Thesis ‘What happens when we die?’ is a question most traditions would not have asked in that form
Where it stands
I teach comparative philosophy and spend my time insisting on what doesn't line up. Here's a thesis about a table everyone likes.
Comparative tables of ‘what happens when we die?’ line up the traditions in neat rows: Platonic immortal soul, Epicurean dissolution, Vedantic rebirth, Buddhist rebirth without self, Confucian deferral, Islamic resurrection. It looks like many answers to one question.
Thesis: the question itself is framed in one tradition's terms, and several rows are answering a question they would not have posed.
‘What happens when we die?’ presupposes a ‘we’ that persists long enough for something to happen to it. Buddhism rejects that at the outset, which is why its cell always reads awkwardly. Confucianism deliberately declines the question. Epicurus would say nothing happens to us, because where death is, we are not. Even the Abrahamic rows differ on whether the question is about a soul's continuation or a whole person's restoration.
I'm not saying comparison is impossible. I'm saying a common question always carries some tradition's framing, and a good table should mark where a tradition would reframe or refuse the question, rather than squeezing an answer into the cell.
I expect objections, especially from traditions that answer the question straightforwardly.