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Arguments

Philosophy’s structured arguments, from the cosmological argument to the Chinese room: find one by name or browse by question, subject, thinker, tradition or letter.

Updated 19 November 2026

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441 structured arguments. Each sets out the argument’s steps, the main objections and the replies, with the questions, thinkers and traditions it belongs to.

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48 arguments for letter P.

  • Pairing problem

    An objection to interactionist substance dualism, associated with Jaegwon Kim: if souls are not in space, nothing seems able to make a particular soul causally paired with one particular body rather than another.

    Coordinates: 1.3.1 1.4.2Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa, René Descartes

  • Paley's watchmaker/design argument

    William Paley's argument in Natural Theology (1802), chapters 1–3, that just as the contrivance of a watch proves that it had a maker, the greater contrivance of organisms such as the eye proves an intelligent designer of nature.

    Coordinates: 1.8 6.12 6.1William Paley, David Hume, Thomas Aquinas

  • Paradox of analysis

    The puzzle of how a philosophical analysis can be both correct and informative: if analysandum and analysans mean the same, the analysis seems trivial; if they do not, it seems incorrect.

    Coordinates: 6.10 3.1.2Plato, Gottlob Frege, G. E. Moore

  • Paradox of deontology

    The puzzle that deontological constraints forbid an agent to violate one person's rights even to prevent several equally serious violations by others, although more violations seem worse than fewer.

    Coordinates: 3.2.2Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, Frances Kamm

  • Paradox of fiction

    The puzzle, whose modern debate began with Colin Radford's paper of 1975, of how we can be genuinely moved by characters and events we know do not exist.

    Coordinates: 5.8 5.5Noël Carroll, Kendall Walton

  • Paradox of free choice permission

    The puzzle that 'You may have soup or salad' seems to imply 'You may have soup and you may have salad', although adding that inference to standard modal logic leads to absurd results.

    Coordinates: 4.3.1 4.3 6.10G. H. von Wright, Hans Kamp

  • Paradox of horror

    The puzzle, posed by Noël Carroll in The Philosophy of Horror (1990), of why people seek out fictions designed to frighten and disgust them; Carroll's answer appeals to curiosity about the monster, and remains disputed.

    Coordinates: 5.5 6.32 6.23Noël Carroll, Berys Gaut

  • Paradox of suspense

    The puzzle of how readers and viewers who already know a story's outcome can still feel suspense, given that suspense seems to require uncertainty.

    Coordinates: 5.5 5.8 6.32Noël Carroll

  • Paradox of the stone

    The dilemma whether an omnipotent being can create a stone too heavy for it to lift: either answer seems to name something it cannot do.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8J. L. Mackie, Richard Swinburne, René Descartes

  • Paradox of tragedy

    The puzzle of how audiences can take pleasure in tragic and other painful art whose proper appreciation involves distressing emotions such as pity, fear and grief.

    Coordinates: 5.5 5.8David Hume, Edmund Burke, Aristotle

  • Paradox of voting

    The puzzle, named by Anthony Downs, that for most individuals the expected costs of voting appear to exceed its expected benefits, so that it is hard to see why rational people vote.

    Coordinates: 6.4 2.6 6.5Jason Brennan

  • The paradoxes of material implication

    The awkward consequences of reading 'if A, then B' as the material conditional, true whenever A is false or B is true, and the main attempts to defend or replace that reading.

    Coordinates: 4.1.1 4.4 4.5Paul Grice, Frank Jackson, Robert Stalnaker

  • Paradoxes of toleration

    Three puzzles in the concept of toleration: whether prejudice can ground toleration, why it could be right to tolerate what is wrong, and how toleration can set limits without becoming intolerant.

    Coordinates: 6.4.2

  • Pascal's mugging

    A decision-theoretic puzzle, published by Nick Bostrom in 2009, in which expected-utility reasoning seems to require handing one's wallet to a mugger who promises an astronomically large but wildly improbable reward.

    Coordinates: 2.6 2.8 3.2.1Nick Bostrom, Blaise Pascal

  • Pascal's wager

    Blaise Pascal's argument that it is rational to wager for God, because the possible infinite gain of doing so outweighs any finite cost, whatever the evidence; an early contribution to decision theory.

    Coordinates: 6.1 2.6Blaise Pascal, Ian Hacking, J. L. Mackie

  • Pateman's sexual contract argument

    Carole Pateman's argument in The Sexual Contract (1988) that the original social contract presupposes a sexual contract among men securing their access to and command over women, so that modern civil society transforms paternal into fraternal patriarchy, and that contracts which alienate the use of a person's capacities, such as marriage and employment, create subordination rather than freedom.

    Coordinates: 6.29 3.2.4 6.4Carole Pateman, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke

  • Penal abolitionism

    The position that legal punishment, or some major form of it such as imprisonment, should be abolished rather than reformed, because it cannot be justified.

    Coordinates: 6.2 6.4 1.7Angela Davis, Derk Pereboom

  • Pessimistic meta-induction

    An argument against scientific realism: since many successful theories in the history of science were later rejected as false, our current successful theories are probably false too.

    Coordinates: 6.8.2 6.8.3 6.8Larry Laudan, Hilary Putnam, Philip Kitcher

  • Petitionary prayer

    Prayer in which someone asks God for something; philosophically, the problem of how such requests can make a difference to a God who is perfectly good, omniscient and unchanging.

    Coordinates: 6.1Thomas Aquinas, Richard Swinburne

  • Philosophical anarchism

    The thesis that no state, or no existing state, has legitimate authority or a claim to its subjects' obedience, held without the further conclusion that states must be resisted or abolished.

    Coordinates: 6.4.3 6.4 6.2Henry David Thoreau, Peter Kropotkin, Joseph Raz

  • Plantinga's modal ontological argument

    Alvin Plantinga's 1974 version of the ontological argument: if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then, given his definition of maximal greatness and the logic of possible worlds, such a being exists in every possible world, and therefore actually exists.

    Coordinates: 1.8 6.1Alvin Plantinga, Peter van Inwagen

  • Plato's argument against imitative poetry

    The case made in Book 10 of Plato's Republic that imitative poetry and painting produce mere images of appearance, require no knowledge and strengthen the irrational part of the soul.

    Coordinates: 5.6 5.2 5.8Plato, Aristotle

  • Plato's argument at the end of Republic V

    Plato's argument in Republic V (474b–480a) that knowledge and belief (doxa) are different capacities, distinguished by what each is set over and what each achieves, so that the lovers of sights and sounds who deny Forms have belief, not knowledge.

    Coordinates: 2.1 1.1.2 2.2Plato, Socrates

  • Plato's argument that rhetoric is a knack

    The argument Plato gives to Socrates in the Gorgias that rhetoric is not a craft but a knack, a form of flattery that aims at pleasure without knowledge of the good.

    Coordinates: 4.2.3Plato, Socrates, Gorgias

  • Pogge's argument that the global order harms the poor

    Thomas Pogge's argument, in World Poverty and Human Rights (2002), that the affluent countries' citizens, by taking part in imposing a global institutional order that predictably produces severe poverty when a feasible alternative exists, violate a negative duty not to harm the global poor; the duty is not merely one of assistance.

    Coordinates: 6.4.1 6.4 6.4.3John Rawls

  • Popper's falsifiability criterion of demarcation

    Karl Popper's argument, in Logik der Forschung (1935) and The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), that since universal theories cannot be verified but can contradict observation, empirical science is marked by falsifiability, upheld by methodological rules against ad hoc rescue, with surviving theories corroborated, never proved.

    Coordinates: 6.8 6.8.3Karl Popper, David Hume, Albert Einstein

  • The positivist argument that religious language is meaningless

    The logical positivists' argument, popularised by A. J. Ayer (1936), that statements about God are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable and so lack cognitive meaning, which makes theism, atheism and agnosticism equally empty.

    Coordinates: 6.1 6.10 1.8A. J. Ayer, Moritz Schlick, C. D. Broad

  • Preface paradox

    The puzzle of an author who rationally believes every claim in her book and also rationally believes, as her preface admits, that at least one of them is false.

    Coordinates: 2.6 2.8

  • Priest's argument for dialetheism from the liar

    Graham Priest's argument that the liar paradox shows some contradictions to be true, since every consistent solution generates a 'revenge' paradox, so that the right response is a paraconsistent logic rather than abandoning naive truth.

    Coordinates: 4.4.2 4.5Graham Priest

  • Principle of fair play

    The principle that those who benefit from a cooperative scheme sustained by others' restraint owe similar restraint in return; a leading but contested ground of political obligation.

    Coordinates: 6.4.3 3.2.4 6.2H. L. A. Hart, John Rawls, Robert Nozick

  • Prisoner's dilemma

    A two-person game in which each player does better by defecting whatever the other does, yet both do worse if both defect than if both cooperate. It is the standard model of conflict between individual and collective rationality.

    Coordinates: 6.5 2.6 3.2.4David Gauthier, Philip Pettit, Thomas Hobbes

  • Private language argument

    Wittgenstein's argument that there could not be a language whose words refer to what only the speaker can know, such as her own immediate sensations, because such words could have no standard of correct use.

    Coordinates: 6.10 1.3 2.4.1Ludwig Wittgenstein, Saul Kripke, Cora Diamond

  • Privation theory of evil

    The view, Neoplatonic in origin and made central to Christian thought by Augustine, that evil is not a substance or positive property but the lack of a good that ought to be present, so that God, who creates only what exists, creates no evil. Contested above all by the objection from pain.

    Coordinates: 1.8 6.1 3.5Augustine of Hippo, Plotinus

  • Problem of animal suffering

    The form of the problem of evil that turns on the vast suffering of non-human animals over evolutionary time, much of it long before humans existed.

    Coordinates: 6.1 3.3.6

  • Problem of easy knowledge

    Stewart Cohen's objection that any theory allowing knowledge from a source before one knows the source is reliable lets us reach anti-sceptical or reliability conclusions far too cheaply.

    Coordinates: 2.3.2 2.4William Alston, Fred Dretske, Alvin Goldman

  • Problem of evil

    The question whether the evil in the world makes it unreasonable to believe in a God who is all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good. Theodicies and defences are responses to it; the problem itself is the challenge they answer.

    Coordinates: 1.8 6.1J. L. Mackie, William Rowe, David Hume

  • Problem of hell

    The difficulty of reconciling the doctrine that some persons suffer separation from God for ever with God's perfect love, justice and power.

    Coordinates: 6.1Augustine of Hippo, Anselm, William Lane Craig

  • Problem of logical omniscience

    The problem that standard possible-worlds epistemic logic implies that agents know every logical truth and every logical consequence of what they know, which no finite thinker does.

    Coordinates: 4.3.2 2.8Jaakko Hintikka, Robert Stalnaker

  • Problem of material constitution

    The puzzle of how a statue relates to the clay it is made of: they share their matter and location, yet seem to differ in their histories or modal properties and so seem to be two things.

    Coordinates: 1.1.3 1.4.1Chrysippus, Peter Geach, W. V. O. Quine

  • Problem of multiple generality

    The problem of analysing sentences with more than one expression of generality, such as 'everyone loves someone', and the inferences that depend on them; Frege's quantifier-variable logic solved it in a way the syllogistic and Boole's algebra did not.

    Coordinates: 4.1.2 4.1.3 4.1Gottlob Frege, Aristotle, George Boole

  • Problem of no best world

    The argument that if every world God could create could be bettered, no creator could be essentially unsurpassable, since whatever it made it could have made better.

    Coordinates: 6.1 1.8G. W. Leibniz, William Rowe, Robert Adams

  • Problem of old evidence

    A difficulty for Bayesian confirmation theory: evidence that is already known has probability one and so seems unable to confirm a new theory, yet known facts plainly can confirm theories.

    Coordinates: 2.8 6.8Albert Einstein, Richard Jeffrey, Bas van Fraassen

  • Problem of other minds

    The problem of how we know, or can even make sense of the idea, that beings other than ourselves have thoughts and feelings, given that we observe only their bodies and behaviour.

    Coordinates: 2.4.1 1.3René Descartes, Thomas Nagel, John Stuart Mill

  • Problem of temporary intrinsics

    David Lewis's argument that one thing cannot have incompatible intrinsic properties at different times unless it has distinct temporal parts, used to support perdurantism.

    Coordinates: 1.4.1David Lewis, Peter Geach, Peter van Inwagen

  • Problem of the criterion

    The puzzle that we seem unable to say which things we know without a criterion of knowledge, and unable to find or test a criterion without already knowing which things we know.

    Coordinates: 2.4 2.3Roderick Chisholm, Sextus Empiricus, Michel de Montaigne

  • Problem of the many

    Peter Unger's puzzle that, because ordinary objects such as clouds have fuzzy boundaries, there seem to be many equally good candidates for being the one cloud we see.

    Coordinates: 1.1.3 4.4.1Peter Geach, David Lewis, Peter van Inwagen

  • Procreation asymmetry

    The pair of judgements that creating a miserable person is wrong and makes things worse, while not creating a happy person is permissible and does not make things worse.

    Coordinates: 3.5 3.3.1Peter Singer, William MacAskill, David Benatar

  • Procreative beneficence

    Julian Savulescu's principle (2001) that people choosing which of their possible children to have should select the child expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, on the relevant available information.

    Coordinates: 3.3.1 6.28 3.5

All terms in the Philosophy Glossary