Draper's argument from pain and pleasure
On this page
Paul Draper's 1989 argument that the observed pattern of pain and pleasure among sentient beings is much more probable on a 'hypothesis of indifference' than on theism, and therefore makes theism less probable than not.
What it means
Question. Does the way pain and pleasure are actually distributed among sentient beings count as evidence against theism, even if no single instance of suffering is shown to be pointless? Paul Draper answered yes in "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists", Noûs 23 (1989), pp. 331–350, reprinted in Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument from Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 12–29. Provenance: the argument originated with Draper. Michael Tooley's Stanford Encyclopedia entry reports that it was inspired by a passage in David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion that weighs four hypotheses about the first causes of the universe (that they are perfectly good, perfectly malicious, mixed, or neither good nor malicious) and favours the last. Tooley classes Draper's argument as an indirect inductive argument: instead of arguing directly from particular evils, as William Rowe does (see the glossary entry Evidential argument from evil), it compares theism with a rival hypothesis. Nick Trakakis's Internet Encyclopedia article calls Draper's paper the best example of this indirect strategy.
Structure. The steps below follow Tooley's presentation, and the numbering is Tooley's, not Draper's. The article itself was not opened for this record, so Draper's own wording is not reproduced. Let HI, the Hypothesis of Indifference, be the hypothesis that neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth results from benevolent or malevolent actions performed by nonhuman persons. Let T be theism. Let O be the conjunction of what we know about pain and pleasure: biologically useful pain and pleasure in moral agents; biologically useful pain and pleasure in sentient beings that are not moral agents; and pain and pleasure not known to be biologically useful. (5) The prior probability of HI is at least as great as that of T. (6) O is more probable on HI than on T. From (5) and (6), by Bayes' theorem, (10) HI is more probable than T given O. (11) HI entails that T is false. Therefore (12) given O, T is more probably false than true. Draper's support for (5), as Tooley reports it, is that theism carries an ontological commitment that HI lacks.
Intended conclusion. The conclusion is not that theism is impossible or refuted. It is that, relative to the facts about pain and pleasure, theism is less probable than not. Tooley notes that the argument says nothing about how far below one half that probability lies.
Objections. Tooley presses several. First, HI may not entail the falsity of theism: a God might create a neutral environment for chancy evolution and then not intervene. Second, the priors in (5) are questionable: HI is a universal generalisation about the absence of nonhuman agency, so it is not clear why its prior probability should be higher. Third, given (5) and (11), theism's probability is already at most one half before the evidence is considered, so the rest of the argument only moves it below one half. Fourth, premise (6) is the main point of dispute. Tooley cites Peter van Inwagen's demand, in "The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence" (Philosophical Perspectives 5, 1991), that a world be described in detail before it is judged possible. Tooley thinks some objections to (6) are unimpressive but says that Draper's support for it needs careful scrutiny. Fifth, the total evidence matters: if other evidence, such as experiences that seem to be of a loving deity, is added to O, the comparison of likelihoods may no longer favour HI. Alvin Plantinga, in the section of Warranted Christian Belief (2000) that answers Draper, says that he has argued elsewhere that O is not more probable on HI than on theism. In that chapter he attacks a different step: the principle that a belief which is 'evidentially challenged' by a more probable rival must be given up. Many ordinary beliefs face such challenges and remain rational, he argues. A challenge of this kind defeats a belief only when the belief has minimal warrant or rests solely on explaining a body of data, and theistic belief, on his account, typically has neither feature.
Replies. Tooley's replies are a defence of the argument's strategy by amending it. He proposes shifting from HI to an alternative hypothesis that, as Tooley notes, Draper himself mentions (Draper 1989, p. 26): an Indifferent Deity Hypothesis, that there is an omnipotent and omniscient creator with no intrinsic concern about the pain or pleasure of other beings. Tooley says this avoids both the entailment problem and the problem about priors. He also notes that a reasoner can reach a Humean conclusion without Draper's Bayesian route, by an inference to the best explanation: a theistic explanation of mixed phenomena must posit morally significant properties beyond our ken, so it is less simple than the indifferent-deity explanation. Sceptical theists challenge our ability to judge what a perfect being would permit (see the glossary entry Sceptical theism); the sources used here do not set out that reply as aimed at Draper specifically, so it is mentioned only as a related line of response.
Key thinkers and texts. Paul Draper, "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists" (1989); David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, as Draper's acknowledged inspiration on Tooley's account; Michael Tooley's critique and reformulation in the Stanford Encyclopedia; Peter van Inwagen (1991) on judgements of possibility; Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (2000), the section answering Draper. Draper has no thinker page on this site.
Coordinates. On this site it belongs to Coordinate 6.1 (Philosophy of Religion) and Coordinate 1.8 (Natural Theology).
Current status. The Internet Encyclopedia article treats it as the best exemplar of the comparative, hypothesis-against-hypothesis form of the evidential argument, and the Stanford Encyclopedia gives it extended treatment as a type of indirect inductive argument. Its assessment is unsettled. Tooley accepts the strategy but rejects parts of the execution, and Plantinga rejects both the likelihood premise and the inference from an evidential challenge to irrationality. The debate turns on how prior probabilities are assigned, whether the comparison should use total evidence, and whether HI is the right rival to theism.
See also the glossary entries Evidential argument from evil, Problem of evil, Logical problem of evil, Sceptical theism, Problem of animal suffering and Bayesian epistemology.
The questions it belongs to
- 6.1 Philosophy of ReligionWhat kind of claim is a religious claim?
- 1.8 Natural TheologyCan argument alone settle whether God exists?
Thinkers
Traditions
To read
- A Treatise of Human Nature — David Hume
- An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding — David Hume
- An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals — David Hume
Sources and further reading
- Michael Tooley, 'The Problem of Evil', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (first published 16 September 2002; substantive revision 3 March 2015)
- Nick Trakakis, 'The Evidential Problem of Evil', Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), Texas A&M University Libraries catalogue record
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Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 15 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
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BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-drapers-argument-from-pain-and-pleasure-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Draper's argument from pain and pleasure (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/drapers-argument-from-pain-and-pleasure/},
note = {Source-checked 15 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Draper's argument from pain and pleasure (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/15 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/drapers-argument-from-pain-and-pleasure/ LA - en ER -
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