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Rigid designation

Updated 19 November 2026

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  1. The argument at a glance
  2. What it means
  3. The questions it belongs to
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  5. Traditions
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  7. Sources and further reading
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The property of a term that designates the same object in every possible world in which that object exists, and nothing else, as proper names do according to Saul Kripke, unlike most descriptions.

Also: rigid designator, rigidity

The argument at a glance

A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.

Question
Do proper names, and perhaps some other terms, pick out the same thing whenever we consider how the world might have been, and if so what follows for the relation between necessity, which concerns how things could have been, and a priority, which concerns how things can be known? The argument considered here uses rigidity to separate the two notions, chiefly through the necessary a posteriori.
Reasons , COT reconstruction: the numbering is ours, not the philosopher's

(COT's reconstruction, following the Stanford entries by LaPorte and Ballarin)

  1. Everything is necessarily identical with itself.
  2. If x is y, whatever is true of x is true of y (Leibniz's Law); so if x is y, y too is necessarily identical with x, and identities between objects hold necessarily.
  3. 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are rigid: each designates the planet Venus in every possible world in which Venus exists and designates nothing else.
  4. So 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', being true, could not have been false.
  5. That Hesperus is Phosphorus could not be known by reflection alone; it was established by observation.
  6. Therefore: some truths are necessary yet knowable only a posteriori, and necessity and a priority are distinct notions. (the entry continues below)
Intended conclusion
The traditional assumption that the necessary and the a priori coincide is false: necessity concerns how things could have been, a priority how they can be known, and rigidity shows how the two can come apart. Kripke used the same pattern for identities involving natural kinds and against the mind–brain identity theory, which COT treats in separate records.
Objections and replies
Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported

Two-dimensionalists deny that a single content is both necessary and a posteriori. In Laura Schroeter's summary of the rationalist version developed by David Chalmers, "'Hesperus = Phosphorus' is aposteriori because we associate distinct reference-fixing criteria with the two names": one intension tracks a priority and another reflects the modal profile of the object, so necessity and a posteriori status belong to different aspects of meaning. Frank Jackson defends a related framework, while Robert Stalnaker is, in Schroeter's words, "a vocal critic of generalized 2D semantics". Allan Gibbard's case of a statue and the lump of clay that composes it (Goliath and Lumpl in Ben Curtis and Harold Noonan's Stanford entry on identity; LaPorte calls the statue David) challenges the claim that all true identities between rigid names are necessary; in LaPorte's report Gibbard gives up the thesis that the two names are rigid in the usual respect and holds that designators are rigid only with respect to a sortal. Descriptivists deny that rigidity favours a referential view of names: Michael Dummett proposed that names take wide scope over modal operators, and Dummett and Jason Stanley argued that a name and a description can share assertoric content while differing in modal behaviour. On general terms, LaPorte reports that Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language, 2010) counts 'green' as a singular term and '… is green' as predicative. The contingent a priori examples are also contested: LaPorte notes that many dispute whether they really are examples of the contingent a priori, among them Keith Donnellan ('The Contingent A Priori and Rigid Designators', 1977).

Replies

Kripke answered the wide-scope proposal (Naming and Necessity, pp. 11–15, as LaPorte cites the passage) by pointing to unembedded sentences and to names inside modal operators that the proposal handles badly. Against generalised two-dimensionalism, Stalnaker offers a metasemantic reading on which only the ordinary intension is a meaning (see Two-dimensional semantics). On rigid general terms, LaPorte reports that Linsky accepts the resulting commitment to abstract kinds or properties, while Martí tries to accommodate nominalism, and he notes that most writers reject a rigid/nonrigid distinction for purely predicative expressions.

Coordinate 6.10.1Coordinate 1.6Coordinate 1.6.1Coordinate 2.2.2Coordinate 6.10Saul KripkeHilary PutnamDavid LewisAlvin PlantingaMichael DummettDavid ChalmersFrank JacksonScott SoamesSources and primary textsRead the full entry

What it means

The question. Do proper names, and perhaps some other terms, pick out the same thing whenever we consider how the world might have been, and if so what follows for the relation between necessity, which concerns how things could have been, and a priority, which concerns how things can be known? The argument considered here uses rigidity to separate the two notions, chiefly through the necessary a posteriori.

Provenance. The notion and the argument originated with Saul Kripke, in 'Identity and Necessity' (1971) and in the lectures published as Naming and Necessity (1972; book edition 1980). Joseph LaPorte quotes Kripke's definition from the 1971 paper: a rigid designator designates its object "in any possible world where the object in question does exist" (Kripke 1971: 146, as quoted by LaPorte; italics omitted). The necessity of identity, on which the argument relies, has an earlier history. Roberta Ballarin's Stanford entry on Ruth Barcan Marcus places a proof in Barcan's 'The Identity of Individuals in a Strict Functional Calculus of Second Order' (Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1947) and says that Barcan's and Kripke's proofs "have a similar structure", though Kripke starts from primitive identity, which implies indiscernibility by Leibniz's Law, and states his proof in terms of necessary statements rather than properties. Ballarin also records a "bitter controversy" in the 1990s (she cites Holt 1996, Humphreys and Fetzer 1998 and Neale 2001) over whether Marcus had already proposed, in 1961, the referential theory of ordinary proper names later associated with Kripke. Her answer is "neither an unqualified yes nor a simple no": Marcus then treated names as ideal Russellian tags while showing awareness of ordinary language. The numbered steps below are COT's reconstruction.

Saul Kripke coined the term (LaPorte cites Naming and Necessity, 1980). Joseph LaPorte's Stanford Encyclopedia entry explains that a rigid designator designates the same object in every possible world where that object exists and never designates anything else. 'Hesperus' is rigid; 'the brightest non-lunar object in the evening sky' is not, since something else could have been brightest. That is why 'Hesperus is the brightest non-lunar object in the evening sky' is true but contingent. Kripke's own formulation concerns only the worlds in which the object exists; Nathan Salmon's term 'obstinate rigidity' is used for the stronger notion of designating the object in every world, including those where it does not exist. One remark of Kripke's hints that the stronger notion might be advantageous, but he never argues for either.

The text's own reasoning. In Ballarin's summary of the shared structure of the proofs, identity between x and y implies that they are indiscernible; one property of x is being necessarily identical to x; so y has that property too, and if x is y then necessarily x is y. Kripke's contribution is to connect this fact about objects with sentences. When an identity is stated with two rigid names, each name picks out the same object in every relevant world, so the sentence cannot be false at any of them; when it is stated with a non-rigid description, it can be contingent. The distinction between how an identity is known and whether it could have failed then becomes the distinction between its epistemic and its modal status.

Rigidity has striking consequences. If 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are both rigid and co-refer, 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is necessary, though it was discovered by astronomy: a necessary a posteriori truth. Kripke and Hilary Putnam extended similar reasoning to natural kind terms, so that 'water is H2O' would be necessary if true. Kripke's metre-stick case suggests the converse possibility of a contingent a priori truth. Descriptions can be rigid too: 'the successor of 2' rigidly designates 3 as a matter of fact (de facto), while a description indexed to a particular world is rigid by its form (de jure). Rigidity figures in Kripke's arguments against descriptivism about names, though LaPorte notes that rigidity is compatible with some forms of descriptivism, and in his argument against the mind–brain identity theory: if 'pain' and 'C-fibre firing' are both rigid, their identity would have to be necessary if true at all.

Structure. (COT's reconstruction, following the Stanford entries by LaPorte and Ballarin) (1) Everything is necessarily identical with itself. (2) If x is y, whatever is true of x is true of y (Leibniz's Law); so if x is y, y too is necessarily identical with x, and identities between objects hold necessarily. (3) 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are rigid: each designates the planet Venus in every possible world in which Venus exists and designates nothing else. (4) So 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', being true, could not have been false. (5) That Hesperus is Phosphorus could not be known by reflection alone; it was established by observation. Therefore (6) some truths are necessary yet knowable only a posteriori, and necessity and a priority are distinct notions. Steps (1) and (2) belong to the logic of identity, step (3) is the semantic premise that carries the conclusion from objects to sentences, and step (5) is epistemic. The metre-stick case runs the parallel reasoning from reference-fixing in the other direction, towards the contingent a priori.

Intended conclusion. The traditional assumption that the necessary and the a priori coincide is false: necessity concerns how things could have been, a priority how they can be known, and rigidity shows how the two can come apart. Kripke used the same pattern for identities involving natural kinds and against the mind–brain identity theory, which COT treats in separate records.

Disputes include whether general terms can be rigid without the notion becoming trivial (if 'water' rigidly designates a kind, so it seems does 'soda pop'), whether the claim that rigidity yields necessary a posteriori propositions survives the Millian view that sentences differing only in co-referring names express the same proposition, and David Lewis's counterpart theory, on which modal claims about an individual concern sufficiently similar counterparts in other worlds; Alvin Plantinga objected that the counterpart theorist rejects what ordinary speakers say and conceals that disagreement.

Objections. Two-dimensionalists deny that a single content is both necessary and a posteriori. In Laura Schroeter's summary of the rationalist version developed by David Chalmers, "'Hesperus = Phosphorus' is aposteriori because we associate distinct reference-fixing criteria with the two names": one intension tracks a priority and another reflects the modal profile of the object, so necessity and a posteriori status belong to different aspects of meaning. Frank Jackson defends a related framework, while Robert Stalnaker is, in Schroeter's words, "a vocal critic of generalized 2D semantics". Allan Gibbard's case of a statue and the lump of clay that composes it (Goliath and Lumpl in Ben Curtis and Harold Noonan's Stanford entry on identity; LaPorte calls the statue David) challenges the claim that all true identities between rigid names are necessary; in LaPorte's report Gibbard gives up the thesis that the two names are rigid in the usual respect and holds that designators are rigid only with respect to a sortal. Descriptivists deny that rigidity favours a referential view of names: Michael Dummett proposed that names take wide scope over modal operators, and Dummett and Jason Stanley argued that a name and a description can share assertoric content while differing in modal behaviour. On general terms, LaPorte reports that Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language, 2010) counts 'green' as a singular term and '… is green' as predicative. The contingent a priori examples are also contested: LaPorte notes that many dispute whether they really are examples of the contingent a priori, among them Keith Donnellan ('The Contingent A Priori and Rigid Designators', 1977).

Replies. Kripke answered the wide-scope proposal (Naming and Necessity, pp. 11–15, as LaPorte cites the passage) by pointing to unembedded sentences and to names inside modal operators that the proposal handles badly. Against generalised two-dimensionalism, Stalnaker offers a metasemantic reading on which only the ordinary intension is a meaning (see Two-dimensional semantics). On rigid general terms, LaPorte reports that Linsky accepts the resulting commitment to abstract kinds or properties, while Martí tries to accommodate nominalism, and he notes that most writers reject a rigid/nonrigid distinction for purely predicative expressions.

Key thinkers and texts. Saul Kripke, 'Identity and Necessity' (1971) and Naming and Necessity (1972/1980); Ruth Barcan Marcus (as Ruth C. Barcan), 'The Identity of Individuals in a Strict Functional Calculus of Second Order' (1947); Allan Gibbard on contingent identity; Michael Dummett on wide-scope descriptivism; David Chalmers and Frank Jackson on two-dimensional semantics, with Robert Stalnaker as critic; Scott Soames on general terms (Philosophy of Language, 2010); Joseph LaPorte's Stanford entry 'Rigid Designators'.

Current status. LaPorte quotes Christopher Hughes (2004) calling the rigidity of names "as close to uncontroversial as any interesting views in analytic philosophy", notes that counterpart theorists are motivated by objections to some of the necessity that rigidity secures, and judges that the objections "do not seem to have done much to damage the widespread appeal of rigidity". What remains disputed is less whether names are rigid than what rigidity shows: whether the necessary a posteriori involves one content or two, whether the contingent a priori examples are genuine, and whether rigidity extends to general terms without trivialisation. Curtis and Noonan add that whether cases of contingent identity are persuasive remains "a matter of considerable controversy".

Further connections on this site. The argument bears on Coordinate 2.2.2 (Reason and Intuition), since it separates what can be known by reason alone from what is necessary, and it sits within 6.10 (Philosophy of Language). Kripke's use of rigidity against the mind–brain identity theory has its own record, Kripke's modal argument against the identity theory; his objections to descriptivism about names are set out in Descriptive theory of names and Causal theory of reference; Millianism and Two-dimensional semantics give the main rival frameworks.

On this site it belongs to Coordinate 6.10.1 (Reference) and bears on 1.6 (Modality) and 1.6.1 (Possible Worlds).

See also the glossary entries Reference, Possible worlds, Necessity, A posteriori, Natural kinds, Identity and Modal logic.

The questions it belongs to

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Sources and further reading

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Checked against the sources above on 15 November 2026. Not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. How we write and check.

Cite this page

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 15 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.

APA (7th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 15). Rigid designation (Arguments). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/rigid-designation/

MLA (9th edition)

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Chicago (17th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Rigid designation (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 15, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/rigid-designation/.

BibTeX

@misc{cot-glossary-rigid-designation-2026,
  author       = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
  title        = {Rigid designation (Arguments)},
  howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = nov,
  url          = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/rigid-designation/},
  note         = {Source-checked 15 November 2026}
}

RIS

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LA  - en
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