Curry's paradox
On this page
A family of paradoxes in which a sentence or set says, in effect, 'if this is true, then anything', and a few plausible rules then prove any claim whatever, without any use of negation.
Also: Curry paradox
The problem at a glance
A guide to the entry below, quoting its own words. Skip to the full entry and its sources.
- The reasoning that leads to it , Standard form of the problem, as given in the entry; the entry does not say who numbered the steps
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let C be a sentence equivalent to 'if C is true, then π', where π is any claim at all.
- Suppose C is true.
- By the transparency of truth, if C is true then π.
- By modus ponens from (1) and (2), π.
- Discharging the supposition by conditional proof, and merging the two uses of it (contraction), we get: if C is true, then π.
- But that is just what C says, so C is true.
- By modus ponens from (4) and (5), π. (the entry continues below)
Objections and responses
- Main responses
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Topic-specific responses keep classical logic and restrict the naive principles: limiting the truth schema in the manner of Alfred Tarski, revision theory or contextualism, or restricting set abstraction as in Russellian type theories. Logical responses keep naive truth or naive sets and revise the logic, either by rejecting contraction, often within substructural logics, or by rejecting modus ponens or detachment, approaches associated with Ripley and J. C. Beall. Graham Priest's principle of uniform solution asks that paradoxes of the same kind receive the same kind of solution, and the entry discusses whether it requires a single remedy for all Curry variants.
- Objections and replies , Raised by other thinkers and critics, as reported
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Each family pays a price: topic-specific responses give up naive principles about truth or sets, while logical responses give up rules of inference that ordinary reasoning relies on. Versions built with a validity predicate (validity Curry) resist some responses, such as rejecting single-premise conditional proof, and motivate substructural accounts of consequence; revenge versions at higher levels of validity remain an open challenge.
Coordinate 4.4.2Coordinate 4.5Arthur PriorAlfred TarskiJ. C. BeallGraham PriestSources and primary textsRead the full entry
What it means
Curry's paradox is the name for a family of self-referential or circular paradoxes, descending from Curry (1942) and Löb (1955), that exploit a notion of implication or consequence to prove an arbitrary claim. Lionel Shapiro and Jc Beall's Stanford Encyclopedia entry notes that the paradox can be built with unrestricted set abstraction in set theory, or with a transparent truth predicate in the theory of truth.
Structure, in the truth-theoretic form: let C be a sentence equivalent to 'if C is true, then π', where π is any claim at all. (1) Suppose C is true. (2) By the transparency of truth, if C is true then π. (3) By modus ponens from (1) and (2), π. (4) Discharging the supposition by conditional proof, and merging the two uses of it (contraction), we get: if C is true, then π. (5) But that is just what C says, so C is true. (6) By modus ponens from (4) and (5), π. Since π was arbitrary, the theory proves everything.
Purpose. The paradox matters because it uses no negation. Approaches to the liar and Russell's paradox that weaken negation, whether by allowing truth-value gaps (paracomplete theories) or gluts (paraconsistent theories), still face Curry's construction if they keep a suitably strong conditional. The entry records Arthur Prior's point that the features of negation relevant to those paradoxes are captured by a broader structure of which the Curry conditional is an instance.
Main responses. Topic-specific responses keep classical logic and restrict the naive principles: limiting the truth schema in the manner of Alfred Tarski, revision theory or contextualism, or restricting set abstraction as in Russellian type theories. Logical responses keep naive truth or naive sets and revise the logic, either by rejecting contraction, often within substructural logics, or by rejecting modus ponens or detachment, approaches associated with Ripley and J. C. Beall. Graham Priest's principle of uniform solution asks that paradoxes of the same kind receive the same kind of solution, and the entry discusses whether it requires a single remedy for all Curry variants.
Objections and replies. Each family pays a price: topic-specific responses give up naive principles about truth or sets, while logical responses give up rules of inference that ordinary reasoning relies on. Versions built with a validity predicate (validity Curry) resist some responses, such as rejecting single-premise conditional proof, and motivate substructural accounts of consequence; revenge versions at higher levels of validity remain an open challenge.
Status. The entry sets out these rival families of response without endorsing a winner. The paradox has shaped the development of non-classical logics, and current work concentrates on validity Curry, meta-inferential validity and the prospects of a uniform solution.
On this site it belongs to Coordinate 4.4.2 (Paraconsistent Logic); it also bears on Coordinate 4.5 (Philosophy of Logic).
See also the glossary entries Liar paradox, Russell's paradox, Paraconsistent logic, Paradox, Truth and Grelling's paradox.
The questions it belongs to
- 4.4.2 Paraconsistent LogicIf you believe one contradiction, must you believe everything?
- 4.5 Philosophy of LogicIs logic discovered or invented?
Thinkers
To read
- An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic — Graham Priest
- Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938 — Alfred Tarski
- Logic: A Very Short Introduction — Graham Priest
Sources and further reading
Cite this page
Responsibility: Coordinates of Thought Editors. Each statement was drafted from the sources listed above and checked against them in a separate pass before publishing; this page is not peer-reviewed by outside specialists. Source-checked 11 November 2026. How to cite this site · How we write and check.
APA (7th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. (2026, November 11). Curry's paradox (Arguments). Coordinates of Thought. Retrieved [date accessed], from https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/currys-paradox/
MLA (9th edition)
“Curry's paradox (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought, 11 Nov. 2026, coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/currys-paradox/. Accessed [date accessed].
Chicago (17th edition)
Coordinates of Thought Editors. “Curry's paradox (Arguments).” Coordinates of Thought. Source-checked November 11, 2026. https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/currys-paradox/.
BibTeX
@misc{cot-glossary-currys-paradox-2026,
author = {{Coordinates of Thought Editors}},
title = {Curry's paradox (Arguments)},
howpublished = {Coordinates of Thought},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
url = {https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/currys-paradox/},
note = {Source-checked 11 November 2026}
}
RIS
TY - ELEC AU - Coordinates of Thought Editors TI - Curry's paradox (Arguments) T2 - Coordinates of Thought PB - Coordinates of Thought PY - 2026 DA - 2026/11/11 UR - https://coordinatesofthought.com/arguments/currys-paradox/ LA - en ER -
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