Cartesian circle
On this page
The objection that Descartes argues in a circle in the Meditations, using clear and distinct perception to prove that God exists and then appealing to God to guarantee that clear and distinct perception is true.
The argument at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- Question
- Can Descartes establish that whatever he clearly and distinctly perceives is true without already relying on that very principle? In the Meditations on First Philosophy, held in the site's Book corner, the truth of clear and distinct perception (the 'C&D Rule' in Lex Newman's Stanford Encyclopedia entry) is supposed to follow from the existence of a God who is no deceiver.
- Reasons , Numbered as set out in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps
-
Newman sets out the sequence: in the Third Meditation René Descartes argues for God's existence from premises he clearly and distinctly perceives; he then derives the truth of the C&D Rule from God's existence and veracity. In Newman's words, "The worry is that he presupposes the C&D Rule in the effort to prove the C&D Rule." Justin Skirry's Internet Encyclopedia article puts the same point in terms of the premises: the proof of God starts from claims such as 'I exist' and the causal adequacy principle, which at that stage are not yet guaranteed, so the proof cannot be certain. In prose:
- Descartes may trust clear and distinct perceptions only once God's existence is proved;
- the proof of God's existence relies on clear and distinct perceptions;
- Therefore: the proof presupposes what it is meant to establish.
- Intended conclusion
- If the objection succeeds, Descartes' route from methodical doubt to certainty is viciously circular, and the Meditations do not answer the sceptical doubts they raise.
Objections and replies
- Further discussion in the entry
-
Objections and Descartes' reply. Descartes answered in the Second Replies by distinguishing present from remembered perception. While we attend to a clear and distinct perception we cannot doubt it; the divine guarantee is needed for conclusions we merely remember having demonstrated, since, in the translation Newman quotes, we "may forget the arguments in question and later remember simply the conclusions". On this reading God's existence is proved by premises that are certain while attended to, and after the proof even remembered demonstrations yield certainty.
- Replies and interpretations
-
Whether the memory reply works is disputed. Newman groups modern readings into bounded-doubt interpretations (Doney, Kenny, Morris, Wilson, Della Rocca and others), on which some premises are immune from doubt, and unbounded-doubt interpretations (Curley, Ernest Sosa, Loeb, Newman and others), on which doubt can reach every judgement once attention lapses. The first faces the question why the deceiving-genius doubt spares those premises and not others; the second faces what Ayers calls a Sisyphus-like predicament, in which the conclusion slips back into doubt as soon as attention drifts. Newman and Nelson (1999) propose that God's existence becomes self-evident, so that the sceptical scenarios become unthinkable. Frankfurt (1970) read Descartes as seeking coherence rather than truth, a reading he later renounced (1978).
Coordinate 2.3Coordinate 2.4Coordinate 2.2.2René DescartesErnest SosaSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
Question. Can Descartes establish that whatever he clearly and distinctly perceives is true without already relying on that very principle? In the Meditations on First Philosophy, held in the site's Book corner, the truth of clear and distinct perception (the 'C&D Rule' in Lex Newman's Stanford Encyclopedia entry) is supposed to follow from the existence of a God who is no deceiver.
Structure. Newman sets out the sequence: in the Third Meditation René Descartes argues for God's existence from premises he clearly and distinctly perceives; he then derives the truth of the C&D Rule from God's existence and veracity. In Newman's words, "The worry is that he presupposes the C&D Rule in the effort to prove the C&D Rule." Justin Skirry's Internet Encyclopedia article puts the same point in terms of the premises: the proof of God starts from claims such as 'I exist' and the causal adequacy principle, which at that stage are not yet guaranteed, so the proof cannot be certain. In prose: (1) Descartes may trust clear and distinct perceptions only once God's existence is proved; (2) the proof of God's existence relies on clear and distinct perceptions; therefore (3) the proof presupposes what it is meant to establish.
Conclusion. If the objection succeeds, Descartes' route from methodical doubt to certainty is viciously circular, and the Meditations do not answer the sceptical doubts they raise.
Objections and Descartes' reply. Descartes answered in the Second Replies by distinguishing present from remembered perception. While we attend to a clear and distinct perception we cannot doubt it; the divine guarantee is needed for conclusions we merely remember having demonstrated, since, in the translation Newman quotes, we "may forget the arguments in question and later remember simply the conclusions". On this reading God's existence is proved by premises that are certain while attended to, and after the proof even remembered demonstrations yield certainty.
Replies and interpretations. Whether the memory reply works is disputed. Newman groups modern readings into bounded-doubt interpretations (Doney, Kenny, Morris, Wilson, Della Rocca and others), on which some premises are immune from doubt, and unbounded-doubt interpretations (Curley, Ernest Sosa, Loeb, Newman and others), on which doubt can reach every judgement once attention lapses. The first faces the question why the deceiving-genius doubt spares those premises and not others; the second faces what Ayers calls a Sisyphus-like predicament, in which the conclusion slips back into doubt as soon as attention drifts. Newman and Nelson (1999) propose that God's existence becomes self-evident, so that the sceptical scenarios become unthinkable. Frankfurt (1970) read Descartes as seeking coherence rather than truth, a reading he later renounced (1978).
Key philosophers and texts. René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) with the Objections and Replies, especially the Second Replies; modern interpreters including Frankfurt, Curley, Ernest Sosa, Loeb, Della Rocca, Newman and Nelson.
Coordinates. On this site it belongs to Coordinate 2.3 (Structure of Justification) and bears on Coordinate 2.4 (Skepticism) and Coordinate 2.2.2 (Reason and Intuition).
Current status. Newman reports that Descartes scholarship generally resists the vicious-circularity reading, while the objection remains widely taught; several interpretations still compete. Skirry calls the circle a serious problem within the Meditations without deciding whether Descartes' reply succeeds.
See also the glossary entries Cogito, Problem of the criterion, Regress problem, Foundationalism, Begging the question and Scepticism.
The questions it belongs to
- 2.3 Structure of JustificationWhy do you believe that? And why do you believe that?
- 2.4 SkepticismHow do you know you are not being deceived about everything?
- 2.2.2 Reason and IntuitionHow, if at all, do you know that a surface cannot be wholly red and wholly green at the same time and in the same respect?
Thinkers
Traditions
To read
- Discourse on the Method — René Descartes
- Meditations on First Philosophy — René Descartes
- Principles of Philosophy — René Descartes
Sources and further reading
- Lex Newman, 'Descartes' Epistemology', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 27 November 2023)
- Justin Skirry, 'René Descartes (1596–1650)', Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (no date shown on the page)
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 14 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
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MLA (9th edition)
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BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-cartesian-circle-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Cartesian circle (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/cartesian-circle/},
note = {Source-checked 14 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Cartesian circle (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/14 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/cartesian-circle/ LA - en ER -
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