Transplant objection
On this page
The leading objection to animalism: if your cerebrum were transplanted into another head, you would seem to go with it, leaving the organism behind, so you are not that organism.
Also: brain-transplant objection, transplant argument against animalism
The argument at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- Reasons , Numbered as set out in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps
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- after the operation the recipient has your psychology, and on psychological-continuity views the recipient is you;
- the organism you were associated with, however, seems to stay behind, for as the entry puts it, "It looks as if the operation would simply move an organ from one organism to another, like transplanting a liver";
- if you were that organism, you would stay behind with it;
- Therefore: you are not an organism, and psychological rather than biological continuity determines where you go. (the entry continues below)
Objections and replies
- Replies
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Animalists generally accept the force of the objection but weigh it against other considerations: we seem to be organisms, it is hard to say what non-organism we could be, and animalism avoids the too many thinkers problem. Olson adds that the case is less compelling than it first appears: he describes a tumour that would kill you unless your brain were replaced, an operation that would destroy your mental properties, and suggests it is not obvious that you would fail to survive it; Bernard Williams (1970) argued in a similar way. A newer reply from so-called new animalism, which the entry associates with Madden, Noonan and others, describes the operation differently: the organism is cut down to the size of a brain, moved, and given new parts, so the animal goes with the cerebrum. Physiological defenders, Korfmacher reports, say instead that the recipient falsely believes he is the donor.
- Further objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
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Olson cites Mark Johnston's 'Remnant Persons: Animalism's Undoing' (2016) as a related objection to brute-physical views.
Coordinate 1.3.2John LockeBernard WilliamsSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
The transplant objection is the leading argument against animalism, the view that each of us is a human organism, and more generally against brute-physical accounts of personal identity. It asks what happens to you if your cerebrum, the organ that supports your memories, beliefs and character, is transplanted into another head.
Structure, following Eric Olson's Stanford Encyclopedia entry: (1) after the operation the recipient has your psychology, and on psychological-continuity views the recipient is you; (2) the organism you were associated with, however, seems to stay behind, for as the entry puts it, "It looks as if the operation would simply move an organ from one organism to another, like transplanting a liver"; (3) if you were that organism, you would stay behind with it; therefore (4) you are not an organism, and psychological rather than biological continuity determines where you go. Carsten Korfmacher's Internet Encyclopedia article describes a body-swap version, in which X's brain is placed in Y's body and the intuition that the resulting person is X counts against bodily criteria, citing John Locke (1689) and Shoemaker (1963); it also notes a variant description on which the surgeons do not move the human animal X at all but give Y a new brain.
Replies. Animalists generally accept the force of the objection but weigh it against other considerations: we seem to be organisms, it is hard to say what non-organism we could be, and animalism avoids the too many thinkers problem. Olson adds that the case is less compelling than it first appears: he describes a tumour that would kill you unless your brain were replaced, an operation that would destroy your mental properties, and suggests it is not obvious that you would fail to survive it; Bernard Williams (1970) argued in a similar way. A newer reply from so-called new animalism, which the entry associates with Madden, Noonan and others, describes the operation differently: the organism is cut down to the size of a brain, moved, and given new parts, so the animal goes with the cerebrum. Physiological defenders, Korfmacher reports, say instead that the recipient falsely believes he is the donor.
Further objections. Olson cites Mark Johnston's 'Remnant Persons: Animalism's Undoing' (2016) as a related objection to brute-physical views.
Status. Olson reports no consensus on what we are; the transplant case remains the main intuitive consideration on the psychological side.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 1.3.2 (Personal Identity).
See also the glossary entries Personal identity, Too many thinkers problem, Fission problem, Teletransportation thought experiment and Reduplication argument.
The questions it belongs to
- 1.3.2 Personal IdentityAre you the same person you were at five?
Thinkers
To read
- A Letter Concerning Toleration — John Locke
- An Essay Concerning Human Understanding — John Locke
- Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy — Bernard Williams
Sources and further reading
- Eric T. Olson, 'Personal Identity', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 30 June 2023)
- Carsten Korfmacher, 'Personal Identity', Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (no date shown)
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 11 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 11). Transplant objection (Arguments). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/transplant-objection/
MLA (9th edition)
“Transplant objection (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought, 11 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/transplant-objection/. Accessed [date accessed].
Chicago (17th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Transplant objection (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 11, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/transplant-objection/.
BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-transplant-objection-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Transplant objection (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/transplant-objection/},
note = {Source-checked 11 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Transplant objection (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/11 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/transplant-objection/ LA - en ER -
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