Problem of the many
On this page
Peter Unger's puzzle that, because ordinary objects such as clouds have fuzzy boundaries, there seem to be many equally good candidates for being the one cloud we see.
Also: problem of the many (metaphysics)
The problem at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- The reasoning that leads to it , Standard form of the problem, as given in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps
A cloud has a core of water droplets and a fringe of borderline ones. Weatherson sets out a set of claims, each plausible but jointly inconsistent, which can be summarised:
- there are many sets of droplets differing only at the fringe;
- there is a cloud;
- there is at most one cloud here;
- each set of droplets composes an object, and different sets compose different objects;
- if any of these objects is a cloud, they all are, since none is better qualified;
- Result: there are many clouds, contradicting (3). (the entry continues below)
Objections and responses
- Responses
Unger's nihilism denies there are clouds, and similar reasoning extends to most kinds of ordinary thing. Overpopulation views accept millions of overlapping clouds and explain our talk of one by restricted counting. Brutalism, defended by Markosian, denies that every set composes something, at the price of brute facts about composition. Geach's relative identity says the candidates are the same cloud though different objects. David Lewis counts by almost-identity: the candidates overlap so heavily that they count as one. Vagueness-based responses deny (5): epistemicism holds that one candidate is the cloud but we cannot know which, and supervaluationism holds that 'there is exactly one cloud' is true on every admissible precisification although no candidate is determinately the cloud. Constitution views, such as Lowe's and Johnston's, distinguish the cloud from the fusions that constitute it; Peter van Inwagen proposes parthood that comes in degrees.
- Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
Weatherson discusses costs for each response: for instance, Hudson argues that overpopulation multiplies thinkers, so that when one person raises an arm millions do, threatening claims about free action; and supervaluationism has difficulty explaining penumbral connections, especially those involving names and demonstratives. Ryan Wasserman's entry on material constitution notes that the problem of the many raises significantly different issues from the constitution puzzles.
Coordinate 1.1.3Coordinate 4.4.1Peter GeachDavid LewisPeter van InwagenSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
The problem of the many asks how there can be exactly one cloud, cat or person where we see one, given that many slightly different collections of matter are equally qualified to be it. Brian Weatherson's Stanford Encyclopedia entry credits the puzzle to Unger (1980) and notes a similar case raised by Peter Geach in the same year.
The structure. A cloud has a core of water droplets and a fringe of borderline ones. Weatherson sets out a set of claims, each plausible but jointly inconsistent, which can be summarised: (1) there are many sets of droplets differing only at the fringe; (2) there is a cloud; (3) there is at most one cloud here; (4) each set of droplets composes an object, and different sets compose different objects; (5) if any of these objects is a cloud, they all are, since none is better qualified; therefore (6) there are many clouds, contradicting (3). The puzzle generalises to almost every ordinary object, including ourselves.
Responses. Unger's nihilism denies there are clouds, and similar reasoning extends to most kinds of ordinary thing. Overpopulation views accept millions of overlapping clouds and explain our talk of one by restricted counting. Brutalism, defended by Markosian, denies that every set composes something, at the price of brute facts about composition. Geach's relative identity says the candidates are the same cloud though different objects. David Lewis counts by almost-identity: the candidates overlap so heavily that they count as one. Vagueness-based responses deny (5): epistemicism holds that one candidate is the cloud but we cannot know which, and supervaluationism holds that 'there is exactly one cloud' is true on every admissible precisification although no candidate is determinately the cloud. Constitution views, such as Lowe's and Johnston's, distinguish the cloud from the fusions that constitute it; Peter van Inwagen proposes parthood that comes in degrees.
Objections. Weatherson discusses costs for each response: for instance, Hudson argues that overpopulation multiplies thinkers, so that when one person raises an arm millions do, threatening claims about free action; and supervaluationism has difficulty explaining penumbral connections, especially those involving names and demonstratives. Ryan Wasserman's entry on material constitution notes that the problem of the many raises significantly different issues from the constitution puzzles.
Current status: Weatherson describes the proposed solutions as "many of them mutually inconsistent" and says it is "not even settled whether a solution should come from metaphysics, or from philosophy of language, or from logic". On this site it belongs to Coordinate 1.1.3 (Mereology), with links to Coordinate 4.4.1 (Many-Valued and Fuzzy Logic).
See also the glossary entries Vagueness, Sorites paradox, Mereology, Problem of material constitution and Identity.
The questions it belongs to
- 1.1.3 MereologyWhen do some things make one thing?
- 4.4.1 Many-Valued and Fuzzy LogicCan a statement be partly true?
Thinkers
To read
- An Essay on Free Will — Peter van Inwagen
- Material Beings — Peter van Inwagen
- On the Plurality of Worlds — David Lewis
Sources and further reading
- Brian Weatherson, 'The Problem of the Many', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 31 August 2023)
- Ryan Wasserman, 'Material Constitution', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 14 January 2026)
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 11 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
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Chicago (17th edition)
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BibTeX
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author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Problem of the many (Philosophy Glossary)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/problem-of-the-many/},
note = {Source-checked 11 November 2026}
}RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Problem of the many (Philosophy Glossary) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/11 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/problem-of-the-many/ LA - en ER -
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