Experience machine
On this page
Robert Nozick's thought experiment: would you plug into a machine that gave you any experiences you wanted, indistinguishable from real life? Most people say no, which is taken to show that something besides experience matters to well-being.
The argument at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- Question
- Is a person's well-being made up entirely of the experiences he or she has, so that two lives which feel exactly the same from the inside go equally well for the person living them? Provenance: the thought experiment originated with Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). Dan Weijers's Internet Encyclopedia article on hedonism directs readers especially to pp. 42-45 of that book for the first discussion; Andrew Moore's Stanford entry cites pp. 43-44 and Roger Crisp's Stanford entry on well-being p. 43. Nozick returned to the case in The Examined Life (1989). The name 'experience machine' is Nozick's own; the abbreviation EMTE (experience machine thought experiment) and the classification of the argument as deductive or abductive belong to the later literature.
- Reasons , COT reconstruction: the numbering is ours, not the philosopher's
-
- If well-being consists only in mental states, then a life on the machine, with experiences at least as good as those of a given real life, is at least as good for the person living it.
- On reflection, a life on the machine is worse for the person than a real life with the same experiences, because the person does nothing, is no one in particular and is cut off from reality.
- So well-being does not consist only in mental states. (the entry continues below)
- Intended conclusion
- The primary target is prudential hedonism, the view that only pleasure is intrinsically good for a person and only pain intrinsically bad. Buscicchi notes that the case tells equally against any theory on which well-being consists only in mental states, including a subjective desire theory that counts only the belief that one is getting what one wants; Crisp adds that it is one motivation for desire theories, since on the machine desires such as the desire to write a great novel would remain unfulfilled. The conclusion is a claim about well-being, not about morality or the meaning of life, although the case is often discussed in both contexts.
Objections and replies
- Main replies
-
(1) Biting the bullet: hedonists argue that the machine life would be better and that refusal is a mistake, sometimes explained by our expecting more pleasure from real friends; Weijers judges that such replies persuade few non-hedonists. (2) Status quo bias: Weijers discusses the reply that refusal reflects "an irrational preference for the familiar or for things to stay as they are." In a reversed version a credible source tells you that you are already in a machine and you may choose to return to reality; Weijers reports empirical evidence that most people would choose to stay, which suggests that familiarity rather than reality drives the original verdict and weakens Nozick's argument. His references include Felipe De Brigard's experimental study of this bias. (3) Method: Weijers argues that comparing lives equal in every respect but one added feature seems certain to yield an artificially pluralist verdict, since any addition looks like a free bonus. Moore lists general hedonist strategies, such as treating the allegedly non-hedonic good as itself a pleasure or as merely instrumental, and calls the incredulous-stare objection far from decisive.
- Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
-
Beyond the hedonist replies already described, the literature surveyed by Buscicchi has questioned whether refusal is good evidence at all. Kolber's 'Mental Statism and the Experience Machine' (Bard Journal of Social Sciences 3, 1994) introduced a reversed case, in which one is asked whether to leave a machine to which one is already connected. Felipe De Brigard's 'If You Like It, Does It Matter If It's Real?' (Philosophical Psychology 23, 2010) reported that only 13 per cent of respondents chose reality in such a reversed case, a result read as evidence of status quo bias. Dan Weijers, in 'Nozick's Experience Machine Is Dead, Long Live the Experience Machine!' (Philosophical Psychology 27, 2014), found that 84 per cent of participants preferred reality in the original version but that many pro-reality answers showed imaginative resistance or overactive imagination, and that a majority chose the machine on behalf of a stranger when no status quo was in play. Silverstein ('In Defense of Happiness', 2000) argued that the anti-machine preference is itself pleasure-driven; Hindriks and Douven (2018) found more pro-pleasure judgements when the machine was replaced by a pill; de Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014) concluded, as Buscicchi reports, that judgements about the case are themselves biased, attributing the bias to morality. Crisp's entry gives what it calls the strongest hedonist response: the intuitions behind refusal rest on common-sense attitudes whose place in our lives may itself be justified on hedonist grounds, much as two-level utilitarianism justifies everyday moral rules, and the paradox of hedonism suggests that valuing other things for their own sake may be the best route to pleasure.
- Replies
-
Defenders of the argument have answered in two ways. First, they have criticised the experiments: Buscicchi holds that Weijers's study avoided the main methodological flaws of De Brigard's, a small sample and a lack of detail on how the experiments were conducted, rejects as misplaced Smith's (2011) methodological objection to such testing, and notes that Löhr (2018) found professional philosophers only slightly more consistent than lay respondents. He also argues that the pill variant is an interesting but different thought experiment, and that it is unfair to set aside the concern with artificiality as a bias, since Nozick himself gave it as a reason not to plug in. Secondly, anti-hedonists have built new versions designed to avoid the biases, including Kagan's (1994) case of a deceived businessman and comparisons of experientially identical or hedonically equal lives (Crisp 2006; Eden Lin 2016; Rowland 2017). Buscicchi discusses a 'freebie problem' with such comparisons, the same worry Weijers raises in the live text above about adding one feature to otherwise equal lives.
Coordinate 3.5Coordinate 6.21Robert NozickThomas NagelSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
The experience machine is a thought experiment introduced by Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) against hedonism about well-being. In Dan Weijers's Internet Encyclopedia account, Nozick asks whether you would plug into "a fantastic machine that flawlessly provides an amazing mix of experiences", with experiences indistinguishable from reality. Most people refuse.
In brief. If pleasant experience were all that made a life go well, the machine life would be at least as good as a real life with the same experiences. Since most people judge that it is not, something else must matter. Andrew Moore's Stanford Encyclopedia entry on hedonism quotes Nozick's conclusion that "something matters to us in addition to experience": we want to do certain things, not just have the experience of doing them, and to be a certain kind of person rather than, in Nozick's phrase, an "indeterminate blob" floating in a tank. Weijers calls it the most widely cited argument that pleasure is not the only source of intrinsic value. Moore notes that Thomas Nagel (1970), as well as Nozick, described lives with all the appearance but none of the reality of self-understanding, achievement and loving relationships.
The question. Is a person's well-being made up entirely of the experiences he or she has, so that two lives which feel exactly the same from the inside go equally well for the person living them? Provenance: the thought experiment originated with Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). Dan Weijers's Internet Encyclopedia article on hedonism directs readers especially to pp. 42-45 of that book for the first discussion; Andrew Moore's Stanford entry cites pp. 43-44 and Roger Crisp's Stanford entry on well-being p. 43. Nozick returned to the case in The Examined Life (1989). The name 'experience machine' is Nozick's own; the abbreviation EMTE (experience machine thought experiment) and the classification of the argument as deductive or abductive belong to the later literature.
The text's own reasoning. Nozick presents a case and a question, not a numbered proof. Lorenzo Buscicchi's Internet Encyclopedia article on the experience machine reports two versions. In 1974 the machine is entered for two years at a time, with intervals outside it in which to choose the next programme; Nozick asks the reader to set aside practical worries, saying, as quoted by Buscicchi, "Ignore problems such as who will service the machines if everyone plugs in", and he adds that others can plug in too, so there is no need to stay out in order to serve them. In The Examined Life the choice is made once and for life: "The question is not whether to try the machine temporarily, but whether to enter it for the rest of your life." Nozick also removes the knowledge that one has chosen: "Upon entering, you will not remember having done this", as Buscicchi quotes him, so that no pleasure is spoiled by the thought that it is machine-produced. Buscicchi judges that the lifelong version better isolates the comparison between two whole lives. Nozick's reasons for refusing go beyond the wish to do things and to be a certain sort of person. Moore records a third, the wish "to make a difference in the world", and Crisp quotes Nozick's complaint that "plugging into an experience machine limits us to a man-made reality". Buscicchi notes that Nozick also called plugging in a kind of suicide, a remark that Bramble has developed into the objection that the machine might end the user's identity.
Structure, COT's reconstruction; the numbering is not Nozick's. (1) If well-being consists only in mental states, then a life on the machine, with experiences at least as good as those of a given real life, is at least as good for the person living it. (2) On reflection, a life on the machine is worse for the person than a real life with the same experiences, because the person does nothing, is no one in particular and is cut off from reality. (3) So well-being does not consist only in mental states. Buscicchi distinguishes two ways of taking the step to (2). On a deductive reading, the fact that most reasonable people value reality in addition to pleasure is taken to show that reality has intrinsic prudential value; he rejects this reading as invalid, since it moves from what people value to what is valuable. On an abductive reading, the widespread refusal to plug in is best explained by the hypothesis that contact with reality is intrinsically good for us; he treats this as the stronger version.
Intended conclusion. The primary target is prudential hedonism, the view that only pleasure is intrinsically good for a person and only pain intrinsically bad. Buscicchi notes that the case tells equally against any theory on which well-being consists only in mental states, including a subjective desire theory that counts only the belief that one is getting what one wants; Crisp adds that it is one motivation for desire theories, since on the machine desires such as the desire to write a great novel would remain unfulfilled. The conclusion is a claim about well-being, not about morality or the meaning of life, although the case is often discussed in both contexts.
Main replies. (1) Biting the bullet: hedonists argue that the machine life would be better and that refusal is a mistake, sometimes explained by our expecting more pleasure from real friends; Weijers judges that such replies persuade few non-hedonists. (2) Status quo bias: Weijers discusses the reply that refusal reflects "an irrational preference for the familiar or for things to stay as they are." In a reversed version a credible source tells you that you are already in a machine and you may choose to return to reality; Weijers reports empirical evidence that most people would choose to stay, which suggests that familiarity rather than reality drives the original verdict and weakens Nozick's argument. His references include Felipe De Brigard's experimental study of this bias. (3) Method: Weijers argues that comparing lives equal in every respect but one added feature seems certain to yield an artificially pluralist verdict, since any addition looks like a free bonus. Moore lists general hedonist strategies, such as treating the allegedly non-hedonic good as itself a pleasure or as merely instrumental, and calls the incredulous-stare objection far from decisive.
Objections. Beyond the hedonist replies already described, the literature surveyed by Buscicchi has questioned whether refusal is good evidence at all. Kolber's 'Mental Statism and the Experience Machine' (Bard Journal of Social Sciences 3, 1994) introduced a reversed case, in which one is asked whether to leave a machine to which one is already connected. Felipe De Brigard's 'If You Like It, Does It Matter If It's Real?' (Philosophical Psychology 23, 2010) reported that only 13 per cent of respondents chose reality in such a reversed case, a result read as evidence of status quo bias. Dan Weijers, in 'Nozick's Experience Machine Is Dead, Long Live the Experience Machine!' (Philosophical Psychology 27, 2014), found that 84 per cent of participants preferred reality in the original version but that many pro-reality answers showed imaginative resistance or overactive imagination, and that a majority chose the machine on behalf of a stranger when no status quo was in play. Silverstein ('In Defense of Happiness', 2000) argued that the anti-machine preference is itself pleasure-driven; Hindriks and Douven (2018) found more pro-pleasure judgements when the machine was replaced by a pill; de Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014) concluded, as Buscicchi reports, that judgements about the case are themselves biased, attributing the bias to morality. Crisp's entry gives what it calls the strongest hedonist response: the intuitions behind refusal rest on common-sense attitudes whose place in our lives may itself be justified on hedonist grounds, much as two-level utilitarianism justifies everyday moral rules, and the paradox of hedonism suggests that valuing other things for their own sake may be the best route to pleasure.
Replies. Defenders of the argument have answered in two ways. First, they have criticised the experiments: Buscicchi holds that Weijers's study avoided the main methodological flaws of De Brigard's, a small sample and a lack of detail on how the experiments were conducted, rejects as misplaced Smith's (2011) methodological objection to such testing, and notes that Löhr (2018) found professional philosophers only slightly more consistent than lay respondents. He also argues that the pill variant is an interesting but different thought experiment, and that it is unfair to set aside the concern with artificiality as a bias, since Nozick himself gave it as a reason not to plug in. Secondly, anti-hedonists have built new versions designed to avoid the biases, including Kagan's (1994) case of a deceived businessman and comparisons of experientially identical or hedonically equal lives (Crisp 2006; Eden Lin 2016; Rowland 2017). Buscicchi discusses a 'freebie problem' with such comparisons, the same worry Weijers raises in the live text above about adding one feature to otherwise equal lives.
Key thinkers and texts. Primary: Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), pp. 42-45; The Examined Life (1989), the lifelong version. Precursor: Thomas Nagel, 'Death', Noûs 4 (1970), cited by Moore for lives with the appearance but not the reality of achievement and love. Critics: Kolber (1994), Silverstein (2000), De Brigard (2010), Hindriks and Douven (2018). Defenders and revisers: Weijers (2014), Kagan (1994), Crisp (2006), Lin (2016), Rowland (2017). Surveys: Weijers's and Moore's encyclopedia entries on hedonism, Crisp's on well-being and Buscicchi's on the experience machine.
Current status. Buscicchi describes two phases: from 1974 to about 2010 a broad consensus that the case refutes prudential hedonism and other mental-state theories, and since about 2010 a specialised literature that has undermined confidence in it as a decisive argument; he concludes that the need to devise new versions shows that "the first generation is dead", while leaving open whether the new versions succeed, and notes that the older consensus persists in textbooks. Crisp likewise warns that quickly dismissing hedonism on the strength of the case is not methodologically sound, and recommends Lin (2016) as a balanced discussion. The underlying question, whether contact with reality matters to how well a life goes, remains open.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 3.5 (Value Theory) and bears on 6.21 (Meaning in Life).
See also the glossary entries Hedonism, Well-being, Thought experiment, Utilitarianism and Meaning in life.
The questions it belongs to
- 3.5 Value TheoryWhat would make your life go well, apart from being moral?
- 6.21 Meaning in LifeDoes a life need a point, and where would it come from?
Thinkers
Traditions
To read
- Anarchy, State, and Utopia — Robert Nozick
- Mind and Cosmos — Thomas Nagel
- Mortal Questions — Thomas Nagel
Sources and further reading
- Dan Weijers, 'Hedonism', Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Andrew Moore, 'Hedonism', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 17 October 2013)
- Lorenzo Buscicchi, 'The Experience Machine', Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (no date shown)
- Roger Crisp, 'Well-Being', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 13 January 2026)
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 22 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
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BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-experience-machine-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Experience machine (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/experience-machine/},
note = {Source-checked 22 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Experience machine (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/22 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/experience-machine/ LA - en ER -
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