Fake barn case
On this page
The thought experiment, first given by Carl Ginet and published by Alvin Goldman in 1976, in which a driver truly and justifiably believes he sees a barn in a district full of barn façades, yet seems not to know it.
Also: barn façade case
The argument at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- Reasons , Numbered as set out in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps
-
Henry drives through a county where many barn façades look exactly like barns from the road. He looks at what happens to be the only real barn and believes he sees a barn.
- His belief is justified, since it rests on normal perception;
- it is true;
- it is not inferred from any false belief;
- yet, as the entry puts it, it is "exceedingly plausible" to judge that it is not knowledge.
- Therefore: justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge, and adding a 'no false lemmas' condition, one response to Edmund Gettier's cases, does not solve the problem.
- Intended conclusion
- The case extends the Gettier problem from inferential to perceptual belief and points to a kind of luck that lies in the believer's environment rather than in a faulty chain of reasoning.
Objections and replies
- Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
-
Stephen Hetherington's IEP entry notes that some epistemologists do not regard the case as a genuine Gettier case at all, and that the very concept of a Gettier case is somewhat vague. The case also tests rival analyses. Saul Kripke's variant, in which the façades are all green and the one real barn red, shows that a sensitivity condition can make 'I see a red barn' count as knowledge while 'I see a barn' does not. The entry notes that safety conditions fare poorly with some versions of the case (Neta and Rohrbaugh 2004). For Ernest Sosa's virtue theory, if Henry's accurate belief manifests his perceptual competence it should count as apt and so as knowledge.
- Replies
-
Sosa has explored three responses: that Henry lacks the relevant competence in fake barn country; that the competence exists but is not manifested in this belief; or, Sosa's own view, that Henry knows, though he lacks reflective knowledge, a further epistemically valuable state. Goldman's 1976 paper itself is listed in the entry among early relevant-alternatives approaches.
Coordinate 2.1.1Coordinate 2.1Alvin GoldmanEdmund GettierSaul KripkeErnest SosaSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
The fake barn case addresses whether justified true belief, even when it is not inferred from any falsehood, is sufficient for knowledge. Jonathan Ichikawa and Matthias Steup's Stanford Encyclopedia entry records that it was first given by Carl Ginet and published by Alvin Goldman in 'Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge' (1976).
Structure. Henry drives through a county where many barn façades look exactly like barns from the road. He looks at what happens to be the only real barn and believes he sees a barn. (1) His belief is justified, since it rests on normal perception; (2) it is true; (3) it is not inferred from any false belief; (4) yet, as the entry puts it, it is "exceedingly plausible" to judge that it is not knowledge. Therefore (5) justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge, and adding a 'no false lemmas' condition, one response to Edmund Gettier's cases, does not solve the problem.
Intended conclusion. The case extends the Gettier problem from inferential to perceptual belief and points to a kind of luck that lies in the believer's environment rather than in a faulty chain of reasoning.
Objections. Stephen Hetherington's IEP entry notes that some epistemologists do not regard the case as a genuine Gettier case at all, and that the very concept of a Gettier case is somewhat vague. The case also tests rival analyses. Saul Kripke's variant, in which the façades are all green and the one real barn red, shows that a sensitivity condition can make 'I see a red barn' count as knowledge while 'I see a barn' does not. The entry notes that safety conditions fare poorly with some versions of the case (Neta and Rohrbaugh 2004). For Ernest Sosa's virtue theory, if Henry's accurate belief manifests his perceptual competence it should count as apt and so as knowledge.
Replies. Sosa has explored three responses: that Henry lacks the relevant competence in fake barn country; that the competence exists but is not manifested in this belief; or, Sosa's own view, that Henry knows, though he lacks reflective knowledge, a further epistemically valuable state. Goldman's 1976 paper itself is listed in the entry among early relevant-alternatives approaches.
Status. Hetherington reports more generally that "There is no consensus, however, that any one of the attempts to solve the Gettier challenge has succeeded" in fully defining knowledge. Hetherington also reports empirical work on Gettier intuitions (Weinberg, Nichols and Stich 2001), which has added the further question whether the intuitions such cases rely on are widely shared.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 2.1.1 (The Gettier Problem) and bears on Coordinate 2.1 (Theories of Knowledge).
See also the glossary entries Gettier problem, Epistemic luck, Reliabilism, Virtue epistemology and Knowledge.
The questions it belongs to
- 2.1.1 The Gettier ProblemCan you be right for the wrong reasons and still count as knowing?
- 2.1 Theories of KnowledgeWhat has to be added to a true belief to make it knowledge?
Thinkers
Traditions
To read
- Epistemology and Cognition — Alvin I. Goldman
- Naming and Necessity — Saul Kripke
- Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language — Saul Kripke
Sources and further reading
- Jonathan Ichikawa and Matthias Steup, 'The Analysis of Knowledge', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (first published 6 February 2001; substantive revision 21 January 2026)
- Stephen Hetherington, 'Gettier Problems', Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 13 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 13). Fake barn case (Arguments). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/fake-barn-case/
MLA (9th edition)
“Fake barn case (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought, 13 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/fake-barn-case/. Accessed [date accessed].
Chicago (17th edition)
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BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-fake-barn-case-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Fake barn case (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/fake-barn-case/},
note = {Source-checked 13 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Fake barn case (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/13 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/fake-barn-case/ LA - en ER -
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