinates: 1.7 4.2.2Mozi

  • Moore's paradox

    The absurdity of saying or believing something of the form 'p, but I do not believe that p', although such a statement may be true and is not a contradiction.

    Coordinates: 4.3.2 6.10.2G. E. Moore, Bas van Fraassen

  • Moral argument for God

    A family of arguments that the existence or character of morality, such as objective obligation, moral knowledge or human dignity, is best explained by, or practically requires, the existence of God.

    Coordinates: 1.8 3.2.6Immanuel Kant, Henry Sidgwick, Robert Adams

  • Moral equality of combatants

    The thesis that soldiers who fight within the rules of discrimination, proportionality and necessity act permissibly whichever side they fight for, so that the justice of a war's cause makes no difference to what its combatants may do.

    Coordinates: 3.3.5 6.2 6.4.3Michael Walzer, Jeff McMahan

  • Moral luck

    Being morally judged for things that depend on factors beyond one's control, such as how one's actions happen to turn out.

    Coordinates: 1.7 3.2 3.4Bernard Williams, Thomas Nagel, Immanuel Kant

  • Moral Twin Earth argument

    Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons's thought experiment against Cornell moral realism: communities whose moral words are causally regulated by different properties seem to disagree rather than to talk past each other.

    Coordinates: 3.1.2 3.1.1 6.10.1G. E. Moore, Hilary Putnam, Ruth Millikan

  • Mozi's argument for identifying upward

    The Mohist argument of Mozi Books 11-13 that, because a world without government contains as many standards of righteousness (yi) as people and so falls into disorder, order requires a hierarchy of the worthiest in which everyone identifies upward with superiors' judgements and finally with Heaven's.

    Coordinates: 6.4 6.4.3Mozi, Thomas Hobbes

  • Mullā Ṣadrā's argument for substantial motion

    Mullā Ṣadrā's argument that change occurs in the substance of existence itself, not only in accidents, so that existents are continually renewed and time is a dimension of existence.

    Coordinates: 1.1.1 1.1Mulla Sadra, Aristotle

  • Mullā Ṣadrā's argument for the primacy of existence

    Mullā Ṣadrā's case that existence, not quiddity (essence), is what is fundamentally real in things, with quiddities derivative limits posited by the mind, reversing the priority he took to be implied by treating existence as superadded to essence.

    Coordinates: 1.1 1.10Mulla Sadra, Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi

  • Multiple realizability

    The thesis that a single mental kind, such as pain, could be realised by many different physical kinds, in brains of different species, in computers or in alien physiology. It was the main argument against the mind–brain identity theory.

    Coordinates: 1.3.1 1.11 6.14Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, David Lewis

  • Multiverse hypothesis

    The hypothesis that our universe is one of a vast ensemble across which laws or constants vary, offered as an explanation of fine-tuning for life; contested over the inverse gambler's fallacy and testability.

    Coordinates: 1.2.2 1.2 1.8Ian Hacking, Nick Bostrom

  • Murderer at the door

    Kant's case, from his reply to Benjamin Constant, of whether one may lie to a would-be murderer who asks where his intended victim is; the standard test of whether a duty-based ethics can treat truthfulness as exceptionless.

    Coordinates: 3.2.2 3.2Immanuel Kant, Christine Korsgaard, John Rawls

  • Nāgārjuna's argument against causation

    Nagarjuna's argument that nothing with intrinsic nature (svabhāva) can be produced from itself, from something else, from both or from neither, so that cause and effect must be mutually dependent and empty.

    Coordinates: 1.4.2 1.1.1Nagarjuna

  • Nagel's argument for the absurd

    Thomas Nagel's argument, in 'The Absurd' (1971), that life is absurd not because we are small or mortal but because we cannot help taking our lives seriously while always being able to step back and see that seriousness as arbitrary.

    Coordinates: 6.21Thomas Nagel, Albert Camus, David Benatar

  • The natural duty argument for political obligation

    The argument that citizens are bound to obey their state not because they consented but because everyone has a natural duty to support and comply with just institutions that apply to them.

    Coordinates: 6.4.3 6.4John Rawls

  • New evil demon problem

    An objection to reliabilism and other externalist theories: a deceived subject internally just like us seems as justified as we are, even though her belief-forming processes are unreliable.

    Coordinates: 2.3.2 2.3 2.4Alvin Goldman, Timothy Williamson, Laurence BonJour

  • New riddle of induction

    Nelson Goodman's problem that the same evidence equally supports 'all emeralds are green' and 'all emeralds are grue', so induction needs a principled way to decide which predicates may be projected.

    Coordinates: 6.8 2.6 2.8Nelson Goodman, David Hume, John Rawls

  • Newcomb's problem

    A decision puzzle in which a reliable predictor has filled an opaque box according to what it predicted you would choose; dominance reasoning says take both boxes, expected-utility reasoning seems to say take only one.

    Coordinates: 2.6 6.5Robert Nozick, Robert Stalnaker, David Lewis

  • Nishida's argument for pure experience

    Nishida Kitarō's argument in An Inquiry into the Good (1911) that experience prior to the split between subject and object is the one reality, from which knower and known, judgement, thinking and willing are later differentiated.

    Coordinates: 2.2.1 1.1Nishida Kitarō, Tanabe Hajime

  • No-miracles argument

    An argument for scientific realism: the predictive and explanatory success of our best theories would be a miracle unless those theories were at least approximately true.

    Coordinates: 6.8.2 6.8Hilary Putnam, Bas van Fraassen, Larry Laudan

  • Non-identity problem

    The puzzle, developed by Derek Parfit, that choices which seem clearly wrong, such as depleting resources or conceiving a child in poor circumstances, may make no one worse off, because the people affected would not otherwise have existed.

    Coordinates: 3.5 3.3.1Derek Parfit

  • Nyāya argument for testimony as a distinct pramāṇa

    The classical Nyāya case, against Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist reductionists, that knowledge from the word of a trustworthy speaker (śabda) is an independent means of knowledge and not a kind of inference.

    Coordinates: 2.2.4 2.2Gautama (Akṣapāda), Vātsyāyana, Udayana

  • Nyāya arguments for Īśvara

    The classical Nyāya arguments, most fully set out by Udayana, that the world's products and the Vedas require an intelligent, omniscient maker (Īśvara), and the Buddhist and Mīmāṃsā critiques they provoked.

    Coordinates: 1.8 1.2.1 2.2.5Udayana, Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita

  • Nyāya five-membered inference

    The Nyāya form for presenting an inference to convince another person (Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.32–39): thesis, reason, example, application and conclusion, illustrated by inferring fire on a hill from smoke.

    Coordinates: 4.2.2 4.1 2.2Gautama (Akṣapāda), Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara

  • Ockham's argument that moral value depends on the divine will

    William of Ockham's reasoning, from a passage in his theological works, that acts such as theft or adultery involve evil insofar as the agent is bound by a divine command to the opposite, and could even be meritorious if God commanded them; scholars dispute how this fits his ethics of right reason.

    Coordinates: 3.2.6 6.1William of Ockham, Thomas Aquinas, Marilyn McCord Adams

  • Okin's argument that justice must extend to the family

    Susan Moller Okin's argument in Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989) that Rawls assumed families to be just although his theory relies on them to form citizens' sense of justice, that the gender-structured family violates equal opportunity and cannot teach justice, and that a theory of justice must therefore apply to the family; Rawls replied in 1997 and Okin answered him in 2004.

    Coordinates: 6.4.1 6.29 6.4Susan Moller Okin, John Rawls

  • Open question argument

    G. E. Moore's argument against defining 'good': for any proposed natural definition, a competent speaker can still sensibly ask whether something with that property is good, so the definition cannot be correct.

    Coordinates: 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1G. E. Moore, Henry Sidgwick, Philip Pettit

  • Original position

    John Rawls's hypothetical choice situation in which representatives of free and equal persons, behind a veil of ignorance, choose principles of justice for the basic structure of society. The veil of ignorance is one of its conditions, not the whole device.

    Coordinates: 6.4.1 3.2.4John Rawls, David Hume, Immanuel Kant

  • Oruka's argument from philosophic sagacity

    H. Odera Oruka's argument that dialogues with philosophic sages show critical, individual reflection on fundamental questions in African societies independently of literacy and academic training, answering the charge that African thought is only anonymous collective belief.

    Coordinates: 6.31 2.7H. Odera Oruka, Paulin Hountondji, Peter Bodunrin

  • Ownerless suffering argument (Śāntideva)

    Śāntideva's argument in the Bodhicaryāvatāra that, since there is no real self to whom suffering belongs, suffering should be prevented simply because it is suffering, whoever's it is.

    Coordinates: 1.3.2 3.2 3.4Śāntideva, Derek Parfit

  • Pairing problem

    An objection to interactionist substance dualism, associated with Jaegwon Kim: if souls are not in space, nothing seems able to make a particular soul causally paired with one particular body rather than another.

    Coordinates: 1.3.1 1.4.2Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa, René Descartes

  • Paley's watchmaker/design argument

    William Paley's argument in Natural Theology (1802), chapters 1–3, that just as the contrivance of a watch proves that it had a maker, the greater contrivance of organisms such as the eye proves an intelligent designer of nature.

    Coordinates: 1.8 6.12 6.1William Paley, David Hume, Thomas Aquinas

  • Paradox of analysis

    The puzzle of how a philosophical analysis can be both correct and informative: if analysandum and analysans mean the same, the analysis seems trivial; if they do not, it seems incorrect.

    Coordinates: 6.10 3.1.2Plato, Gottlob Frege, G. E. Moore

  • Paradox of deontology

    The puzzle that deontological constraints forbid an agent to violate one person's rights even to prevent several equally serious violations by others, although more violations seem worse than fewer.

    Coordinates: 3.2.2Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, Frances Kamm

  • Paradox of fiction

    The puzzle, whose modern debate began with Colin Radford's paper of 1975, of how we can be genuinely moved by characters and events we know do not exist.

    Coordinates: 5.8 5.5Noël Carroll, Kendall Walton

  • Paradox of free choice permission

    The puzzle that 'You may have soup or salad' seems to imply 'You may have soup and you may have salad', although adding that inference to standard modal logic leads to absurd results.

    Coordinates: 4.3.1 4.3 6.10G. H. von Wright, Hans Kamp

  • Paradox of horror

    The puzzle, posed by Noël Carroll in The Philosophy of Horror (1990), of why people seek out fictions designed to frighten and disgust them; Carroll's answer appeals to curiosity about the monster, and remains disputed.

    Coordinates: 5.5 6.32 6.23Noël Carroll, Berys Gaut

  • Paradox of suspense

    The puzzle of how readers and viewers who already know a story's outcome can still feel suspense, given that suspense seems to require uncertainty.

    Coordinates: 5.5 5.8 6.32Noël Carroll

  • Paradox of the stone

    The dilemma whether an omnipotent being can create a stone too heavy for it to lift: either answer seems to name something it cannot do.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8J. L. Mackie, Richard Swinburne, René Descartes

  • Paradox of tragedy

    The puzzle of how audiences can take pleasure in tragic and other painful art whose proper appreciation involves distressing emotions such as pity, fear and grief.

    Coordinates: 5.5 5.8David Hume, Edmund Burke, Aristotle

  • Paradox of voting

    The puzzle, named by Anthony Downs, that for most individuals the expected costs of voting appear to exceed its expected benefits, so that it is hard to see why rational people vote.

    Coordinates: 6.4 2.6 6.5Jason Brennan

  • The paradoxes of material implication

    The awkward consequences of reading 'if A, then B' as the material conditional, true whenever A is false or B is true, and the main attempts to defend or replace that reading.

    Coordinates: 4.1.1 4.4 4.5Paul Grice, Frank Jackson, Robert Stalnaker

  • Paradoxes of toleration

    Three puzzles in the concept of toleration: whether prejudice can ground toleration, why it could be right to tolerate what is wrong, and how toleration can set limits without becoming intolerant.

    Coordinates: 6.4.2

  • Pascal's mugging

    A decision-theoretic puzzle, published by Nick Bostrom in 2009, in which expected-utility reasoning seems to require handing one's wallet to a mugger who promises an astronomically large but wildly improbable reward.

    Coordinates: 2.6 2.8 3.2.1Nick Bostrom, Blaise Pascal

  • Pascal's wager

    Blaise Pascal's argument that it is rational to wager for God, because the possible infinite gain of doing so outweighs any finite cost, whatever the evidence; an early contribution to decision theory.

    Coordinates: 6.1 2.6Blaise Pascal, Ian Hacking, J. L. Mackie

  • Pateman's sexual contract argument

    Carole Pateman's argument in The Sexual Contract (1988) that the original social contract presupposes a sexual contract among men securing their access to and command over women, so that modern civil society transforms paternal into fraternal patriarchy, and that contracts which alienate the use of a person's capacities, such as marriage and employment, create subordination rather than freedom.

    Coordinates: 6.29 3.2.4 6.4Carole Pateman, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke

  • Penal abolitionism

    The position that legal punishment, or some major form of it such as imprisonment, should be abolished rather than reformed, because it cannot be justified.

    Coordinates: 6.2 6.4 1.7Angela Davis, Derk Pereboom

  • Pessimistic meta-induction

    An argument against scientific realism: since many successful theories in the history of science were later rejected as false, our current successful theories are probably false too.

    Coordinates: 6.8.2 6.8.3 6.8Larry Laudan, Hilary Putnam, Philip Kitcher

  • Petitionary prayer

    Prayer in which someone asks God for something; philosophically, the problem of how such requests can make a difference to a God who is perfectly good, omniscient and unchanging.

    Coordinates: 6.1Thomas Aquinas, Richard Swinburne

  • Philosophical anarchism

    The thesis that no state, or no existing state, has legitimate authority or a claim to its subjects' obedience, held without the further conclusion that states must be resisted or abolished.

    Coordinates: 6.4.3 6.4 6.2Henry David Thoreau, Peter Kropotkin, Joseph Raz

  • Plantinga's modal ontological argument

    Alvin Plantinga's 1974 version of the ontological argument: if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then, given his definition of maximal greatness and the logic of possible worlds, such a being exists in every possible world, and therefore actually exists.

    Coordinates: 1.8 6.1Alvin Plantinga, Peter van Inwagen

  • Plato's argument against imitative poetry

    The case made in Book 10 of Plato's Republic that imitative poetry and painting produce mere images of appearance, require no knowledge and strengthen the irrational part of the soul.

    Coordinates: 5.6 5.2 5.8Plato, Aristotle

  • Plato's argument at the end of Republic V

    Plato's argument in Republic V (474b–480a) that knowledge and belief (doxa) are different capacities, distinguished by what each is set over and what each achieves, so that the lovers of sights and sounds who deny Forms have belief, not knowledge.

    Coordinates: 2.1 1.1.2 2.2Plato, Socrates

  • Plato's argument that rhetoric is a knack

    The argument Plato gives to Socrates in the Gorgias that rhetoric is not a craft but a knack, a form of flattery that aims at pleasure without knowledge of the good.

    Coordinates: 4.2.3Plato, Socrates, Gorgias

  • Pogge's argument that the global order harms the poor

    Thomas Pogge's argument, in World Poverty and Human Rights (2002), that the affluent countries' citizens, by taking part in imposing a global institutional order that predictably produces severe poverty when a feasible alternative exists, violate a negative duty not to harm the global poor; the duty is not merely one of assistance.

    Coordinates: 6.4.1 6.4 6.4.3John Rawls

  • Popper's falsifiability criterion of demarcation

    Karl Popper's argument, in Logik der Forschung (1935) and The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), that since universal theories cannot be verified but can contradict observation, empirical science is marked by falsifiability, upheld by methodological rules against ad hoc rescue, with surviving theories corroborated, never proved.

    Coordinates: 6.8 6.8.3Karl Popper, David Hume, Albert Einstein

  • The positivist argument that religious language is meaningless

    The logical positivists' argument, popularised by A. J. Ayer (1936), that statements about God are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable and so lack cognitive meaning, which makes theism, atheism and agnosticism equally empty.

    Coordinates: 6.1 6.10 1.8A. J. Ayer, Moritz Schlick, C. D. Broad

  • Preface paradox

    The puzzle of an author who rationally believes every claim in her book and also rationally believes, as her preface admits, that at least one of them is false.

    Coordinates: 2.6 2.8

  • Priest's argument for dialetheism from the liar

    Graham Priest's argument that the liar paradox shows some contradictions to be true, since every consistent solution generates a 'revenge' paradox, so that the right response is a paraconsistent logic rather than abandoning naive truth.

    Coordinates: 4.4.2 4.5Graham Priest

  • Principle of fair play

    The principle that those who benefit from a cooperative scheme sustained by others' restraint owe similar restraint in return; a leading but contested ground of political obligation.

    Coordinates: 6.4.3 3.2.4 6.2H. L. A. Hart, John Rawls, Robert Nozick

  • Prisoner's dilemma

    A two-person game in which each player does better by defecting whatever the other does, yet both do worse if both defect than if both cooperate. It is the standard model of conflict between individual and collective rationality.

    Coordinates: 6.5 2.6 3.2.4David Gauthier, Philip Pettit, Thomas Hobbes

  • Private language argument

    Wittgenstein's argument that there could not be a language whose words refer to what only the speaker can know, such as her own immediate sensations, because such words could have no standard of correct use.

    Coordinates: 6.10 1.3 2.4.1Ludwig Wittgenstein, Saul Kripke, Cora Diamond

  • Privation theory of evil

    The view, Neoplatonic in origin and made central to Christian thought by Augustine, that evil is not a substance or positive property but the lack of a good that ought to be present, so that God, who creates only what exists, creates no evil. Contested above all by the objection from pain.

    Coordinates: 1.8 6.1 3.5Augustine of Hippo, Plotinus

  • Problem of animal suffering

    The form of the problem of evil that turns on the vast suffering of non-human animals over evolutionary time, much of it long before humans existed.

    Coordinates: 6.1 3.3.6

  • Problem of easy knowledge

    Stewart Cohen's objection that any theory allowing knowledge from a source before one knows the source is reliable lets us reach anti-sceptical or reliability conclusions far too cheaply.

    Coordinates: 2.3.2 2.4William Alston, Fred Dretske, Alvin Goldman

  • Problem of evil

    The question whether the evil in the world makes it unreasonable to believe in a God who is all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good. Theodicies and defences are responses to it; the problem itself is the challenge they answer.

    Coordinates: 1.8 6.1J. L. Mackie, William Rowe, David Hume

  • Problem of hell

    The difficulty of reconciling the doctrine that some persons suffer separation from God for ever with God's perfect love, justice and power.

    Coordinates: 6.1Augustine of Hippo, Anselm, William Lane Craig

  • Problem of logical omniscience

    The problem that standard possible-worlds epistemic logic implies that agents know every logical truth and every logical consequence of what they know, which no finite thinker does.

    Coordinates: 4.3.2 2.8Jaakko Hintikka, Robert Stalnaker

  • Problem of material constitution

    The puzzle of how a statue relates to the clay it is made of: they share their matter and location, yet seem to differ in their histories or modal properties and so seem to be two things.

    Coordinates: 1.1.3 1.4.1Chrysippus, Peter Geach, W. V. O. Quine

  • Problem of multiple generality

    The problem of analysing sentences with more than one expression of generality, such as 'everyone loves someone', and the inferences that depend on them; Frege's quantifier-variable logic solved it in a way the syllogistic and Boole's algebra did not.

    Coordinates: 4.1.2 4.1.3 4.1Gottlob Frege, Aristotle, George Boole

  • Problem of no best world

    The argument that if every world God could create could be bettered, no creator could be essentially unsurpassable, since whatever it made it could have made better.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8G. W. Leibniz, William Rowe, Robert Adams

  • Problem of old evidence

    A difficulty for Bayesian confirmation theory: evidence that is already known has probability one and so seems unable to confirm a new theory, yet known facts plainly can confirm theories.

    Coordinates: 2.8 6.8Albert Einstein, Richard Jeffrey, Bas van Fraassen

  • Problem of other minds

    The problem of how we know, or can even make sense of the idea, that beings other than ourselves have thoughts and feelings, given that we observe only their bodies and behaviour.

    Coordinates: 2.4.1 1.3René Descartes, Thomas Nagel, John Stuart Mill

  • Problem of temporary intrinsics

    David Lewis's argument that one thing cannot have incompatible intrinsic properties at different times unless it has distinct temporal parts, used to support perdurantism.

    Coordinates: 1.4.1David Lewis, Peter Geach, Peter van Inwagen

  • Problem of the criterion

    The puzzle that we seem unable to say which things we know without a criterion of knowledge, and unable to find or test a criterion without already knowing which things we know.

    Coordinates: 2.4 2.3Roderick Chisholm, Sextus Empiricus, Michel de Montaigne

  • Problem of the many

    Peter Unger's puzzle that, because ordinary objects such as clouds have fuzzy boundaries, there seem to be many equally good candidates for being the one cloud we see.

    Coordinates: 1.1.3 4.4.1Peter Geach, David Lewis, Peter van Inwagen

  • Procreation asymmetry

    The pair of judgements that creating a miserable person is wrong and makes things worse, while not creating a happy person is permissible and does not make things worse.

    Coordinates: 3.5 3.3.1Peter Singer, William MacAskill, David Benatar

  • Procreative beneficence

    Julian Savulescu's principle (2001) that people choosing which of their possible children to have should select the child expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, on the relevant available information.

    Coordinates: 3.3.1 6.28 3.5

  • Rachels's argument about active and passive euthanasia

    James Rachels's argument in 'Active and Passive Euthanasia' (1975) that killing is not in itself worse than letting die, shown by a pair of cases differing only in that respect; the paper, as its title says, applies the point to active and passive euthanasia.

    Coordinates: 3.3.1 3.2.2James Rachels, Frances Kamm, Shelly Kagan

  • Radical interpretation

    Donald Davidson's thought experiment of interpreting a wholly unknown language from scratch, using only evidence about which sentences speakers hold true in which circumstances, constrained by the principle of charity. David Lewis developed a rival version.

    Coordinates: 6.10 1.3.3Donald Davidson, W. V. O. Quine, David Lewis

  • Ratnakīrti's formulation of the proof of momentariness

    Ratnakīrti's systematic statement, in his two Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi treatises, of the Buddhist inference that whatever exists is momentary because existing is being causally capable; he reorganises arguments found in Dharmakīrti and his teacher Jñānaśrīmitra rather than inventing them.

    Coordinates: 1.4.1 1.4.2Ratnakīrti, Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita

  • Raven paradox

    Carl Hempel's puzzle that, given two plausible principles of confirmation, observing a green apple confirms that all ravens are black.

    Coordinates: 6.8 2.8Carl Hempel, Nelson Goodman

  • Rawls's argument for the difference principle

    Rawls's argument that free and equal persons choosing principles of justice behind a veil of ignorance would permit social and economic inequalities only if they benefit the least advantaged.

    Coordinates: 6.4.1 3.2.4John Rawls, Robert Nozick, G. A. Cohen

  • Raz's service conception of authority

    Joseph Raz's argument that a directive is legitimately authoritative for someone when following it would help them conform better to reasons that already apply to them than trying to act on those reasons directly.

    Coordinates: 6.4.3 6.2Joseph Raz

  • Reduplication argument

    Bernard Williams's argument that, because two people could equally inherit a dead man's apparent memories and two people cannot be one, psychological continuity cannot by itself secure personal identity.

    Coordinates: 1.3.2Bernard Williams, Robert Nozick, David Lewis

  • Regress problem

    The problem that if every justified belief must be supported by another justified belief, the chain of reasons must go on for ever, loop back on itself, or stop somewhere; and each option seems unsatisfactory.

    Coordinates: 2.3 2.3.1 2.4Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus, René Descartes

  • Replaceability argument

    The argument, associated with Peter Singer, that killing a non-self-conscious animal need not be wrong if it lived a good life, dies painlessly and is replaced by another animal with a comparably good life.

    Coordinates: 3.3.6 6.26 3.2.1Peter Singer, Tom Regan

  • Repugnant conclusion

    Derek Parfit's name for the implication that, for any very large population with excellent lives, some much larger population whose members have lives barely worth living would be better.

    Coordinates: 3.5 3.2.1Derek Parfit, David Benatar

  • Responsibility gap

    The worry, stated by Andreas Matthias, that learning and autonomous machines can produce harmful outcomes for which no human can fairly be held morally responsible.

    Coordinates: 6.16 6.17Helen Nissenbaum, Luciano Floridi, Daniel Dennett

  • Retributivism

    The theory that punishment is justified because, and to the extent that, wrongdoers deserve it: those who commit serious wrongs deserve proportionate punishment, and the innocent may never be punished.

    Coordinates: 6.2 6.4 1.7H. L. A. Hart, Robert Nozick, Immanuel Kant

  • Revenge problem

    The recurring difficulty that the very notions a theory uses to solve the Liar paradox can be used to build a new Liar that the theory cannot handle.

    Coordinates: 2.5 4.4.2 4.5Saul Kripke, Hartry Field, Graham Priest

  • Rigid designation

    The property of a term that designates the same object in every possible world in which that object exists, and nothing else, as proper names do according to Saul Kripke, unlike most descriptions.

    Coordinates: 6.10.1 1.6 1.6.1Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, David Lewis

  • Rollback argument

    Peter van Inwagen's argument that if a choice is undetermined, replaying the universe many times would reveal a stable ratio of outcomes, showing the choice to be a matter of chance and so not free.

    Coordinates: 1.7Peter van Inwagen, Robert Kane

  • Ross's paradox

    Alf Ross's 1941 observation that if obligation is closed under logical consequence, an obligation to mail a letter yields an obligation to mail it or burn it.

    Coordinates: 4.3.1Kit Fine

  • Rousseau's argument for legitimate authority

    Rousseau's argument in The Social Contract (1762) that political authority is legitimate only if it is the authority of the general will, in which each citizen, uniting with all, obeys only himself.

    Coordinates: 6.4.3 6.4.2 3.2.4Jean-Jacques Rousseau

  • Rule-following paradox

    Saul Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein: no fact about a speaker's past behaviour or mind settles whether she meant addition or some deviant function by 'plus', so it seems there is no fact about what anyone means.

    Coordinates: 6.10 1.3.3Saul Kripke, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Simon Blackburn

  • Russell's paradox

    The contradiction that arises from the set of all sets that are not members of themselves: it is a member of itself if and only if it is not. It showed that naive set theory and Frege's logical foundations of arithmetic were inconsistent.

    Coordinates: 6.9 4.5 4.1.2Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege, A. N. Whitehead

  • Saadia's four proofs of creation

    Saadia Gaon's four arguments, in the First Treatise of The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, that the world had a beginning: from the finitude of heaven and earth, from composition, from accidents, and from the impossibility of traversing an infinite past.

    Coordinates: 1.2.1 1.8 1.4Saadia Gaon, John Philoponus, Maimonides

  • Sadistic conclusion

    Gustaf Arrhenius's name for the implication of some population theories that adding lives with negative welfare can be better than adding lives with positive welfare.

    Coordinates: 3.5 3.2.1

  • Sahopalambhaniyama argument

    Dharmakīrti's argument that, because an object such as blue and the cognition of it are invariably apprehended together, they are not different; it was read as supporting Yogācāra idealism.

    Coordinates: 1.1 2.2.1 1.3Dharmakīrti, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Adi Shankara

  • Salazar Bondy's argument from dependency to inauthenticity

    Augusto Salazar Bondy's argument in ¿Existe una filosofía de nuestra América? (1968) that a culture formed under dependence and domination produces imitative, inauthentic philosophy, so that authentic Latin American philosophy awaits a transformation of the conditions that produce dependence; Leopoldo Zea's circumstantialist reply is its principal objection.

    Coordinates: 6.31 6.6Augusto Salazar Bondy, Leopoldo Zea, Bartolomé de las Casas

  • Sandel's argument from giftedness

    Michael Sandel's argument that genetic and other enhancement is objectionable even when safe, fair and freely chosen, because it expresses a drive to mastery that fails to appreciate the gifted character of human powers and achievements.

    Coordinates: 3.3.1 6.25 3.5Michael Sandel, Frances Kamm

  • Śāntarakṣita's neither-one-nor-many argument

    Śāntarakṣita's argument, in the Ornament of the Middle Way, that nothing has an intrinsic nature because nothing is in reality either truly one or truly many, and these two options are exhaustive.

    Coordinates: 1.1 1.1.1 1.1.3Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Tsongkhapa

  • Sartre's argument that bad faith needs no unconscious

    Jean-Paul Sartre's argument in Being and Nothingness that self-deception cannot be explained by an unconscious censor, and must be understood instead through the double structure of human reality as facticity and transcendence.

    Coordinates: 1.7 1.3 6.21Jean-Paul Sartre

  • Scandal of deduction

    The problem that standard theories of semantic information assign logical truths, and so valid deductions, no information at all, although deduction seems to tell us something.

    Coordinates: 6.18 4.1 4.3.2Jaakko Hintikka, Rudolf Carnap, Ludwig Wittgenstein

  • Sceptical theism

    A family of responses to arguments from evil: we have little reason to expect to see God's reasons for permitting evil, so our failure to see them is weak evidence that there are none.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8William Rowe, Richard Swinburne, William Alston

  • Schellenberg's argument from nonresistant nonbelief

    J. L. Schellenberg's argument, in its mature form (2007, 2015), that a perfectly loving God would always be open to a conscious relationship with every capable person, so that no one would be a nonbeliever without resisting God; since some people are nonresistant nonbelievers, there is no such God.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8J. L. Schellenberg, John Hick, Richard Swinburne

  • Scotus's argument for an infinite being

    John Duns Scotus's demonstration, in the Ordinatio and A Treatise on God as First Principle, that there is a being first in efficient causality, finality and pre-eminence, that this being is infinite and that there is only one; its modal version argues from the possibility of a first cause to its actual existence.

    Coordinates: 1.8 1.2.1 1.6Duns Scotus, Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle

  • Searle's account of institutional facts

    John Searle's argument that institutional facts, such as money, borders and property, exist because of collective acceptance of status functions under constitutive rules of the form 'X counts as Y in C', which carry rights and duties.

    Coordinates: 6.7 6.15John Searle

  • Sense and reference

    Frege's distinction between what an expression picks out (its reference) and the way it presents that thing (its sense), introduced to explain informative identity statements.

    Coordinates: 6.10.1 6.10 1.3.3Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Saul Kripke

  • Ship of Theseus

    The ancient puzzle of a ship whose planks are replaced one by one: is the repaired ship the original? If the old planks are reassembled, which of the two ships is Theseus's? It is the classic test case for theories of identity, persistence and constitution.

    Coordinates: 1.4.1 1.1.3 1.3.2Thomas Hobbes, Chrysippus, Aristotle

  • Situationism (moral psychology)

    The position, drawn from social psychology, that features of situations explain much more of people's behaviour than is usually supposed and robust character traits correspondingly less; a challenge to virtue ethics.

    Coordinates: 3.4 3.2.3Gilbert Harman, Robert Adams

  • Sleeping Beauty problem

    A puzzle about self-locating belief: Beauty is woken once if a fair coin lands heads and twice, with memory erased, if it lands tails. On waking, should her credence in heads be one half or one third?

    Coordinates: 2.8Adam Elga, Robert Stalnaker, David Lewis

  • Slingshot argument

    An argument, made famous by Donald Davidson, that if true sentences correspond to facts at all, they all correspond to one and the same 'Great Fact'.

    Coordinates: 2.5 6.10.1 1.1Donald Davidson, Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Searle

  • Socrates's argument from the Laws in the Crito

    The argument Plato gives Socrates in the Crito for refusing to escape his death sentence: by living in Athens he agreed to obey its laws, owes them the debt of a child, and must either persuade them or obey.

    Coordinates: 6.4.3 6.2 3.2.4Socrates, Plato, David Hume

  • Sor Juana's argument for women's learning

    The case Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz made in her Response to Sor Filotea (1691) that a woman may rightly devote herself to study, and that women may study, write and teach, drawing on scripture, scholastic philosophy and the example of learned women.

    Coordinates: 6.3 6.29 2.7Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle

  • Sorites paradox

    The argument that, since removing one grain never turns a heap into a non-heap, a single grain is a heap; or, run upwards, that a million grains are not. It turns on the tolerance of vague terms.

    Coordinates: 4.4.1 4.5Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, W. V. O. Quine

  • Soul-making theodicy

    The theodicy, given its classic modern form by John Hick in Evil and the God of Love, that God permits suffering and wrongdoing because a world of real challenges is needed for free creatures to grow from moral immaturity towards goodness and fellowship with God. Hick named its type after Irenaeus.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8John Hick, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Richard Swinburne

  • Speaker meaning

    What a speaker means by an utterance on a particular occasion, as distinct from what the words mean in the language. Paul Grice analysed it in terms of intentions aimed at being recognised by the hearer.

    Coordinates: 6.10 6.10.2 1.3.3Paul Grice, Peter Strawson, Saul Kripke

  • Species problem

    The problem of saying what species are, given that biologists use more than twenty competing species concepts and that species seem to be evolving lineages rather than kinds defined by essences.

    Coordinates: 6.12Aristotle, Philip Kitcher, Ruth Millikan

  • Sphoṭa

    In Indian philosophy of language, especially in the grammarian Bhartrhari, the meaning-bearing linguistic unit, as opposed to the passing sounds that reveal it. For Bhartrhari, the sentence is grasped as a single, undivided whole.

    Coordinates: 6.10Bhartrhari, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa

  • Spinoza's argument on prophecy and Scripture

    Baruch Spinoza's argument in the Theological-Political Treatise (1670) that the prophets excelled in imagination rather than intellect, so that Scripture teaches obedience and charity, not speculative truth, and philosophy must be free.

    Coordinates: 2.2.5 6.1 6.4.2Baruch Spinoza, Maimonides

  • St Petersburg paradox

    The puzzle of a coin-tossing game whose expected monetary value is infinite, so that expected-value reasoning seems to recommend paying any finite price to play, although almost every actual payoff is small.

    Coordinates: 2.6 6.5Richard Jeffrey, Frank Ramsey

  • Strawson's argument from the reactive attitudes

    P. F. Strawson's argument in 'Freedom and Resentment' (1962) that holding people responsible consists in reactive attitudes such as resentment and gratitude, which the practice withdraws only on grounds of excuse or exemption; since determinism would not make either ground hold universally, and abandoning the attitudes wholesale is not a human option, determinism does not threaten responsibility.

    Coordinates: 1.7 3.4Peter Strawson, Derk Pereboom

  • Suhrawardī's argument for knowledge by presence

    Suhrawardī's argument that self-awareness is not mediated by any representation or form of the self, so that some knowledge consists in the immediate presence of the known to the knower, a model he extends to vision and to God's knowledge.

    Coordinates: 2.2 1.3.2Suhrawardi, Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra

  • Suhrawardī's critique of Peripatetic definition

    Suhrawardi's argument, in The Philosophy of Illumination, that no human being can frame an essential definition by genus and differentia as Aristotle and Ibn Sina required, so that knowledge of what a thing is must rest on direct acquaintance.

    Coordinates: 2.1 2.2.2 6.10Suhrawardi, Aristotle, Ibn Sina

  • Surprise examination paradox

    The puzzle of a teacher who announces a surprise test next week, and a student who argues by elimination that no day is possible, although a test given midweek still surprises him.

    Coordinates: 4.3.2 2.8W. V. O. Quine, Kurt Gödel

  • Swampman

    Donald Davidson's imagined molecule-for-molecule duplicate of himself, created by chance in a swamp, with no history; it tests theories on which mental content depends on evolutionary or learning history.

    Coordinates: 1.3.3 6.12Donald Davidson, Ruth Millikan, Fred Dretske

  • Symbol grounding problem

    Stevan Harnad's problem of how the symbols of a formal system can have meaning intrinsic to the system, rather than meaning that depends wholly on interpretation by an outside mind.

    Coordinates: 6.17 1.3.3John Searle

  • Szasz's myth-of-mental-illness argument

    Thomas Szasz's argument, first published in 1960, that genuine disease requires a bodily lesion, so that what psychiatry calls mental illness is a metaphor for problems in living and moral conflict.

    Coordinates: 6.14 6.13Michel Foucault

  • Tarski's semantic conception of truth

    Alfred Tarski's account (1933-35; 1944) of what an adequate definition of truth must achieve, material adequacy (Convention T) and formal correctness, together with his argument from the Liar that a language containing its own truth predicate and obeying classical logic is inconsistent, so that truth must be defined in a richer metalanguage.

    Coordinates: 2.5 4.5 6.10Alfred Tarski, Hartry Field, Hilary Putnam

  • Teleological suspension of the ethical

    The possibility, explored in Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling through Abraham's readiness to sacrifice Isaac, that the ethical understood as the universal may be suspended for a higher end: the individual's absolute relation to God.

    Coordinates: 3.2.6 6.1Søren Kierkegaard, G. W. F. Hegel

  • Teletransportation thought experiment

    Derek Parfit's case of a machine that records a person's exact state, destroys the body and builds a duplicate on Mars: is the person who steps out on Mars the person who stepped in?

    Coordinates: 1.3.2Derek Parfit

  • Third Man argument

    An argument in Plato's Parmenides (132a-b) that the principles behind the theory of Forms generate an infinite regress of Forms of Largeness; the name comes from Aristotle.

    Coordinates: 1.1.2 1.1Plato, Aristotle

  • Thomson's violinist argument

    Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument in 'A Defense of Abortion' (1971) that even if the fetus has a right to life, that right does not include a right to the use of another person's body, so abortion is not always unjust.

    Coordinates: 3.3.1 3.3 6.4.2Judith Jarvis Thomson

  • Toegye's argument for the alternate issuance of the Four and the Seven

    Yi Hwang (Toegye)'s argument, developed in letters with Ki Taesŭng (Kobong) from 1559, that the Four Sprouts arise when principle (i) issues and vital force (ki) follows, and the Seven Emotions when vital force issues and principle follows it.

    Coordinates: 6.23 3.4Yi Hwang (Toegye), Mencius, Zhu Xi

  • Too many thinkers problem

    The objection that if we are not human animals, then wherever a person is there are two thinkers, the person and the animal that shares her brain.

    Coordinates: 1.3.2

  • Transcendental argument

    An argument that something the sceptic doubts must be the case, because it is a necessary condition of something the sceptic accepts, such as having experience, thought or language.

    Coordinates: 2.4 2.4.1Immanuel Kant, Peter Strawson, Hilary Putnam

  • Transplant objection

    The leading objection to animalism: if your cerebrum were transplanted into another head, you would seem to go with it, leaving the organism behind, so you are not that organism.

    Coordinates: 1.3.2John Locke, Bernard Williams

  • Trolley problem

    The puzzle, first posed by Philippa Foot and reshaped by Judith Jarvis Thomson, of why it seems permissible to divert a runaway trolley so that it kills one person instead of five, when killing one to save five is usually thought wrong.

    Coordinates: 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.3.4Philippa Foot, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Derek Parfit

  • Turing test

    Alan Turing's 1950 proposal to replace the question 'Can machines think?' with a game in which an interrogator, conversing by text, tries to tell a machine from a human; passing is offered as evidence of intelligence.

    Coordinates: 6.17 1.3Alan Turing, John Searle, Ned Block

  • Twin Earth

    Hilary Putnam's imagined planet, identical to Earth except that the watery stuff is not H2O; it is used to argue that meaning and mental content are not fixed by what is in the head.

    Coordinates: 6.10.1 1.3.3Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, David Chalmers

  • Two-envelope paradox

    The puzzle that, given two envelopes one holding twice as much as the other, expected-value reasoning seems to recommend switching whichever envelope one holds, although the situation is symmetrical.

    Coordinates: 2.6 2.8David Chalmers

  • Unity of knowing and acting (zhixing heyi)

    Wang Yangming's thesis that genuine knowing and acting are one: anyone who truly knows the good is already moved to do it, so knowing without acting is not yet real knowing.

    Coordinates: 3.1.4 6.24 3.4Wang Yangming, Zhu Xi, Socrates

  • Unity of the intellect

    Ibn Rushd's thesis, argued in his Long Commentary on Aristotle's De anima, that there is one separate material intellect for all human beings, and the controversy it provoked in Latin philosophy.

    Coordinates: 1.3 1.3.2 6.20Ibn Rushd, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas

  • Utility monster

    Robert Nozick's imagined being that gains far more utility from resources than others lose, used to argue that utilitarianism would require everyone to be sacrificed to it.

    Coordinates: 3.2.1 6.4.2Robert Nozick, Derek Parfit

  • Valladolid debate

    The 1550-51 dispute between Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda and Bartolomé de las Casas over whether Spain could justly make war on the Indigenous peoples of the Americas.

    Coordinates: 3.3.5 6.4.2Bartolomé de las Casas, Francisco de Vitoria, Aristotle

  • Vasubandhu's dream argument

    Vasubandhu's defence, in the Twenty Verses, of the thesis that experience is appearance only: dreams and shared visions show that mental appearances can have every feature realists claim only external objects can have.

    Coordinates: 2.2.1 1.1 2.4Vasubandhu

  • Vasubandhu's refutation of the self

    Vasubandhu's argument, in the final chapter of his Commentary on the Treasury of Abhidharma, that no self or person exists over and above the five aggregates: only what has causes is real, and 'I' is a convenient designation for a causal continuum of momentary events.

    Coordinates: 1.3.2 1.1.3 1.4.1Vasubandhu, Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara

  • Vātsyāyana's argument for atoms from the limits of division

    Vātsyāyana's argument, in his Nyāyabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra 4.2.16–17, that the division of a material thing must end in a smallest partless part, the atom, because otherwise the first compound could not exist and all things would consist of equally innumerable parts.

    Coordinates: 1.1.3 1.1.1Vātsyāyana, Gautama (Akṣapāda), Uddyotakara

  • Vātsyāyana's argument for the self from desire, aversion and knowledge

    Vātsyāyana's case, in his Nyāyabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra 1.1.5 and 1.1.10, that desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition reveal a single enduring self: they are qualities that need a bearer, and desire in particular requires one subject who perceived before and remembers now.

    Coordinates: 1.3.2 2.2.3 1.3.1Vātsyāyana, Gautama (Akṣapāda), Uddyotakara

  • Veil of ignorance

    Rawls's thought experiment: choose principles of justice without knowing what position you will hold in society.

    Coordinates: 6.4.1 3.2.4John Rawls, John Harsanyi

  • Very repugnant conclusion

    A strengthened form of the repugnant conclusion: a population containing very many lives of severe suffering, together with enough lives barely worth living, could be better than one in which everyone flourishes.

    Coordinates: 3.5 3.2.1

  • Villoro's argument that knowing requires objectively sufficient reasons

    Luis Villoro's argument in Creer, saber, conocer (1982) that the truth clause should be dropped from the definition of knowledge: to know that p is to believe that p on reasons that are objectively sufficient for one's epistemic community, reasons that are fallible, so that knowledge is socially conditioned; Guillermo Hurtado objected (2003) that the argument grants the sceptic a false premise.

    Coordinates: 2.1 2.4 2.7Luis Villoro

  • Vitoria's argument for Amerindian dominium

    Francisco de Vitoria's argument in the relectio De Indis (1539) that the Indigenous peoples of the Americas were true owners and rulers despite unbelief, sin or alleged irrationality, so that papal grant, discovery and their sins gave Spain no title; his accepted 'just titles', grounded in the law of nations, have been read as a restrictive rationalisation of conquest.

    Coordinates: 6.4.2 3.3.5 6.4.3Francisco de Vitoria, Aristotle, Hugo Grotius

  • Wang Chong's argument against a purposive Heaven

    Wang Chong's case in the Lunheng (first century CE) that Heaven (tian) produces things spontaneously (ziran) and without intention, so that calamities and anomalies are not Heaven's reprimands to rulers.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8Wang Chong

  • Watsuji's argument that the person is betweenness

    Watsuji Tetsurō's argument that a human being (ningen) is at once individual and social, existing in the 'betweenness' (aidagara) of relationships, so that ethics is the study of how people stand to one another, through a double negation of individual and group.

    Coordinates: 3.2.5 1.3.2Watsuji Tetsurō, Thomas Hobbes, Nishida Kitarō

  • Weitz's open-concept argument

    Morris Weitz's 1956 argument that art is an open concept, always liable to be extended to unforeseen cases, and so cannot be defined by necessary and sufficient conditions.

    Coordinates: 5.2.1 5.2Morris Weitz, Ludwig Wittgenstein, George Dickie

  • Whewell's argument from the consilience of inductions

    Whewell's argument, in The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, that when an induction obtained from one class of facts also explains a different class of facts it was not designed for, this consilience is a test of the theory's truth.

    Coordinates: 6.8 6.8.2William Whewell, John Stuart Mill, Isaac Newton

  • White Horse Dialogue

    Gongsun Long's dialogue defending the sophistical thesis 'white horse is not horse' through five arguments, whose logic remains one of the most debated puzzles of early Chinese philosophy.

    Coordinates: 6.10 4.2.1 1.1.2Gongsun Long, Xunzi

  • Wilt Chamberlain argument

    Robert Nozick's argument in Anarchy, State, and Utopia that voluntary transfers from any favoured distribution will upset it, so that maintaining a pattern of justice requires continual interference with liberty.

    Coordinates: 6.4.1 6.4.2Robert Nozick, John Rawls, G. A. Cohen

  • Winch's argument against a natural science of society

    Peter Winch's Wittgensteinian argument that social life consists in rule-governed, meaningful action, so that understanding a society is closer to philosophy than to natural science and other cultures must be understood by their own standards of intelligibility.

    Coordinates: 6.15 6.31Peter Winch, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philip Pettit

  • Wiredu's argument for conceptual decolonization

    Kwasi Wiredu's argument that philosophical concepts absorbed through colonial languages should be tested against an African language, such as Akan, so that uncritically assimilated Western frameworks can be identified and either justified or set aside.

    Coordinates: 6.31 6.10 2.5Kwasi Wiredu

  • Wiredu's argument for consensual democracy

    Kwasi Wiredu's argument that a non-party democracy based on consensus, drawing on traditional Akan practice, would represent citizens better than majoritarian multiparty politics.

    Coordinates: 6.4 6.4.3Kwasi Wiredu

  • Wolf's fitting-fulfilment argument

    Susan Wolf's argument that neither subjective attitudes alone nor objective value alone can account for meaning in life, so that meaning arises when a person is actively engaged with, and attracted to, projects that are genuinely worthwhile.

    Coordinates: 6.21 3.5Susan Wolf, Thaddeus Metz, Peter Singer

  • Xunzi's argument that human nature is bad

    Xunzi's argument, in chapter 23 of the Xunzi (rendered by Goldin as 'Human Nature is Evil'), that inborn desires followed without reflection lead to strife, so that goodness must come from deliberate effort guided by ritual.

    Coordinates: 3.4 3.2.3Xunzi, Mencius

  • Yablo's paradox

    Stephen Yablo's infinite sequence of sentences, each saying that all later ones are untrue, which generates a Liar-like contradiction while apparently avoiding self-reference.

    Coordinates: 4.5 2.5Graham Priest

  • Young's argument that oppression has five faces

    Iris Marion Young's argument that oppression is structural and plural: a group is oppressed if it suffers any of five conditions, exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism or systematic violence, which the distributive model of justice cannot capture.

    Coordinates: 6.7 6.4.1 6.29Iris Marion Young, Michel Foucault

  • Yulgok's argument that vital force issues and principle rides on it

    Yi I (Yulgok)'s argument, in his 1572 exchange with Sŏng Hon (Ugye), against Toegye's alternate issuance: only vital force issues, principle rides on it, and the Seven Emotions include the Four Sprouts.

    Coordinates: 6.23 3.4 1.1Yi I, Yi Hwang (Toegye)

  • Zea's culturalist reply on Latin American philosophy

    Leopoldo Zea's position, set against Augusto Salazar Bondy's, that philosophy is always developed from a historical and cultural perspective, so that Latin American philosophy need not prove originality by European standards to be philosophy.

    Coordinates: 6.31 6.6Leopoldo Zea, Augusto Salazar Bondy, Risieri Frondizi

  • Zeno's paradoxes

    Arguments by Zeno of Elea, such as the Dichotomy, Achilles and the tortoise and the Arrow, which aim to show that plurality and motion lead to absurdity, in defence of Parmenides' view that reality is one and unchanging.

    Coordinates: 1.5 1.4 6.9Zeno of Elea, Parmenides, Aristotle

  • Zhengming (rectification of names)

    The Confucian demand that names and titles match the realities they stand for, beginning with social roles.

    Coordinates: 6.10 6.4 6.10.1Confucius, Xunzi

  • Zhuangzi's argument on adjudicating disputes

    The argument in chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi that winning a disputation does not show one is right, and that no judge could settle a dispute without already taking a side.

    Coordinates: 4.2.2 4.2Zhuangzi, Guo Xiang

  • Zombie argument

    An argument against physicalism: a being physically identical to a human but with no conscious experience (a philosophical zombie) seems conceivable; if it is therefore possible, consciousness is something over and above the physical.

    Coordinates: 1.3.4 1.3.1 1.6Saul Kripke, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett

All terms in the Philosophy Glossary