Argument from queerness
On this page
J. L. Mackie's argument that objective moral values would be metaphysically and epistemically strange, unlike anything else we know, so that we should not believe in them.
The argument at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- Question
- The question it addresses is whether there could be objective moral values: facts that make demands on us whatever we happen to want.
- Reasons , Numbered as set out in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps
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Joyce presents Mackie's case in two steps, and Michael Ridge's entry on moral non-naturalism reads it the same way. The following numbering is a reconstruction.
- Conceptual step: ordinary moral thought is committed to objective values and objective prescriptions, which would give an agent reasons independently of that agent's desires or purposes.
- Ontological step: such values would be utterly unlike anything else with which we are familiar; Ridge reports Mackie as arguing that their defender must credit them with a special power to motivate.
- We have no good reason to believe in entities so unlike everything else.
- Therefore: there are no objective values, and moral judgements, which presuppose them, are systematically untrue. (the entry continues below)
- Intended conclusion
- Error theory: moral discourse is committed to objective values that do not exist, so its positive claims are untrue.
Objections and replies
- Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
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Joyce distinguishes two lines of response: one accepts that objective values would be too strange but denies that moral discourse is committed to them; the other accepts the commitment but denies the strangeness. Ridge surveys the second line. Some, Ridge reports (citing Svavarsdóttir 1999), deny that moral properties need any mysterious motivational power, noting that some people seem to make sound moral judgements yet remain unmoved; John McDowell holds that one cannot recognise something as cruel without some disapproval of it, a view Ridge questions; non-naturalists such as Shafer-Landau answer the related worry, which Mackie and Simon Blackburn press, that they cannot explain why moral properties supervene on natural ones. Joyce notes that a Humean theory of reasons for action does not obviously commit one to instrumentalism about epistemic reasons, a point relevant to replies that compare moral with epistemic normativity.
- Replies
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Ridge calls the supervenience problem serious and judges it unclear that Shafer-Landau's appeal to token constitution can do the needed work; he describes the newer grounding and essence-based response of Bengson, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2024) as an interesting strategy, while noting that critics may find its primitive essence facts mysterious. Ridge also reports related epistemological challenges to non-naturalism: Darwinian debunking (Street 2006) and the worry that intuitions could only by cosmic coincidence track causally isolated facts (Bedke 2009); Enoch (2011) and Vavova (2015) offer replies.
Coordinate 3.1.1Coordinate 3.1.4Coordinate 3.1.3J. L. MackieJohn McDowellSimon BlackburnSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
The argument from queerness is J. L. Mackie's main argument, in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977), for a moral error theory. Richard Joyce's Stanford Encyclopedia entry notes that Mackie famously calls the properties at issue 'queer', in what Joyce calls an increasingly anachronistic use of the term.
The question it addresses is whether there could be objective moral values: facts that make demands on us whatever we happen to want.
Structure. Joyce presents Mackie's case in two steps, and Michael Ridge's entry on moral non-naturalism reads it the same way. The following numbering is a reconstruction. (1) Conceptual step: ordinary moral thought is committed to objective values and objective prescriptions, which would give an agent reasons independently of that agent's desires or purposes. (2) Ontological step: such values would be utterly unlike anything else with which we are familiar; Ridge reports Mackie as arguing that their defender must credit them with a special power to motivate. (3) We have no good reason to believe in entities so unlike everything else. Therefore (4) there are no objective values, and moral judgements, which presuppose them, are systematically untrue. Joyce stresses that on this view the realist is right about what moral concepts require but wrong about the world.
Intended conclusion. Error theory: moral discourse is committed to objective values that do not exist, so its positive claims are untrue.
Objections. Joyce distinguishes two lines of response: one accepts that objective values would be too strange but denies that moral discourse is committed to them; the other accepts the commitment but denies the strangeness. Ridge surveys the second line. Some, Ridge reports (citing Svavarsdóttir 1999), deny that moral properties need any mysterious motivational power, noting that some people seem to make sound moral judgements yet remain unmoved; John McDowell holds that one cannot recognise something as cruel without some disapproval of it, a view Ridge questions; non-naturalists such as Shafer-Landau answer the related worry, which Mackie and Simon Blackburn press, that they cannot explain why moral properties supervene on natural ones. Joyce notes that a Humean theory of reasons for action does not obviously commit one to instrumentalism about epistemic reasons, a point relevant to replies that compare moral with epistemic normativity.
Replies. Ridge calls the supervenience problem serious and judges it unclear that Shafer-Landau's appeal to token constitution can do the needed work; he describes the newer grounding and essence-based response of Bengson, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2024) as an interesting strategy, while noting that critics may find its primitive essence facts mysterious. Ridge also reports related epistemological challenges to non-naturalism: Darwinian debunking (Street 2006) and the worry that intuitions could only by cosmic coincidence track causally isolated facts (Bedke 2009); Enoch (2011) and Vavova (2015) offer replies.
Status. The debate is unresolved. Joyce suggests that whether moral discourse is centrally committed to objective prescriptivity may be very hard to settle, because there is no agreed model of conceptual identity; Ridge treats motivation, supervenience and moral knowledge as live difficulties for non-naturalism.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 3.1.1 (Moral Realism vs Anti-Realism) and bears on Coordinate 3.1.4 (Moral Motivation) and Coordinate 3.1.3 (Moral Epistemology).
See also the glossary entries Moral error theory, Moral anti-realism, Moral realism, Supervenience, Motivational internalism and Ethical intuitionism.
The questions it belongs to
- 3.1.1 Moral Realism vs Anti-RealismIf everyone approved of torturing children, would it still be wrong?
- 3.1.4 Moral MotivationCan you know an act is wrong and be entirely unmoved?
- 3.1.3 Moral EpistemologyHow would you check whether a moral claim is true?
Thinkers
Traditions
To read
- Being Good: A Short Introduction to Ethics — Simon Blackburn
- Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong — J. L. Mackie
- The Miracle of Theism — J. L. Mackie
Sources and further reading
- Richard Joyce, 'Moral Anti-Realism', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 24 May 2021)
- Michael Ridge, 'Moral Non-Naturalism', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 14 June 2025)
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 12 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 12). Argument from queerness (Arguments). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/argument-from-queerness/
MLA (9th edition)
“Argument from queerness (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought, 12 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/argument-from-queerness/. Accessed [date accessed].
Chicago (17th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Argument from queerness (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 12, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/argument-from-queerness/.
BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-argument-from-queerness-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Argument from queerness (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/argument-from-queerness/},
note = {Source-checked 12 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Argument from queerness (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/12 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/argument-from-queerness/ LA - en ER -
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