Too many thinkers problem
On this page
The objection that if we are not human animals, then wherever a person is there are two thinkers, the person and the animal that shares her brain.
Also: thinking animal problem, too-many-thinkers problem
The problem at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- The problem
- The question is what kind of thing a thinking person is. Structure: (1) there is a human animal located where you are, sharing your brain; (2) that animal thinks whatever you think; (3) on psychological-continuity views you are not that animal, since you and it would persist under different conditions; therefore (4) two thinkers are reading this sentence. Olson draws three awkward consequences: you and an organism both think; the organism, being psychologically indistinguishable from you, would also count as a person; and you could not know which of the two you are. The intended conclusion, for animalists, is that we are organisms. Carsten Korfmacher's Internet Encyclopedia article records the related animal argument of Ayers, Snowdon and Olson: since a human animal is located wherever each of us is, a theory that gives us different persistence conditions puts two things in one place.
- The reasoning that leads to it , Standard form of the problem, as given in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps
The question is what kind of thing a thinking person is. Structure:
- there is a human animal located where you are, sharing your brain;
- that animal thinks whatever you think;
- on psychological-continuity views you are not that animal, since you and it would persist under different conditions;
- Result: two thinkers are reading this sentence. (the entry continues below)
Responses
- Replies
One may deny that the organism thinks, but Olson observes that this is easy to say and hard to defend, since it seems to make organisms zombies; the best-known version, Shoemaker's argument that organisms have the wrong persistence conditions to think, is highly controversial. Constitution views, associated with Baker, Johnston and Shoemaker, hold that a person is made of the same matter as an animal but persists differently, and Baker develops a more complex variant of the denial strategy. A personal-pronoun response, attributed to Noonan and discussed by Olson, says that 'I' refers only to persons, so the animal's thought 'I am a person' is about you, and you can know you are not the animal. So-called new animalism, associated with Madden and Noonan, holds that organisms themselves persist by psychological continuity.
Coordinate 1.3.2Sources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
The too many thinkers problem is an objection to views on which we are not human animals. Eric Olson's Stanford Encyclopedia entry on personal identity puts it simply: healthy adult human organisms seem to be conscious and intelligent, so if each of us is something other than the organism we are associated with, there are two thinkers where we expected one.
The question is what kind of thing a thinking person is. Structure: (1) there is a human animal located where you are, sharing your brain; (2) that animal thinks whatever you think; (3) on psychological-continuity views you are not that animal, since you and it would persist under different conditions; therefore (4) two thinkers are reading this sentence. Olson draws three awkward consequences: you and an organism both think; the organism, being psychologically indistinguishable from you, would also count as a person; and you could not know which of the two you are. The intended conclusion, for animalists, is that we are organisms. Carsten Korfmacher's Internet Encyclopedia article records the related animal argument of Ayers, Snowdon and Olson: since a human animal is located wherever each of us is, a theory that gives us different persistence conditions puts two things in one place.
Replies. One may deny that the organism thinks, but Olson observes that this is easy to say and hard to defend, since it seems to make organisms zombies; the best-known version, Shoemaker's argument that organisms have the wrong persistence conditions to think, is highly controversial. Constitution views, associated with Baker, Johnston and Shoemaker, hold that a person is made of the same matter as an animal but persists differently, and Baker develops a more complex variant of the denial strategy. A personal-pronoun response, attributed to Noonan and discussed by Olson, says that 'I' refers only to persons, so the animal's thought 'I am a person' is about you, and you can know you are not the animal. So-called new animalism, associated with Madden and Noonan, holds that organisms themselves persist by psychological continuity.
Status. The problem is one of the main supports for animalism, which in turn faces the transplant objection. Olson reports that there is no consensus, or even a dominant view, on what we are.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 1.3.2 (Personal Identity).
See also the glossary entries Personal identity, Transplant objection, Fission problem, Persistence and Identity.
The questions it belongs to
- 1.3.2 Personal IdentityAre you the same person you were at five?
Sources and further reading
- Eric T. Olson, 'Personal Identity', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 30 June 2023)
- Carsten Korfmacher, 'Personal Identity', Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (no date shown)
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Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 11 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
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BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-too-many-thinkers-problem-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Too many thinkers problem (Philosophy Glossary)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/too-many-thinkers-problem/},
note = {Source-checked 11 November 2026}
}RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Too many thinkers problem (Philosophy Glossary) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/11 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/too-many-thinkers-problem/ LA - en ER -
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