Isolation objection (coherentism)
On this page
The objection that, because coherence is a purely internal relation among beliefs, a coherent system could be wholly cut off from the world, so coherence gives no reason to think beliefs are true.
The argument at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- Reasons , Numbered as set out in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps
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- A coherence theory, in its basic form, makes justification a matter of relations among beliefs and assigns no essential role to experience.
- Such relations make no reference to the world outside the system.
- Therefore: there is little reason to think that a coherent system accurately reflects the external world. (the entry continues below)
- Intended conclusion
- Pure coherentism cannot explain why justified beliefs are likely to be true, and so fails as a theory of epistemic justification.
Objections and replies
- Replies
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Olsson reports that most influential coherentists answer by giving some beliefs close to experience a special status: C. I. Lewis's supposed facts asserted, Rescher's truth-candidates, Laurence BonJour's cognitively spontaneous beliefs and Thagard's principle of data priority. On this weak foundationalism, coherence cannot create credibility from nothing but can raise credibility that is already there. BonJour went further, arguing that the agreement of independent witnesses can generate justification without prior credibility. Susan Haack's foundherentism combines coherence with foundationalist elements, on the analogy of solving a crossword.
- Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
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Probabilistic work has made the replies precise and pressed them hard. Klein and Warfield (1994) argued that more coherent sets can be less probable, a conclusion Olsson considers premature in the light of Bovens and Olsson (2002). More seriously, impossibility results due to Bovens and Hartmann (2003) and Olsson (2005) show that, given independence and individual credibility, no measure of coherence is truth-conducive even other things being equal. Olsson argues that these results affect weak foundationalism too. Responses question the premises of the results: Huemer revised the independence condition, and others challenge the ceteris paribus conditions, at the risk of making coherence truth-conducive by definition.
Coordinate 2.3.1Coordinate 2.3C. I. LewisLaurence BonJourSusan HaackSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
The isolation objection asks how the mere fact that a system of beliefs hangs together could provide any guidance to truth and reality. Erik Olsson's Stanford Encyclopedia entry calls it "a serious objection that any coherence theory of justification must immediately face."
Structure. (1) A coherence theory, in its basic form, makes justification a matter of relations among beliefs and assigns no essential role to experience. (2) Such relations make no reference to the world outside the system. Therefore (3) there is little reason to think that a coherent system accurately reflects the external world. A variant, the alternative-systems objection, adds: (1) for any coherent system there could be other systems equally coherent but incompatible with it; (2) if coherence sufficed for justification, the beliefs in each would be justified for whoever held them; therefore (3) coherence cannot be indicative of truth.
Intended conclusion. Pure coherentism cannot explain why justified beliefs are likely to be true, and so fails as a theory of epistemic justification.
Replies. Olsson reports that most influential coherentists answer by giving some beliefs close to experience a special status: C. I. Lewis's supposed facts asserted, Rescher's truth-candidates, Laurence BonJour's cognitively spontaneous beliefs and Thagard's principle of data priority. On this weak foundationalism, coherence cannot create credibility from nothing but can raise credibility that is already there. BonJour went further, arguing that the agreement of independent witnesses can generate justification without prior credibility. Susan Haack's foundherentism combines coherence with foundationalist elements, on the analogy of solving a crossword.
Objections. Probabilistic work has made the replies precise and pressed them hard. Klein and Warfield (1994) argued that more coherent sets can be less probable, a conclusion Olsson considers premature in the light of Bovens and Olsson (2002). More seriously, impossibility results due to Bovens and Hartmann (2003) and Olsson (2005) show that, given independence and individual credibility, no measure of coherence is truth-conducive even other things being equal. Olsson argues that these results affect weak foundationalism too. Responses question the premises of the results: Huemer revised the independence condition, and others challenge the ceteris paribus conditions, at the risk of making coherence truth-conducive by definition.
Status. Olsson concludes that the coherence theory offers a suggestive picture of a web of belief but has struggled to supply the details; some results support weak foundationalism, while the impossibility results cast doubt even on that version. The debate continues.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 2.3.1 (Foundationalism vs Coherentism) and bears on Coordinate 2.3 (Structure of Justification).
See also the glossary entries Coherentism, Foundationalism, Regress problem, Coherence theory of truth, Justification and Bayesian epistemology.
The questions it belongs to
- 2.3.1 Foundationalism vs CoherentismIs knowledge a building or a raft?
- 2.3 Structure of JustificationWhy do you believe that? And why do you believe that?
Thinkers
Traditions
To read
- Symbolic Logic — C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford
- The Structure of Empirical Knowledge — Laurence BonJour
Sources and further reading
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 13 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 13). Isolation objection (coherentism) (Arguments). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/isolation-objection-coherentism/
MLA (9th edition)
“Isolation objection (coherentism) (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought, 13 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/isolation-objection-coherentism/. Accessed [date accessed].
Chicago (17th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Isolation objection (coherentism) (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 13, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/isolation-objection-coherentism/.
BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-isolation-objection-coherentism-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Isolation objection (coherentism) (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/isolation-objection-coherentism/},
note = {Source-checked 13 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Isolation objection (coherentism) (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/13 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/isolation-objection-coherentism/ LA - en ER -
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