No-miracles argument
On this page
An argument for scientific realism: the predictive and explanatory success of our best theories would be a miracle unless those theories were at least approximately true.
Also: no miracles argument, miracle argument, ultimate argument for scientific realism
The argument at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- Question
- Does the predictive and explanatory success of science give us reason to believe that its theories, including what they say about unobservable entities, are approximately true? Provenance: 'no-miracles argument' and 'miracle argument' are later labels, taken from a remark by Hilary Putnam in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), p. 73 (page as cited by Chakravartty), rather than names for a single canonical argument. The reasoning was developed by several writers in different forms: Putnam's remark; Richard Boyd's abductive argument of the 1980s; and later elaborations and reconstructions, among which Chakravartty cites Boyd (1989) and Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (1999), chapter 4.
- In the text’s own form , Philosopher’s own formulation, as reported
- Putnam's 1975 remark is a single sentence, not a set of premises; Larry Laudan placed it, attributed to Putnam (1975), as the epigraph of his 1981 critique: "The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle." The numbered version above is this site's reconstruction following Chakravartty's exposition. Boyd's version, as Igor Douven's Stanford Encyclopedia entry on abduction summarises it, has a different shape: the reliability of scientific methodology is best explained by supposing that the background theories on which it relies are at least approximately true, and from this Boyd concludes that abduction is itself a reliable rule of inference (Boyd 1981, 1984, 1985).
- Reasons , COT reconstruction: the numbering is ours, not the philosopher's
-
Its structure can be set out as follows.
- Our best scientific theories are extraordinarily successful in prediction, retrodiction, explanation and the manipulation of nature.
- The best explanation of that success is that these theories are true or approximately true, describing a mind-independent world, including its unobservable parts.
- If they were not, their success would be a kind of miracle.
- We should prefer a straightforward explanation to a miraculous one.
- Therefore: we should believe that our best theories are approximately true. (the entry continues below)
- Intended conclusion
- In the Putnam form the conclusion is that belief in the approximate truth of our best theories is more reasonable than any anti-realist alternative, because only realism explains their success without appeal to coincidence. In Boyd's form there is a further conclusion about method, that inference to the best explanation is reliable, which is why critics have treated the defence of realism and the defence of abduction together.
Objections and replies
- Further discussion in the entry
-
Three objections dominate. First, Bas van Fraassen suggests that successful theories are like well-adapted organisms: they survive because they are successful, so their success needs no deeper explanation in terms of truth. Chakravartty leaves it open whether this evolutionary analogy is enough to dissolve the intuition behind the argument. Second, Colin Howson, Peter Lipton, and P. D. Magnus and Craig Callender argue that the argument commits the base-rate fallacy: a low chance that a false theory would succeed does not settle how probable truth is without knowing the base rate of approximately true theories among candidates, which cannot be independently estimated. John Worrall has replied that the charge rests on a misleading probabilistic formalisation. Third, the pessimistic meta-induction challenges premise (2) by pointing to successful theories later judged false.
- Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
-
A further objection concerns circularity. Douven reports that Laudan (1981) and Arthur Fine (1984) charged Boyd's argument with circularity: it rests on a premise that is itself supported by inference to the best explanation, the very form of inference the anti-realist questions.
- Replies
-
Psillos (1999, chapter 4), drawing on a distinction credited to Richard Braithwaite, replies that Boyd's argument is rule-circular rather than premise-circular: it employs abduction but does not assume its conclusion as a premise, and rule-circular arguments need not be vicious, provided, in Douven's quotation of Psillos, "that one should not have reason to doubt the reliability of the rule" (p. 85). Psillos also allows that the argument need not convert a critic; it justifies the rule from the perspective of someone already sympathetic to abduction (p. 89). Douven leaves open why this extra condition should be accepted and how many failures would make the reliability of abduction doubtful.
Coordinate 6.8.2Coordinate 6.8Hilary PutnamBas van FraassenLarry LaudanSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
Question. Does the predictive and explanatory success of science give us reason to believe that its theories, including what they say about unobservable entities, are approximately true? Provenance: 'no-miracles argument' and 'miracle argument' are later labels, taken from a remark by Hilary Putnam in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), p. 73 (page as cited by Chakravartty), rather than names for a single canonical argument. The reasoning was developed by several writers in different forms: Putnam's remark; Richard Boyd's abductive argument of the 1980s; and later elaborations and reconstructions, among which Chakravartty cites Boyd (1989) and Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (1999), chapter 4.
The no-miracles argument holds that the remarkable success of mature science is best explained by the approximate truth of the theories that produce it. In Anjan Chakravartty's Stanford Encyclopedia survey, the argument is credited to Hilary Putnam (1975), who claimed that realism "is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle"; Richard Boyd and others later elaborated it.
Its structure can be set out as follows. (1) Our best scientific theories are extraordinarily successful in prediction, retrodiction, explanation and the manipulation of nature. (2) The best explanation of that success is that these theories are true or approximately true, describing a mind-independent world, including its unobservable parts. (3) If they were not, their success would be a kind of miracle. (4) We should prefer a straightforward explanation to a miraculous one. Therefore (5) we should believe that our best theories are approximately true. Because the argument infers a hypothesis from the fact that it explains a phenomenon, it is itself an instance of inference to the best explanation, applied to science as a whole.
The reasoning in the text's own form. Putnam's 1975 remark is a single sentence, not a set of premises; Larry Laudan placed it, attributed to Putnam (1975), as the epigraph of his 1981 critique: "The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle." The numbered version above is this site's reconstruction following Chakravartty's exposition. Boyd's version, as Igor Douven's Stanford Encyclopedia entry on abduction summarises it, has a different shape: the reliability of scientific methodology is best explained by supposing that the background theories on which it relies are at least approximately true, and from this Boyd concludes that abduction is itself a reliable rule of inference (Boyd 1981, 1984, 1985).
Its purpose is to give realism a positive, quasi-empirical defence: realism is presented as the hypothesis that makes sense of the history of successful science.
Intended conclusion. In the Putnam form the conclusion is that belief in the approximate truth of our best theories is more reasonable than any anti-realist alternative, because only realism explains their success without appeal to coincidence. In Boyd's form there is a further conclusion about method, that inference to the best explanation is reliable, which is why critics have treated the defence of realism and the defence of abduction together.
Three objections dominate. First, Bas van Fraassen suggests that successful theories are like well-adapted organisms: they survive because they are successful, so their success needs no deeper explanation in terms of truth. Chakravartty leaves it open whether this evolutionary analogy is enough to dissolve the intuition behind the argument. Second, Colin Howson, Peter Lipton, and P. D. Magnus and Craig Callender argue that the argument commits the base-rate fallacy: a low chance that a false theory would succeed does not settle how probable truth is without knowing the base rate of approximately true theories among candidates, which cannot be independently estimated. John Worrall has replied that the charge rests on a misleading probabilistic formalisation. Third, the pessimistic meta-induction challenges premise (2) by pointing to successful theories later judged false.
Objections. A further objection concerns circularity. Douven reports that Laudan (1981) and Arthur Fine (1984) charged Boyd's argument with circularity: it rests on a premise that is itself supported by inference to the best explanation, the very form of inference the anti-realist questions.
Replies. Psillos (1999, chapter 4), drawing on a distinction credited to Richard Braithwaite, replies that Boyd's argument is rule-circular rather than premise-circular: it employs abduction but does not assume its conclusion as a premise, and rule-circular arguments need not be vicious, provided, in Douven's quotation of Psillos, "that one should not have reason to doubt the reliability of the rule" (p. 85). Psillos also allows that the argument need not convert a critic; it justifies the rule from the perspective of someone already sympathetic to abduction (p. 89). Douven leaves open why this extra condition should be accepted and how many failures would make the reliability of abduction doubtful.
Chakravartty describes the intuition behind the argument as the most powerful one motivating realism, but he also reports that the realism debate is often said to show every symptom of a perennial philosophical dispute. Realists answering the historical objections increasingly restrict their commitment to the parts of theories that are retained across theory change.
Key thinkers and texts. Hilary Putnam, Mathematics, Matter and Method (Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 73 (as cited by Chakravartty), and Meaning and the Moral Sciences (Routledge, 1978), where he raised the historical worry about reference taken up under Pessimistic meta-induction; Richard Boyd, 'Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology' (PSA 1980, volume II, 1981), 'The Current Status of Scientific Realism' (in J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism, 1984) and 'What Realism Implies and What it Does Not', Dialectica 43 (1989); Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (1980), p. 40; Larry Laudan, 'A Confutation of Convergent Realism' (1981); Arthur Fine, 'The Natural Ontological Attitude' (in Leplin (ed.) 1984); Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (1999), chapter 4; Colin Howson, Hume's Problem (2000), and P. D. Magnus and Craig Callender (2004) on the base-rate objection.
Current status. The argument remains contested on three separate fronts: whether the success of science needs a truth-based explanation at all, whether its probabilistic form survives the base-rate objection, and whether abduction can be defended without vicious circularity.
Coordinates. Because its central step is an inference to the best explanation applied to science as a whole, the argument also belongs with the general methodological questions of Coordinate 6.8 (Philosophy of Science).
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 6.8.2 (Scientific Realism).
See also the glossary entries Scientific realism, Abduction (inference to the best explanation), Pessimistic meta-induction, Problem of unconceived alternatives, Anti-realism and Underdetermination.
The questions it belongs to
- 6.8.2 Scientific RealismDo electrons exist, or do they just work?
- 6.8 Philosophy of ScienceWhat makes a claim scientific?
Thinkers
Traditions
To read
- Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth — Larry Laudan
- Reason, Truth and History — Hilary Putnam
- The Scientific Image — Bas C. van Fraassen
Sources and further reading
- Anjan Chakravartty, 'Scientific Realism', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 12 June 2017)
- Igor Douven, 'Abduction', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (first published 9 March 2011; substantive revision 18 June 2025)
- Larry Laudan, 'A Confutation of Convergent Realism', Philosophy of Science 48, no. 1 (March 1981), pp. 19-49 (Cambridge University Press journal record, DOI 10.1086/288975)
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 15 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 15). No-miracles argument (Arguments). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/no-miracles-argument/
MLA (9th edition)
“No-miracles argument (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought, 15 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/no-miracles-argument/. Accessed [date accessed].
Chicago (17th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. “No-miracles argument (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 15, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/no-miracles-argument/.
BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-no-miracles-argument-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {No-miracles argument (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/no-miracles-argument/},
note = {Source-checked 15 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - No-miracles argument (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/15 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/no-miracles-argument/ LA - en ER -
For reference managers (Zotero, Mendeley, EndNote): BibTeX file · RIS file