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Problem of the criterion

Updated 29 October 2026

On this page
  1. The problem at a glance
  2. What it means
  3. The questions it belongs to
  4. Thinkers
  5. To read
  6. Sources and further reading
  7. About this page
  8. Cite this page

The puzzle that we seem unable to say which things we know without a criterion of knowledge, and unable to find or test a criterion without already knowing which things we know.

The problem at a glance

A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.

The reasoning that leads to it , Standard form of the problem, as given in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps

The structure can be set out in four steps:

  1. to pick out which beliefs are knowledge we need a criterion separating knowledge from mere belief;
  2. to discover or check such a criterion we must already know some cases of knowledge to test it against;
  3. so neither answer can be reached without presupposing the other;
  4. Result: it seems that neither can be reached at all. (the entry continues below)
Objections and responses
Further discussion in the entry

The main objections are these. Methodism is accused of fixing on an arbitrary criterion, and its empiricist versions drift into scepticism about common-sense knowledge. Scepticism is accused of having no better support than its rivals. Particularism is accused, by Amico among others, of giving no independent reason for its starting cases and of openly begging the question.

Further discussion in the entry

Replies have mostly refined particularism or replaced the three-way choice. Moser's explanatory particularism treats the starting beliefs as revisable; Ernest Sosa begins from animal knowledge and builds towards reflective knowledge. Cling, Poston and DePaul develop coherentist responses, and Rescher a coherentist form of methodism. Conee's applied evidentialism starts from seemings rather than beliefs and accepts a form of rule-circularity, whose viciousness is itself disputed. Amico proposes dissolving rather than solving the problem.

Coordinate 2.4Coordinate 2.3Roderick ChisholmSextus EmpiricusMichel de MontaigneG. W. F. HegelErnest SosaSources and primary textsRead the full entry

What it means

The problem of the criterion is the puzzle that two basic questions of epistemology each seem to need an answer to the other before either can be answered. Kevin McCain's Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy article notes that Roderick Chisholm often introduced it with a pair of questions: what do we know, and how are we to decide whether we know? McCain suggests that perhaps the best formulation is more general: which propositions are true, and how can we tell which propositions are true? As McCain stresses, these are not questions about the nature of truth itself but about which propositions we should accept as true.

The structure can be set out in four steps: (1) to pick out which beliefs are knowledge we need a criterion separating knowledge from mere belief; (2) to discover or check such a criterion we must already know some cases of knowledge to test it against; (3) so neither answer can be reached without presupposing the other; therefore (4) it seems that neither can be reached at all. Sextus Empiricus presents the difficulty in Book 2 of Outlines of Pyrrhonism as the wheel or diallelus, in the setting of the dispute between Academic sceptics and Stoics. Michel de Montaigne revived it in the Apology for Raymond Sebond, and G. W. F. Hegel returned to it in 1807.

Its purpose is to test whether any theory of knowledge can begin without begging the question against the sceptic. Chisholm distinguished three responses. Particularism starts from an answer to the first question, particular cases of knowledge, and derives a criterion from them. Methodism starts from a criterion and uses it to identify the cases. Scepticism concludes that, since neither question can be answered independently, neither can be answered. Chisholm defended particularism, sometimes called commonsensism, while conceding that the problem has no solution and, in the words McCain quotes, that "we can deal with the problem only by begging the question".

The main objections are these. Methodism is accused of fixing on an arbitrary criterion, and its empiricist versions drift into scepticism about common-sense knowledge. Scepticism is accused of having no better support than its rivals. Particularism is accused, by Amico among others, of giving no independent reason for its starting cases and of openly begging the question.

Replies have mostly refined particularism or replaced the three-way choice. Moser's explanatory particularism treats the starting beliefs as revisable; Ernest Sosa begins from animal knowledge and builds towards reflective knowledge. Cling, Poston and DePaul develop coherentist responses, and Rescher a coherentist form of methodism. Conee's applied evidentialism starts from seemings rather than beliefs and accepts a form of rule-circularity, whose viciousness is itself disputed. Amico proposes dissolving rather than solving the problem.

McCain reports no settled verdict: proposed responses have multiplied, and argument continues over rule-circularity and over whether there is one problem or a family. Cling connects it with the regress argument through a paradox of reasons, and others treat the Cartesian circle (Van Cleve, Sosa) and Hume's attack on induction (Weintraub) as special cases. It differs from the regress problem, which asks how chains of reasons can end, whereas the criterion problem asks whether cases or criteria must come first.

On this site it belongs to Coordinate 2.4 (Skepticism); it also bears on Coordinate 2.3 (Structure of Justification).

See also the glossary entries Scepticism, Regress problem, Coherentism, Foundationalism, Begging the question and Justification.

The questions it belongs to

Thinkers

To read

Sources and further reading

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Checked against the sources above on 11 November 2026. Not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. How we write and check.

Cite this page

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 11 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.

APA (7th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 11). Problem of the criterion (Philosophy Glossary). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/problem-of-the-criterion/

MLA (9th edition)

“Problem of the criterion (Philosophy Glossary).” Coordinates of Thought, 11 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/problem-of-the-criterion/. Accessed [date accessed].

Chicago (17th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Problem of the criterion (Philosophy Glossary).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 11, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/problem-of-the-criterion/.

BibTeX

@misc{cot-glossary-problem-of-the-criterion-2026,
  author       = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
  title        = {Problem of the criterion (Philosophy Glossary)},
  howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = nov,
  url          = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/problem-of-the-criterion/},
  note         = {Source-checked 11 November 2026}
}

RIS

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