Argument from inductive risk
On this page
Richard Rudner's argument that because accepting a hypothesis always risks error, and how much evidence is enough depends on how bad an error would be, scientists as scientists must make value judgements.
Also: inductive risk argument
What it means
The argument from inductive risk addresses the question whether scientists, in their capacity as scientists, must make ethical or social value judgements. Its classic statement is Richard Rudner's 1953 paper 'The Scientist qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments', which Julian Reiss and Jan Sprenger's Stanford Encyclopedia entry on scientific objectivity presents as the main challenge to the value-free ideal.
In outline: (1) accepting or rejecting hypotheses is part of the scientist's work; (2) no evidence makes a hypothesis certain, so every acceptance risks error; (3) whether the evidence is sufficient for acceptance depends on how serious the consequences of error would be, roughly the relative costs of type I and type II errors; (4) judging that seriousness is an ethical value judgement; therefore (5) scientists qua scientists make value judgements, and the value-neutrality thesis fails. Rudner's illustration is drug safety: how much evidence is enough to declare a drug safe depends on what is at stake if the declaration is wrong.
The intended conclusion is limited. Values do not replace evidence; they set the threshold of evidential sufficiency. Carl Hempel accepted a modified version: confirmation is value-free, but acceptance carries residual inductive risk, and contextual values fix how much of it is tolerable.
Two classic objections target premise (1). Richard Jeffrey replied in 1956 that fundamental laws have general scope, so scientists cannot tailor acceptance to every application; they should confine themselves to gathering and interpreting evidence, possibly supplemented by assessing the probability of a hypothesis. Isaac Levi replied in 1960 that community standards of inference, such as a five per cent significance level, settle acceptance, so values may lie in those standards but not in an individual scientist's daily work. An influential reply is Heather Douglas's: in a 2000 paper with a case study on the carcinogenic effects of dioxin in rats, she argues that values enter decisions well before acceptance, such as how pathological samples are classified and how results are extrapolated from high to low doses, so they cannot be confined to the acceptance stage. Douglas later distinguishes a legitimate indirect role for values, helping decide what counts as sufficient reason, from an illegitimate direct role in which values act as reasons themselves. Critics answer that this distinction is hard to police, since a conservative statistical model may express either reasonable caution or reasoning towards a foregone conclusion. Elizabeth Anderson's entry on feminist epistemology discusses the argument from inductive risk under standards of proof, one of the ways in which feminist philosophers have defended the influence of social values on theory choice.
The debate remains open. Defenders of the value-free ideal still contest premise (1) or the scope of premise (3), while its supporters disagree about how far it reaches and how admitted values should be managed.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 6.8 (Philosophy of Science) and Coordinate 2.6 (Rationality).
See also the glossary entries Value-free ideal, Objectivity, Induction, Evidence and Feminist empiricism.
The questions it belongs to
- 6.8 Philosophy of ScienceWhat makes a claim scientific?
- 2.6 RationalityIs it rational to believe what the evidence supports, or what serves you?
Thinkers
To read
- Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science — Carl G. Hempel
- Private Government — Elizabeth Anderson
- Subjective Probability: The Real Thing — Richard Jeffrey
Sources and further reading
- Julian Reiss and Jan Sprenger, 'Scientific Objectivity', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 30 October 2020)
- Elizabeth Anderson, 'Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 1 August 2024)
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 11 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 11). Argument from inductive risk (Philosophy Glossary). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/argument-from-inductive-risk/
MLA (9th edition)
“Argument from inductive risk (Philosophy Glossary).” Coordinates of Thought, 11 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/argument-from-inductive-risk/. Accessed [date accessed].
Chicago (17th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Argument from inductive risk (Philosophy Glossary).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 11, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/argument-from-inductive-risk/.
BibTeX
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author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Argument from inductive risk (Philosophy Glossary)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/argument-from-inductive-risk/},
note = {Source-checked 11 November 2026}
}RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Argument from inductive risk (Philosophy Glossary) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/11 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/argument-from-inductive-risk/ LA - en ER -
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