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Retributivism

Updated 19 November 2026

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  1. The argument at a glance
  2. What it means
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The theory that punishment is justified because, and to the extent that, wrongdoers deserve it: those who commit serious wrongs deserve proportionate punishment, and the innocent may never be punished.

Also: retributive justice, retributivist

The argument at a glance

A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.

Question
What, if anything, makes it right for a political community to impose suffering or deprivation on a person because of what that person has done, rather than because of what punishing them will achieve? Retributivism answers by appeal to desert, and so owes an account both of why wrongdoers deserve to suffer and of why it falls to the state to see that they do.
Reasons , COT reconstruction: the numbering is ours, not the philosopher's

Structure (COT's reconstruction of the desert argument, not Kant's numbering).

  1. A person who culpably commits a serious wrong deserves a proportionate punishment.
  2. It is good in itself, and not merely useful, that a legitimate punisher give such a person what is deserved; in Kant's terms the penal law is a categorical imperative.
  3. Desert limits as well as grounds punishment, so the innocent may not be punished and the guilty may not be punished beyond their desert; in Kant's terms the criminal may never be treated merely as a means.
  4. The proper punisher is the state acting through public courts, not the private victim (Kant contrasts a public court with mere private judgment; Walen cites Hegel's section 102 for a stronger version of the view that the state is the only proper punisher).
  5. Therefore: the state has a reason, independent of deterrence and reform, to punish the guilty in proportion to their wrongs, and only them. (the entry continues below)
Intended conclusion
Past wrongdoing is itself a sufficient reason to punish, so that the justification of a particular punishment looks backward to the offence rather than forward to its effects; negative retributivists accept only the limiting conclusion in step (3).
Objections and replies
Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported

Critics argue that retributive intuitions are vengeance in disguise; that if free will is an illusion no one deserves punishment; that deserving something does not entitle others to impose it; and, in Hart's phrase, that retributivism is a mysterious piece of moral alchemy that turns wrong plus suffering into good. Fair-play theories are also criticised for misdescribing a crime such as murder as a form of free riding.

Further discussion in the entry

Objections (further). Against Moore's argument, Walen raises four difficulties: it moves from first-person guilt to third-person blame; the response may reflect imagination rather than experience; it treats the propriety of feeling guilt as if it settled the propriety of adding punishment; and it leaves open whether guilt is a morally sound reaction at all. Hoskins and Duff add that emotion-based accounts do not explain why the state should satisfy such emotions. On proportionality, critics ask how a crime's gravity, or the unfair advantage it secures, is to be measured; Rauscher notes that Kant himself accepted that like for like cannot always be applied to the letter, and Hegel's move from literal equality to equality of value responds to the same difficulty. Gertrude Ezorsky, as reported in Kevin Murtagh's Internet Encyclopedia article on punishment, tests retributivism "by imagining a world in which punishing criminals has no further effects worth achieving": a Kantian would still hold that wrongdoers ought to be punished there, which Ezorsky takes to be a troubling consequence. The criticism Walen calls arguably the most worrisome concerns hard treatment: that accounts of why suffering, and not only censure, is deserved are inadequate. On free will, Gregg Caruso's Stanford entry on scepticism about moral responsibility argues that retributivism needs basic desert, which scepticism denies, so that sceptics must look to non-retributive responses such as incapacitation.

Replies

To the free-will objection, Walen cites Fischer and Ravizza (1998), Morse (2004) and Nadelhoffer (2013) in support of the view that most people can weigh reasons and choose, which is the capacity desert requires; Hoskins and Duff reply that only a desert-based ground gives more than contingent protection against punishing the innocent or punishing excessively. To the worry that desert does not entitle anyone to punish, Walen reports a distinction between desert claims about good outcomes and desert claims about rights (Hill 1999; Berman 2008). To the moral-alchemy objection, Alexander and Ferzan (2018) argue that deserved suffering, unlike undeserved suffering, can be inherently good when inflicted by a proper punitive agent, although Tadros (2013) objects that on such a view, if a person were already suffering, the situation might be made better if that person committed a wrong; Hegel's own text presents punishment as superseding the crime and restoring right (section 99). To Ezorsky, Kant's reply, as Murtagh presents it, is that justice matters so much that human life would lose its value if justice perished, though Murtagh himself regards scepticism towards that view as warranted.

Coordinate 6.2Coordinate 6.4Coordinate 1.7H. L. A. HartRobert NozickImmanuel KantG. W. F. HegelSources and primary textsRead the full entry

What it means

Retributivism justifies punishment by desert rather than by its good consequences. Alec Walen's Stanford Encyclopedia entry on retributive justice identifies three principles: that those who commit certain wrongful acts, paradigmatically serious crimes, morally deserve to suffer a proportionate punishment; that it is intrinsically good for a legitimate punisher to give them that punishment; and that it is impermissible intentionally to punish the innocent or to inflict disproportionately large punishments on wrongdoers.

The question. What, if anything, makes it right for a political community to impose suffering or deprivation on a person because of what that person has done, rather than because of what punishing them will achieve? Retributivism answers by appeal to desert, and so owes an account both of why wrongdoers deserve to suffer and of why it falls to the state to see that they do.

Provenance. Retributivism is a family of positions rather than a single argument. The anchor text of this record is Immanuel Kant's Doctrine of Right (1797), the first part of The Metaphysics of Morals, General Remark E on the right of punishing, where Kant originated his own formulation of the argument from desert (Rauscher notes that Kant was long considered an exemplar of the retributivist theory); G. W. F. Hegel reformulated it in his own terms in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1821), sections 99 to 101; Michael S. Moore's appeal to considered judgments in Placing Blame (1997) is a later defence. Whether Kant is a pure retributivist is disputed: Frederick Rauscher's Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Kant's social and political philosophy reports that Byrd (1989) showed a role for deterrence in Kant's theory, while Shell (1997) defends the retributive reading, and Rauscher concludes that for Kant guilt is the only proper justification of punishment even though punishment may also serve deterrent functions.

Key distinctions. Positive retributivism treats desert as a reason to punish; negative retributivism treats desert only as a limit, so that wrongdoing removes protection against proportionate punishment without supplying a reason for it. Mixed theories such as H. L. A. Hart's take consequences to supply the reason to punish and desert to supply the constraint. Retribution should also be distinguished from revenge: following Robert Nozick, Walen notes that revenge involves pleasure in another's suffering, whereas retribution need not.

Justifications. Immanuel Kant defended an equality principle that underlies the lex talionis reading of retribution. G. W. F. Hegel held that the state is the proper punisher and that wrongdoers have a right to be punished. Herbert Morris's fair-play theory holds that the offender takes an unfair advantage over law-abiding citizens, which punishment removes. Jean Hampton held that punishment defeats the wrongdoer's implicit claim of superiority over the victim. Antony Duff's communicative theory treats punishment as conveying deserved censure. Michael Moore appeals to the guilt a wrongdoer ought to feel.

The text's own reasoning. Kant's argument is continuous prose, not a numbered proof. In W. Hastie's public-domain translation (The Philosophy of Law, Edinburgh, 1887, pp. 195-198), "The Penal Law is a Categorical Imperative", and "Juridical Punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another Good either with regard to the Criminal himself or to Civil Society"; it is to be imposed only because the person punished has committed a crime (Akademie edition 6:331, the reference Rauscher gives for this claim). The measure is "the Principle of Equality": "the undeserved evil which any one commits on another, is to be regarded as perpetrated on himself". "This is the Right of Retaliation (jus talionis)", which Kant presents as the only principle able to fix "both the quality and the quantity of a just penalty" (Ak. 6:332, again Rauscher's reference). Then comes the island example: "Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members", as a people inhabiting an island might resolve to scatter, "the last Murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out", so "that every one may realize the desert of his deeds, and that bloodguiltiness may not remain upon the people" (Hastie, p. 198; Ak. 6:333, the reference given in the abstract of Krista K. Thomason's 'Symbol of Justice: Bloodguilt in Kant', Kantian Review, 2020). The example isolates desert: a dissolving society has no future to protect, yet Kant holds that the punishment is still owed. Hegel's version, in S. W. Dyde's public-domain translation (Hegel's Philosophy of Right, London, 1896), treats crime as a violation of right that exists positively only in the criminal's particular will, so that "to injure this will in its concrete existence is to supersede the crime, which would otherwise be positively established, and to restore right" (section 99); the injury "is a right of the criminal himself" (section 100); and the identity required between crime and punishment "is not literal equality, but equality in the inherent nature of the injury, namely, its value" (section 101). Moore's argument is an appeal to first-person judgment: imagining that he had committed a horrible violent crime, his response, as quoted in Walen's entry, "would be that I would feel guilty unto death" (Placing Blame, p. 145), and he holds that it would be "elitist and condescending" (p. 148) to withhold from others the judgment one passes on oneself.

Structure (COT's reconstruction of the desert argument, not Kant's numbering). (1) A person who culpably commits a serious wrong deserves a proportionate punishment. (2) It is good in itself, and not merely useful, that a legitimate punisher give such a person what is deserved; in Kant's terms the penal law is a categorical imperative. (3) Desert limits as well as grounds punishment, so the innocent may not be punished and the guilty may not be punished beyond their desert; in Kant's terms the criminal may never be treated merely as a means. (4) The proper punisher is the state acting through public courts, not the private victim (Kant contrasts a public court with mere private judgment; Walen cites Hegel's section 102 for a stronger version of the view that the state is the only proper punisher). Therefore (5) the state has a reason, independent of deterrence and reform, to punish the guilty in proportion to their wrongs, and only them. Steps (1) to (3) restate the three principles in the opening paragraph; the island example is offered in support of (2), and Moore's considered-judgment argument in support of (1).

Intended conclusion. Past wrongdoing is itself a sufficient reason to punish, so that the justification of a particular punishment looks backward to the offence rather than forward to its effects; negative retributivists accept only the limiting conclusion in step (3).

Objections. Critics argue that retributive intuitions are vengeance in disguise; that if free will is an illusion no one deserves punishment; that deserving something does not entitle others to impose it; and, in Hart's phrase, that retributivism is a mysterious piece of moral alchemy that turns wrong plus suffering into good. Fair-play theories are also criticised for misdescribing a crime such as murder as a form of free riding.

Objections (further). Against Moore's argument, Walen raises four difficulties: it moves from first-person guilt to third-person blame; the response may reflect imagination rather than experience; it treats the propriety of feeling guilt as if it settled the propriety of adding punishment; and it leaves open whether guilt is a morally sound reaction at all. Hoskins and Duff add that emotion-based accounts do not explain why the state should satisfy such emotions. On proportionality, critics ask how a crime's gravity, or the unfair advantage it secures, is to be measured; Rauscher notes that Kant himself accepted that like for like cannot always be applied to the letter, and Hegel's move from literal equality to equality of value responds to the same difficulty. Gertrude Ezorsky, as reported in Kevin Murtagh's Internet Encyclopedia article on punishment, tests retributivism "by imagining a world in which punishing criminals has no further effects worth achieving": a Kantian would still hold that wrongdoers ought to be punished there, which Ezorsky takes to be a troubling consequence. The criticism Walen calls arguably the most worrisome concerns hard treatment: that accounts of why suffering, and not only censure, is deserved are inadequate. On free will, Gregg Caruso's Stanford entry on scepticism about moral responsibility argues that retributivism needs basic desert, which scepticism denies, so that sceptics must look to non-retributive responses such as incapacitation.

Replies. To the free-will objection, Walen cites Fischer and Ravizza (1998), Morse (2004) and Nadelhoffer (2013) in support of the view that most people can weigh reasons and choose, which is the capacity desert requires; Hoskins and Duff reply that only a desert-based ground gives more than contingent protection against punishing the innocent or punishing excessively. To the worry that desert does not entitle anyone to punish, Walen reports a distinction between desert claims about good outcomes and desert claims about rights (Hill 1999; Berman 2008). To the moral-alchemy objection, Alexander and Ferzan (2018) argue that deserved suffering, unlike undeserved suffering, can be inherently good when inflicted by a proper punitive agent, although Tadros (2013) objects that on such a view, if a person were already suffering, the situation might be made better if that person committed a wrong; Hegel's own text presents punishment as superseding the crime and restoring right (section 99). To Ezorsky, Kant's reply, as Murtagh presents it, is that justice matters so much that human life would lose its value if justice perished, though Murtagh himself regards scepticism towards that view as warranted.

Key thinkers and texts. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Doctrine of Right, General Remark E; G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1821), sections 99 to 102; Herbert Morris, 'Persons and Punishment' (1968), cited by Walen with Hegel for the wrongdoer's right to be punished; H. L. A. Hart (1968) for the moral-alchemy objection; Michael S. Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 1997); David Dolinko (1991); Jean Hampton's defeat theory; Antony Duff's communicative retributivism; Alec Walen's and Zachary Hoskins and Antony Duff's Stanford Encyclopedia entries.

Current status. Walen judges that "Retributive justice has a deep grip on the punitive intuitions of most people", but that if the accounts of deserved hard treatment fail, retributivism at most explains why wrongdoers deserve censure; he nevertheless holds that the proportionality limit gives reason to keep taking the project of justifying it seriously. Whether Kant himself was a pure retributivist remains an open interpretive question.

On this site it belongs to Coordinate 6.2 (Philosophy of Law).

Further connections on this site. It also bears on Coordinate 6.4 (Political Philosophy), because it concerns the authority of the state to punish, and on Coordinate 1.7 (Free Will and Determinism), through the sceptical objection that no one has the basic desert retribution requires.

See also the glossary entries Punishment, Justice, Moral responsibility, Free will and Deontology.

Further cross-references. Which conduct the law may punish at all is a separate question, discussed under Legal moralism; for rival and successor views see also the glossary entries Deterrence theory (punishment), Communicative theory of punishment, Penal abolitionism, Restorative justice and Manipulation argument.

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Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Checked against the sources above on 15 November 2026. Not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. How we write and check.

Cite this page

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 15 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.

APA (7th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 15). Retributivism (Arguments). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/retributivism/

MLA (9th edition)

“Retributivism (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought, 15 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/retributivism/. Accessed [date accessed].

Chicago (17th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Retributivism (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 15, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/retributivism/.

BibTeX

@misc{cot-glossary-retributivism-2026,
  author       = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
  title        = {Retributivism (Arguments)},
  howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = nov,
  url          = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/retributivism/},
  note         = {Source-checked 15 November 2026}
}

RIS

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