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Basic argument

Updated 29 October 2026

On this page
  1. The argument at a glance
  2. What it means
  3. The questions it belongs to
  4. Thinkers
  5. To read
  6. Sources and further reading
  7. About this page
  8. Cite this page

Galen Strawson's argument that true moral responsibility is impossible, because it would require us to be the causes of ourselves, which nothing can be.

Also: Galen Strawson's Basic Argument, basic argument against moral responsibility

The argument at a glance

A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.

Reasons , Numbered as set out in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps
  1. nothing can be causa sui, the cause of itself;
  2. to be truly or ultimately morally responsible for one's actions, one would have to be causa sui, at least in certain crucial mental respects;
  3. Therefore: no one can be truly or ultimately morally responsible. (the entry continues below)
Objections
Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported

Critics challenge premise (2) and the step from

  1. to
  2. . Alfred Mele suggests that an action can be up to an agent even if none of the factors contributing to it were up to her; Randolph Clarke challenges the claim that if what one does is up to one, how one is must also be up to one; John Martin Fischer argues that the argument relies on a principle that responsibility for an action requires responsibility for every factor contributing to it, which Istvan denies the argument needs. Robert Kane and others try to make sense of a limited self-formation that would stop the regress. Defenders such as Istvan and Parks argue that the intuitive premises survive these objections or can be restated more carefully.

Coordinate 1.7Robert KaneDerk PereboomSources and primary textsRead the full entry

What it means

The Basic Argument is Galen Strawson's case for scepticism about moral responsibility, presented in work of 1986 and 1994 and developed later. Gregg Caruso's Stanford Encyclopedia entry on scepticism about moral responsibility lists it among the main arguments for scepticism and stresses that it makes no appeal to determinism or indeterminism.

In short form: (1) nothing can be causa sui, the cause of itself; (2) to be truly or ultimately morally responsible for one's actions, one would have to be causa sui, at least in certain crucial mental respects; therefore (3) no one can be truly or ultimately morally responsible. The longer version supplies the reasoning behind (2). (a) One does what one does because of how one is, mentally speaking. (b) So to be responsible for what one does, one must be responsible for how one is. (c) To be responsible for how one is, one must have chosen to be that way, using some principles of choice. (d) But then one must be responsible for those principles, which requires a further choice according to further principles, and so on. (e) The regress cannot be completed, so true responsibility is impossible.

The responsibility at issue is what Strawson calls true or ultimate responsibility; the SEP presents the argument as concluding that such responsibility is impossible because it would require true self-determination, without any appeal to determinism or indeterminism.

Objections. Critics challenge premise (2) and the step from (a) to (b). Alfred Mele suggests that an action can be up to an agent even if none of the factors contributing to it were up to her; Randolph Clarke challenges the claim that if what one does is up to one, how one is must also be up to one; John Martin Fischer argues that the argument relies on a principle that responsibility for an action requires responsibility for every factor contributing to it, which Istvan denies the argument needs. Robert Kane and others try to make sense of a limited self-formation that would stop the regress. Defenders such as Istvan and Parks argue that the intuitive premises survive these objections or can be restated more carefully.

Caruso places the Basic Argument alongside hard determinism, luck-based arguments and Derk Pereboom's manipulation argument as grounds for scepticism about moral responsibility, and concludes that the real-life practical implications of such scepticism remain an open question.

On this site it belongs to Coordinate 1.7 (Free Will and Determinism).

See also the glossary entries Moral responsibility, Free will, Regress problem, Manipulation argument, Luck objection and Retributivism.

The questions it belongs to

Thinkers

To read

Sources and further reading

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Checked against the sources above on 22 November 2026. Not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. How we write and check.

Cite this page

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 22 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.

APA (7th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 22). Basic argument (Philosophy Glossary). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/basic-argument/

MLA (9th edition)

“Basic argument (Philosophy Glossary).” Coordinates of Thought, 22 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/basic-argument/. Accessed [date accessed].

Chicago (17th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Basic argument (Philosophy Glossary).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 22, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/basic-argument/.

BibTeX

@misc{cot-glossary-basic-argument-2026,
  author       = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
  title        = {Basic argument (Philosophy Glossary)},
  howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = nov,
  url          = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/basic-argument/},
  note         = {Source-checked 22 November 2026}
}

RIS

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