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Disappearing agent objection

Updated 29 October 2026

On this page
  1. The argument at a glance
  2. What it means
  3. The questions it belongs to
  4. Thinkers
  5. To read
  6. Sources and further reading
  7. About this page
  8. Cite this page

Derk Pereboom's objection that, on event-causal libertarianism, nothing about the agent settles which undetermined decision occurs, so the agent 'disappears' just where control is needed.

Also: disappearing agent argument, problem of the disappearing agent

The argument at a glance

A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.

Question
The question is whether an undetermined decision can be settled by the agent. Pereboom's paradigm is a case in which moral and prudential motives are in equipoise. Structure: (1) to decide freely, an agent must settle which option occurs, where "An agent settles which option for action occurs just in case she determines, not necessarily causally, which action occurs"; (2) on event-causal libertarianism only events are causally relevant to the decision; (3) because the process is indeterministic, those events leave open which decision occurs; therefore (4) "nothing settles which decision occurs", and so "it can't be the agent or anything about the agent that settles which decision occurs." Clarke quotes the formulation in Pereboom's Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (2014), where "the agent disappears when it needs to be settled whether the decision will occur". The intended conclusion is that event-causal libertarianism lacks an account of settling; Pereboom suggests that a libertarian in this position might move to agent-causal libertarianism, on which agents as substances settle which decision occurs by causing it.
Reasons , Numbered as set out in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps

The question is whether an undetermined decision can be settled by the agent. Pereboom's paradigm is a case in which moral and prudential motives are in equipoise. Structure:

  1. to decide freely, an agent must settle which option occurs, where "An agent settles which option for action occurs just in case she determines, not necessarily causally, which action occurs";
  2. on event-causal libertarianism only events are causally relevant to the decision;
  3. because the process is indeterministic, those events leave open which decision occurs;
  4. Therefore: "nothing settles which decision occurs", and so "it can't be the agent or anything about the agent that settles which decision occurs." (the entry continues below)
Objections and replies
Objections and replies , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported

Alfred Mele replies that on event-causal views it remains correct to say that agents, not events, make decisions, and that if an agent's deciding is sufficient for settling, settling does not depend on agent-causal powers; he illustrates abilities with a basketball player's free throws, and suggests, with Pereboom's agreement, that adequate control allows a small probability of failure. Clarke, in Noûs, argues that the objection as it stands fails: since nothing prior settles the matter, the agent settles it simply by deciding, and demanding a stronger sense of 'settles' begs the question unless independently argued. He also argues that two distinct problems have been conflated, the disappearing agent problem and the problem of present luck, naming Christopher Franklin and Runyan among those who treat them as equivalent, and that present luck would remain problematic even granting agent causation. Pereboom answers that the dispute concerns the commitments of an event-causal theory of action, not ordinary speech.

Coordinate 1.7Coordinate 6.24Derk PereboomRobert KaneSources and primary textsRead the full entry

What it means

The disappearing agent objection is Derk Pereboom's argument that event-causal libertarianism cannot give agents the control that free will requires. Event-causal libertarianism holds that free decisions are caused, indeterministically, by prior events in the agent such as desires and beliefs; Robert Kane's view is the main such account discussed in the Stanford Encyclopedia entry by Randolph Clarke, Justin Capes and Philip Swenson. The name reflects, in Pereboom's words in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, that "the agent (metaphorically) vanishes at the point at which we expect that she can settle whether the decision occurs."

The question is whether an undetermined decision can be settled by the agent. Pereboom's paradigm is a case in which moral and prudential motives are in equipoise. Structure: (1) to decide freely, an agent must settle which option occurs, where "An agent settles which option for action occurs just in case she determines, not necessarily causally, which action occurs"; (2) on event-causal libertarianism only events are causally relevant to the decision; (3) because the process is indeterministic, those events leave open which decision occurs; therefore (4) "nothing settles which decision occurs", and so "it can't be the agent or anything about the agent that settles which decision occurs." Clarke quotes the formulation in Pereboom's Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (2014), where "the agent disappears when it needs to be settled whether the decision will occur". The intended conclusion is that event-causal libertarianism lacks an account of settling; Pereboom suggests that a libertarian in this position might move to agent-causal libertarianism, on which agents as substances settle which decision occurs by causing it.

Objections and replies. Alfred Mele replies that on event-causal views it remains correct to say that agents, not events, make decisions, and that if an agent's deciding is sufficient for settling, settling does not depend on agent-causal powers; he illustrates abilities with a basketball player's free throws, and suggests, with Pereboom's agreement, that adequate control allows a small probability of failure. Clarke, in Noûs, argues that the objection as it stands fails: since nothing prior settles the matter, the agent settles it simply by deciding, and demanding a stronger sense of 'settles' begs the question unless independently argued. He also argues that two distinct problems have been conflated, the disappearing agent problem and the problem of present luck, naming Christopher Franklin and Runyan among those who treat them as equivalent, and that present luck would remain problematic even granting agent causation. Pereboom answers that the dispute concerns the commitments of an event-causal theory of action, not ordinary speech.

Status. The exchange continues without resolution, within the wider debate over whether indeterminism reduces control by introducing luck.

On this site it belongs to Coordinate 1.7 (Free Will and Determinism) and bears on Coordinate 6.24 (Philosophy of Action).

See also the glossary entries Luck objection, Libertarianism (free will), Rollback argument, Free will and Moral responsibility.

The questions it belongs to

Thinkers

To read

Sources and further reading

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Checked against the sources above on 11 November 2026. Not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. How we write and check.

Cite this page

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 11 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.

APA (7th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 11). Disappearing agent objection (Philosophy Glossary). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/disappearing-agent-objection/

MLA (9th edition)

“Disappearing agent objection (Philosophy Glossary).” Coordinates of Thought, 11 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/disappearing-agent-objection/. Accessed [date accessed].

Chicago (17th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Disappearing agent objection (Philosophy Glossary).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 11, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/disappearing-agent-objection/.

BibTeX

@misc{cot-glossary-disappearing-agent-objection-2026,
  author       = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
  title        = {Disappearing agent objection (Philosophy Glossary)},
  howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = nov,
  url          = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/disappearing-agent-objection/},
  note         = {Source-checked 11 November 2026}
}

RIS

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TI  - Disappearing agent objection (Philosophy Glossary)
T2  - Coordinates of Thought
PB  - Coordinates of Thought
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DA  - 2026/11/11
UR  - https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/disappearing-agent-objection/
LA  - en
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