Bar-Hillel–Carnap paradox
On this page
The result that, on Bar-Hillel and Carnap's probabilistic theory of semantic information, a contradiction carries maximal information.
Also: BCP
The problem at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- The reasoning that leads to it , COT reconstruction: the numbering is ours, not the philosopher's
Bar-Hillel and Carnap's theory rests on what the entry calls the inverse range principle: the information a sentence carries varies inversely with the likelihood of its truth, so that a sentence ruling out a larger range of possibilities carries more information. The content of a sentence is the set of possible worlds in which it is false; its measure is cont(s) = 1 − p(s), where p is an a priori probability. In reconstruction:
- a sentence's semantic information increases as the set of worlds it rules out grows;
- a contradiction is false in every world and so rules out every world;
- Result: a contradiction has maximal content (its cont value is 1), and on the logarithmic measure inf its information is infinite. (the entry continues below)
- The puzzling result
- For Bar-Hillel and Carnap the result was a consequence to be accepted rather than a refutation; for critics it shows that a probabilistic measure of semantic content misdescribes information.
Objections and responses
- Principal responses and objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
Bar-Hillel and Carnap themselves accepted the result, holding that semantic information does not imply truth; the entry quotes their remark: "A self-contradictory sentence asserts too much; it is too informative to be true." The entry notes that this makes information non-factive. Floridi's theory of strongly semantic information diagnoses the paradox as arising from a principle that is too weak, namely that semantic information is independent of truth-value. On his account semantic information consists of data that are well-formed, meaningful and true (the veridicality thesis; the entry cites Fred Dretske's work of 1981 as a classic example of an information-is-factive view), so that a contradiction is not information at all, and computes the quantity of strongly semantic information from the distance between a statement and the situation it is about. Verisimilitude-based accounts, from Frické, Cevolani and D'Alfonso, also avoid the paradox without probabilities, while allowing false claims to carry information; Allo (2007) argues for pluralism about information.
- Replies
Fetzer (2004) and Dodig-Crnkovic (2005) raised objections to Floridi's theory, and Sequoiah-Grayson (2007) defended it; Dinneen and Brauner (2015) find the veridicality thesis an obstacle to a single definition of information, while Mingers and Standing (2018) defend it.
Coordinate 6.18Coordinate 2.8Rudolf CarnapLuciano FloridiFred DretskeSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
The Bar-Hillel–Carnap paradox addresses the question how the information carried by a sentence should be measured, and whether information so measured requires truth. It arises in Bar-Hillel and Rudolf Carnap's 'An Outline of a Theory of Semantic Information' (1952), and Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson and Luciano Floridi's Stanford Encyclopedia entry on semantic conceptions of information abbreviates it as BCP.
Structure. Bar-Hillel and Carnap's theory rests on what the entry calls the inverse range principle: the information a sentence carries varies inversely with the likelihood of its truth, so that a sentence ruling out a larger range of possibilities carries more information. The content of a sentence is the set of possible worlds in which it is false; its measure is cont(s) = 1 − p(s), where p is an a priori probability. In reconstruction: (1) a sentence's semantic information increases as the set of worlds it rules out grows; (2) a contradiction is false in every world and so rules out every world; therefore (3) a contradiction has maximal content (its cont value is 1), and on the logarithmic measure inf its information is infinite. A contradiction, which tells us nothing true about the world, comes out as the most informative sentence there is. (The mirror image, that a tautology carries zero information, is treated in this glossary as the scandal of deduction.)
Intended conclusion. For Bar-Hillel and Carnap the result was a consequence to be accepted rather than a refutation; for critics it shows that a probabilistic measure of semantic content misdescribes information.
Principal responses and objections. Bar-Hillel and Carnap themselves accepted the result, holding that semantic information does not imply truth; the entry quotes their remark: "A self-contradictory sentence asserts too much; it is too informative to be true." The entry notes that this makes information non-factive. Floridi's theory of strongly semantic information diagnoses the paradox as arising from a principle that is too weak, namely that semantic information is independent of truth-value. On his account semantic information consists of data that are well-formed, meaningful and true (the veridicality thesis; the entry cites Fred Dretske's work of 1981 as a classic example of an information-is-factive view), so that a contradiction is not information at all, and computes the quantity of strongly semantic information from the distance between a statement and the situation it is about. Verisimilitude-based accounts, from Frické, Cevolani and D'Alfonso, also avoid the paradox without probabilities, while allowing false claims to carry information; Allo (2007) argues for pluralism about information.
Replies. Fetzer (2004) and Dodig-Crnkovic (2005) raised objections to Floridi's theory, and Sequoiah-Grayson (2007) defended it; Dinneen and Brauner (2015) find the veridicality thesis an obstacle to a single definition of information, while Mingers and Standing (2018) defend it.
Key philosophers and texts. Bar-Hillel and Rudolf Carnap (1952); Luciano Floridi on strongly semantic information; Fred Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information (1981), as a classic factive view.
Current status. The entry describes both Bar-Hillel and Carnap's position and Floridi's as not uncontroversial. Whether semantic information must be true remains disputed, and the paradox is the standard test case for any theory of semantic content.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 6.18 (Philosophy of Information) and bears on Coordinate 2.8 (Formal Epistemology).
See also the glossary entries Information, Informational theory of knowledge, Scandal of deduction and Liar paradox.
The questions it belongs to
- 6.18 Philosophy of InformationIs information something in the world, or something we bring to it?
- 2.8 Formal EpistemologyBy how much should this evidence move you?
Thinkers
To read
- Information: A Very Short Introduction — Luciano Floridi
- Knowledge and the Flow of Information — Fred Dretske
- The Fourth Revolution: How the Infosphere Is Reshaping Human Reality — Luciano Floridi
Sources and further reading
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 12 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 12). Bar-Hillel–Carnap paradox (Philosophy Glossary). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/bar-hillel-carnap-paradox/
MLA (9th edition)
“Bar-Hillel–Carnap paradox (Philosophy Glossary).” Coordinates of Thought, 12 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/bar-hillel-carnap-paradox/. Accessed [date accessed].
Chicago (17th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Bar-Hillel–Carnap paradox (Philosophy Glossary).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 12, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/bar-hillel-carnap-paradox/.
BibTeX
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author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Bar-Hillel–Carnap paradox (Philosophy Glossary)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/bar-hillel-carnap-paradox/},
note = {Source-checked 12 November 2026}
}RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Bar-Hillel–Carnap paradox (Philosophy Glossary) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/12 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/bar-hillel-carnap-paradox/ LA - en ER -
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