Skip to content
Coordinates of ThoughtHome of Philosophy
Join

Appiah's argument against races

Updated 29 October 2026

On this page
  1. The argument at a glance
  2. What it means
  3. The questions it belongs to
  4. Thinkers
  5. Traditions
  6. To read
  7. Sources and further reading
  8. About this page
  9. Cite this page

Kwame Anthony Appiah's argument that, since nothing in the world answers to the biological notion of race that ordinary racial talk presupposes, there are no races, though there are racial identities with real social effects.

The argument at a glance

A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.

Reasons , Numbered as set out in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps

The argument can be set out as a semantic step followed by a factual one.

  1. The meaning of 'race', as the term has been used, is fixed by the idea of groups whose members share a heritable biological essence, the view James and Burgos call racial naturalism.
  2. The only candidate referent for 'race', so understood, would be such discrete, essence-bearing biological groups.
  3. Biology shows that no such groups exist.
  4. Therefore: the term refers to nothing, and there are no races. (the entry continues below)
Objections
Further discussion in the entry

The objections come from two directions. Social constructionists, among them Lucius Outlaw and Paul Taylor, as James and Burgos report, reply that even if biological races do not exist, races are real social groups produced by histories of racialisation; the falsity of racial naturalism shows only that races are not what naturalists thought. Sally Haslanger's analysis of race as a social position is a further version of this reply. Biological realists object from the other side, defending population-based or cladistic notions of race that do not require essences. On Du Bois, Gooding-Williams reports that Outlaw reads his definition as a cluster concept, and that Taylor argues that Appiah misunderstands what it is for people to share a history.

Coordinate 6.30Kwame Anthony AppiahW. E. B. Du BoisLucius OutlawSally HaslangerSources and primary textsRead the full entry

What it means

Appiah's argument addresses whether races exist and, if they do not, what to make of racial talk and racial identity. Kwame Anthony Appiah developed it in 'The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race' (1985), in In My Father's House (1992) and in later work from the mid-1990s. Michael James and Adam Burgos's Stanford Encyclopedia entry on race cites Appiah, with Naomi Zack, as a representative of racial scepticism.

The argument can be set out as a semantic step followed by a factual one. (1) The meaning of 'race', as the term has been used, is fixed by the idea of groups whose members share a heritable biological essence, the view James and Burgos call racial naturalism. (2) The only candidate referent for 'race', so understood, would be such discrete, essence-bearing biological groups. (3) Biology shows that no such groups exist. Therefore (4) the term refers to nothing, and there are no races. Robert Gooding-Williams's Stanford Encyclopedia entry on W. E. B. Du Bois records the conclusion in Appiah's own words, 'the truth is that there are no races', and reports his earlier claim that the logic of Du Bois's reasoning 'leads naturally to the final repudiation of race as a term of difference'. Appiah's critique of Du Bois was part of the argument: he contended that even Du Bois's sociohistorical definition of race failed to individuate races without falling back on common ancestry, a biological criterion. The purpose is to show that the notion of race presupposed by ordinary racial talk is empty, and so to change how racial identities are understood.

The objections come from two directions. Social constructionists, among them Lucius Outlaw and Paul Taylor, as James and Burgos report, reply that even if biological races do not exist, races are real social groups produced by histories of racialisation; the falsity of racial naturalism shows only that races are not what naturalists thought. Sally Haslanger's analysis of race as a social position is a further version of this reply. Biological realists object from the other side, defending population-based or cladistic notions of race that do not require essences. On Du Bois, Gooding-Williams reports that Outlaw reads his definition as a cluster concept, and that Taylor argues that Appiah misunderstands what it is for people to share a history.

Appiah's later work partly absorbs these replies. James and Burgos report that he came to accept that human folk races are real as social identities, functioning through ascription, identification and treatment, even though they are wrongly thought to be biologically grounded. In 1996 he described himself as against races but for racial identities, adding, in the words the entry quotes, 'Racial identity can be the basis of resistance to racism', while warning against letting racial identities 'subject us to new tyrannies'. The entry maps the current field into racial scepticism, several kinds of constructionism, deflationary forms of realism and population naturalism, with a further normative dispute between eliminativists, who would discard the concept of race, and conservationists, who would keep it; it reports a consensus against racial naturalism, but whether the right response is to abandon the concept or to reinterpret it remains contested.

The argument is developed in In My Father's House. On this site it belongs to Coordinate 6.30 (Philosophy of Race).

See also the glossary entries Du Bois's conservation-of-races argument, Haslanger's ameliorative argument, Social constructionism, Natural kinds and Pan-Africanism.

The questions it belongs to

Thinkers

Traditions

To read

Sources and further reading

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Checked against the sources above on 13 November 2026. Not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. How we write and check.

Cite this page

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 13 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.

APA (7th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 13). Appiah's argument against races (Philosophy Glossary). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/appiahs-argument-against-races/

MLA (9th edition)

“Appiah's argument against races (Philosophy Glossary).” Coordinates of Thought, 13 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/appiahs-argument-against-races/. Accessed [date accessed].

Chicago (17th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Appiah's argument against races (Philosophy Glossary).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 13, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/appiahs-argument-against-races/.

BibTeX

@misc{cot-glossary-appiahs-argument-against-races-2026,
  author       = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
  title        = {Appiah's argument against races (Philosophy Glossary)},
  howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = nov,
  url          = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/appiahs-argument-against-races/},
  note         = {Source-checked 13 November 2026}
}

RIS

TY  - ELEC
AU  - Coordinates of Thought Editors
TI  - Appiah's argument against races (Philosophy Glossary)
T2  - Coordinates of Thought
PB  - Coordinates of Thought
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/11/13
UR  - https://coordinatesofthought.com/glossary/appiahs-argument-against-races/
LA  - en
ER  - 

For reference managers (Zotero, Mendeley, EndNote): BibTeX file · RIS file

All terms in the glossary