Philosophical anarchism
On this page
The thesis that no state, or no existing state, has legitimate authority or a claim to its subjects' obedience, held without the further conclusion that states must be resisted or abolished.
The argument at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- Question
- Can any state have a right to rule that its subjects are morally bound to obey, and if no state, or no existing state, has such a right, what follows for how its subjects should act? Provenance. The a priori argument originated with Robert Paul Wolff (who has no thinker page on this site) in In Defense of Anarchism, first published in 1970 (Harper and Row, as the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy's bibliography gives it) and reissued by the University of California Press (third edition, 1998, the edition the Stanford entry on political obligation cites). The a posteriori argument is A. John Simmons's verdict on a critical survey of the theories of political obligation, set out in Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton University Press, 1979) and restated in Justification and Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press, 2001). On the labels, Fiala's Stanford entry notes that the term 'a priori anarchism' is found in Simmons (2001), and that Peter Kropotkin had already used it in an article of 1910.
- Reasons , COT reconstruction: the numbering is ours, not the philosopher's
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(COT's reconstruction of the a posteriori argument, following the SEP and IEP reports of Simmons)
- A person has a general obligation to obey a particular state only if some valid moral principle binds that person to that state.
- The candidate principles are those of the standard theories, which Simmons, as the Internet Encyclopedia entry by Ned Dobos notes, regards as exhaustive.
- Actual consent binds only the relatively few who have explicitly committed themselves; the Stanford entry reports the conclusion, drawn by Simmons among others, that only "those relatively few people who have explicitly committed themselves to obey the law" have a general obligation.
- Fair play binds only those who accept benefits rather than merely receive them, and natural-duty principles do not tie anyone to one state rather than another (the particularity requirement).
- Therefore most subjects of every existing state have no general political obligation.
- Since, on Simmons's view, a state's legitimacy with respect to a person is its right to impose duties on that person, correlated with an obligation to obey,
- no existing state is legitimate with respect to most of its subjects. (the entry continues below)
- Intended conclusion
- The two forms reach different conclusions. Wolff's is a claim about every possible state outside a single limiting case. Simmons's concerns actual states, and it is narrower than it may sound. He separates the justification of states in general from the legitimacy of a particular state: as Fabienne Peter's Stanford entry on political legitimacy reports, a state is justified if "having a state is morally better than not having a state" (Simmons 2001: 125), while legitimacy requires the subject's actual consent. The practical upshot, in Simmons's words as the political-obligation entry quotes them, is to "remove any strong moral presumption in favor of obedience to, compliance with" existing states (2001: 104). Many of the law's demands remain morally binding on independent grounds; Dobos, in his own voice, puts the point by saying that a state "might deserve obedience without being entitled to it".
Objections and replies
- Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
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Wolff's a priori version has drawn further criticism beyond Reiman's. John Horton denies that autonomy should "invariably override all other values" (as quoted in the Stanford entry on political obligation); Richard Dagger argues that autonomy has to be developed and that authority can help to develop it (1997, pp. 66-68, as cited there); and Simmons himself calls Wolff's argument a "failed attempt" (2001: 111). The Stanford entry on authority adds an objection drawn from Joseph Raz's service conception of authority. On Raz's normal justification thesis, as the entry presents it, a person has authority over another when the subject would better comply with reasons that already apply to her by accepting the authority's directives as binding than by trying to follow those reasons directly; the service conception combines this thesis with Raz's dependence and pre-emption theses. Citing Raz (2010: 147-48) and Placani (2021), the entry replies to Wolff that "we can autonomously choose to act in ways that involve some suspension of autonomous decision making", so deferring to an authority whose directives help one conform to reason need not abandon autonomy. Against the a posteriori version, critics charge that it adopts an overly individualistic picture of obligation which ignores how persons are embedded in political communities, and Horton warns that giving up political obligation would demand "a root and branch reimagining of our political relations" (2010, p. 133, as cited by the Stanford entry). The criticisms pull in opposite directions: the entry reports Chaim Gans (Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience, Cambridge University Press, 1992) calling the view "false or hypocritical radicalism", while Senor finds it "all too genuine a threat to political order".
- Further discussion in the entry
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The main objection is that the view is toothless: it "remains merely theoretical", and critics call it a "bourgeois convenience that actually serves the status quo". Defenders reply that careful reflection on sovereignty and obligation properly precedes action, and that showing the absence of authority is itself a significant step.
- Replies
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Simmons himself concedes that Wolff's a priori route fails and rests his anarchism instead on the failure, one by one, of the positive theories. The Stanford entry on political obligation accepts that framing: the best reply to a posteriori anarchism would be a theory of political obligation immune to Simmons's objections, and it notes that no single theory has the support of all of those who continue to believe in political obligation. Wolff's a priori position has also found a defender: Matthew Noah Smith (cited in the entry's text as 2011; its bibliography lists his 'Political Obligation and the Self', 2013) tries to rescue it by replacing autonomy with "the moral status of the subject's self"; the entry doubts that this account, which rests on a strongly individualistic conception of the self rejected by membership theorists, will gain traction.
Coordinate 6.4.3Coordinate 6.4Coordinate 6.2Henry David ThoreauPeter KropotkinJoseph RazSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
The question. Can any state have a right to rule that its subjects are morally bound to obey, and if no state, or no existing state, has such a right, what follows for how its subjects should act? Provenance. The a priori argument originated with Robert Paul Wolff (who has no thinker page on this site) in In Defense of Anarchism, first published in 1970 (Harper and Row, as the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy's bibliography gives it) and reissued by the University of California Press (third edition, 1998, the edition the Stanford entry on political obligation cites). The a posteriori argument is A. John Simmons's verdict on a critical survey of the theories of political obligation, set out in Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton University Press, 1979) and restated in Justification and Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press, 2001). On the labels, Fiala's Stanford entry notes that the term 'a priori anarchism' is found in Simmons (2001), and that Peter Kropotkin had already used it in an article of 1910.
Philosophical anarchism is the thesis that no state, or no existing state, has legitimate authority over its subjects, combined with a refusal to infer that states must therefore be resisted or abolished. Andrew Fiala's Stanford Encyclopedia entry calls it "a theoretical standpoint" which "is not necessarily connected to practical activism". Political anarchism, of which Mikhail Bakunin is the paradigm, adds the practical programme of dismantling the state.
The position comes in two forms. A priori anarchism holds that states are illegitimate always and everywhere. Its classic statement is Robert Paul Wolff's In Defense of Anarchism (1970), whose argument can be set out as follows: (1) legitimate authority is a right to command, correlated with a duty to obey; (2) every person has a continuing primary obligation of autonomy, which the Stanford entry on political obligation summarises as "the refusal to be ruled"; (3) a duty to obey commands because they are commanded is incompatible with that obligation; therefore (4) the autonomous person "will never view the commands of the state as legitimate, as having a binding moral force". Only a unanimous direct democracy would escape the conclusion, and Wolff saw "no serious hope" of one. Jeffrey Reiman criticised the claim as absolute and a priori.
The text's own reasoning. Wolff argues in continuous prose, not in numbered steps; the four steps above are COT's condensation of the summaries in the Stanford entries. His starting point is a definition, quoted in the Stanford entry on authority by Tom Christiano and Stefan Sciaraffa: "To claim authority is to claim the right to be obeyed" (Wolff 1970: 6). Authority in this sense is normative, a matter of right; Fiala reports him as treating popular approval of states as merely conventional and as produced by coercion and propaganda. From the conflict between the right to be obeyed and the duty of autonomy Wolff draws the conclusion that, in Fiala's quotation, "philosophical anarchism would seem to be the only reasonable political belief for an enlightened man" (1970: 17).
A posteriori anarchism, associated with A. John Simmons, allows that a state could in principle be legitimate, but holds that the available theories of political obligation, from consent and fair play to association and natural duty, fail for actual states. Simmons insists that philosophical anarchists "do not take the illegitimacy of states to entail a strong moral imperative to oppose or eliminate states". Without a principled duty of obedience, Fiala observes, obedience becomes "a matter of choice, preference, and pragmatism", and some philosophical anarchists remain law-abiding while others resist. Fiala places William Godwin's view of government as a necessary evil and Henry David Thoreau's selective refusal to pay tax in the background of the tradition, and reports Peter Kropotkin's claim that anarchists do not argue against the state a priori, a claim the entry notes does not hold for every anarchist.
Structure. (COT's reconstruction of the a posteriori argument, following the SEP and IEP reports of Simmons) (1) A person has a general obligation to obey a particular state only if some valid moral principle binds that person to that state. (2) The candidate principles are those of the standard theories, which Simmons, as the Internet Encyclopedia entry by Ned Dobos notes, regards as exhaustive. (3) Actual consent binds only the relatively few who have explicitly committed themselves; the Stanford entry reports the conclusion, drawn by Simmons among others, that only "those relatively few people who have explicitly committed themselves to obey the law" have a general obligation. (4) Fair play binds only those who accept benefits rather than merely receive them, and natural-duty principles do not tie anyone to one state rather than another (the particularity requirement). (5) Therefore most subjects of every existing state have no general political obligation. (6) Since, on Simmons's view, a state's legitimacy with respect to a person is its right to impose duties on that person, correlated with an obligation to obey, (7) no existing state is legitimate with respect to most of its subjects. Dobos states the conclusion thus: "According to a posteriori philosophical anarchism, no existing state is legitimate or has a right to obedience", adding that political obligation might be owed to an authority that satisfied certain conditions.
Intended conclusion. The two forms reach different conclusions. Wolff's is a claim about every possible state outside a single limiting case. Simmons's concerns actual states, and it is narrower than it may sound. He separates the justification of states in general from the legitimacy of a particular state: as Fabienne Peter's Stanford entry on political legitimacy reports, a state is justified if "having a state is morally better than not having a state" (Simmons 2001: 125), while legitimacy requires the subject's actual consent. The practical upshot, in Simmons's words as the political-obligation entry quotes them, is to "remove any strong moral presumption in favor of obedience to, compliance with" existing states (2001: 104). Many of the law's demands remain morally binding on independent grounds; Dobos, in his own voice, puts the point by saying that a state "might deserve obedience without being entitled to it".
Objections. Wolff's a priori version has drawn further criticism beyond Reiman's. John Horton denies that autonomy should "invariably override all other values" (as quoted in the Stanford entry on political obligation); Richard Dagger argues that autonomy has to be developed and that authority can help to develop it (1997, pp. 66-68, as cited there); and Simmons himself calls Wolff's argument a "failed attempt" (2001: 111). The Stanford entry on authority adds an objection drawn from Joseph Raz's service conception of authority. On Raz's normal justification thesis, as the entry presents it, a person has authority over another when the subject would better comply with reasons that already apply to her by accepting the authority's directives as binding than by trying to follow those reasons directly; the service conception combines this thesis with Raz's dependence and pre-emption theses. Citing Raz (2010: 147-48) and Placani (2021), the entry replies to Wolff that "we can autonomously choose to act in ways that involve some suspension of autonomous decision making", so deferring to an authority whose directives help one conform to reason need not abandon autonomy. Against the a posteriori version, critics charge that it adopts an overly individualistic picture of obligation which ignores how persons are embedded in political communities, and Horton warns that giving up political obligation would demand "a root and branch reimagining of our political relations" (2010, p. 133, as cited by the Stanford entry). The criticisms pull in opposite directions: the entry reports Chaim Gans (Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience, Cambridge University Press, 1992) calling the view "false or hypocritical radicalism", while Senor finds it "all too genuine a threat to political order".
The main objection is that the view is toothless: it "remains merely theoretical", and critics call it a "bourgeois convenience that actually serves the status quo". Defenders reply that careful reflection on sovereignty and obligation properly precedes action, and that showing the absence of authority is itself a significant step.
Replies. Simmons himself concedes that Wolff's a priori route fails and rests his anarchism instead on the failure, one by one, of the positive theories. The Stanford entry on political obligation accepts that framing: the best reply to a posteriori anarchism would be a theory of political obligation immune to Simmons's objections, and it notes that no single theory has the support of all of those who continue to believe in political obligation. Wolff's a priori position has also found a defender: Matthew Noah Smith (cited in the entry's text as 2011; its bibliography lists his 'Political Obligation and the Self', 2013) tries to rescue it by replacing autonomy with "the moral status of the subject's self"; the entry doubts that this account, which rests on a strongly individualistic conception of the self rejected by membership theorists, will gain traction.
Key thinkers and texts. Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (1970; third edition 1998); Jeffrey Reiman, In Defense of Political Philosophy: A Reply to Robert Paul Wolff's "In Defense of Anarchism" (Harper and Row, 1972); A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (1979) and Justification and Legitimacy (2001); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1986); John Horton, Political Obligation (Macmillan, 1992); Chaim Gans, Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience (1992). Henry David Thoreau and Peter Kropotkin, discussed above, appear in Fiala's entry as background figures and points of contrast rather than as parties to the analytic debate.
Current status. Philosophical anarchism remains a live position in the analytic literature on political obligation: the Stanford entry on political obligation holds that the best response to it, especially in its a posteriori form, would be a theory of political obligation immune to its objections, and it records Michael Huemer (2013, as cited there) as regarding philosophical anarchism as a second-best alternative that could prepare the way for anarchism proper. Recent arguments about whether cooperation actually produces the benefits of law, the entry adds, may renew the dispute. Whether the view is too weak or too dangerous remains contested, and no consensus has formed on either charge.
Related arguments on this site. The individual grounds whose failure the a posteriori argument alleges have their own entries: Hume's argument against the original contract (on tacit consent), Principle of fair play, and the contract arguments Hobbes's state-of-nature argument and Original position. Because its subject is whether there is a general moral obligation to obey the law, the position also belongs to Coordinate 6.2 (Philosophy of Law).
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 6.4.3 (Sovereignty and the State) and Coordinate 6.4 (Political Philosophy).
See also the glossary entries Anarchism, Political obligation, Authority, Political legitimacy and Personal autonomy.
The questions it belongs to
- 6.4.3 Sovereignty and the StateWho holds final authority, and what makes it final?
- 6.4 Political PhilosophyWhen is political power legitimate, and what may it rightly do?
- 6.2 Philosophy of LawIs an unjust law still a law?
Thinkers
To read
- Civil Disobedience — Henry David Thoreau
- Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution — Peter Kropotkin
- The Morality of Freedom — Joseph Raz
Sources and further reading
- Andrew Fiala, 'Anarchism', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 4 December 2025)
- Richard Dagger and David Lefkowitz, 'Political Obligation', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 15 March 2021)
- Tom Christiano and Stefan Sciaraffa, 'Authority', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 7 October 2025)
- Ned Dobos, 'Political Obligation', Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (no date shown)
- Fabienne Peter, 'Political Legitimacy', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 11 December 2023)
- Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (University of California Press; copyright 1998, first published 1970), De Gruyter Brill record of the 2020 reissue
- A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), Texas A&M University Libraries catalogue record
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Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 15 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
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BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-philosophical-anarchism-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Philosophical anarchism (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/philosophical-anarchism/},
note = {Source-checked 15 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Philosophical anarchism (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/15 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/philosophical-anarchism/ LA - en ER -
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