Bradley's regress
On this page
F. H. Bradley's argument, in Appearance and Reality (1893), that relations cannot unite their terms without generating an endless series of further relations, so that relations are mere appearance.
The argument at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- Question
- The question it addresses is how a relation can relate: what makes two terms and a relation between them into one unified fact rather than three separate items.
- Reasons , COT reconstruction: the numbering is ours, not the philosopher's
-
Candlish and Basile do not number the steps; the following is a reconstruction of the two regresses they describe. First regress:
- a relation depends on its terms, since it needs at least two;
- terms also depend on relations, since they are partly constituted by the relations they stand in;
- so each related term is itself a complex of a part that grounds the relation and a part constituted by it, and the same reasoning applies to those parts, without end. Second regress: (1) suppose a relation is a further real thing alongside its terms; (2) then a further relation is needed to relate it to them; (3) the same holds for that relation;
- Therefore: the unity of the related whole is never reached. (the entry continues below)
- Intended conclusion
- Relations, and the many terms they relate, are 'appearances': not nothing, but lacking full individuality, which for Bradley is what being real requires. They read the positive view as holistic: relations and terms are aspects of an all-embracing whole, the Absolute, which is experience in a wide sense.
Objections and replies
- Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
-
Bertrand Russell's multiple relation theory of judgement, which treats a relation as a further constituent, is a target of the second regress; Bradley complained that Russell had never really faced the question. Russell and G. E. Moore read the arguments as a case for the internality of relations, a reading Candlish and Basile call a misreading. C. D. Broad was scathing about Bradley's reasoning.
- Replies
-
Candlish and Basile argue that Broad misread Bradley as assuming that relations are objects, when that assumption is precisely what the second regress attacks. They also note that Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus, in which objects hang in one another like links of a chain, tries to avoid the regress by eliminating relations as constituents, and argue that the image does not answer Bradley.
Coordinate 1.1Coordinate 1.1.2Coordinate 1.10F. H. BradleyBertrand RussellG. E. MooreC. D. BroadLudwig WittgensteinGottlob FregeSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
Bradley's regress is the name given to F. H. Bradley's regress arguments against the reality of relations, set out in chapter III ('Relation and Quality') of Appearance and Reality (1893). The Stanford Encyclopedia entry by Stewart Candlish and Pierfrancesco Basile describes them as condensed arguments that Bradley deploys as a team, aimed at showing that neither external nor internal relations can account for the unity of things.
The question it addresses is how a relation can relate: what makes two terms and a relation between them into one unified fact rather than three separate items.
Structure. Candlish and Basile do not number the steps; the following is a reconstruction of the two regresses they describe. First regress: (1) a relation depends on its terms, since it needs at least two; (2) terms also depend on relations, since they are partly constituted by the relations they stand in; (3) so each related term is itself a complex of a part that grounds the relation and a part constituted by it, and the same reasoning applies to those parts, without end. Second regress: (1) suppose a relation is a further real thing alongside its terms; (2) then a further relation is needed to relate it to them; (3) the same holds for that relation; therefore (4) the unity of the related whole is never reached. They read the second as a reductio of the assumption that relations are objects.
Intended conclusion. Relations, and the many terms they relate, are 'appearances': not nothing, but lacking full individuality, which for Bradley is what being real requires. They read the positive view as holistic: relations and terms are aspects of an all-embracing whole, the Absolute, which is experience in a wide sense.
Objections. Bertrand Russell's multiple relation theory of judgement, which treats a relation as a further constituent, is a target of the second regress; Bradley complained that Russell had never really faced the question. Russell and G. E. Moore read the arguments as a case for the internality of relations, a reading Candlish and Basile call a misreading. C. D. Broad was scathing about Bradley's reasoning.
Replies. Candlish and Basile argue that Broad misread Bradley as assuming that relations are objects, when that assumption is precisely what the second regress attacks. They also note that Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus, in which objects hang in one another like links of a chain, tries to avoid the regress by eliminating relations as constituents, and argue that the image does not answer Bradley.
Status. Candlish and Basile report a revival of interest in Bradley's critique of relations within analytic ontology, with little attention to his wider speculative aims. They connect the critique with the problem of the unity of the proposition, with Bradley's rejection of independent ideas joined by a copula, and with Gottlob Frege's strict division between concept and object. The entry does not adjudicate whether the regress is vicious; its bibliography includes both critical discussions and Vallicella's 'Relations, Monism and the Vindication of Bradley's Regress' (2002).
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 1.1 (Ontology) and bears on Coordinate 1.1.2 (Universals and Particulars) and Coordinate 1.10 (Meta-Metaphysics).
See also the glossary entries Monism, Idealism, Regress problem, Universals and Carroll's regress.
The questions it belongs to
- 1.1 OntologyWhat is there?
- 1.1.2 Universals and ParticularsA tomato and a fire engine are both red. Is there something they share?
- 1.10 Meta-MetaphysicsAre metaphysical arguments about anything?
Thinkers
To read
- A History of Western Philosophy — Bertrand Russell
- Appearance and Reality — F. H. Bradley
- In Praise of Idleness — Bertrand Russell
Sources and further reading
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 12 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
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MLA (9th edition)
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Chicago (17th edition)
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BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-bradleys-regress-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Bradley's regress (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/bradleys-regress/},
note = {Source-checked 12 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Bradley's regress (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/12 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/bradleys-regress/ LA - en ER -
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