Consequence argument
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An argument for incompatibilism, widely regarded as the best one: if determinism is true, our acts are consequences of the laws of nature and the remote past, neither of which is up to us, so our acts are not up to us either.
Also: van Inwagen's consequence argument
What it means
The question. If every event, including every human choice, follows by law from the state of the world long before the agent existed, can anyone ever do otherwise than they actually do? Provenance: the argument is reformulated rather than wholly originated by Peter van Inwagen. Michael McKenna and D. Justin Coates's Stanford Encyclopedia entry on compatibilism credits Carl Ginet with developing it in 1966 ('Might We Have No Choice?'), and Kadri Vihvelin groups van Inwagen's 1975 article ('The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism', Philosophical Studies 27, pp. 185-199) and his book An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) with versions by Ginet, David Wiggins (1973) and James Lamb (1977). Van Inwagen's regimentation is the one later discussion takes as standard.
The consequence argument aims to show that free will, understood as the ability to do otherwise, is incompatible with determinism. Kadri Vihvelin's Stanford Encyclopedia entry on arguments for incompatibilism identifies Peter van Inwagen's version (1975, 1983) as the standard one, with related versions by Carl Ginet, David Wiggins and Lamb.
The text's own reasoning. The informal statement in the next paragraph closely follows van Inwagen's own wording in An Essay on Free Will (1983: 56, as cited by Vihvelin). In the book, Vihvelin reports, van Inwagen presents three formal arguments that he intends as three versions of the same basic argument; her discussion begins with the third, the Rule Beta argument, driven by a rule for transferring powerlessness, and that third version is the one set out below.
Informally: if determinism is true, our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and of events in the remote past; but it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and it is not up to us what the laws of nature are; therefore the consequences of these things, including our present acts, are not up to us. Van Inwagen's formal version uses an operator N, read as "no one has, or ever had, any choice about" the truth of a proposition. Let H describe the remote past, L the laws and P any true proposition about a present act. (1) Necessarily, if H and L, then P (the definition of determinism). (2) Hence no one has a choice about the fact that if H, then if L, then P (rule Alpha). (3) No one has a choice about H (the fixity of the past). (4) So no one has a choice about the fact that if L, then P (rule Beta). (5) No one has a choice about L (the fixity of the laws). (6) So no one has a choice about P (rule Beta again). The SEP calls rule Beta, the transfer of powerlessness from premises to conclusion, the key to the argument.
Structure. The six numbered steps in the previous paragraph condense, in COT's paraphrase, the seven-line presentation of van Inwagen's third formal argument in Vihvelin's entry: her first two lines (the definition of determinism and its logically equivalent restatement) appear together as step (1). Two inference rules do the work. In Vihvelin's statement, 'N p' abbreviates 'p and no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p'. Rule Alpha licenses the inference from the logical necessity of p to Np: no one has a choice about what is logically necessary. Rule Beta licenses the inference from Np and N(if p then q) to Nq: powerlessness over a truth and over its implying another truth yields powerlessness over the second. Determinism enters only through step (1); the fixity of the past and of the laws are separate premises, and each can be, and has been, attacked independently.
Intended conclusion. The conclusion is conditional: if determinism is true, no one could ever have acted otherwise. By itself it says nothing about whether determinism is true or whether we are free. Combined with confidence that we can act otherwise it yields libertarianism; combined with determinism it yields the denial of free will. Because the argument concerns the ability to do otherwise, its bearing on moral responsibility depends on whether responsibility requires that ability, which is the question raised by Frankfurt cases.
Objections have targeted each element. Early compatibilists rejected Beta on the basis of compatibilist analyses of the ability to do otherwise; incompatibilists replied that Beta was more plausible than any such analysis. Thomas McKay and David Johnson showed that Beta entails an agglomeration principle that is invalid, as an untossed fair coin illustrates; van Inwagen conceded the point and proposed a modified operator, and others offered repaired transfer principles. David Lewis treated the argument as a reductio of its premises, arguing that a compatibilist need only claim that the agent could have acted so that a slight divergence from the actual laws, shortly before the decision, would have occurred, not that the agent could break a law. Contextualists hold that "can" means compossible with the relevant facts, so that whether one can do otherwise varies with the facts held fixed.
Objections. Lewis's 1981 paper ('Are We Free to Break the Laws?', Theoria 47, pp. 113-121) turns on a distinction between a weak and a strong thesis, as Timothy O'Connor and Christopher Franklin report in the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on free will. The weak thesis says that I am able to do something such that, had I done it, a law would have been broken; the strong thesis says that I am able to break a law, so that my act would itself be or cause a law-breaking event. Lewis accepts the first and rejects the second, and charges the argument with sliding between them; Vihvelin describes the same charge as an equivocation between two counterfactuals, one saying that the past or the laws would have been different had I acted otherwise, the other saying that I would have caused that difference. A second family of objections concerns the analysis of ability itself. Conditional analyses of 'could have done otherwise', which McKenna and Coates associate with Hume, Hobart and Ayer, were in their account refuted by objections from Roderick Chisholm and van Inwagen; more recently, they report, several compatibilists, among them Michael Fara, Michael Smith and Kadri Vihvelin (whose 2004 paper is titled 'Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account'), have offered positive accounts of the ability to do otherwise that they hold to be compatible with determinism. A third response, associated with John Martin Fischer, grants for the sake of argument that the all-in ability to do otherwise may be incompatible with determinism but denies that moral responsibility requires it; O'Connor and Franklin cite Fischer's work of 1987 and 1994 for this concession.
Replies. To McKay and Johnson, van Inwagen (in 'Free Will Remains a Mystery', 2000) conceded that Rule Beta is invalid; Vihvelin's entry then discusses a revised operator, N*, on which N*p means that p and no one can, or ever could, do anything such that, if she did it, p might be false. Lewis's reply is not treated as decisive either: Vihvelin grants that a natural way of understanding how the past and the laws constrain us leads more or less directly to the incompatibilist conclusion, and O'Connor and Franklin judge that Lewis's argument does not by itself establish that the restrictive analysis of ability is wrong. Of the dispositional accounts, McKenna and Coates report that some will claim that a restriction these accounts need is not dialectically innocent, and they press the worry with a Frankfurt example.
Key thinkers and texts. Carl Ginet, 'Might We Have No Choice?' (1966); David Wiggins, 'Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism' (1973); James W. Lamb, 'On a Proof of Incompatibilism', The Philosophical Review 86 (1977); Peter van Inwagen, 'The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism' (1975), An Essay on Free Will (1983) and 'Free Will Remains a Mystery' (2000); David Lewis, 'Are We Free to Break the Laws?' (1981); Thomas J. McKay and David Johnson, 'A Reconsideration of an Argument against Compatibilism', Philosophical Topics 24 (1996); John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will (1994).
The SEP describes the argument as widely regarded as the best argument for incompatibilism; replies concentrate on the transfer rule and on the fixity of the past and the laws.
Current status. Vihvelin's own assessment is that, if the argument was meant to show that no compatibilist account of being able to do otherwise could succeed, Lewis's reply shows that it fails as a reductio; yet she credits it with moving the debate on to the metaphysics of abilities, causation, counterfactuals and laws, and regards that as a significant advance. O'Connor and Franklin describe it as a powerful challenge to compatibilism. The repaired transfer principles, the fixity of the laws and the analysis of ability all remain disputed.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 1.7 (Free Will and Determinism).
See also the glossary entries Free will, Determinism, Compatibilism, Libertarianism (free will), Manipulation argument, Frankfurt cases and Laws of nature.
The questions it belongs to
- 1.7 Free Will and DeterminismCould you have done otherwise?
Thinkers
To read
- An Essay on Free Will — Peter van Inwagen
- Material Beings — Peter van Inwagen
- On the Plurality of Worlds — David Lewis
Sources and further reading
- Kadri Vihvelin, 'Arguments for Incompatibilism', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 22 August 2022)
- Michael McKenna and D. Justin Coates, 'Compatibilism', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 16 April 2024)
- Timothy O'Connor and Christopher Franklin, 'Free Will', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 3 November 2022)
- Peter van Inwagen, 'The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism', Philosophical Studies 27, no. 3 (1975), pp. 185-199, DOI 10.1007/BF01624156 (Springer record; metadata checked via Crossref)
- Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), vi + 248 pp. (Michigan State University Libraries catalogue record)
- David Lewis, 'Are We Free to Break the Laws?', Theoria 47, no. 3 (1981), pp. 113-121, DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.1981.tb00473.x (Crossref record)
- Thomas J. McKay and David Johnson, 'A Reconsideration of an Argument against Compatibilism', Philosophical Topics 24, no. 2 (1996), pp. 113-122, DOI 10.5840/philtopics199624219 (Crossref record)
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BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-consequence-argument-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Consequence argument (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/consequence-argument/},
note = {Source-checked 15 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Consequence argument (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/15 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/consequence-argument/ LA - en ER -
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