Problem of animal suffering
On this page
The form of the problem of evil that turns on the vast suffering of non-human animals over evolutionary time, much of it long before humans existed.
Also: Darwinian problem of evil
The problem at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- The problem
- The question is whether a perfectly good and all-powerful God would permit suffering on this scale in beings who cannot be morally improved by it and who bear no responsibility for it.
- The reasoning that leads to it , Standard form of the problem, as given in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps
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Engel treats the problem as a version of the evidential argument from evil, in the standard form:
- if God exists, there is no gratuitous suffering;
- gratuitous suffering exists, as the animal record makes evident;
- Result: God does not exist. (the entry continues below)
Objections and responses
- Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
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Murray offers what he calls Causa Dei explanations, defined in the review as cases offered on behalf of God's innocence in light of the evidence, which the theist is not justified in rejecting. Neo-Cartesian views hold that animals lack the kind of consciousness needed to feel pain, including on a higher-order-thought account. A fall-based explanation attributes natural evil, pre-human suffering included, to the fall of preternatural beings. A third holds that pain is needed to preserve the integrity of living organisms. A fourth holds that a nomically regular universe moving from chaos to order is intrinsically good enough to outweigh the suffering it involves.
- Replies
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Engel answers that pain behaviour, neurophysiological similarity, endogenous pain-control systems and the effects of analgesics justify the belief that animals feel pain; that the appeal to a fall of preternatural beings fails; that an omnipotent God could create sentient creatures that do not suffer; and that a universe moving from chaos to order without animal suffering is conceivable. Even if some explanations succeeded, he argues, Murray gives no reason to think that the premise asserting gratuitous evil is false. He judges that the book "fails on its own terms", while finding it instructive.
Coordinate 6.1Coordinate 3.3.6Sources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
The problem of animal suffering is the version of the problem of evil that starts from the pain of non-human animals. Michael J. Murray's Nature Red in Tooth and Claw (Oxford University Press, 2008) calls it "the Darwinian problem of evil", referring, in the words quoted in Mylan Engel Jr.'s Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews review, to "the vast and unquantifiable array of nonhuman-animal suffering that is endemic to the evolutionary machinery". The suffering in question spans nearly three billion years of natural selection, most of it long before any human being existed.
The question is whether a perfectly good and all-powerful God would permit suffering on this scale in beings who cannot be morally improved by it and who bear no responsibility for it.
Structure. Engel treats the problem as a version of the evidential argument from evil, in the standard form: (1) if God exists, there is no gratuitous suffering; (2) gratuitous suffering exists, as the animal record makes evident; therefore (3) God does not exist. Animal suffering puts special pressure on premise (2), because explanations that appeal to human freedom or moral growth seem not to apply.
Objections. Murray offers what he calls Causa Dei explanations, defined in the review as cases offered on behalf of God's innocence in light of the evidence, which the theist is not justified in rejecting. Neo-Cartesian views hold that animals lack the kind of consciousness needed to feel pain, including on a higher-order-thought account. A fall-based explanation attributes natural evil, pre-human suffering included, to the fall of preternatural beings. A third holds that pain is needed to preserve the integrity of living organisms. A fourth holds that a nomically regular universe moving from chaos to order is intrinsically good enough to outweigh the suffering it involves.
Replies. Engel answers that pain behaviour, neurophysiological similarity, endogenous pain-control systems and the effects of analgesics justify the belief that animals feel pain; that the appeal to a fall of preternatural beings fails; that an omnipotent God could create sentient creatures that do not suffer; and that a universe moving from chaos to order without animal suffering is conceivable. Even if some explanations succeeded, he argues, Murray gives no reason to think that the premise asserting gratuitous evil is false. He judges that the book "fails on its own terms", while finding it instructive.
Status. The debate continues within the wider literature on natural evil, and it connects philosophy of religion with questions about animal minds.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 6.1 (Philosophy of Religion) and bears on Coordinate 3.3.6 (Animal Ethics).
See also the glossary entries Problem of evil, Evidential argument from evil, Theodicy, Sceptical theism, Free will defence and Moral status.
The questions it belongs to
- 6.1 Philosophy of ReligionWhat kind of claim is a religious claim?
- 3.3.6 Animal EthicsWhat is it about humans that makes us count?
Sources and further reading
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 12 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 12). Problem of animal suffering (Arguments). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/problem-of-animal-suffering/
MLA (9th edition)
“Problem of animal suffering (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought, 12 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/problem-of-animal-suffering/. Accessed [date accessed].
Chicago (17th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Problem of animal suffering (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 12, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/problem-of-animal-suffering/.
BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-problem-of-animal-suffering-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Problem of animal suffering (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/problem-of-animal-suffering/},
note = {Source-checked 12 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Problem of animal suffering (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/12 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/problem-of-animal-suffering/ LA - en ER -
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