Frankfurt cases
On this page
Thought experiments, introduced by Harry Frankfurt in 1969, in which an agent seems morally responsible for an action although a hidden intervener would have ensured that she could not have done otherwise.
Also: Frankfurt-style cases, Frankfurt examples, Frankfurt-type examples
What it means
The question. Is a person morally responsible for what she did only if she could have done otherwise? Provenance: the cases originated with Harry G. Frankfurt, 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility', The Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23 (1969), pp. 829-839, the paper in which, as Phillip Gosselin's 1987 abstract notes, Frankfurt gave the principle its name. David Robb's Stanford Encyclopedia entry adds that Frankfurt credited Robert Nozick's unpublished lectures with similar examples. 'Frankfurt cases' and 'Frankfurt-style cases' are later labels for the whole family, most of whose members were devised by other philosophers.
Frankfurt cases are designed to refute the principle of alternative possibilities: a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Harry Frankfurt published the first such counterexamples in 1969. David Robb's Stanford Encyclopedia entry describes their structure as inevitability without causation: the intervener makes the outcome unavoidable without bringing it about.
The text's own reasoning. Frankfurt's own example, in what McKenna and Coates call a close approximation, concerns Jones, who decides to shoot Smith, and Black, who would have intervened had Jones wavered; Jones does not waver. The voting version below is John Martin Fischer's later adaptation, which Robb uses as his standard case. The reasoning, as Robb and McKenna and Coates present it, turns on a difference between circumstances that make an action unavoidable and circumstances that actually bring it about. Black's readiness explains why Jones had no alternative, but it plays no part in explaining why Jones acted as he did, so it seems irrelevant to whether he is responsible. Fischer later drew from such cases the moral, reported by O'Connor and Franklin, that the freedom relevant to responsibility is a feature of the actual sequence of events, not of what would have happened otherwise.
Structure. The three numbered steps in the next paragraph are COT's reconstruction. Logically the argument is a counterexample: the principle states a necessary condition of responsibility, so a single possible case in which an agent is responsible although she could not have done otherwise refutes it. Everything therefore depends on describing one case that secures two things at once, that the intervener guarantees the outcome and that the intervener has no part in the sequence that actually produces it. The objections below deny that both can be secured together.
In a standard version, Black, a neurosurgeon, implants a device in Jones's brain to monitor his deliberation about how to vote. If Jones shows signs of deciding to vote Democrat, the device will make him vote Republican; if he decides to vote Republican on his own, the device does nothing. Jones votes Republican on his own. The argument runs: (1) Jones is morally responsible for voting Republican, since he did so for his own reasons and the device played no role; (2) Jones could not have done otherwise, since the device would have prevented any other choice; therefore (3) responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise, and the principle of alternative possibilities is false. If this succeeds, the consequence argument, which concerns alternative possibilities, would not by itself threaten moral responsibility.
Intended conclusion. The direct conclusion is that the principle of alternative possibilities, in Robb's formulation 'a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise', is false. Gosselin's abstract describes the principle as a premise of the standard argument from determinism to the absence of responsibility, which is why its refutation matters to compatibilists. Compatibilists of this actual-sequence kind, a position Vihvelin's entry discusses under the labels 'source' compatibilism and semi-compatibilism, citing Fischer (1994) and Fischer and Ravizza (1998), accept that responsibility is compatible with determinism whatever is true of the ability to do otherwise; O'Connor and Franklin note that compatibilists who take this line can concede that the all-in ability to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism while denying that it matters for responsibility.
The main objection is the dilemma defence, developed by Robert Kane, David Widerker and Carl Ginet. Black's device must respond to some prior sign of Jones's coming decision. If that sign causally determines the decision, the case presupposes determinism and begs the question against incompatibilists who deny that determined agents are responsible; if it does not, Jones could still have decided otherwise, so a robust alternative remains. A second line, which John Martin Fischer named the flicker of freedom strategy, finds small alternatives that remain, such as beginning to incline towards another choice; critics answer that such flickers are not robust enough to ground responsibility.
Objections. The dilemma defence has three classic statements: Robert Kane, Free Will and Values (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), p. 51; David Widerker, 'Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities', The Philosophical Review 104 (1995), pp. 247-261; and Carl Ginet, 'In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities', Philosophical Perspectives 10 (1996), pp. 403-417. Robb takes the name 'W-defence' ('What-should-he-have-done defense') from Widerker's 2003 essay 'Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's Argument Against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities'. The flicker strategy has an early form in Peter van Inwagen's 'Ability and Responsibility', The Philosophical Review 87 (1978), pp. 201-224, which Robb cites both as an early attempt to locate residual alternatives and for a counterexample concerning omissions.
Defenders have built cases that avoid prior signs. Alfred Mele and Robb's blockage case has a process that will cause the Republican decision unless Jones makes it himself, without interfering with his deliberation. Derk Pereboom's tax evasion case uses a moral reason that would have to occur for any alternative choice and that would trigger intervention. Hunt's cases block alternative neural pathways in advance. Critics reply that such cases may end up making the choice causally determined.
Replies. The defenders' cases are Alfred Mele and David Robb, 'Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases', The Philosophical Review 107 (1998), pp. 97-112; David P. Hunt, 'Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action', Philosophical Studies 97 (2000), pp. 195-227; and Derk Pereboom's Tax Evasion case. Erik Carlson's review of Living without Free Will (2001) reports that its chapter 1 constructs Frankfurt-style examples against the view that responsibility requires alternative possibilities; David Shoemaker's review of Pereboom's 2014 book reports that Pereboom leans on Frankfurt cases to show that responsibility requires not robust alternatives but that the agent be the source of her action. Pereboom then argues, in his manipulation argument, that compatibilist accounts of such sourcehood are insufficient. O'Connor and Franklin report that the revised indeterministic cases have themselves been challenged.
Key thinkers and texts. Harry G. Frankfurt, 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' (1969); Peter van Inwagen, 'Ability and Responsibility' (1978); Robert Kane, Free Will and Values (1985); John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will (1994); David Widerker (1995); Carl Ginet (1996); Alfred Mele and David Robb (1998); David P. Hunt (2000); Derk Pereboom, Living without Free Will (2001); John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998).
Robb reports that little consensus has emerged. Fischer and Mark Ravizza's distinction between regulative control, the ability to do otherwise, and guidance control, the reasons-responsiveness that grounds responsibility, is, in Robb's words, another influential account, developing Frankfurt's insight in a compatibilist direction.
Current status. O'Connor and Franklin conclude that at most these cases show that the all-in ability to do otherwise is not necessary for responsibility, not that alternatives play no role at all, and they note that Fischer (2018) has conceded that reasons-responsiveness requires the ability to do otherwise in some sense. Robb's entry records that not everyone is impressed by the cases and that the critical literature is too large to survey. The debate continues on two fronts: whether a case without a prior sign can avoid presupposing determinism, and whether the alternatives that remain are robust enough to matter.
On this site it belongs to Coordinates 1.7 (Free Will and Determinism) and 6.24 (Philosophy of Action).
See also the glossary entries Moral responsibility, Free will, Compatibilism, Consequence argument, Manipulation argument and Thought experiment.
The questions it belongs to
- 1.7 Free Will and DeterminismCould you have done otherwise?
- 6.24 Philosophy of ActionWhat is the difference between your arm rising and your raising it?
Thinkers
To read
- A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will — Robert Kane
- An Essay on Free Will — Peter van Inwagen
- Living Without Free Will — Derk Pereboom
Sources and further reading
- David Robb, 'Moral Responsibility and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (first published 9 July 2020)
- Harry G. Frankfurt, 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility', The Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23 (4 December 1969), pp. 829-839, DOI 10.2307/2023833 (Crossref record)
- Phillip Gosselin, 'The Principle of Alternate Possibilities', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 1 (1987), pp. 91-104, DOI 10.1080/00455091.1987.10715902 (Cambridge Core record and abstract)
- Michael McKenna and D. Justin Coates, 'Compatibilism', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 16 April 2024)
- Timothy O'Connor and Christopher Franklin, 'Free Will', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 3 November 2022)
- Erik Carlson, review of Derk Pereboom, Living Without Free Will, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002.01.10
- David Shoemaker, review of Derk Pereboom, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014.09.20
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Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 15 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
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BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-frankfurt-cases-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Frankfurt cases (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/frankfurt-cases/},
note = {Source-checked 15 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Frankfurt cases (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/15 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/frankfurt-cases/ LA - en ER -
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