Skip to content
Coordinates of ThoughtHome of Philosophy
Join

Argument from illusion

Updated 19 November 2026

On this page
  1. The argument at a glance
  2. What it means
  3. The questions it belongs to
  4. Thinkers
  5. To read
  6. Sources and further reading
  7. About this page
  8. Cite this page

The classic argument that, because in illusions something appears to have a quality the ordinary object lacks, we are never directly presented with ordinary objects, even in veridical perception.

Also: illusion argument

The argument at a glance

A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.

Question
The question is whether things' sometimes looking other than they are shows that we never directly perceive the world.
Reasons , Reconstruction by the scholar named in the entry

The entry gives a seven-step version for a subject S:

  1. in an illusion it seems to S that something has a sensible quality F which the ordinary object lacks;
  2. whenever it seems to S that something is F, S is directly presented with something that is F;
  3. so in an illusion S is not directly presented with the ordinary object;
  4. the same account must apply to veridical and illusory experiences;
  5. so in veridical experience S is not directly presented with the object;
  6. if not there, then nowhere;
  7. Therefore: we are never directly presented with ordinary objects. (the entry continues below)
Intended conclusion
The immediate objects of awareness are sense-data, leading to indirect realism or phenomenalism.
Objections and replies
Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported

Barnes and Elizabeth Anscombe argued that the phenomenal principle is fallacious. Adverbialists, intentionalists and naive realist disjunctivists all deny it, treating illusion respectively as a way of sensing, as misrepresentation, or as an object's look in abnormal conditions. French and Walters (2018) argue that the argument is invalid: from (1), (2) and Leibniz's Law it follows only that S is presented with something other than the object, not that S is not also presented with the object.

Replies

Defenders answer that the principle rests on phenomenological fact rather than logic. The validity gap can be closed by an 'Exclusion Assumption', though whether it is defensible, the entry says, "remains to be seen".

Coordinate 2.2.1C. D. BroadA. J. AyerElizabeth AnscombeSources and primary textsRead the full entry

What it means

The argument from illusion is one of the two classic arguments behind the problem of perception, as Tim Crane and Craig French's Stanford Encyclopedia entry sets it out. Its target is direct realism, the view that experiences directly present ordinary objects.

The question is whether things' sometimes looking other than they are shows that we never directly perceive the world.

Structure. The entry gives a seven-step version for a subject S: (1) in an illusion it seems to S that something has a sensible quality F which the ordinary object lacks; (2) whenever it seems to S that something is F, S is directly presented with something that is F; (3) so in an illusion S is not directly presented with the ordinary object; (4) the same account must apply to veridical and illusory experiences; (5) so in veridical experience S is not directly presented with the object; (6) if not there, then nowhere; therefore (7) we are never directly presented with ordinary objects. Premise (2) is the phenomenal principle, for which the entry quotes Howard Robinson's formulation. Following Snowdon, the entry calls the illusion stage the base case and the generalisation the spreading step. C. D. Broad motivated the principle by asking why a penny seen at an angle looks elliptical rather than any other shape, and A. J. Ayer held that illusory and veridical experiences differ in "degree and not of kind".

Intended conclusion. The immediate objects of awareness are sense-data, leading to indirect realism or phenomenalism.

Objections. Barnes and Elizabeth Anscombe argued that the phenomenal principle is fallacious. Adverbialists, intentionalists and naive realist disjunctivists all deny it, treating illusion respectively as a way of sensing, as misrepresentation, or as an object's look in abnormal conditions. French and Walters (2018) argue that the argument is invalid: from (1), (2) and Leibniz's Law it follows only that S is presented with something other than the object, not that S is not also presented with the object.

Replies. Defenders answer that the principle rests on phenomenological fact rather than logic. The validity gap can be closed by an 'Exclusion Assumption', though whether it is defensible, the entry says, "remains to be seen".

Status. Sense-datum theory fell from favour in the later twentieth century, though it retains occasional defenders; the live dispute is between intentionalists and naive realists. Unlike the argument from hallucination, whose main burden lies in the spreading step, its main burden lies in the base case, which depends on the phenomenal principle.

On this site it belongs to Coordinate 2.2.1 (Perception).

See also the glossary entries Argument from hallucination, Sense data, Perception and Theories of error (khyātivāda).

The questions it belongs to

Thinkers

To read

Compare this argument

Sources and further reading

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Checked against the sources above on 12 November 2026. Not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. How we write and check.

Cite this page

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 12 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.

APA (7th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 12). Argument from illusion (Arguments). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/argument-from-illusion/

MLA (9th edition)

“Argument from illusion (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought, 12 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/argument-from-illusion/. Accessed [date accessed].

Chicago (17th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Argument from illusion (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 12, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/argument-from-illusion/.

BibTeX

@misc{cot-glossary-argument-from-illusion-2026,
  author       = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
  title        = {Argument from illusion (Arguments)},
  howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = nov,
  url          = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/argument-from-illusion/},
  note         = {Source-checked 12 November 2026}
}

RIS

TY  - ELEC
AU  - Coordinates of Thought Editors
TI  - Argument from illusion (Arguments)
T2  - Coordinates of Thought
PB  - Coordinates of Thought
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/11/12
UR  - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/argument-from-illusion/
LA  - en
ER  - 

For reference managers (Zotero, Mendeley, EndNote): BibTeX file · RIS file

All arguments · The Philosophy Glossary