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Kūkai and Bhartṛhari: when a word is part of what is real rather than a label for it

Last spring I visited Kōyasan, the mountain monastery Kūkai founded, and sat in on the morning chanting. I don't understand Sanskrit and barely understand the Sino-Japanese readings, but it was obvious the monks didn't treat the syllables as labels for something else. The sounds themselves were the practice.

When I got home I tried to read about Kūkai's view of language. He wrote a short treatise on the meanings of sound, letters and reality, and as far as I can follow, he holds that these three are not separate: the whole cosmos is the Dharma Body expressing itself, and sound and written signs are part of that expression rather than names stuck onto it.

On this site I saw Bhartṛhari described in a similar way, as someone for whom the word is close to the root of reality. Is that a real kinship, or a surface resemblance?

I also think of my grandmother, a devout Jōdo Shinshū Buddhist, who said the nembutsu every day. For her the name of Amida was not a description of Amida.

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5 replies

  1. Meera Kulkarni

    Fellow

    The kinship is real at the level of the starting intuition. The Vākyapadīya opens by speaking of Brahman, without beginning or end, whose essence is the Word, from which the world unfolds. And Bhartṛhari holds that there is no cognition not interpenetrated by language. So for him too, language isn't a set of labels attached to an already sorted world. But the frameworks differ completely: Bhartṛhari's ultimate is a Brahmanical word-principle, Kūkai's is the cosmic Buddha. Same shape of thought, different metaphysics underneath.

  2. Aiko Tanabe

    Fellow

    One thing to keep in mind is that Kūkai's claim is first of all about practice and liberation, not a theory of reference in the modern sense. Shingon teaches that through body, speech and mind in ritual, the practitioner's activity and the Buddha's become one. The view of language serves that. Reading him alongside Frege is possible, but it's like reading a liturgy as a dictionary.

    Helpful · 1
  3. Oskar Nyberg

    Fellow

    A friendly sceptic's question. Philosophy of language asks how noises come to be about things. Kūkai and Bhartṛhari seem to deny there's a gap between sound and reality to be bridged. Is that an answer to the question, or a refusal to ask it? I'm genuinely unsure. It might be the better position; it just isn't playing the same game as Frege's sense and reference.

    Helpful · 2
  4. Govinda Prasad Upadhyaya

    Fellow

    India had several versions of this, not one. Mīmāṃsā, Kumārila included, held the relation between word and meaning to be eternal and not established by any person, which is part of why the Veda could be authorless. Bhartṛhari went further and grounded reality itself in the Word. And the Buddhist logicians took the opposite view, that words are conventional and work by exclusion. So the kinship Rin sees with Kūkai is with one strand of a long argument, not with “Indian thought” as such.

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  5. Rin Matsuda

    Fellow

    Oskar's question stays with me. For my grandmother I think the answer is: the nembutsu isn't a way of being about Amida at all. In Shinran's teaching, as she understood it, the Name is Amida's own working reaching her, not her effort to reach out. A word that acts rather than refers. Maybe that's why I couldn't fit Kūkai into the philosophy of language textbook: he's describing words of that kind.