Heidegger's argument that being-in-the-world comes before the subject–object relation
On this page
Martin Heidegger's argument in Being and Time that we first encounter things as equipment within a world of practical involvements, so that the Cartesian picture of a subject facing objects is derivative.
The argument at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- Question
- Is our basic relation to the world that of a mind representing objects, or something prior to that?
- Reasons , COT reconstruction: the numbering is ours, not the philosopher's
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- The Cartesian tradition begins from a subject locked, in Heidegger's phrase, in the 'cabinet of consciousness' (SZ 62), facing an extended world it must then prove exists.
- But we first encounter things such as hammers not as objects with properties but in use, as equipment serviceable for a task.
- Equipment refers beyond itself: a pen affords writing and points to paper, desk and chair, so things show up within a whole of affordances and references, which is what Heidegger calls a world.
- Things show up as merely present objects (presence-at-hand) only when this involvement is disturbed, for example when a tool turns out to be damaged (SZ 73), or in a deficient mode of concern (SZ 61).
- So presence-at-hand is derivative of readiness-to-hand, and the subject–object relation is not the basic form of our being.
- Intended conclusion
- The basic structure of the kind of being we are (Dasein) is being-in-the-world, with self, world and relation inseparable. Starting from an isolated subject is an ontologically inadequate starting point (SZ 205), and the attempt to prove the external world rests on the same mistake.
Objections and replies
- Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
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- Some interpreters, including Hubert Dreyfus, equate understanding with skilful coping; others (the entry cites Wrathall) argue that understanding is primarily projection onto possibilities, and that skilled know-how is its best example rather than its definition.
- Embodiment: the entry notes that Heidegger never explains what role our material bodies play in constituting the space we inhabit (see Cerbone).
- Idealism: Blattner and Han-Pile read Heidegger as arguing for a form of idealism about being.
- Replies
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The coping and projection readings agree on the derivative status of presence-at-hand and differ on what understanding consists in. Heidegger does say that existential space is not reducible to the material body; the entry treats the lack of a positive account of the body as a real gap (compare Merleau-Ponty's argument that perception is bodily; a comparison, not a claim of influence). The idealism question remains disputed.
Coordinate 1.3Coordinate 1.1Coordinate 2.4Martin HeideggerRené DescartesHubert DreyfusSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
Question. Is our basic relation to the world that of a mind representing objects, or something prior to that?
Provenance. The argument is Martin Heidegger's, in Being and Time (1927). The account follows the Stanford Encyclopedia entry 'Martin Heidegger', which cites the German pagination (SZ); the numbering is editorial.
Structure. (1) The Cartesian tradition begins from a subject locked, in Heidegger's phrase, in the 'cabinet of consciousness' (SZ 62), facing an extended world it must then prove exists. (2) But we first encounter things such as hammers not as objects with properties but in use, as equipment serviceable for a task. (3) Equipment refers beyond itself: a pen affords writing and points to paper, desk and chair, so things show up within a whole of affordances and references, which is what Heidegger calls a world. (4) Things show up as merely present objects (presence-at-hand) only when this involvement is disturbed, for example when a tool turns out to be damaged (SZ 73), or in a deficient mode of concern (SZ 61). (5) So presence-at-hand is derivative of readiness-to-hand, and the subject–object relation is not the basic form of our being.
Intended conclusion. The basic structure of the kind of being we are (Dasein) is being-in-the-world, with self, world and relation inseparable. Starting from an isolated subject is an ontologically inadequate starting point (SZ 205), and the attempt to prove the external world rests on the same mistake.
Objections. (a) Some interpreters, including Hubert Dreyfus, equate understanding with skilful coping; others (the entry cites Wrathall) argue that understanding is primarily projection onto possibilities, and that skilled know-how is its best example rather than its definition. (b) Embodiment: the entry notes that Heidegger never explains what role our material bodies play in constituting the space we inhabit (see Cerbone). (c) Idealism: Blattner and Han-Pile read Heidegger as arguing for a form of idealism about being.
Replies. The coping and projection readings agree on the derivative status of presence-at-hand and differ on what understanding consists in. Heidegger does say that existential space is not reducible to the material body; the entry treats the lack of a positive account of the body as a real gap (compare Merleau-Ponty's argument that perception is bodily; a comparison, not a claim of influence). The idealism question remains disputed.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 1.3 (Philosophy of Mind) and 1.1 (Ontology). See also Dasein, Phenomenology and Husserl's argument for the phenomenological reduction.
The questions it belongs to
- 1.3 Philosophy of MindWhat is a mind, and how does it relate to the body and the world?
- 1.1 OntologyWhat is there?
- 2.4 SkepticismHow do you know you are not being deceived about everything?
Thinkers
Traditions
To read
- Being and Time — Martin Heidegger
- Discourse on the Method — René Descartes
- Meditations on First Philosophy — René Descartes
Sources and further reading
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 22 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 22). Heidegger's argument that being-in-the-world comes before the subject–object relation (Arguments). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/heideggers-argument-that-being-in-the-world-comes-before-the-subject-object-relation/
MLA (9th edition)
“Heidegger's argument that being-in-the-world comes before the subject–object relation (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought, 22 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/heideggers-argument-that-being-in-the-world-comes-before-the-subject-object-relation/. Accessed [date accessed].
Chicago (17th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Heidegger's argument that being-in-the-world comes before the subject–object relation (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 22, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/heideggers-argument-that-being-in-the-world-comes-before-the-subject-object-relation/.
BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-heideggers-argument-that-being-in-the-world-comes-before-the-subject-object-relation-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Heidegger's argument that being-in-the-world comes before the subject–object relation (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/heideggers-argument-that-being-in-the-world-comes-before-the-subject-object-relation/},
note = {Source-checked 22 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Heidegger's argument that being-in-the-world comes before the subject–object relation (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/22 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/heideggers-argument-that-being-in-the-world-comes-before-the-subject-object-relation/ LA - en ER -
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