Condorcet jury theorem
On this page
Condorcet's 1785 result that if voters are independent and each more likely than not to be right on a yes-or-no question, a majority is more reliable than any one of them and becomes almost certainly right as the group grows; the founding argument of epistemic democracy.
Also: Condorcet's jury theorem
The argument at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- Reasons , Numbered as set out in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps
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For a choice between two options, one of them correct:
- independence: whether one voter is correct is independent of whether others are;
- competence: each voter has the same probability, greater than one half, of being correct.
- Therefore: the probability that the majority is correct increases as the (odd) number of voters grows; and
- it tends to one as the group becomes very large. (the entry continues below)
- Intended conclusion
- Used as an argument, the theorem supports majority rule and inclusive decision-making on epistemic grounds. Rediscovered by Black (1958), it became central to epistemic democracy in the work of List and Goodin (2001), Landemore (2013) and Goodin and Spiekermann (2018).
Objections and replies
- Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
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Real votes are correlated through shared evidence, perspectives and influences, and such correlations are usually positive; deliberation creates dependence; models with opinion leaders (Boland, Proschan and Tong) show the effect. If competence varies, adding less competent members can lower group reliability. Asymptotic infallibility is untenable if the truth can be underdetermined by the total evidence. David Estlund rejects the competence assumption, citing uncertainty about competence in debates over rule by the knowledgeable, and calls the theorem too shaky a basis for such arguments. Game-theoretic models (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996) show that sincere voting by everyone need not be an equilibrium.
- Replies
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Dietrich and Spiekermann's conditional and competence-sensitive theorems restore independence by conditioning on common causes and replace competence with a weaker tendency to competence, yielding increasing reliability without infallibility. Paroush (1998) shows that asymptotic infallibility survives if everyone's competence has a uniform lower bound above one half; Dietrich and Spiekermann (2013), generalising Ladha (1993), show that for interchangeable voters larger groups are more reliable without becoming infallible; and List and Goodin extend the theorem to plurality voting over several options. Dietrich (2008) argues that independence and competence are not simultaneously justified, which explains why the refinements matter.
Coordinate 2.7Coordinate 6.4Marquis de CondorcetSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
The jury theorem addresses whether majority decisions by groups track the truth better than individuals. It comes from the Marquis de Condorcet's Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (1785), although, as Franz Dietrich and Kai Spiekermann's Stanford Encyclopedia entry notes, Condorcet's text does not follow modern mathematics and later authors such as Grofman stated it formally.
Structure. For a choice between two options, one of them correct: (1) independence: whether one voter is correct is independent of whether others are; (2) competence: each voter has the same probability, greater than one half, of being correct. Therefore (3) the probability that the majority is correct increases as the (odd) number of voters grows; and (4) it tends to one as the group becomes very large. The entry likens the voters to independent tosses of the same coin biased towards the truth.
Intended conclusion. Used as an argument, the theorem supports majority rule and inclusive decision-making on epistemic grounds. Rediscovered by Black (1958), it became central to epistemic democracy in the work of List and Goodin (2001), Landemore (2013) and Goodin and Spiekermann (2018).
Objections. Real votes are correlated through shared evidence, perspectives and influences, and such correlations are usually positive; deliberation creates dependence; models with opinion leaders (Boland, Proschan and Tong) show the effect. If competence varies, adding less competent members can lower group reliability. Asymptotic infallibility is untenable if the truth can be underdetermined by the total evidence. David Estlund rejects the competence assumption, citing uncertainty about competence in debates over rule by the knowledgeable, and calls the theorem too shaky a basis for such arguments. Game-theoretic models (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996) show that sincere voting by everyone need not be an equilibrium.
Replies. Dietrich and Spiekermann's conditional and competence-sensitive theorems restore independence by conditioning on common causes and replace competence with a weaker tendency to competence, yielding increasing reliability without infallibility. Paroush (1998) shows that asymptotic infallibility survives if everyone's competence has a uniform lower bound above one half; Dietrich and Spiekermann (2013), generalising Ladha (1993), show that for interchangeable voters larger groups are more reliable without becoming infallible; and List and Goodin extend the theorem to plurality voting over several options. Dietrich (2008) argues that independence and competence are not simultaneously justified, which explains why the refinements matter.
Status. The entry's assessment is that the infallibility conclusion is untenable where the truth may be underdetermined and dubious even otherwise, while increasing reliability is the more appropriate form of the claim. Jury theorems now belong to epistemic social choice theory and remain a technical core of epistemic arguments for democracy.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 2.7 (Social Epistemology) and bears on Coordinate 6.4 (Political Philosophy).
See also the glossary entries Epistemic democracy, Social choice theory, Democracy, Deliberative democracy, Group belief and Social epistemology.
The questions it belongs to
- 2.7 Social EpistemologyMuch of what you know depends on other people. What follows?
- 6.4 Political PhilosophyWhen is political power legitimate, and what may it rightly do?
Thinkers
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Sources and further reading
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 13 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 13). Condorcet jury theorem (Arguments). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/condorcet-jury-theorem/
MLA (9th edition)
“Condorcet jury theorem (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought, 13 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/condorcet-jury-theorem/. Accessed [date accessed].
Chicago (17th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Condorcet jury theorem (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 13, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/condorcet-jury-theorem/.
BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-condorcet-jury-theorem-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Condorcet jury theorem (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/condorcet-jury-theorem/},
note = {Source-checked 13 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Condorcet jury theorem (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/13 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/condorcet-jury-theorem/ LA - en ER -
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