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Problem of multiple generality

Updated 19 November 2026

On this page
  1. The problem at a glance
  2. What it means
  3. The questions it belongs to
  4. Thinkers
  5. Traditions
  6. To read
  7. Sources and further reading
  8. About this page
  9. Cite this page

The problem of analysing sentences with more than one expression of generality, such as 'everyone loves someone', and the inferences that depend on them; Frege's quantifier-variable logic solved it in a way the syllogistic and Boole's algebra did not.

The problem at a glance

A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.

The reasoning that leads to it , Standard form of the problem, as given in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps

The case for a new logic runs as follows.

  1. The validity of many inferences, in mathematics as in ordinary reasoning, depends on how several expressions of generality and relations of two or more places are combined, and in what order.
  2. Aristotle's syllogistic analyses each categorical proposition into a single quantifier, 'all', 'some', 'no' or 'not all', relating a subject term to a predicate term; Gabriel Uzquiano's Stanford Encyclopedia entry notes that this logic dominated for centuries but proved inadequate for representing mathematical argument. Kevin Klement's Internet Encyclopedia article adds that George Boole's algebraic logic could not deal adequately with multiple generality either.
  3. Therefore a logic adequate to such inferences needs a different analysis of the proposition.
  4. Gottlob Frege's Begriffsschrift (1879) supplied one: it replaced subject and predicate with function and argument, treated relations as functions of more than one argument, and expressed generality by quantifiers binding variables, so that several quantifiers, each with its own scope, can occur in one formula. (the entry continues below)
Objections and responses
Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported

The first is historical. Schuman argues that Scholastic logicians handled multiply general propositions through a regimented Latin word order that disambiguates much as quantifier scope does; he cites Terence Parsons's view that later medieval logicians had the tools to disambiguate such sentences, John Buridan's catalogue of multiply general forms, and studies of the topic in sixteenth-century Aristotelian logic and in the logic of Golden Age Spain and New Spain. The second concerns the Fregean regimentation itself: Uzquiano notes that the method of rewriting binary quantifiers with unary ones cannot be extended to 'many', 'most' or 'few', and that analysing 'most planets are visible to the naked eye' in that way is a mistake.

Replies

To the historical objection, Dummett's verdict was that the Scholastic theories, however subtle, never gave a universal account comparable to Frege's; Schuman accepts that account as accurate and fair, while remarking that it still has a whiff of whiggishness about it. To the second, Uzquiano reports that such quantifiers are better treated as irreducibly binary; their study gave rise to the theory of generalised quantifiers, whose contemporary form he dates from Andrzej Mostowski (1957) and Per Lindström (1966).

Coordinate 4.1.2Coordinate 4.1.3Coordinate 4.1Gottlob FregeAristotleGeorge BooleMichael DummettJohn BuridanBertrand RussellSources and primary textsRead the full entry

What it means

The problem of multiple generality concerns sentences that contain more than one expression of generality, together with relational expressions, and the inferences that turn on them. Boaz Faraday Schuman's example is 'everyone loves someone', which can mean that for every person there is someone whom that person loves, or that there is one particular person whom everyone loves. The second reading implies the first but not conversely. The question is what a logic must be like to show why such inferences are valid or invalid. The phrase appears in Michael Dummett's Frege: Philosophy of Language, which Schuman cites for the claim that Scholastic logic had wrestled with the problems posed by inferences involving multiple generality.

The argument. The case for a new logic runs as follows. (1) The validity of many inferences, in mathematics as in ordinary reasoning, depends on how several expressions of generality and relations of two or more places are combined, and in what order. (2) Aristotle's syllogistic analyses each categorical proposition into a single quantifier, 'all', 'some', 'no' or 'not all', relating a subject term to a predicate term; Gabriel Uzquiano's Stanford Encyclopedia entry notes that this logic dominated for centuries but proved inadequate for representing mathematical argument. Kevin Klement's Internet Encyclopedia article adds that George Boole's algebraic logic could not deal adequately with multiple generality either. (3) Therefore a logic adequate to such inferences needs a different analysis of the proposition. (4) Gottlob Frege's Begriffsschrift (1879) supplied one: it replaced subject and predicate with function and argument, treated relations as functions of more than one argument, and expressed generality by quantifiers binding variables, so that several quantifiers, each with its own scope, can occur in one formula. In Klement's judgement, Frege's system was the first able to capture statements of multiple generality, and he adds: "This too was impossible in all earlier logical systems." Uzquiano credits Frege and Bertrand Russell with the related procedure of regimenting 'every A is B' and 'some A is B' using the single-place universal and existential quantifiers.

Purpose. The argument explains why quantificational logic displaced the syllogistic as the standard logic, and it is a main ground for calling Frege the founder of modern logic.

Objections. The first is historical. Schuman argues that Scholastic logicians handled multiply general propositions through a regimented Latin word order that disambiguates much as quantifier scope does; he cites Terence Parsons's view that later medieval logicians had the tools to disambiguate such sentences, John Buridan's catalogue of multiply general forms, and studies of the topic in sixteenth-century Aristotelian logic and in the logic of Golden Age Spain and New Spain. The second concerns the Fregean regimentation itself: Uzquiano notes that the method of rewriting binary quantifiers with unary ones cannot be extended to 'many', 'most' or 'few', and that analysing 'most planets are visible to the naked eye' in that way is a mistake.

Replies. To the historical objection, Dummett's verdict was that the Scholastic theories, however subtle, never gave a universal account comparable to Frege's; Schuman accepts that account as accurate and fair, while remarking that it still has a whiff of whiggishness about it. To the second, Uzquiano reports that such quantifiers are better treated as irreducibly binary; their study gave rise to the theory of generalised quantifiers, whose contemporary form he dates from Andrzej Mostowski (1957) and Per Lindström (1966).

Current status. That variable-binding quantification handles multiple generality, where the syllogistic does not, is the textbook view and is not seriously contested as a claim about expressive power. What remains open is historical: how far medieval and early modern logicians anticipated the solution by other means.

On this site it belongs to Coordinate 4.1.2 (Predicate Logic), with connections to Coordinate 4.1.3 (Syllogistic Logic) and Coordinate 4.1 (Formal Logic).

See also the glossary entries Predicate logic, Quantifier, Syllogism, Propositional logic, Second-order logic, Domain of discourse and De re and de dicto.

The questions it belongs to

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Sources and further reading

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Checked against the sources above on 14 November 2026. Not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. How we write and check.

Cite this page

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 14 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.

APA (7th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 14). Problem of multiple generality (Arguments). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/problem-of-multiple-generality/

MLA (9th edition)

“Problem of multiple generality (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought, 14 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/problem-of-multiple-generality/. Accessed [date accessed].

Chicago (17th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Problem of multiple generality (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 14, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/problem-of-multiple-generality/.

BibTeX

@misc{cot-glossary-problem-of-multiple-generality-2026,
  author       = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
  title        = {Problem of multiple generality (Arguments)},
  howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = nov,
  url          = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/problem-of-multiple-generality/},
  note         = {Source-checked 14 November 2026}
}

RIS

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