Situationism (moral psychology)
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The position, drawn from social psychology, that features of situations explain much more of people's behaviour than is usually supposed and robust character traits correspondingly less; a challenge to virtue ethics.
What it means
The question. Do people possess robust character traits, such as honesty or compassion, that reliably produce trait-appropriate behaviour across very different situations, and, if they do not, can virtue ethics still claim to describe how good people actually are and how they become good? Provenance. The philosophical argument originated with Gilbert Harman, 'Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999), 315–331, and 'The Nonexistence of Character Traits', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000), 223–226, and with John Doris, 'Persons, Situations and Virtue Ethics', Noûs 32 (1998), and Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge University Press, 2002). 'Situationism' itself is a label taken from social psychology.
Situationism, in moral psychology, is the position that features of the situations people find themselves in, often trivial and ethically irrelevant ones, explain much more of their behaviour than is commonly supposed, and that robust character traits correspondingly explain less. Lachlan Walmsley's Stanford Encyclopedia entry captures the challenge: "The striking fact is not that people fail standards for good conduct, but that they can be so easily induced to do so." Those who draw sceptical conclusions about character are often called character sceptics; some add the normative claim that ethics should pay less attention to character.
The evidence comes from social psychology. In a study by Isen and Levin, people who had just found a dime in a payphone were far more likely to help a stranger who dropped papers than those who had not. In Darley and Batson's study, passers-by who were not in a hurry were far more likely to help a person in apparent distress than those who were. In Milgram's obedience experiments, ordinary subjects administered what they believed were electric shocks to a protesting victim at an experimenter's polite request.
Drawing on such work, John Doris and Gilbert Harman argued that it undermines the conception of character presupposed by virtue ethics. Walmsley cautions that they are often misdescribed as denying that traits exist: Harman later wrote that social psychology does not show there are no character traits, and Doris has affirmed that traits exist. The real dispute is over how traits should be characterised and what role they should play in ethics. Virtue ethicists have replied in several ways: that apparent inconsistency often reflects rational sensitivity to circumstances (Robert Adams, Kamtekar), although this fits poorly with cases like the found dime; that virtue is a skill acquired through practice, on the model of expertise (Julia Annas and others); and that genuine virtue and practical wisdom are rare, which is consistent with the experimental results. Mainstream personality psychology is itself interactionist, explaining behaviour by the interplay of person and situation. In Walmsley's words, the relevant psychology is "unfinished business."
The argument. Harman's abstract states the core claim in its strongest form: ordinary moral thought commits what social psychologists call the fundamental attribution error, "the error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent's distinctive character traits"; and "there is no evidence that people have character traits in the relevant sense." Doris's target, as Lawrence Blum's review of Lack of Character in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews reports it, is 'globalism', a conception of character with three features: consistency (a trait is displayed across a wide range of eliciting conditions), stability (it is displayed reliably over repeated trials) and evaluative integration (good traits hang together in a personality). Doris accepts narrow, 'local' traits, such as honesty at work but not at home.
Structure. (COT's reconstruction, following the order of the argument as Harman and Doris present it; the numbering is not theirs). (1) Virtue ethics, ancient and modern, presupposes that good people have robust, global character traits that explain and predict their conduct across situations. (2) If people had such traits, behaviour would be substantially consistent across situations that call for the same trait. (3) Experimental social psychology, in studies such as those described above, shows that behaviour varies dramatically with apparently minor and ethically irrelevant features of situations. (4) So there is little evidence that most people have robust global traits; at most they have local ones. Therefore (5) virtue ethics rests on an empirically inadequate moral psychology, and its account of how character explains conduct, and of moral education as cultivating such character, is called into question.
Intended conclusion. Harman's 1999 conclusion is both descriptive and practical: because attributing character traits, in his abstract's words, "leads to much evil, we should try to educate ourselves and others to stop doing it." Doris's conclusion, on Blum's report, is more moderate: robust traits are much rarer than ordinary discourse and virtue ethics assume, and he recommends what he calls self-manipulation, avoiding situations likely to induce bad conduct, rather than trying to transform one's global character.
Objections. (1) The construal objection. Gopal Sreenivasan, 'Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution', Mind 111 (2002), 47–68, grants the experimental data for the sake of argument but disputes their interpretation. His abstract lists three respects in which the experiments are inadequate tests of a trait: they ignore the subject's own construal of the situation, they count behaviour only marginally relevant to the trait, and they disregard the normative character of the responses that interest virtue theory. So, he argues, the evidence does not refute the claim that people have character traits properly understood. (2) The holism objection. Rachana Kamtekar, 'Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character', Ethics 114 (2004), 458–491, argues that the traits tested are isolated dispositions to behave in stereotypical ways, cut off from reasoning, whereas virtue ethics explains action by a person's character as a whole, a more or less integrated set of desires, beliefs, goals and values; inconsistency is explained by obstacles to an achievement of practical reason, not by the absence of character. Rosalind Hursthouse and Glen Pettigrove's Stanford entry on virtue ethics summarises both as holding that the studies are irrelevant to the multi-track disposition a virtue is meant to be. (3) The mixed-traits view. Christian Miller, Moral Character: An Empirical Theory (Oxford University Press, 2013), argues, as Bradford Cokelet's review reports, that most people's character is neither good enough for virtue nor bad enough for vice: they have 'mixed traits' whose operation explains the experimental results better than either robust virtues or no traits at all. (4) Blum's objection that Doris fails to separate morally relevant from morally irrelevant features of situations, and so overstates the absence of robust traits, with research on rescuers as his main example.
Replies. Both originators later qualified the strong reading, as noted above; Harman's clarification that social psychology does not demonstrate that there are no character traits is in 'Skepticism about Character Traits', Journal of Ethics 13 (2009), 235–242. Mark Alfano, in Character as Moral Fiction (Cambridge University Press, 2013), presses the challenge against what he calls the hard core of virtue ethics; on Neera Badhwar's review he argues that most people cannot possess the central moral and intellectual virtues across a wide range of circumstances, while proposing that virtue-labelling can produce 'factitious virtue', trait-consistent conduct sustained by the attribution itself. Alfano also named the 'dodge' of denying that virtue ethics makes empirical claims at all; the Stanford entry on empirical moral psychology suggests that, so understood, virtue ethics could not clearly claim its traditional advantages in psychological realism and moral development. Against Adams's move to accept frail and fragmentary virtues (a response that, the same entry notes, echoes Maria Merritt's 2000 article), Hursthouse and Pettigrove report Daniel Russell's and Kamtekar's view that giving up practical wisdom as the unifying core of virtue is a substantial sacrifice.
Key thinkers and texts. Harman (1999; 2000; 2009); Doris, 'Persons, Situations and Virtue Ethics' (1998) and Lack of Character (2002); Sreenivasan (2002); Kamtekar (2004); Robert Adams, A Theory of Virtue (2006); Miller, Moral Character (2013) and Character and Moral Psychology (2014); Alfano, Character as Moral Fiction (2013); and, for the skill model, Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtue (2011). John Doris, Christian Miller, Mark Alfano, Rachana Kamtekar, Gopal Sreenivasan and Julia Annas are named here without site pages.
Current status. The dispute is unresolved. Since neither Harman nor Doris now denies that traits of some kind exist, the open questions are which conception of trait the evidence supports, whether the virtues of practical wisdom are rare ideals or attainable dispositions, and what follows for moral education. The challenge is separate from the virtue ethicist's claim that virtue is rare, and from the question of akrasia: Marcia Homiak's Stanford entry on moral character, noting that many of Milgram's subjects protested even while continuing to obey, describes them as incontinent: they have character, though it is neither virtuous nor vicious.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 3.4 (Moral Psychology) and bears on Coordinate 3.2.3 (Character-Based Approaches).
See also the glossary entries Practical wisdom (phronēsis), Virtue ethics, Moral responsibility, Moral agency and Akrasia.
The questions it belongs to
- 3.4 Moral PsychologyAre people naturally good, naturally selfish, or naturally neither?
- 3.2.3 Character-Based ApproachesShould ethics ask what to do, or who to be?
Thinkers
Traditions
To read
Sources and further reading
- Lachlan Walmsley, 'Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 6 January 2020)
- Gilbert Harman, 'Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999), 315-331 (PhilPapers record with abstract)
- Gilbert Harman, 'The Nonexistence of Character Traits', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100, no. 2 (2000), 223-226 (PhilArchive record)
- Lawrence Blum, review of John M. Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge University Press, 2002), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003.08.02
- Gopal Sreenivasan, 'Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution', Mind 111, no. 441 (2002), 47-68 (PhilPapers record with abstract)
- Rachana Kamtekar, 'Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character', Ethics 114, no. 3 (2004), 458-491 (PhilPapers record with abstract)
- Rosalind Hursthouse and Glen Pettigrove, 'Virtue Ethics', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 3 May 2026)
- Marcia Homiak, 'Moral Character', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 15 April 2019)
- Bradford Cokelet, review of Christian B. Miller, Moral Character: An Empirical Theory (Oxford University Press, 2013), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014.02.07
- Neera K. Badhwar, review of Mark Alfano, Character as Moral Fiction (Cambridge University Press, 2013), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014.01.04
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@misc{cot-glossary-situationism-moral-psychology-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Situationism (moral psychology) (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/situationism-moral-psychology/},
note = {Source-checked 15 November 2026}
}
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TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Situationism (moral psychology) (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/15 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/situationism-moral-psychology/ LA - en ER -
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