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Ibn Rushd's reply to al-Ghazālī on the eternal will

Updated 19 November 2026

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Ibn Rushd's counter-argument, in the First Discussion of The Incoherence of the Incoherence, that an unchanging First Cause whose conditions for acting are complete cannot delay its effect, that 'will' is said of God and humans non-univocally, and that the world is therefore eternally produced though caused.

The argument at a glance

A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.

Question
If God is eternal and unchanging, can the world have begun to exist? Al-Ghazali had answered yes: an eternal will can decree from eternity that the world begin at a chosen moment. Ibn Rushd replied in the First Discussion of The Incoherence of the Incoherence, defending the philosophers' thesis that the world is eternal while denying that this makes it uncaused.
Reasons , Numbered as set out in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps

Drawing on the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Ibn Rushd by Fouad Ben Ahmed and Robert Pasnau and H. Chad Hillier's Internet Encyclopedia article, the reply can be set out as follows.

  1. When an agent's causation is complete, nothing remains that could hold back its act; in the rendering quoted by Ben Ahmed and Pasnau, "the effect of a cause cannot be delayed after the causation."
  2. The First Cause is changeless; Ben Ahmed and Pasnau present Ibn Rushd's view that it is incoherent to posit an eternal changeless actuality that suddenly begins to act after an eternity of inaction.
  3. Will in humans, Hillier reports, is a faculty that chooses between options, moved by desire; this cannot apply to God, since desire would imply change in the eternal, and Ibn Rushd charges al-Ghazali with confusing eternal and human will and making them univocal.
  4. Creation, so understood, is not a choice between equal alternatives but, in Hillier's account, a choice of existence or non-existence, and for God there can be no gap between decision and action.
  5. Therefore: God's causal agency is eternal and so is its effect, the world. Two further steps make the conclusion coherent.
  6. Temporal events need a source that is eternal yet in motion; Ben Ahmed and Pasnau report Ibn Rushd's view that the temporal cannot proceed from an absolutely eternal being, and that this intermediary is the celestial body.
  7. Causes that are essentially ordered are simultaneous and must have a first member, whereas an accidental ordering takes place over time; Hillier reports Oliver Leaman's reading that Ibn Rushd accepted accidental but not essential infinite series.
Intended conclusion
The world is eternal yet caused. Hillier adds that in The Decisive Treatise Ibn Rushd treats the dispute as largely verbal: the two groups agree about time and the world's future and disagree only about the world's existence in the eternal past, so that the world can be labelled neither pre-eternal, in the sense of uncaused, nor originated in the theologians' sense.
Objections and replies
Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported

Al-Ghazali's first proof against eternity pressed the infinities of planetary revolutions, whose measurably different rates seem to make one infinite larger than another; Hillier judges Ibn Rushd's response, that numbering does not apply to eternal beings since there can be no degrees in the infinite, a weak one. The deeper objection is the one al-Ghazali had built into his own argument: if God's will is not a will that chooses, it is hard to see how God remains a free agent rather than a necessitating cause. Maimonides, as Kenneth Seeskin's entry reports, held that it is impossible to show by logical considerations alone either that the universe was created or that it is eternal; this is a parallel position that denies Ibn Rushd's claim to demonstration, not a documented reply to him.

Replies

Ibn Rushd's answer to the freedom objection is step (3): God is still rightly called an intending and willing agent, Ben Ahmed and Pasnau report from the Kashf, though, being exempt from passivity and change, God does not exercise will in the usual sense. To the infinity objection he replies with the distinction in step (7), on which accidental infinite series are admissible while an essential infinite is not.

Coordinate 1.2.1Coordinate 1.8Coordinate 1.4Ibn RushdAl-GhazaliMaimonidesThomas AquinasSources and primary textsRead the full entry

What it means

Question. If God is eternal and unchanging, can the world have begun to exist? Al-Ghazali had answered yes: an eternal will can decree from eternity that the world begin at a chosen moment. Ibn Rushd replied in the First Discussion of The Incoherence of the Incoherence, defending the philosophers' thesis that the world is eternal while denying that this makes it uncaused.

Structure. Drawing on the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Ibn Rushd by Fouad Ben Ahmed and Robert Pasnau and H. Chad Hillier's Internet Encyclopedia article, the reply can be set out as follows. (1) When an agent's causation is complete, nothing remains that could hold back its act; in the rendering quoted by Ben Ahmed and Pasnau, "the effect of a cause cannot be delayed after the causation." (2) The First Cause is changeless; Ben Ahmed and Pasnau present Ibn Rushd's view that it is incoherent to posit an eternal changeless actuality that suddenly begins to act after an eternity of inaction. (3) Will in humans, Hillier reports, is a faculty that chooses between options, moved by desire; this cannot apply to God, since desire would imply change in the eternal, and Ibn Rushd charges al-Ghazali with confusing eternal and human will and making them univocal. (4) Creation, so understood, is not a choice between equal alternatives but, in Hillier's account, a choice of existence or non-existence, and for God there can be no gap between decision and action. Therefore (5) God's causal agency is eternal and so is its effect, the world. Two further steps make the conclusion coherent. (6) Temporal events need a source that is eternal yet in motion; Ben Ahmed and Pasnau report Ibn Rushd's view that the temporal cannot proceed from an absolutely eternal being, and that this intermediary is the celestial body. (7) Causes that are essentially ordered are simultaneous and must have a first member, whereas an accidental ordering takes place over time; Hillier reports Oliver Leaman's reading that Ibn Rushd accepted accidental but not essential infinite series.

Intended conclusion. The world is eternal yet caused. Hillier adds that in The Decisive Treatise Ibn Rushd treats the dispute as largely verbal: the two groups agree about time and the world's future and disagree only about the world's existence in the eternal past, so that the world can be labelled neither pre-eternal, in the sense of uncaused, nor originated in the theologians' sense.

Objections. Al-Ghazali's first proof against eternity pressed the infinities of planetary revolutions, whose measurably different rates seem to make one infinite larger than another; Hillier judges Ibn Rushd's response, that numbering does not apply to eternal beings since there can be no degrees in the infinite, a weak one. The deeper objection is the one al-Ghazali had built into his own argument: if God's will is not a will that chooses, it is hard to see how God remains a free agent rather than a necessitating cause. Maimonides, as Kenneth Seeskin's entry reports, held that it is impossible to show by logical considerations alone either that the universe was created or that it is eternal; this is a parallel position that denies Ibn Rushd's claim to demonstration, not a documented reply to him.

Replies. Ibn Rushd's answer to the freedom objection is step (3): God is still rightly called an intending and willing agent, Ben Ahmed and Pasnau report from the Kashf, though, being exempt from passivity and change, God does not exercise will in the usual sense. To the infinity objection he replies with the distinction in step (7), on which accidental infinite series are admissible while an essential infinite is not.

Current status. The extent to which God's will, or the world, is necessitated on Ibn Rushd's account remains contested; Ben Ahmed and Pasnau note that interpretation is more contentious than his own summary suggests and points to studies by Kogan, Davidson, Adamson and Twetten. In the Latin world, Ben Ahmed and Pasnau report that by the 1260s 'Averroist' was used in a pejorative sense, that Thomas Aquinas responded with heated invective, and that lists of condemned propositions were directed at the Paris arts faculty in 1270 and again in 1277; Dag Nikolaus Hasse's entry reports that the eternity of the world and related theses were among those condemned. Hillier is explicit that the 'double truth' later charged against the Averroists was not held by Ibn Rushd himself.

On this site it belongs to Coordinate 1.2.1 (Origins and First Cause); the question of divine will links it to Coordinate 1.8 (Natural Theology), and the eternity of time to Coordinate 1.4 (Philosophy of Time).

See also the glossary entries Al-Ghazālī's argument from the eternal will, Eternity of the world, Infinity, Double truth, Aquinas's argument that the world's beginning cannot be demonstrated and Ḥudūth dahrī (origination in perpetuity).

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Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Checked against the sources above on 14 November 2026. Not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. How we write and check.

Cite this page

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 14 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.

APA (7th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 14). Ibn Rushd's reply to al-Ghazālī on the eternal will (Arguments). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/ibn-rushds-reply-to-al-ghazali-on-the-eternal-will/

MLA (9th edition)

“Ibn Rushd's reply to al-Ghazālī on the eternal will (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought, 14 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/ibn-rushds-reply-to-al-ghazali-on-the-eternal-will/. Accessed [date accessed].

Chicago (17th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Ibn Rushd's reply to al-Ghazālī on the eternal will (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 14, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/ibn-rushds-reply-to-al-ghazali-on-the-eternal-will/.

BibTeX

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  author       = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
  title        = {Ibn Rushd's reply to al-Ghazālī on the eternal will (Arguments)},
  howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = nov,
  url          = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/ibn-rushds-reply-to-al-ghazali-on-the-eternal-will/},
  note         = {Source-checked 14 November 2026}
}

RIS

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