Two-envelope paradox
On this page
The puzzle that, given two envelopes one holding twice as much as the other, expected-value reasoning seems to recommend switching whichever envelope one holds, although the situation is symmetrical.
Also: two-envelope problem, two envelopes paradox
The problem at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- The reasoning that leads to it , Reconstruction by the scholar named in the entry
- suppose your envelope contains n;
- the other then contains 2n or n/2 with equal probability, so its expected value is 1.25n, more than n;
- since this holds whatever n is, you should switch. (the entry continues below)
Objections and responses
- Principal objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
The first objection to the argument is that step (2) silently assumes the two possibilities are equally likely for every amount, which, as Chalmers's unpublished 1994 note on his own site shows, no bounded distribution of amounts allows: if there is an upper limit on what an envelope may contain, high values make switching a bad idea.
- Replies
Michael Clark and Nicholas Shackel reply in Mind (2000) that this settles only the bounded case and that earlier claims to have resolved the paradox were premature, because there are unbounded distributions in which the paradoxical calculation involves no mathematical error. Chalmers's 1994 note likewise gives a proper distribution with infinite expected value that reproduces the conditional reasoning, and his 2002 paper connects such cases to the St Petersburg game.
Coordinate 2.6Coordinate 2.8David ChalmersSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
The two-envelope paradox asks what goes wrong in an apparently correct expected-value argument that recommends an absurd policy. One envelope contains twice as much money as the other; you are handed one at random.
The reasoning, as David Chalmers sets it out: (1) suppose your envelope contains n; (2) the other then contains 2n or n/2 with equal probability, so its expected value is 1.25n, more than n; (3) since this holds whatever n is, you should switch. But the same argument, run from the other envelope, recommends switching back, and the setup gives no reason to favour either envelope. The intended conclusion of the argument is a rule of action; the paradox is that the rule cannot be right.
Principal objections. The first objection to the argument is that step (2) silently assumes the two possibilities are equally likely for every amount, which, as Chalmers's unpublished 1994 note on his own site shows, no bounded distribution of amounts allows: if there is an upper limit on what an envelope may contain, high values make switching a bad idea.
Replies. Michael Clark and Nicholas Shackel reply in Mind (2000) that this settles only the bounded case and that earlier claims to have resolved the paradox were premature, because there are unbounded distributions in which the paradoxical calculation involves no mathematical error. Chalmers's 1994 note likewise gives a proper distribution with infinite expected value that reproduces the conditional reasoning, and his 2002 paper connects such cases to the St Petersburg game.
A second objection targets the infinite case. Chalmers's 2002 Analysis paper offers a disjunctive diagnosis. Where expectations are finite, the early steps are false because they ignore the probability distribution. Where expectations are infinite, those steps can be true, and the error is the inference to the unconditional recommendation: the overall expected gain from switching is a series without a well-defined sum. He concludes that both a decision-theoretic dominance principle and a probabilistic averaging principle fail without restriction, writing that "dominance reasoning is not generally valid". Clark and Shackel instead hold that the paradox is resolved only by attending to the partial sums of the series of expected gains.
Current status: both Chalmers and Clark and Shackel treat the bounded or finite case as resting on an illicit equiprobability assumption; they diagnose the infinite case differently, and Chalmers suggests the failed principles may hold when restricted to finite expectations and absolutely convergent series. On this site it belongs to Coordinate 2.6 (Rationality), with links to Coordinate 2.8 (Formal Epistemology).
See also the glossary entries St Petersburg paradox, Newcomb's problem, Interpretations of probability and Paradox.
The questions it belongs to
- 2.6 RationalityIs it rational to believe what the evidence supports, or what serves you?
- 2.8 Formal EpistemologyBy how much should this evidence move you?
Thinkers
To read
- Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy — David J. Chalmers
- The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory — David J. Chalmers
Sources and further reading
- David J. Chalmers, 'The St. Petersburg Two-Envelope Paradox', Analysis 62 (2002), 155-157 (author's copy)
- Michael Clark and Nicholas Shackel, 'The Two-Envelope Paradox', Mind 109:435 (2000), 415-442 (Cardiff University ORCA record)
- David J. Chalmers, 'The Two-Envelope Paradox: A Complete Analysis?' (unpublished; written up in 1994, hosted on the author's site consc.net)
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Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 11 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
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BibTeX
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author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Two-envelope paradox (Philosophy Glossary)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/two-envelope-paradox/},
note = {Source-checked 11 November 2026}
}RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Two-envelope paradox (Philosophy Glossary) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/11 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/two-envelope-paradox/ LA - en ER -
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