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Kumārila's circularity objection to apoha

Updated 19 November 2026

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  1. The argument at a glance
  2. What it means
  3. The questions it belongs to
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  5. Traditions
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  7. Sources and further reading
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Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's objection, in the Apohavāda chapter of his Ślokavārttika, to Dignāga's theory that words mean the exclusion of others: to exclude 'non-cow' one must already know 'cow', so meaning by exclusion is circular, and our grasp of 'cow' is positive in any case.

The argument at a glance

A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.

Question
Do general words such as 'cow' refer to real universals, or can their meaning be explained, as the Buddhist epistemologist Dignāga proposed, as the exclusion of what is other (apoha)? John Taber and Kei Kataoka's critical edition (2021) describes the Apohavāda chapter of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Ślokavārttika as an exhaustive critique of the Buddhist theory that a word refers not to a positive entity such as a universal but to an exclusion. Kumārila flourished around 660 CE, according to Daniel Arnold's Stanford Encyclopedia entry. The circularity charge is the best-known part of that critique.
Reasons , Numbered as set out in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps

In Gaṅgānātha Jhā's translation of the chapter (1909), the argument runs as follows.

  1. On the apoha view, 'cow' means the exclusion of non-cow.
  2. To exclude non-cows, one must first identify which objects are denotable by 'non-cow' (kārikās 81–82).
  3. But 'non-cow' is itself the negation of cow, so the excluded class can be identified only through the concept of cow.
  4. If cow is then explained as the negation of non-cow, each concept depends on the other; in Jhā's rendering of kārikās 83–84, "there would be mutual inter-dependence" (a related charge of mutual dependence, between the diversity of the non-cows and the diversity of the exclusions, appears at kārikās 65–66).
  5. Moreover, as Jhā's translation with its commentary extracts puts the point at kārikās 71–74, neither the individual cows nor the animals to be excluded can be grasped as one group unless some positive similarity or single property among them is recognised, so apoha presupposes the common character it was meant to replace.
  6. The cognition produced by a word rests on a positive entity alone (kārikās 92–94).
  7. Therefore: apoha cannot be what general words mean; their object must be something positive, such as a universal. (the entry continues below)
Intended conclusion
The exclusion theory fails as an account of word meaning, and the shared positive cognition that a general word produces requires a real universal as its object.
Objections and replies
Objections , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported

Tillemans reports that the usual charge against apoha by non-Buddhist critics, "like Kumārila and Uddyotakara", is circularity. The Naiyāyika Uddyotakara (c. 600) is the earlier critic. James Blumenthal and James Apple's Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Śāntarakṣita reports that he argued in his Nyāyavārttika that apoha entails circularity and leaves its defenders no way out except a denotationism they want to avoid. The objections to Kumārila's argument come from the Buddhist side. Tillemans reports that Dharmakīrti answered the circularity charge with what is essentially a tu quoque: a realist too must understand what a term excludes as much as what it applies to. Blumenthal and Apple report three charges by Kumārila, that apoha is circular, counter-intuitive and redundant, and Śāntarakṣita's replies to them.

Replies

Śāntarakṣita distinguished non-implicative negation (prasajyapratiṣedha) from two kinds of implicative exclusion, mental and objective, and argued that Kumārila wrongly treats every apoha as a bare negation. Against circularity, he replied, in Blumenthal and Apple's words, that "to understand cow one need not understand non-cow, but rather the mere idea of cow": mental representations are exclusions because they exclude other representations, and our experience of unifying similarities among representations gives rise to conceptual constructs. A defender of Kumārila can answer that this concedes a positive content, 'the mere idea of cow', which is the point at issue. Tillemans reports Bob Hale's reformulation of the difficulty: the Buddhist view runs counter to the compositionality of language, so on Hale's view the non-Buddhist criticism stands.

Coordinate 1.1.2Coordinate 6.10Coordinate 6.10.1Kumārila BhaṭṭaDignāgaUddyotakaraDharmakīrtiŚāntarakṣitaSources and primary textsRead the full entry

What it means

Question. Do general words such as 'cow' refer to real universals, or can their meaning be explained, as the Buddhist epistemologist Dignāga proposed, as the exclusion of what is other (apoha)? John Taber and Kei Kataoka's critical edition (2021) describes the Apohavāda chapter of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Ślokavārttika as an exhaustive critique of the Buddhist theory that a word refers not to a positive entity such as a universal but to an exclusion. Kumārila flourished around 660 CE, according to Daniel Arnold's Stanford Encyclopedia entry. The circularity charge is the best-known part of that critique.

Structure. In Gaṅgānātha Jhā's translation of the chapter (1909), the argument runs as follows. (1) On the apoha view, 'cow' means the exclusion of non-cow. (2) To exclude non-cows, one must first identify which objects are denotable by 'non-cow' (kārikās 81–82). (3) But 'non-cow' is itself the negation of cow, so the excluded class can be identified only through the concept of cow. (4) If cow is then explained as the negation of non-cow, each concept depends on the other; in Jhā's rendering of kārikās 83–84, "there would be mutual inter-dependence" (a related charge of mutual dependence, between the diversity of the non-cows and the diversity of the exclusions, appears at kārikās 65–66). (5) Moreover, as Jhā's translation with its commentary extracts puts the point at kārikās 71–74, neither the individual cows nor the animals to be excluded can be grasped as one group unless some positive similarity or single property among them is recognised, so apoha presupposes the common character it was meant to replace. (6) The cognition produced by a word rests on a positive entity alone (kārikās 92–94). Therefore (7) apoha cannot be what general words mean; their object must be something positive, such as a universal. Tom Tillemans's Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Dharmakīrti states the charge compactly: understanding blue as understanding non-non-blue presupposes understanding blue, so "we go round in circles".

Intended conclusion. The exclusion theory fails as an account of word meaning, and the shared positive cognition that a general word produces requires a real universal as its object.

Objections. Tillemans reports that the usual charge against apoha by non-Buddhist critics, "like Kumārila and Uddyotakara", is circularity. The Naiyāyika Uddyotakara (c. 600) is the earlier critic. James Blumenthal and James Apple's Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Śāntarakṣita reports that he argued in his Nyāyavārttika that apoha entails circularity and leaves its defenders no way out except a denotationism they want to avoid. The objections to Kumārila's argument come from the Buddhist side. Tillemans reports that Dharmakīrti answered the circularity charge with what is essentially a tu quoque: a realist too must understand what a term excludes as much as what it applies to. Blumenthal and Apple report three charges by Kumārila, that apoha is circular, counter-intuitive and redundant, and Śāntarakṣita's replies to them.

Replies. Śāntarakṣita distinguished non-implicative negation (prasajyapratiṣedha) from two kinds of implicative exclusion, mental and objective, and argued that Kumārila wrongly treats every apoha as a bare negation. Against circularity, he replied, in Blumenthal and Apple's words, that "to understand cow one need not understand non-cow, but rather the mere idea of cow": mental representations are exclusions because they exclude other representations, and our experience of unifying similarities among representations gives rise to conceptual constructs. A defender of Kumārila can answer that this concedes a positive content, 'the mere idea of cow', which is the point at issue. Tillemans reports Bob Hale's reformulation of the difficulty: the Buddhist view runs counter to the compositionality of language, so on Hale's view the non-Buddhist criticism stands.

Key thinkers and texts. Dignāga, originator of the apoha theory; Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Ślokavārttika, Apohavāda chapter (critical edition and annotated translation by Taber and Kataoka, 2021; English translation by Jhā, 1909); Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārttika, as earlier critic; Dharmakīrti's reworking of apoha and his reply; and Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṅgraha.

Coordinates. On this site the argument belongs to Coordinate 1.1.2 (Universals and Particulars), and it also bears on Coordinate 6.10 (Philosophy of Language) and Coordinate 6.10.1 (Reference), since it concerns what general terms refer to.

Current status. The debate remains contested in modern scholarship. Hale holds that the criticism survives. Tillemans doubts why the negative class should be privileged at all, asking "Why would we understand words first and foremost by the via negativa?" Defenders of apoha follow Śāntarakṣita's and Dharmakīrti's causal and representational accounts. The live entry Apoha describes the exchange as one of the most sophisticated pre-modern discussions of universals, concepts and meaning.

See also the glossary entries Apoha, Universals, Nominalism, Mīmāṃsā, Kumārila's argument against an omniscient person and Sahopalambhaniyama argument.

The questions it belongs to

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Sources and further reading

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Checked against the sources above on 14 November 2026. Not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. How we write and check.

Cite this page

Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 14 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.

APA (7th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 14). Kumārila's circularity objection to apoha (Arguments). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/kumarilas-circularity-objection-to-apoha/

MLA (9th edition)

“Kumārila's circularity objection to apoha (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought, 14 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/kumarilas-circularity-objection-to-apoha/. Accessed [date accessed].

Chicago (17th edition)

Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Kumārila's circularity objection to apoha (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 14, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/kumarilas-circularity-objection-to-apoha/.

BibTeX

@misc{cot-glossary-kumarilas-circularity-objection-to-apoha-2026,
  author       = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
  title        = {Kumārila's circularity objection to apoha (Arguments)},
  howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = nov,
  url          = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/kumarilas-circularity-objection-to-apoha/},
  note         = {Source-checked 14 November 2026}
}

RIS

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