Murderer at the door
On this page
Kant's case, from his reply to Benjamin Constant, of whether one may lie to a would-be murderer who asks where his intended victim is; the standard test of whether a duty-based ethics can treat truthfulness as exceptionless.
The problem at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- The reasoning that leads to it , Reconstruction by the scholar named in the entry
Kant's background test is the formula of universal law. In the Stanford Encyclopedia account by Robert Johnson and Adam Cureton, a maxim of making lying promises whenever this gets one what one wants cannot even be conceived as a universal law: in a world where everyone acted on it there would be no practice of giving one's word, yet the liar's plan depends on that practice. Failing this test yields a perfect duty, one that admits no exception in favour of inclination. In the essay itself, as Korsgaard and Varden reconstruct it, Kant reasons in three steps:
- lying is wrong whatever the circumstances;
- whoever lies makes himself answerable for what follows from the lie, even for consequences he did not foresee, whereas someone who tells the truth cannot be held accountable for what others then do; Kant imagines that the victim has slipped out unseen and meets the murderer because of the lie, so that the liar can be blamed as the cause of the death;
- Result: there is no right to lie, even to the murderer.
Objections and responses
- Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
Constant's objection, as Varden reports it, was that an unconditional duty of truthfulness would make society impossible, since people could not protect themselves against violent aggressors, and that truth is owed only to those who have a right to it, which a murderer does not. A second objection treats Kant's verdict as a reductio of his rigorism: Korsgaard notes that unsympathetic readers take Kant's conclusions as a defeat for his ethics, or for ethical rationalism generally.
- Replies
Korsgaard's defence, in Philosophy and Public Affairs (1986), argues first that the deceiver's maxim can survive the universal-law test: the murderer supposes that you do not know what circumstances you are in, so the lie would remain effective even if such lies were universally practised; in her words, the maxim "did not so much pass as evade universalization". Under the formula of humanity, however, every lie is wrong, because deception, like coercion, violates the conditions under which the other person could assent to what is done to him. Korsgaard therefore proposes a two-level Kantian theory, modelled on John Rawls's distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory: the formula of humanity and the kingdom of ends set the ideal, the formula of universal law sets an absolute floor, and in the face of evil the ideal becomes a goal rather than a rule to live by. She draws on Bernard Williams's criticism of consequentialism to argue that this keeps integrity intact and leaves room for regret, and concludes that the case does not impugn Kant's ethics as an ideal system but shows the need for special principles for dealing with evil. Varden, in the Journal of Social Philosophy (2010), argues instead that the essay has been misread as a claim about the ethics of maxims: it belongs to Kant's Doctrine of Right, which concerns external freedom and what a public court may hold against us. On her reading the murderer is not wronged, having no right to the truth, but lying remains wrong in general because it undermines the trust on which rightful interaction depends, and the liar who acts unilaterally becomes legally answerable for the outcome; she extends the analysis to lies told to Nazi officers, who represented no legitimate public authority. Varden also notes juridical readings by Jacob Weinrib, a self-defence approach by David Sussman, and Allen Wood's treatment of lying from the standpoints of both right and virtue.
Coordinate 3.2.2Coordinate 3.2Immanuel KantChristine KorsgaardJohn RawlsBernard WilliamsSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
The murderer at the door is the case Immanuel Kant discusses in a late essay replying to Benjamin Constant, whose title Helga Varden renders 'On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy' and Christine Korsgaard 'On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives'. A would-be murderer asks whether the person he means to kill is in your house. May you lie to him? The question is whether a duty-based ethics can hold a duty such as truthfulness to be without exception, even when keeping it seems to help a killer.
The reasoning. Kant's background test is the formula of universal law. In the Stanford Encyclopedia account by Robert Johnson and Adam Cureton, a maxim of making lying promises whenever this gets one what one wants cannot even be conceived as a universal law: in a world where everyone acted on it there would be no practice of giving one's word, yet the liar's plan depends on that practice. Failing this test yields a perfect duty, one that admits no exception in favour of inclination. In the essay itself, as Korsgaard and Varden reconstruct it, Kant reasons in three steps: (1) lying is wrong whatever the circumstances; (2) whoever lies makes himself answerable for what follows from the lie, even for consequences he did not foresee, whereas someone who tells the truth cannot be held accountable for what others then do; Kant imagines that the victim has slipped out unseen and meets the murderer because of the lie, so that the liar can be blamed as the cause of the death; therefore (3) there is no right to lie, even to the murderer.
Objections. Constant's objection, as Varden reports it, was that an unconditional duty of truthfulness would make society impossible, since people could not protect themselves against violent aggressors, and that truth is owed only to those who have a right to it, which a murderer does not. A second objection treats Kant's verdict as a reductio of his rigorism: Korsgaard notes that unsympathetic readers take Kant's conclusions as a defeat for his ethics, or for ethical rationalism generally.
Replies. Korsgaard's defence, in Philosophy and Public Affairs (1986), argues first that the deceiver's maxim can survive the universal-law test: the murderer supposes that you do not know what circumstances you are in, so the lie would remain effective even if such lies were universally practised; in her words, the maxim "did not so much pass as evade universalization". Under the formula of humanity, however, every lie is wrong, because deception, like coercion, violates the conditions under which the other person could assent to what is done to him. Korsgaard therefore proposes a two-level Kantian theory, modelled on John Rawls's distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory: the formula of humanity and the kingdom of ends set the ideal, the formula of universal law sets an absolute floor, and in the face of evil the ideal becomes a goal rather than a rule to live by. She draws on Bernard Williams's criticism of consequentialism to argue that this keeps integrity intact and leaves room for regret, and concludes that the case does not impugn Kant's ethics as an ideal system but shows the need for special principles for dealing with evil. Varden, in the Journal of Social Philosophy (2010), argues instead that the essay has been misread as a claim about the ethics of maxims: it belongs to Kant's Doctrine of Right, which concerns external freedom and what a public court may hold against us. On her reading the murderer is not wronged, having no right to the truth, but lying remains wrong in general because it undermines the trust on which rightful interaction depends, and the liar who acts unilaterally becomes legally answerable for the outcome; she extends the analysis to lies told to Nazi officers, who represented no legitimate public authority. Varden also notes juridical readings by Jacob Weinrib, a self-defence approach by David Sussman, and Allen Wood's treatment of lying from the standpoints of both right and virtue.
Current status. There is no settled interpretation. Readers divide over whether the essay states a moral or a juridical claim, whether the universal-law test really condemns the lie, and whether Kantian ethics needs separate principles for non-ideal conditions. The case remains a standard test for any deontology that recognises exceptionless duties.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 3.2.2 (Duty-Based Approaches), within Coordinate 3.2 (Normative Ethics).
See also the glossary entries Categorical imperative, Deontology, Moral absolutism, Moral dilemma, Moral residue and Integrity objection.
The questions it belongs to
- 3.2.2 Duty-Based ApproachesAre some things wrong even when they would do good?
- 3.2 Normative EthicsWhat should I look at to tell whether an act is right?
Thinkers
Traditions
To read
- A Theory of Justice — John Rawls
- An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? — Immanuel Kant
- Critique of Practical Reason — Immanuel Kant
Sources and further reading
- Christine M. Korsgaard, 'The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil', Philosophy and Public Affairs 15, no. 4 (1986), 325-349 (Harvard DASH open-access copy)
- Helga Varden, 'Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door . . . One More Time: Kant's Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis', Journal of Social Philosophy 41, no. 4 (Winter 2010), 403-421 (PhilArchive copy)
- Robert Johnson and Adam Cureton, 'Kant's Moral Philosophy', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 2 October 2025)
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BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-murderer-at-the-door-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Murderer at the door (Philosophy Glossary)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/murderer-at-the-door/},
note = {Source-checked 14 November 2026}
}RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Murderer at the door (Philosophy Glossary) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/14 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/murderer-at-the-door/ LA - en ER -
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