Disappearing agent objection
On this page
Derk Pereboom's objection that, on event-causal libertarianism, nothing about the agent settles which undetermined decision occurs, so the agent 'disappears' just where control is needed.
Also: disappearing agent argument, problem of the disappearing agent
The argument at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- Question
- The question is whether an undetermined decision can be settled by the agent. Pereboom's paradigm is a case in which moral and prudential motives are in equipoise. Structure: (1) to decide freely, an agent must settle which option occurs, where "An agent settles which option for action occurs just in case she determines, not necessarily causally, which action occurs"; (2) on event-causal libertarianism only events are causally relevant to the decision; (3) because the process is indeterministic, those events leave open which decision occurs; therefore (4) "nothing settles which decision occurs", and so "it can't be the agent or anything about the agent that settles which decision occurs." Clarke quotes the formulation in Pereboom's Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (2014), where "the agent disappears when it needs to be settled whether the decision will occur". The intended conclusion is that event-causal libertarianism lacks an account of settling; Pereboom suggests that a libertarian in this position might move to agent-causal libertarianism, on which agents as substances settle which decision occurs by causing it.
- Reasons , Numbered as set out in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps
The question is whether an undetermined decision can be settled by the agent. Pereboom's paradigm is a case in which moral and prudential motives are in equipoise. Structure:
- to decide freely, an agent must settle which option occurs, where "An agent settles which option for action occurs just in case she determines, not necessarily causally, which action occurs";
- on event-causal libertarianism only events are causally relevant to the decision;
- because the process is indeterministic, those events leave open which decision occurs;
- Therefore: "nothing settles which decision occurs", and so "it can't be the agent or anything about the agent that settles which decision occurs." (the entry continues below)
Objections and replies
- Objections and replies , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
Alfred Mele replies that on event-causal views it remains correct to say that agents, not events, make decisions, and that if an agent's deciding is sufficient for settling, settling does not depend on agent-causal powers; he illustrates abilities with a basketball player's free throws, and suggests, with Pereboom's agreement, that adequate control allows a small probability of failure. Clarke, in Noûs, argues that the objection as it stands fails: since nothing prior settles the matter, the agent settles it simply by deciding, and demanding a stronger sense of 'settles' begs the question unless independently argued. He also argues that two distinct problems have been conflated, the disappearing agent problem and the problem of present luck, naming Christopher Franklin and Runyan among those who treat them as equivalent, and that present luck would remain problematic even granting agent causation. Pereboom answers that the dispute concerns the commitments of an event-causal theory of action, not ordinary speech.
Coordinate 1.7Coordinate 6.24Derk PereboomRobert KaneSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
The disappearing agent objection is Derk Pereboom's argument that event-causal libertarianism cannot give agents the control that free will requires. Event-causal libertarianism holds that free decisions are caused, indeterministically, by prior events in the agent such as desires and beliefs; Robert Kane's view is the main such account discussed in the Stanford Encyclopedia entry by Randolph Clarke, Justin Capes and Philip Swenson. The name reflects, in Pereboom's words in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, that "the agent (metaphorically) vanishes at the point at which we expect that she can settle whether the decision occurs."
The question is whether an undetermined decision can be settled by the agent. Pereboom's paradigm is a case in which moral and prudential motives are in equipoise. Structure: (1) to decide freely, an agent must settle which option occurs, where "An agent settles which option for action occurs just in case she determines, not necessarily causally, which action occurs"; (2) on event-causal libertarianism only events are causally relevant to the decision; (3) because the process is indeterministic, those events leave open which decision occurs; therefore (4) "nothing settles which decision occurs", and so "it can't be the agent or anything about the agent that settles which decision occurs." Clarke quotes the formulation in Pereboom's Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (2014), where "the agent disappears when it needs to be settled whether the decision will occur". The intended conclusion is that event-causal libertarianism lacks an account of settling; Pereboom suggests that a libertarian in this position might move to agent-causal libertarianism, on which agents as substances settle which decision occurs by causing it.
Objections and replies. Alfred Mele replies that on event-causal views it remains correct to say that agents, not events, make decisions, and that if an agent's deciding is sufficient for settling, settling does not depend on agent-causal powers; he illustrates abilities with a basketball player's free throws, and suggests, with Pereboom's agreement, that adequate control allows a small probability of failure. Clarke, in Noûs, argues that the objection as it stands fails: since nothing prior settles the matter, the agent settles it simply by deciding, and demanding a stronger sense of 'settles' begs the question unless independently argued. He also argues that two distinct problems have been conflated, the disappearing agent problem and the problem of present luck, naming Christopher Franklin and Runyan among those who treat them as equivalent, and that present luck would remain problematic even granting agent causation. Pereboom answers that the dispute concerns the commitments of an event-causal theory of action, not ordinary speech.
Status. The exchange continues without resolution, within the wider debate over whether indeterminism reduces control by introducing luck.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 1.7 (Free Will and Determinism) and bears on Coordinate 6.24 (Philosophy of Action).
See also the glossary entries Luck objection, Libertarianism (free will), Rollback argument, Free will and Moral responsibility.
The questions it belongs to
- 1.7 Free Will and DeterminismCould you have done otherwise?
- 6.24 Philosophy of ActionWhat is the difference between your arm rising and your raising it?
Thinkers
To read
Sources and further reading
- Derk Pereboom, review of Alfred R. Mele, Aspects of Agency: Decisions, Abilities, Explanations, and Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2017), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2018.06.32
- Randolph Clarke, 'Free Will, Agent Causation, and "Disappearing Agents"', Noûs (accepted manuscript, PhilArchive)
- Randolph Clarke, Justin Capes and Philip Swenson, 'Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 18 August 2021)
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Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 11 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
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BibTeX
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author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Disappearing agent objection (Philosophy Glossary)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/disappearing-agent-objection/},
note = {Source-checked 11 November 2026}
}RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Disappearing agent objection (Philosophy Glossary) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/11 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/disappearing-agent-objection/ LA - en ER -
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