Penal abolitionism
On this page
The position that legal punishment, or some major form of it such as imprisonment, should be abolished rather than reformed, because it cannot be justified.
What it means
Penal abolitionism is the position that legal punishment should be abolished rather than reformed. The Stanford Encyclopedia entry on legal punishment by Zachary Hoskins and Antony Duff names among its classic sources Christie, Hulsman, de Haan and Bianchi, and distinguishes two scopes. Some abolitionists target particular modes of punishment, such as capital punishment or, in Angela Davis's work (2003), imprisonment; others, including Golash, Boonin and Zimmerman, target criminal punishment in any form.
Provenance. Penal abolitionism is a label for several distinct positions rather than one argument. Angela Davis's Are Prisons Obsolete? (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003, an Open Media book) is cited in the Stanford entry as an example of abolitionism directed at one mode of punishment, imprisonment; David Boonin's The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 2008) sets out a book-length philosophical case that no justification of legal punishment as such succeeds, which Jim Staihar's review calls "an extraordinarily comprehensive critique of a wide range of theories". The free-will sceptics' quarantine model is a further, different proposal: it rejects punishment grounded in basic desert, but its premise is scepticism about moral responsibility rather than the failure of every justification of punishment; Derk Pereboom's case for that scepticism is treated in the glossary entry Manipulation argument and is not rebuilt here.
The question abolitionism presses is whether a practice that deliberately imposes burdens and condemnation on people can be justified at all. Its strongest version, which the entry calls the "more powerful abolitionist challenge", holds that punishment "cannot be justified even in principle". The argument can be reconstructed as follows: (1) punishment intentionally burdens and condemns persons, which requires strong justification; (2) the main justifications, consequentialist, retributivist and communicative, each fail to supply it; (3) there are alternative responses to crime that serve the legitimate aims of protection and repair without punishment; therefore (4) punishment ought to be abolished. Premise (2) draws on the standard objections: that deterrence permits injustice, that desert is contested, and that censure need not take the form of hard treatment.
The text's own reasoning. Boonin's book, as Jim Staihar's review in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2009) reports it, begins from the observation that punishing someone involves intentionally harming them, which people have a prima facie right against, and asks why state officials may intentionally harm those who break just and reasonable laws. Boonin sets two tests for any answer: a foundational test, that it rest only on morally acceptable principles, and an entailment test, that it permit punishing offenders and forbid punishing non-offenders. His publisher's description states his conclusion that there is no satisfactory solution to this problem, and that legal punishment should therefore be abolished. Davis's book, whose chapters include 'Prison reform or prison abolition?' and 'Abolitionist alternatives', is not reconstructed here; this record reports only its classification in the Stanford entry.
Structure (Boonin's argument, as reported by Staihar; the numbering is COT's). (1) Legal punishment intentionally harms offenders, and intentional harm needs justification. (2) An acceptable justification must pass both the foundational and the entailment test. (3) Each consequentialist solution, including act-utilitarian and rule-utilitarian ones, each retributivist solution, among them desert-based, forfeiture-based and fairness-based ones, and each other solution, whether consent-based, reprobative, moral-educational, self-defence-based or hybrid, fails on at least one of seven counts: unacceptable assumptions, punishing the innocent, failing to punish the guilty, failing to explain proportionality, failing to explain excuses, failing to explain why only the state may punish, and failing to explain why the harm is intentional rather than merely foreseen. (4) A practice of pure restitution, in which offenders compensate victims in monetary or other forms such as community service, can still incapacitate dangerous offenders, express blame, educate and deter, while harming offenders only foreseeably. Therefore (5) legal punishment should be abolished in favour of restitution. This is a sharper, author-specific form of the general reconstruction in the previous paragraph.
Intended conclusion. Not that wrongdoing should go unanswered, but that the deliberate infliction of harm as punishment should give way to non-punitive responses: restitution in Boonin's case, the abolition of imprisonment in the work of Davis as the Stanford entry classifies it, and incapacitation without desert in the quarantine model.
Abolitionists propose several alternatives. Restorative justice replaces trial and punishment with mediation and reconciliation among those affected. Barnett (1977) proposed enforced restitution to victims. Free-will sceptics such as Derk Pereboom and Caruso propose a quarantine model, incapacitating dangerous offenders on the analogy of public-health measures rather than punishing them. Christie's claim that criminal law appropriates conflicts belonging to the parties remains a recurring theme.
Objections. Staihar argues that Boonin's critique sometimes overreaches. Boonin, he says, does not clearly separate a desert requirement (that punishment not violate rights) from a value requirement (that its consequences be best), so it is unclear whether the abolitionist claim is that punishment is never deserved or that restitution has better results. The objection that theories fail to punish the guilty is strong, he says, only against a theory that entails that some criminals do not deserve to be punished, since not punishing can be justified, as plea bargains and pardons show; the objection concerning the punishment of non-offenders rests on a principle that is controversial in scope; and faulting theories for not explaining the state's exclusive authority asks them for something they were not designed to supply. Staihar also presses an objection Boonin does not address, penal substitution: whereas others cannot remove an offender's punitive desert by undergoing punishment on her behalf, third parties could discharge her duty to compensate, so that pure restitution would rule out any harmful treatment of the offender, an implication Staihar expects many to find unacceptable. Against the quarantine model, the Stanford entry on legal punishment adds to the dignity worry the charge that it may not rule out disproportionate treatment, and Caruso lists further critics, among them Corrado (1996), Lemos (2016) and Tadros (2017).
Replies challenge both the negative and the positive claims. Defenders argue that one or more justifications of punishment survive the objections. Against the alternatives, Duff argues that restitution for a wrong must include apologetic moral reparation and so comes to resemble communicative punishment, and Smilansky questions whether the quarantine model is consistent with human dignity. Even so, Duff insists that the abolitionist challenge "must be met, rather than ignored", and the entry keeps open the possibility that punishment cannot be justified. The debate remains unresolved.
Replies. Staihar himself calls the book "an extraordinarily comprehensive critique of a wide range of theories" and says that Boonin convincingly shows that a plausible solution to the problem of punishment will differ markedly from existing theories, so his objections press for a sharper structure rather than a rejection. Pereboom and Caruso, as Caruso's Stanford entry reports, ground incapacitation in the right to harm in self-defence rather than on purely consequentialist grounds, so that innocent people could not be incapacitated, since they pose no direct threat to others; and they limit it to what protection requires: less dangerous criminal tendencies justify only more moderate restraints, fairness requires attempts at rehabilitation, and nothing justifies making a detained person's life more miserable than the danger requires. Boonin's reply to the charge that alternatives cannot do punishment's work is the claim, reported above, that restitution serves the same protective and expressive aims while harming offenders only as a foreseen side effect.
Key thinkers and texts. Christie (1977, 'Conflicts as Property') and Hulsman (1986), as cited in the Stanford entry; Barnett (1977) on restitution; Angela Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? (2003); David Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (2008), with Jim Staihar's review (2009); Derk Pereboom, 'Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Punishment' (2013), and Gregg Caruso's public health-quarantine model; S. Smilansky, 'Hard Determinism and Punishment: A Practical Reductio' (2011).
Current status. Defenders of punishment answer the negative claim by defending particular justifications, and the boundary between restitution and punishment, pressed from one side by Duff and from another by the penal-substitution objection, is where the positive proposal is most contested. Abolitionist arguments are reported here as positions in a philosophical debate; COT takes no view on penal policy.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 6.2 (Philosophy of Law).
Further connections on this site. It also bears on Coordinate 6.4 (Political Philosophy), because it questions the state's claimed authority to punish, and on Coordinate 1.7 (Free Will and Determinism), through the quarantine model's grounding in scepticism about basic desert.
See also the glossary entries Punishment, Restorative justice, Retributivism, Communicative theory of punishment and Free will.
Further cross-references. See also the glossary entries Deterrence theory (punishment), Moral responsibility and Manipulation argument.
The questions it belongs to
- 6.2 Philosophy of LawIs an unjust law still a law?
- 6.4 Political PhilosophyWhen is political power legitimate, and what may it rightly do?
- 1.7 Free Will and DeterminismCould you have done otherwise?
Thinkers
To read
Sources and further reading
- Zachary Hoskins and Antony Duff, 'Legal Punishment', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 11 March 2026)
- David Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), DOI 10.1017/CBO9780511819254 (publisher's book page: description and contents)
- Jim Staihar, review of David Boonin, The Problem of Punishment, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (11 July 2009)
- Angela Y. Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? (New York: Seven Stories Press, [2003]; Open Media book), Simmons University Library catalogue record (bibliographic details and contents only)
- Gregg Caruso, 'Skepticism About Moral Responsibility', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (first published 18 January 2018)
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 15 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
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BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-penal-abolitionism-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Penal abolitionism (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/penal-abolitionism/},
note = {Source-checked 15 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Penal abolitionism (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/15 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/penal-abolitionism/ LA - en ER -
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