Concept tag
#liar-paradox
-
Is the liar paradox a problem about language or about truth itself?
Take the sentence: this sentence is false. If true, it's false; if false, it's true. Tarski's response (1933) was that a language can't consistently contain its own truth predicate, so we need a hierarchy: an object language, a metalanguage that talks about…
Started by Tomasz Szewczak3 replies -
Does the dialetheist really believe contradictions, or has she changed the meaning of ‘not’?
A question I keep returning to. Quine, in Philosophy of Logic (1970), has a famous argument against "deviant" logicians. Suppose someone claims to accept a sentence of the form "P and not-P". Quine says: then whatever they mean by "not", it isn't…
Started by Tomasz Szewczak4 replies