Card 2.4 · Root II — Epistemology
Skepticism
How do you know you are not being deceived about everything?
Skepticism is the family of positions that either deny that knowledge is attainable — in some domain, or entirely — or suspend judgement on whether it is.
Where it sits
Under II. Epistemology. Contains 2.4.1. Borders 2.2.1 Perception, 2.3 Structure of justification, 1.3.1.
Narrower questions under this one:
The rival answers
| Position | Claim |
|---|---|
| Academic skepticism | Nothing can be known (on one reading; others take the Academics to argue dialectically) |
| Pyrrhonian skepticism | Suspend judgement, including about whether nothing can be known |
| Cartesian methodical doubt | Doubt as a tool, deployed in order to reach certainty |
| Fallibilism | Knowledge is real but never certain; the demand for certainty was the error |
| Common-sense realism | Some things are simply known; the burden is on the doubter |
| Contextualism | Whether you know depends on the standards in play |
| Relevant alternatives | You need only rule out the possibilities that are live |
Key figures
| Figure | Dates | Tradition | Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pyrrho | c. 360–270 BCE | Greek | Suspension of judgement as a way of life |
| Sextus Empiricus | fl. 2nd c. CE | Greek | Systematised the modes of doubt |
| Nagarjuna | c. 150–250 CE | Indian Buddhist | Uses reductio and Madhyamaka critique against claims of intrinsic nature; whether this is skepticism in the Greek or modern epistemological sense is disputed |
| Sriharsa | c. 12th c. CE | Indian | Presses destructive arguments against Nyāya definitions of valid cognition; included here as an Indian skeptical/dialectical comparison rather than as a simple analogue of Pyrrhonism |
| Al-Ghazali | 1058–1111 | Islamic | A doubt-crisis resolved not by argument but otherwise |
| René Descartes | 1596–1650 | European modern | The evil demon; doubt as method |
| G. E. Moore | 1873–1958 | Analytic | Here is one hand |
| Carneades | c. 214–129 BCE | Greek | Probabilism: act on impressions by degrees of credibility rather than suspending all judgement |
Also on this question: Arcesilaus
Connections
→ 2.1, 2.3 · ↔ 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 1.3.1, 2.6 · ◇ Academic skepticism, Pyrrhonism, Cartesian doubt, fallibilism, common-sense realism, contextualism, relevant alternatives · ○ Classical; Islamic golden age; Early modern; Table 3 .
→ narrower questions · ↔ questions it borders · ◇ the positions, mapped in Part III of the book · ○ the eras and comparison tables (Parts IV and V)
The full card is in the book
In The Coordinates of Thought this card goes on to a worked example that sets the answers against one case, and to where the question touches daily life — page 111.
On Coordinates of Thought
Conversations about this question in Skepticism:
- Reading group: al-Ghazālī’s Deliverance from Error, the chapters on doubt 7 replies
- Moore’s “here is one hand” is not really an argument, and that is exactly why it works 6 replies
- Is it fair to call Nāgārjuna or Śrīharṣa a sceptic at all? 6 replies
- Teaching Descartes in Dakar with Peirce in my pocket: should doubt need a reason? 6 replies
- Global scepticism refutes itself, and the famous escape routes do not work 6 replies