Kasb (acquisition)
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The Ashʿarite doctrine that God creates every human act together with a temporary created power for it, which the human being 'acquires'; it was meant to keep divine omnipotence while leaving room for responsibility.
Also: kasb, iktisāb, iktisab, acquisition (kalām), theory of acquisition
The argument at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- Reasons , COT reconstruction: the numbering is ours, not the philosopher's
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(COT's reconstruction from the Lumaʿ as reported by Bin Hussain, Abrahamov and Thiele).
- Whatever occurs in God's dominion is willed and created by God, otherwise God would be weak or neglectful.
- Human acts occur in God's dominion, and often not as their agents intend them; so their real producer is God, not the human agent.
- Some human motions are necessary (trembling), others are not (walking, coming and going), and human beings perceive this difference in themselves.
- The difference cannot lie in who creates the motion, since the proofs of createdness apply to both kinds alike.
- It lies instead in a created power, distinct from the agent and present with the act, through which the agent performs the non-necessary act; to have an act occur through such a power is to acquire it.
- God creates acts but cannot be their acquirer, since God does not act through a created power.
- Therefore: acquired acts are created by God and are at the same time the acts of the human beings who acquire them, and it is to acquired acts, not to necessary ones, that command, prohibition, reward and punishment attach.
- Intended conclusion
- Divine omnipotence is not limited by any human creative power, yet the line between what a person does and what merely happens to him is kept, so that the moral and legal order of command and prohibition has a proper object.
Objections and replies
- Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
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The Muʿtazilite objection, as Thiele reports it, is that the Ashʿarite theory of action makes nonsense of morality: God would reward and punish human beings for what is actually divinely created, which would be unjust. A second Muʿtazilite line concerns the ability to do otherwise. Thiele notes that the Baṣran Muʿtazila, whose theory of the act is expounded by Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, identified freedom of action with a power over alternatives; al-Ashʿarī's created power, by contrast, exists only with the act and, in Thiele's words, "human power only relates to a single act". On this basis Thiele concludes that "for al-Ašʿarī we can act voluntarily without having freedom of action", so that responsibility rests on voluntariness rather than on a two-way power. Al-Ashʿarī himself records an objection from symmetry: if necessary motion is created and acquired motion is also created, either both should be necessary or both acquired; Bin Hussain gives his answer that the two differ with respect to necessity and acquisition.
- Replies
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Within the Ashʿarite school the doctrine was reworked rather than abandoned. Thiele argues that Al-Bāqillānī replaced al-Ashʿarī's mere conjunction between human power and act with a correlation: the act comes to have an attribute on account of the agent's created power, so that, as Thiele summarises him, a human being cannot be praised or blamed for the existence of his acts, and God's command and prohibition relate instead to an attribute of acts caused by human power. Thiele adds that Al-Juwayni formulated a similar position in his Irshād but denied that this correlation implies any effect of human power on acquired acts. Al-Ghazali's defence of acquisition as a middle way, described above, belongs to this later development.
Coordinate 1.7Coordinate 1.4.2Coordinate 6.24Al-Ash'ariAl-GhazaliAl-JuwayniQāḍī ʿAbd al-JabbārAl-BāqillānīSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
Kind of record. Kasb is a theological doctrine, the Ashʿarite account of human action, rather than a single argument; the arguments offered for it and the objections raised against it are set out below.
Kasb, usually translated 'acquisition', is the name that Al-Ash'ari (al-Ashʿarī) and his followers gave to the kind of power God creates in human beings when they act. In Kara Richardson's account in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, this power is temporary, it is created for one specific action, and its link to that action is not causal: God creates both the power and the act, and the agent is said to acquire the act rather than to bring it about.
The doctrine answers a problem set by two commitments of Ashʿarite kalām. The first is that God's creative power is all-pervasive, and the SEP describes Ashʿarite theologians as broadly endorsing occasionalism, the view that God is the only true cause. The second is that people are rightly praised, blamed, rewarded and punished. Kasb tries to mark the difference between an act that is mine and an event that merely happens in my body without making me a second creator beside God.
Provenance. The doctrine is reformulated rather than originated by al-Ashʿarī: Jan Thiele (2016) reports that the term 'acquisition' had already been used by Ḍirār b. ʿAmr, who appears to have introduced it into the technical vocabulary, and by al-Najjār before him, and Binyamin Abrahamov (1989) describes al-Ashʿarī as developing the theory under al-Najjār's influence. The argument structured below is al-Ashʿarī's own reasoning in Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, the work translated by Richard J. McCarthy in The Theology of al-Ashʿarī (1953). It is reported here through specialist scholarship (Abrahamov 1989; Mohammed Yusoff Bin Hussain's Glasgow MLitt thesis of 1979; Thiele 2016), not from a fresh reading of the Arabic. The numbering below is COT's reconstruction, and 'compatibilism' is a modern label applied to the doctrine by later interpreters, not al-Ashʿarī's term.
The main rival positions show the shape of the debate. Muʿtazilite theologians held that human beings produce some accidents directly and others by 'generation' (tawallud), producing the cause of the accident; on their view, the SEP explains, I must be the source of my acts, and generation was not meant to involve responsibility shared between God and the human agent. At the other extreme, determinists denied that created things have power. Al-Ghazali presents acquisition as a middle way between these: against the determinists he points to the evident difference between a deliberate movement and an involuntary tremor, and against the Muʿtazila he appeals to the pervasiveness of divine power.
The text's own reasoning. The order of the arguments that follows is the order in which Bin Hussain reports them (his pp. 64-79 and 117-122), and the Lumaʿ page references are as cited by Bin Hussain. As Bin Hussain reports, al-Ashʿarī argues first from divine will (Lumaʿ pp. 33-35, as cited by Bin Hussain): nothing can occur in God's dominion that God does not will, since an unwilled event would imply neglect or weakness in God, and the same holds for the act of any other agent. He then argues, in Bin Hussain's account, from the gap between intention and result (Lumaʿ p. 55, as cited by Bin Hussain): the unbeliever may intend his unbelief to be good and true, but it turns out bad and false, contrary to his intention, so the one who makes an act exist as it really is must be someone who intends it as it really is, and that can only be God. God is therefore the creator of the act; but God is not its acquirer, because, in Bin Hussain's account (Lumaʿ pp. 57-58, as cited by Bin Hussain), God cannot be powerful through a created power, whereas the human being acts through one. As Bin Hussain reports, the Muʿtazila had allowed that compulsory motions are created by God while voluntary ones are produced by human beings, and al-Ashʿarī replies (Lumaʿ pp. 58-59, as cited by Bin Hussain) that the proofs of createdness apply equally to both, and that the two still differ, since one is necessary, a constraint one cannot escape, such as the trembling of palsy or fever, while the other, such as coming and going, is acquired. Finally, in the order Bin Hussain reports, he argues that the capacity for acting is not the agent himself (Lumaʿ p. 76, as cited by Bin Hussain), since one and the same person is sometimes capable and sometimes not; in McCarthy's translation, as quoted by Abrahamov (Lumaʿ par. 122), "Therefore he must be capable in virtue of something distinct from him." Bin Hussain reports his further arguments (Lumaʿ pp. 77-78, as cited by Bin Hussain) that this created capacity exists with the act, not before it, and that it does not extend to the contrary act.
Structure. (COT's reconstruction from the Lumaʿ as reported by Bin Hussain, Abrahamov and Thiele). (1) Whatever occurs in God's dominion is willed and created by God, otherwise God would be weak or neglectful. (2) Human acts occur in God's dominion, and often not as their agents intend them; so their real producer is God, not the human agent. (3) Some human motions are necessary (trembling), others are not (walking, coming and going), and human beings perceive this difference in themselves. (4) The difference cannot lie in who creates the motion, since the proofs of createdness apply to both kinds alike. (5) It lies instead in a created power, distinct from the agent and present with the act, through which the agent performs the non-necessary act; to have an act occur through such a power is to acquire it. (6) God creates acts but cannot be their acquirer, since God does not act through a created power. Therefore (7) acquired acts are created by God and are at the same time the acts of the human beings who acquire them, and it is to acquired acts, not to necessary ones, that command, prohibition, reward and punishment attach.
Intended conclusion. Divine omnipotence is not limited by any human creative power, yet the line between what a person does and what merely happens to him is kept, so that the moral and legal order of command and prohibition has a proper object.
Objections. The Muʿtazilite objection, as Thiele reports it, is that the Ashʿarite theory of action makes nonsense of morality: God would reward and punish human beings for what is actually divinely created, which would be unjust. A second Muʿtazilite line concerns the ability to do otherwise. Thiele notes that the Baṣran Muʿtazila, whose theory of the act is expounded by Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, identified freedom of action with a power over alternatives; al-Ashʿarī's created power, by contrast, exists only with the act and, in Thiele's words, "human power only relates to a single act". On this basis Thiele concludes that "for al-Ašʿarī we can act voluntarily without having freedom of action", so that responsibility rests on voluntariness rather than on a two-way power. Al-Ashʿarī himself records an objection from symmetry: if necessary motion is created and acquired motion is also created, either both should be necessary or both acquired; Bin Hussain gives his answer that the two differ with respect to necessity and acquisition.
A natural question about the doctrine is what acquiring an act adds if the acquired power is itself created and has no effect on the act; the SEP also records that some interpreters take al-Ashʿarī's claim that human beings are the subjects of temporary powers for specific actions to show that his position falls short of full-blown occasionalism. The SEP entry sets out the Ashʿarite form of the doctrine; it does not discuss how the Māturīdī school treated acquisition, so this entry should not be read as describing a single view shared by all kalām schools. The doctrine therefore sits at the centre of Islamic discussions of free will, compatibilism and divine causation. The SEP adds that, relayed by al-Ghazali, Ashʿarite accounts of causation contributed to the development of occasionalist doctrines in medieval and early modern Europe.
Replies. Within the Ashʿarite school the doctrine was reworked rather than abandoned. Thiele argues that Al-Bāqillānī replaced al-Ashʿarī's mere conjunction between human power and act with a correlation: the act comes to have an attribute on account of the agent's created power, so that, as Thiele summarises him, a human being cannot be praised or blamed for the existence of his acts, and God's command and prohibition relate instead to an attribute of acts caused by human power. Thiele adds that Al-Juwayni formulated a similar position in his Irshād but denied that this correlation implies any effect of human power on acquired acts. Al-Ghazali's defence of acquisition as a middle way, described above, belongs to this later development.
Key thinkers and texts. Al-Ash'ari, Kitāb al-Lumaʿ (in the Book corner as The Theology of al-Ashʿarī (Kitāb al-Lumaʿ), McCarthy's translation); al-Bāqillānī; Al-Juwayni, Kitāb al-Irshād (in the Book corner as A Guide to Conclusive Proofs for the Principles of Belief (Kitāb al-Irshād)); Al-Ghazali, whose defence of acquisition as a middle way is described above; Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār for the Baṣran Muʿtazilite theory of the act. Modern studies: Richard M. Frank (1966), Abrahamov (1989), Thiele (2016) and Zeyneb Betul Taskin (2023).
Current status. Whether al-Ashʿarī's created power has any causal role is disputed. Richard Frank's 1966 reading, cited in the Stanford entry, takes his position to fall short of full occasionalism. Taskin (2023), according to her abstract, argues against Frank's reading, drawing on Abrahamov's view that the Lumaʿ supports an occasionalist interpretation, and defends an occasionalist reading of kasb in the Lumaʿ, holding that the relation between created power and acquisition can be a conditional one rather than a causal one. Thiele's reading, that al-Ashʿarī grounds responsibility in voluntariness without a power to do otherwise, makes the doctrine a natural point of comparison with modern compatibilist accounts, but comparison is not identity: the problem it answers is set by divine creation, not by natural determinism. Later developments by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi and the critiques of Ibn Rushd and Ibn Taymiyya are not described in this entry. Kasb should be kept distinct from two neighbouring glossary entries: Qadar (divine decree), God's determining of events, which gave its name to the early debate over human freedom and responsibility; and Predestination, the doctrine of God's eternal choice of who will be saved. Kasb is not a thesis about what God has decreed but an account of how an act that God creates can still be the agent's own and so the object of command, praise and blame. The doctrine also bears on Coordinate 6.24 (Philosophy of Action).
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 1.7 (Free Will and Determinism) and Coordinate 1.4.2 (Causation).
See also the glossary entries Ashʿarism, Muʿtazila, Occasionalism, Kalām, Free will, Compatibilism and Divine foreknowledge and free will.
The questions it belongs to
- 1.7 Free Will and DeterminismCould you have done otherwise?
- 1.4.2 CausationWhat do you actually see when you see one thing cause another?
- 6.24 Philosophy of ActionWhat is the difference between your arm rising and your raising it?
Thinkers
Traditions
To read
- A Guide to Conclusive Proofs for the Principles of Belief (Kitāb al-Irshād) — Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī; translated by Paul E. Walker
- Deliverance from Error — Al-Ghazali
- Moderation in Belief (al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād) — Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī; translated by Aladdin M. Yaqub
Sources and further reading
- Kara Richardson, 'Causation in Arabic and Islamic Thought', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 15 August 2025)
- Jan Thiele, 'Conceptions of Self-Determination in Fourth/Tenth-Century Muslim Theology: al-Bāqillānī's Theory of Human Acts in its Historical Context', Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 26, no. 2 (2016), pp. 245-269, doi:10.1017/S0957423916000035 (Cambridge Core)
- Binyamin Abrahamov, 'A Re-examination of al-Ashʿarī's Theory of Kasb according to Kitāb al-Lumaʿ', Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 121, no. 2 (1989), pp. 210-221, doi:10.1017/S0035869X00109219 (Cambridge Core record; abstract and footnotes)
- Mohammed Yusoff Bin Hussain, Al-Ashʿari's Discussion of the Philosophical Problem of Free Will and Predestination, MLitt thesis, University of Glasgow, 1979 (Enlighten: Theses repository)
- Zeyneb Betul Taskin, 'An Occasionalist Reading of al-Ashʿarī's Theory of Kasb in Kitāb al-Lumaʿ', The Muslim World 113, no. 4 (2023), pp. 399-415, doi:10.1111/muwo.12478 (abstract, IxTheo/RelBib record)
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BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-kasb-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Kasb (acquisition) (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/kasb/},
note = {Source-checked 20 November 2026}
}
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TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Kasb (acquisition) (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/20 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/kasb/ LA - en ER -
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