Problem of logical omniscience
On this page
The problem that standard possible-worlds epistemic logic implies that agents know every logical truth and every logical consequence of what they know, which no finite thinker does.
Also: logical omniscience
The problem at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- The problem
- The problem arises from the possible-worlds analysis introduced by Jaakko Hintikka. In prose: (1) an agent knows p just in case p holds in every world compatible with what the agent knows; (2) a logical truth holds in every world, and a logical consequence of p holds in every world where p holds; therefore (3) the agent knows every logical truth and every logical consequence of what it knows. In the formal system, the rule of necessitation (generalisation) delivers knowledge of every theorem and principle K delivers closure under known implication. The intended conclusion of the critics is that the semantics idealises beyond recognition: Francesco Berto and Mark Jago's entry on impossible worlds says simply that "these principles seem false", since no one knows all logical and mathematical truths.
- The reasoning that leads to it , Standard form of the problem, as given in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps
The problem arises from the possible-worlds analysis introduced by Jaakko Hintikka. In prose:
- an agent knows p just in case p holds in every world compatible with what the agent knows;
- a logical truth holds in every world, and a logical consequence of p holds in every world where p holds;
- Result: the agent knows every logical truth and every logical consequence of what it knows. (the entry continues below)
Objections and responses
- Further discussion in the entry
The principal objections to the argument deny that it refutes the framework. Some accept the idealisation: Berto and Jago note that Robert Stalnaker (1991, 1999) defends these seemingly false principles. Hintikka's early response denied that an agent who fails to draw distant consequences is inconsistent, and proposed calling the denial of such a consequence 'indefensible' instead; critics, including Chisholm and Jago, objected to this terminology, and Rendsvig, Symons and Wang report that "few philosophers" were satisfied with it.
- The principal replies, from those who accept the problem, revise the semantics
Impossible worlds, which Hintikka called 'impossible possible worlds' and which Rantala developed as 'seemingly possible' worlds, let agents fail to exclude worlds where logic breaks down; Rantala later allowed any connective to behave arbitrarily at such worlds. Awareness logic, whose seminal work is Fagin and Halpern (1987), separates implicit knowledge from explicit knowledge, which also requires awareness; since awareness is not closed under logical consequence, neither is explicit knowledge.
Coordinate 4.3.2Coordinate 2.8Jaakko HintikkaRobert StalnakerSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
The problem of logical omniscience asks whether the standard logic of knowledge and belief can describe real, finite thinkers at all. In Rasmus Rendsvig, John Symons and Yanjing Wang's Stanford Encyclopedia entry, an agent is logically omniscient if "Whenever an agent c knows all of the formulas in a set Γ and A follows logically from Γ, then c also knows A."
The problem arises from the possible-worlds analysis introduced by Jaakko Hintikka. In prose: (1) an agent knows p just in case p holds in every world compatible with what the agent knows; (2) a logical truth holds in every world, and a logical consequence of p holds in every world where p holds; therefore (3) the agent knows every logical truth and every logical consequence of what it knows. In the formal system, the rule of necessitation (generalisation) delivers knowledge of every theorem and principle K delivers closure under known implication. The intended conclusion of the critics is that the semantics idealises beyond recognition: Francesco Berto and Mark Jago's entry on impossible worlds says simply that "these principles seem false", since no one knows all logical and mathematical truths.
The principal objections to the argument deny that it refutes the framework. Some accept the idealisation: Berto and Jago note that Robert Stalnaker (1991, 1999) defends these seemingly false principles. Hintikka's early response denied that an agent who fails to draw distant consequences is inconsistent, and proposed calling the denial of such a consequence 'indefensible' instead; critics, including Chisholm and Jago, objected to this terminology, and Rendsvig, Symons and Wang report that "few philosophers" were satisfied with it.
The principal replies, from those who accept the problem, revise the semantics. Impossible worlds, which Hintikka called 'impossible possible worlds' and which Rantala developed as 'seemingly possible' worlds, let agents fail to exclude worlds where logic breaks down; Rantala later allowed any connective to behave arbitrarily at such worlds. Awareness logic, whose seminal work is Fagin and Halpern (1987), separates implicit knowledge from explicit knowledge, which also requires awareness; since awareness is not closed under logical consequence, neither is explicit knowledge.
Each reply faces objections in turn. Unconstrained impossible worlds, Berto and Jago report, may make "no real progress" over a purely syntactic treatment, while constrained versions such as Levesque's still yield "a weakened form of logical omniscience". Jago's proposal admits as epistemically accessible only genuine possibilities and non-obvious impossibilities, but, as the entry notes, it is not clear that the length of a proof tracks how obvious an impossibility is.
The current state of the debate is unsettled: no reply commands general agreement, and the epistemic logic entry says that debates about the idealisations involved "are ongoing in both philosophical and interdisciplinary contexts".
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 4.3.2 (Epistemic Logic) and Coordinate 2.8 (Formal Epistemology).
See also the glossary entries Epistemic logic, Epistemic closure, Possible worlds, Common knowledge and Bayesian epistemology.
The questions it belongs to
- 4.3.2 Epistemic LogicIf you know something, do you know that you know it?
- 2.8 Formal EpistemologyBy how much should this evidence move you?
Thinkers
To read
Sources and further reading
- Rasmus Rendsvig, John Symons and Yanjing Wang, 'Epistemic Logic', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 1 December 2023)
- Francesco Berto and Mark Jago, 'Impossible Worlds', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 27 April 2023)
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 11 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 11). Problem of logical omniscience (Philosophy Glossary). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/problem-of-logical-omniscience/
MLA (9th edition)
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Chicago (17th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Problem of logical omniscience (Philosophy Glossary).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 11, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/problem-of-logical-omniscience/.
BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-problem-of-logical-omniscience-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Problem of logical omniscience (Philosophy Glossary)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/problem-of-logical-omniscience/},
note = {Source-checked 11 November 2026}
}RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Problem of logical omniscience (Philosophy Glossary) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/11 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/problem-of-logical-omniscience/ LA - en ER -
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