Leibniz's mill
On this page
Leibniz's argument, in Monadology section 17, that perception cannot be explained mechanically: walk through a thinking machine enlarged like a mill and you would find only parts pushing one another.
Also: Leibniz's mill argument
The argument at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- Question
- The question is whether perception, and what depends on it, can be explained by matter in motion.
- Reasons , Numbered as set out in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps
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The entry offers two readings. On the first, a visitor walking through the machine observes only parts and motions, and nothing observed explains perception. The second, a 'true unity' reconstruction, runs:
- materialism holds that matter can explain perception;
- perception is the representation of a manifold in a true unity, "the representation in the simple of the compound" in the Principles of Nature and Grace;
- nothing divisible is a true unity;
- matter is infinitely divisible;
- Therefore: matter cannot explain perception, and materialism is false. (the entry continues below)
Objections and replies
- Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
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Paul Lodge's paper in Ergo sets out the interpretive disputes. Read, with Duncan (2012), as an appeal to an intuition of inexplicability, the mill invites the worry that apparent inconceivability may reflect ignorance rather than impossibility; Leibniz himself wrote, in his Reply to Bayle, that "It is no proof of the impossibility of something merely to say that one cannot conceive this or that." Wilson (1999) locates the difficulty in the unity of perceptual consciousness; Lodge objects that Leibniz holds perception does not require apperception. An observational reading associated with Richard Rorty and Paul Churchland is set aside because its proponents give it no basis in the text.
- Replies
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Lodge partly defends the unity-of-perception reading he developed with Marc Bobro, citing section 16 of the Monadology, while conceding that their earlier case for it was overstated. He identifies a second strategy, in the letter to Sophie Charlotte and 'On the Souls of Men and Beasts': matter is purely passive, whereas perception is an active power.
Coordinate 1.3.1Coordinate 1.3.4G. W. LeibnizRichard RortyPaul ChurchlandJohn SearleThomas NagelFrank JacksonSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
Leibniz's mill is the argument in section 17 of G. W. Leibniz's Monadology (1714) that perception cannot be produced by any mechanism. In the Ariew and Garber translation quoted in the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Leibniz's philosophy of mind, perception is "inexplicable on mechanical principles": were a thinking machine enlarged so that one could enter it "just like into a windmill", one would find "only parts pushing one another", and so "it is in the simple substance, and not in the composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception."
The question is whether perception, and what depends on it, can be explained by matter in motion.
Structure. The entry offers two readings. On the first, a visitor walking through the machine observes only parts and motions, and nothing observed explains perception. The second, a 'true unity' reconstruction, runs: (1) materialism holds that matter can explain perception; (2) perception is the representation of a manifold in a true unity, "the representation in the simple of the compound" in the Principles of Nature and Grace; (3) nothing divisible is a true unity; (4) matter is infinitely divisible; therefore (5) matter cannot explain perception, and materialism is false. The entry stresses that Leibniz also rejects Cartesian dualism, so the conclusion is not a split between thinking and extended substance.
Objections. Paul Lodge's paper in Ergo sets out the interpretive disputes. Read, with Duncan (2012), as an appeal to an intuition of inexplicability, the mill invites the worry that apparent inconceivability may reflect ignorance rather than impossibility; Leibniz himself wrote, in his Reply to Bayle, that "It is no proof of the impossibility of something merely to say that one cannot conceive this or that." Wilson (1999) locates the difficulty in the unity of perceptual consciousness; Lodge objects that Leibniz holds perception does not require apperception. An observational reading associated with Richard Rorty and Paul Churchland is set aside because its proponents give it no basis in the text.
Replies. Lodge partly defends the unity-of-perception reading he developed with Marc Bobro, citing section 16 of the Monadology, while conceding that their earlier case for it was overstated. He identifies a second strategy, in the letter to Sophie Charlotte and 'On the Souls of Men and Beasts': matter is purely passive, whereas perception is an active power.
Status. Which reading is right remains disputed. The SEP entry notes that many contemporary philosophers, among them John Searle, Thomas Nagel, Colin McGinn and Frank Jackson, have objected to versions of materialism with thought experiments similar to Leibniz's; this is a comparison, not a claim of influence.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 1.3.1 (The Mind–Body Problem) and Coordinate 1.3.4 (Qualia and the Hard Problem).
See also the glossary entries Physicalism, Explanatory gap, Hard problem of consciousness, Knowledge argument, Chinese room argument and Divisibility argument.
The questions it belongs to
- 1.3.1 The Mind–Body ProblemHow can a thought move an arm?
- 1.3.4 Qualia and the Hard ProblemWhy isn't it all dark inside?
Thinkers
To read
- Discourse on Metaphysics — Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
- Matter and Consciousness — Paul M. Churchland
- Mind and Cosmos — Thomas Nagel
Sources and further reading
- Mark Kulstad and Laurence Carlin, 'Leibniz's Philosophy of Mind', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 29 June 2020)
- Paul Lodge, 'Leibniz's Mill Argument Against Mechanical Materialism Revisited', Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 1:3 (2014), DOI 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0001.003
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Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 12 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
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BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-leibnizs-mill-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Leibniz's mill (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/leibnizs-mill/},
note = {Source-checked 12 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Leibniz's mill (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/12 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/leibnizs-mill/ LA - en ER -
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