Alienation objection
On this page
The objection that impartial moral theories, consequentialist and Kantian alike, cannot accommodate the motives proper to love and friendship, so that an agent who acts from them is estranged from the people closest to them.
Also: alienation objection to consequentialism
What it means
The alienation objection holds that impartial moral theories distort the motives that belong to personal relationships. It is distinct from the Marxist concept of alienation and concerns the relation between moral reasons and partial attachments. Troy Jollimore's Stanford Encyclopedia entry on impartiality states the charge as the worry that impartialist theories prevent an agent's personal concerns from playing a special role in her deliberation, threatening her integrity and alienating her from herself and from others; he cites Michael Stocker, Bernard Williams, Samuel Scheffler, Dean Cocking and Justin Oakley among those who press it.
The argument may be put thus. (1) Love and friendship require that one act for the sake of the particular person, not for the sake of a general principle. (2) Impartial theories require that, at least in the end, an agent's reasons be grounded in an impartial standard, such as maximising the good or acting from duty. (3) An agent who acts on such a standard when helping a friend acts for the wrong reason, or has, in Bernard Williams's phrase of 1981 as cited in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong's SEP entry on consequentialism, one thought too many, as when a man saving his drowning wife reasons from an impartial principle rather than simply because she is his wife. Therefore (4) impartial theories either cannot permit the motives of love and friendship or misrepresent them. Stocker's version extends the point to Kantian ethics, whose emphasis on duty seems to undercut the motives typical of close relationships.
The best-known consequentialist reply is Peter Railton's sophisticated consequentialism (1984). Railton distinguishes the criterion of rightness from the motives an agent should have: someone committed to doing good may best achieve it by acquiring dispositions, including real love for particular people, that seldom involve consequentialist reasoning, so that in psychology and conduct they resemble a non-consequentialist. Frank Jackson developed a similar strategy, arguing that good is often best produced by concentrating on small groups. Others appeal to agent-relative value, so that a friend's welfare carries special weight for the friend. Sinnott-Armstrong's entry also notes that whether any version adequately captures intuitions about friendship remains controversial.
Jollimore groups Railton and Jackson with those who hold that consequentialism will mostly require only modest changes to ordinary partial lives. He reports that whether irreducible, morally admirable partiality exists is frequently seen as the main issue dividing partialists from impartialists.
On this site it belongs to Coordinates 3.2.1 (Consequence-Based Approaches) and 6.19 (Philosophy of Love and Friendship).
See also the glossary entries Integrity objection, Demandingness objection, Consequentialism, Care ethics, Deontology and Alienation.
The questions it belongs to
- 3.2.1 Consequence-Based ApproachesIf an act produces the best outcome, can it be wrong?
- 6.19 Philosophy of Love and FriendshipDo you love someone for their qualities, or for being them?
Thinkers
To read
- Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy — Bernard Williams
- Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980 — Bernard Williams
Sources and further reading
- Troy Jollimore, 'Impartiality', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 17 September 2026)
- Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, 'Consequentialism', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 4 October 2023)
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 11 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 11). Alienation objection (Philosophy Glossary). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/alienation-objection/
MLA (9th edition)
“Alienation objection (Philosophy Glossary).” Coordinates of Thought, 11 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/alienation-objection/. Accessed [date accessed].
Chicago (17th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Alienation objection (Philosophy Glossary).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 11, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/alienation-objection/.
BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-alienation-objection-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Alienation objection (Philosophy Glossary)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/alienation-objection/},
note = {Source-checked 11 November 2026}
}RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Alienation objection (Philosophy Glossary) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/11 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/alienation-objection/ LA - en ER -
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