Card 1.3 · Root I — Metaphysics
Philosophy of Mind
What is a mind, and how does it relate to the body and the world?
Philosophy of mind asks what mental phenomena are — thought, perception, feeling, intentionality, consciousness — and how the mind relates to the body and to the rest of the physical world.
On this card
Where it sits
Under I. Metaphysics. Borders 2.2.1 Perception and 6.14 Philosophy of psychology. Feeds 1.7 Free will and 6.17 Philosophy of AI.
New to metaphysics? Read the guide
Narrower questions under this one:
- 1.3.1 The Mind–Body Problem How can a thought move an arm?
- 1.3.2 Personal Identity Are you the same person you were at five?
- 1.3.3 Intentionality How can one thing be about another thing?
- 1.3.4 Qualia and the Hard Problem Why isn't it all dark inside?
The rival answers
These positions answer different dimensions of the problem and should not be read as points on a single ontological scale. Behaviourism and functionalism characterise mental states in ways that cut across the materialism–dualism divide. Functionalism is officially neutral between materialism and dualism, although it has been particularly attractive to materialists.
Rival accounts of mind
| Position | Claim |
|---|---|
| Eliminative materialism | Some or all of the mental states posited by common sense do not exist |
| Behaviourism | Mental talk reduces to dispositions to behave |
| Identity theory | Mental states are identical to brain states |
| Functionalism | Mental states are defined by their causal roles, not by what realises them |
| Property dualism | One substance, two irreducible kinds of property |
| Substance dualism | Mind and body are two distinct substances |
| Panpsychism | Mentality or experience is fundamental and widespread throughout nature |
| Idealism | Reality is fundamentally mental, or the mental has ontological priority; stronger immaterialist forms deny mind-independent matter |
Where do you stand?
What is a mind, and how does it relate to the body and the world?
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Key figures
| Figure | Dates | Tradition | Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aristotle | 384–322 BCE | Greek | Soul as the form of a living body |
| Vasubandhu | c. 4th–5th c. CE | Indian Buddhist | Detailed analysis of mind without a self |
| Ibn Sina | 980–1037 | Islamic | The floating man argument for self-awareness |
| René Descartes | 1596–1650 | European modern | Substance dualism in its canonical form |
| Gilbert Ryle | 1900–1976 | Analytic | The ghost in the machine as a category mistake |
| Thomas Nagel | b. 1937 | Analytic | What it is like to be a bat; subjectivity resists reduction |
Also on this question: Asaṅga Xuanzang
Talk about it here
Conversations about this question in Consciousness:
- Consciousness is fundamental, not produced by the brain 9 replies
- We will never have a test for machine consciousness, and we should say so plainly 6 replies
- Functionalism is officially neutral, but in practice it is materialism with better manners 6 replies
- Nishida’s pure experience dissolves the hard problem rather than solving it 6 replies
- Reading group: the Elisabeth–Descartes letters of 1643, slowly 6 replies
Join free to ask about it Everything in Consciousness
Connections
→ 1.1, 1.3.1 · ↔ 2.2.1, 6.14, 6.17 · ◇ eliminative materialism, behaviourism, identity theory, functionalism, property dualism, substance dualism, panpsychism, idealism · ○ Axial Age; Islamic golden age; Modern; Table 2
→ depends on · ↔ borders: genuine overlap, neither prior · ◇ answered by: points from question to answers · ○ appears in: points to the timeline and the comparisons
The full card is in the book
In The Coordinates of Thought this card goes on to a worked example that sets the answers against one case, and to where the question touches daily life — page 42.