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Boltzmann brain

Updated 29 October 2026

On this page
  1. The problem at a glance
  2. What it means
  3. The questions it belongs to
  4. Sources and further reading
  5. About this page
  6. Cite this page

A brain-like observer arising from a random thermal fluctuation rather than from evolution; cosmological models predicting that such observers vastly outnumber ordinary ones face a sceptical problem.

Also: Boltzmann brains

The problem at a glance

A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.

The reasoning that leads to it , Standard form of the problem, as given in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps

Sinan Dogramaci and Miriam Schoenfield set out the worry in 'Why I Am Not a Boltzmann Brain' (forthcoming in the Philosophical Review). Some cosmological models imply that, long after stars have died, random fluctuations will produce Boltzmann brains in numbers that dwarf ordinary observers, and some of them will have experiences exactly like ours; they report Sean Carroll's judgement that the current best-fit cosmological model arguably has this consequence. The sceptical argument then runs:

  1. our scientific evidence supports a model on which most observers with experiences like ours are Boltzmann brains;
  2. by reasoning that treats oneself as a random member of the class of observers with one's experiences, one should conclude that one is probably such a brain;
  3. Result: one's experiences are probably illusory, and with them the evidence for the model. (the entry continues below)
Responses
Further discussion in the entry

Responses divide over which step fails. Carroll's response, in 'Why Boltzmann Brains Are Bad', targets the first step: theories on which most observers like us are Boltzmann brains are unacceptable, not because the data rule them out but because they are "cognitively unstable", unable to be simultaneously true and justifiably believed; on this view, predicting a preponderance of such observers counts against a cosmological model. Dogramaci and Schoenfield reject the second step. On Bayesian grounds, evidence confirms that one is a Boltzmann brain only if it is much more probable on that hypothesis, and they argue it is not: an ordinary observer's experiences must be coherent, while a fluctuation is very unlikely to produce any particular coherent experience, and perceptual evidence concerns one's own here and now. They also argue that the indifference principle behind the second step leads to absurd results and should be abandoned. The debate connects with wider disputes about self-locating belief, and the cognitive-instability response itself has critics, so the question remains unsettled.

Coordinate 1.2.2Coordinate 1.2Coordinate 2.4Sources and primary textsRead the full entry

What it means

A Boltzmann brain is a hypothetical observer, a brain with a brief stretch of experience, that comes into existence through a random fluctuation of matter rather than through the evolution of life in a low-entropy universe. The name recalls the physicist Ludwig Boltzmann. The problem it poses belongs to the philosophy of cosmology and to epistemology at once.

Sinan Dogramaci and Miriam Schoenfield set out the worry in 'Why I Am Not a Boltzmann Brain' (forthcoming in the Philosophical Review). Some cosmological models imply that, long after stars have died, random fluctuations will produce Boltzmann brains in numbers that dwarf ordinary observers, and some of them will have experiences exactly like ours; they report Sean Carroll's judgement that the current best-fit cosmological model arguably has this consequence. The sceptical argument then runs: (1) our scientific evidence supports a model on which most observers with experiences like ours are Boltzmann brains; (2) by reasoning that treats oneself as a random member of the class of observers with one's experiences, one should conclude that one is probably such a brain; therefore (3) one's experiences are probably illusory, and with them the evidence for the model. The authors note that, unlike Cartesian scepticism, this worry concerns observers that physicists take to be actual.

Responses divide over which step fails. Carroll's response, in 'Why Boltzmann Brains Are Bad', targets the first step: theories on which most observers like us are Boltzmann brains are unacceptable, not because the data rule them out but because they are "cognitively unstable", unable to be simultaneously true and justifiably believed; on this view, predicting a preponderance of such observers counts against a cosmological model. Dogramaci and Schoenfield reject the second step. On Bayesian grounds, evidence confirms that one is a Boltzmann brain only if it is much more probable on that hypothesis, and they argue it is not: an ordinary observer's experiences must be coherent, while a fluctuation is very unlikely to produce any particular coherent experience, and perceptual evidence concerns one's own here and now. They also argue that the indifference principle behind the second step leads to absurd results and should be abandoned. The debate connects with wider disputes about self-locating belief, and the cognitive-instability response itself has critics, so the question remains unsettled.

On this site it belongs to Coordinates 1.2 (Cosmology (Philosophical)), 1.2.2 (Fine-Tuning and Necessity) and 2.4 (Skepticism).

See also the glossary entries Anthropic principle, Multiverse hypothesis, Arrow of time, Scepticism and Brain in a vat.

The questions it belongs to

Sources and further reading

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Checked against the sources above on 12 November 2026. Not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. How we write and check.

Cite this page

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 12 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.

APA (7th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 12). Boltzmann brain (Philosophy Glossary). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/boltzmann-brain/

MLA (9th edition)

“Boltzmann brain (Philosophy Glossary).” Coordinates of Thought, 12 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/boltzmann-brain/. Accessed [date accessed].

Chicago (17th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Boltzmann brain (Philosophy Glossary).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 12, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/boltzmann-brain/.

BibTeX

@misc{cot-glossary-boltzmann-brain-2026,
  author       = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
  title        = {Boltzmann brain (Philosophy Glossary)},
  howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = nov,
  url          = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/boltzmann-brain/},
  note         = {Source-checked 12 November 2026}
}

RIS

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TI  - Boltzmann brain (Philosophy Glossary)
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PB  - Coordinates of Thought
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LA  - en
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All terms in the glossary