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Pairing problem

Updated 19 November 2026

On this page
  1. The problem at a glance
  2. What it means
  3. The questions it belongs to
  4. Thinkers
  5. To read
  6. Sources and further reading
  7. About this page
  8. Cite this page

An objection to interactionist substance dualism, associated with Jaegwon Kim: if souls are not in space, nothing seems able to make a particular soul causally paired with one particular body rather than another.

Also: Kim's pairing problem, pairing argument

The problem at a glance

A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.

The problem
given two exactly similar minds and the bodies with which they interact, "In virtue of what is M1 causally paired with B1, and M2 with B2?" The entry stresses that this is a metaphysical question, not the epistemological question of how we would know the pairings. Among physical things relative location can do the pairing, but for non-spatial souls "relative spatial location is unavailable", and the minds' intrinsic properties, being exactly similar, cannot do it either.
The reasoning that leads to it , Standard form of the problem, as given in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps

Andrew Bailey, Joshua Rasmussen and Luke Van Horn give a modal reconstruction:

  1. necessarily, if x causes y, there are relations whose holding makes it the case that x causes y;
  2. necessarily, a spatial relation is among those relations, so that (1) and (2) together form 'Kim's Dictum';
  3. necessarily, a soul stands in no spatial relations, the 'Nowhere Man' principle;
  4. Result: it is impossible for a soul to cause anything. (the entry continues below)
Objections and responses
Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported

One response appeals to individualistic powers, citing Peter Unger (2006) and Foster: where a key can open any lock of a given kind, a soul might have a power to affect one particular body and no other. Bailey, Rasmussen and Van Horn reject both premises. Against Kim's Dictum they invoke singular causation and a quantum-tunnelling case in which causal continuity holds although no spatial relation pairs the particle before and after; against Nowhere Man they suggest that souls might occupy regions of space and be paired with bodies by co-location.

Replies

The entry answers the first strategy with the doubt that it is "by no means obvious that powers could be individualistic in this sense", while noting Audi (2011) as a qualified defence.

Coordinate 1.3.1Coordinate 1.4.2Jaegwon KimErnest SosaRené DescartesSources and primary textsRead the full entry

What it means

The pairing problem is an objection to interactionist substance dualism associated with Jaegwon Kim. The Stanford Encyclopedia entry on mental causation by David Robb, John Heil and Sophie Gibb cites Kim (1973, 2005), Ernest Sosa (1984) and John Foster (1991) for it. It differs from the classic interaction problem pressed against René Descartes, which asks how an unextended mind could move a body at all; the pairing problem asks what could tie a particular mind causally to one particular body.

The question, in the entry's words: given two exactly similar minds and the bodies with which they interact, "In virtue of what is M1 causally paired with B1, and M2 with B2?" The entry stresses that this is a metaphysical question, not the epistemological question of how we would know the pairings. Among physical things relative location can do the pairing, but for non-spatial souls "relative spatial location is unavailable", and the minds' intrinsic properties, being exactly similar, cannot do it either.

Structure. Andrew Bailey, Joshua Rasmussen and Luke Van Horn give a modal reconstruction: (1) necessarily, if x causes y, there are relations whose holding makes it the case that x causes y; (2) necessarily, a spatial relation is among those relations, so that (1) and (2) together form 'Kim's Dictum'; (3) necessarily, a soul stands in no spatial relations, the 'Nowhere Man' principle; therefore (4) it is impossible for a soul to cause anything. The intended conclusion is that substance dualism cannot accommodate mental causation.

Objections. One response appeals to individualistic powers, citing Peter Unger (2006) and Foster: where a key can open any lock of a given kind, a soul might have a power to affect one particular body and no other. Bailey, Rasmussen and Van Horn reject both premises. Against Kim's Dictum they invoke singular causation and a quantum-tunnelling case in which causal continuity holds although no spatial relation pairs the particle before and after; against Nowhere Man they suggest that souls might occupy regions of space and be paired with bodies by co-location.

Replies. The entry answers the first strategy with the doubt that it is "by no means obvious that powers could be individualistic in this sense", while noting Audi (2011) as a qualified defence.

Status. The entry reports these responses without declaring a winner; Bailey, Rasmussen and Van Horn conclude that the argument fails against substance dualism, and the question remains live within debates about mental causation.

On this site it belongs to Coordinate 1.3.1 (The Mind–Body Problem) and Coordinate 1.4.2 (Causation).

See also the glossary entries Interaction problem, Dualism, Mental causation, Causal exclusion argument and Physicalism.

The questions it belongs to

Thinkers

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Sources and further reading

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Checked against the sources above on 12 November 2026. Not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. How we write and check.

Cite this page

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 12 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.

APA (7th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 12). Pairing problem (Arguments). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/pairing-problem/

MLA (9th edition)

“Pairing problem (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought, 12 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/pairing-problem/. Accessed [date accessed].

Chicago (17th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Pairing problem (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 12, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/pairing-problem/.

BibTeX

@misc{cot-glossary-pairing-problem-2026,
  author       = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
  title        = {Pairing problem (Arguments)},
  howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = nov,
  url          = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/pairing-problem/},
  note         = {Source-checked 12 November 2026}
}

RIS

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AU  - Coordinates of Thought Editors
TI  - Pairing problem (Arguments)
T2  - Coordinates of Thought
PB  - Coordinates of Thought
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/11/12
UR  - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/pairing-problem/
LA  - en
ER  - 

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