Gettier problem
On this page
The problem, posed by Edmund Gettier in 1963, that a justified true belief can be true by luck and still not be knowledge, so that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowing.
The problem at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- The problem
- Is justified true belief sufficient for knowledge? Matthias Steup's Stanford Encyclopedia entry calls the tripartite analysis (knowledge as true, believed and justified) the traditional view, while noting that it was mostly articulated by its twentieth-century critics. The Gettier problem is the challenge of saying what, if anything, must be added to justified true belief, since such cases show it is not enough.
- The reasoning that leads to it , Standard form of the problem, as given in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps
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Edmund Gettier's two-and-a-half-page paper 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?' (1963) argues by counterexample. In Stephen Hetherington's Internet Encyclopedia account of the first case, Smith has been told by the company president that Jones will get the job and has counted ten coins in Jones's pocket; he infers that whoever gets the job has ten coins in his pocket. In fact Smith gets the job and happens to have ten coins in his own pocket. In the second case Smith has good evidence that Jones owns a Ford and infers that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona; Jones owns no Ford, but Brown happens to be in Barcelona. The reasoning runs:
- on the analysis, S knows that p if p is true, S believes p and S is justified in believing p;
- justification is fallible, so a justified belief can rest on a false or misleading basis;
- in each case the subject has a justified true belief that is true only by luck;
- intuitively the subject does not know;
- Result: justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. (the entry continues below)
- The puzzling result
- The three conditions may be necessary, but they are not jointly sufficient. Gettier himself offered no repair. Steup records earlier cases of a similar shape: Dharmottara's desert-water case (around 770 CE), similar cases given by Sriharsa (twelfth century), Peter of Mantua's case (fourteenth century) and Bertrand Russell's stopped clock. These are comparisons that show the problem is not confined to one tradition; they are not presented as sources of Gettier's paper.
Objections and responses
- Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
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A minority resists the verdict rather than repairing the analysis. Hetherington reports that Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001) questioned the reliability and universality of the intuitions on which the cases rely, that Kaplan (1985) and Lewis (1996) offered dissolutions, and that he himself has defended the possibility of knowing luckily. In the fake barn case, attributed by Steup to Carl Ginet and published by Alvin Goldman (1976), Henry looks at the one real barn in a county of facades; Steup notes that Ernest Sosa accepts that Henry knows.
- Replies
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Most epistemologists have accepted the verdict and sought a fourth condition, and each proposal has met new cases. Requirements of no false evidence (Lehrer's 'no false core evidence' proposal, in Hetherington's account) face cases in which no false evidence is used, such as Feldman's (1974); Steup discusses further cases, including a robot-dog example and the 'Barn County' case. Defeasibility accounts (Lehrer and Paxson 1969) face their own counterexamples, and Goldman's causal account (1967) meets, as Hetherington reports, problems about deviant causal chains and about knowledge of things such as numbers that arguably have no causal effects. Robert Nozick's sensitivity condition is rejected by most contemporary epistemologists, chiefly, Steup says, because of DeRose's 'abominable conjunction' argument; Saul Kripke's barn and colour cases show further that sensitivity handles only some of the counterexamples to the traditional analysis. Sosa's safety condition (1999) faces Comesaña's Halloween case, and Sosa's virtue account, which identifies knowledge with apt belief, must say something about fake barns. Linda Zagzebski (1994) argued that any analysis of the form justified true belief plus a further, non-redundant condition will be open to cases of the same kind. Timothy Williamson, in Knowledge and Its Limits (2000), concludes that knowledge is too fundamental to analyse.
Coordinate 2.1.1Coordinate 2.1Edmund GettierDharmottaraAlvin GoldmanErnest SosaTimothy WilliamsonSriharsaRobert NozickSaul KripkeBertrand RussellSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
Question. Is justified true belief sufficient for knowledge? Matthias Steup's Stanford Encyclopedia entry calls the tripartite analysis (knowledge as true, believed and justified) the traditional view, while noting that it was mostly articulated by its twentieth-century critics. The Gettier problem is the challenge of saying what, if anything, must be added to justified true belief, since such cases show it is not enough.
Structure. Edmund Gettier's two-and-a-half-page paper 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?' (1963) argues by counterexample. In Stephen Hetherington's Internet Encyclopedia account of the first case, Smith has been told by the company president that Jones will get the job and has counted ten coins in Jones's pocket; he infers that whoever gets the job has ten coins in his pocket. In fact Smith gets the job and happens to have ten coins in his own pocket. In the second case Smith has good evidence that Jones owns a Ford and infers that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona; Jones owns no Ford, but Brown happens to be in Barcelona. The reasoning runs: (1) on the analysis, S knows that p if p is true, S believes p and S is justified in believing p; (2) justification is fallible, so a justified belief can rest on a false or misleading basis; (3) in each case the subject has a justified true belief that is true only by luck; (4) intuitively the subject does not know; therefore (5) justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. Hetherington picks out fallible justification and luck as the two features that make a case a Gettier case.
Conclusion. The three conditions may be necessary, but they are not jointly sufficient. Gettier himself offered no repair. Steup records earlier cases of a similar shape: Dharmottara's desert-water case (around 770 CE), similar cases given by Sriharsa (twelfth century), Peter of Mantua's case (fourteenth century) and Bertrand Russell's stopped clock. These are comparisons that show the problem is not confined to one tradition; they are not presented as sources of Gettier's paper.
Objections. A minority resists the verdict rather than repairing the analysis. Hetherington reports that Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001) questioned the reliability and universality of the intuitions on which the cases rely, that Kaplan (1985) and Lewis (1996) offered dissolutions, and that he himself has defended the possibility of knowing luckily. In the fake barn case, attributed by Steup to Carl Ginet and published by Alvin Goldman (1976), Henry looks at the one real barn in a county of facades; Steup notes that Ernest Sosa accepts that Henry knows.
Replies. Most epistemologists have accepted the verdict and sought a fourth condition, and each proposal has met new cases. Requirements of no false evidence (Lehrer's 'no false core evidence' proposal, in Hetherington's account) face cases in which no false evidence is used, such as Feldman's (1974); Steup discusses further cases, including a robot-dog example and the 'Barn County' case. Defeasibility accounts (Lehrer and Paxson 1969) face their own counterexamples, and Goldman's causal account (1967) meets, as Hetherington reports, problems about deviant causal chains and about knowledge of things such as numbers that arguably have no causal effects. Robert Nozick's sensitivity condition is rejected by most contemporary epistemologists, chiefly, Steup says, because of DeRose's 'abominable conjunction' argument; Saul Kripke's barn and colour cases show further that sensitivity handles only some of the counterexamples to the traditional analysis. Sosa's safety condition (1999) faces Comesaña's Halloween case, and Sosa's virtue account, which identifies knowledge with apt belief, must say something about fake barns. Linda Zagzebski (1994) argued that any analysis of the form justified true belief plus a further, non-redundant condition will be open to cases of the same kind. Timothy Williamson, in Knowledge and Its Limits (2000), concludes that knowledge is too fundamental to analyse.
Key philosophers and texts. Edmund Gettier (1963); Dharmottara and Sriharsa as earlier precedents; Alvin Goldman (1967, 1976); Lehrer and Paxson (1969); Robert Nozick on sensitivity; Ernest Sosa on safety and virtue (1999 onwards); Zagzebski (1994); Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (2000).
Coordinates. On this site it belongs to Coordinate 2.1.1 (The Gettier Problem) and Coordinate 2.1 (Theories of Knowledge).
Current status. Hetherington writes that "There is no consensus, however, that any one of the attempts to solve the Gettier challenge has succeeded", and Steup states that no analysis has been widely accepted. Some epistemologists conclude that knowledge is unanalysable; others pursue alternative methods or return to justification-based approaches.
See also the glossary entries Knowledge, Justification, Epistemic luck, Fake barn case, Reliabilism, Virtue epistemology and Knowledge-first epistemology.
The questions it belongs to
- 2.1.1 The Gettier ProblemCan you be right for the wrong reasons and still count as knowing?
- 2.1 Theories of KnowledgeWhat has to be added to a true belief to make it knowledge?
Thinkers
- Edmund Gettier
- Dharmottara
- Alvin Goldman
- Ernest Sosa
- Timothy Williamson
- Sriharsa
- Robert Nozick
- Saul Kripke
- Bertrand Russell
Traditions
To read
- A History of Western Philosophy — Bertrand Russell
- Anarchy, State, and Utopia — Robert Nozick
- Epistemology and Cognition — Alvin I. Goldman
Sources and further reading
- Stephen Hetherington, 'Gettier Problems', Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (no date shown on the page)
- Matthias Steup, 'The Analysis of Knowledge', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 21 January 2026)
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 14 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
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BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-gettier-problem-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Gettier problem (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/gettier-problem/},
note = {Source-checked 14 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Gettier problem (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/14 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/gettier-problem/ LA - en ER -
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