Is negative utilitarianism the most compassionate moral theory, or the most dangerous one?
Its coordinates: 3.2 Normative Ethics · 3.2.1 Consequence-Based Approaches · 3.2.2 Duty-Based Approaches +3 more
On the trekking routes I meet a lot of young Westerners who have read a little philosophy and a little Buddhism, and lately some of them talk about negative utilitarianism: the view that morality is about minimising suffering, not maximising happiness. Karl Popper suggested something like it in The Open Society and Its Enemies, arguing that the urgent claim of suffering is not matched by any equal claim to promote happiness.
I can feel the pull of it. When I take a group over Thorung La, I do not try to make everyone as happy as possible. I try to bring everyone down unhurt. Preventing harm seems to come first, and seems more certain, than producing joy. And people tell me it fits the Buddha's teaching, which begins with suffering and its end.
But there is an objection I read about that frightens me. If only suffering counts, then a world with no sentient beings has no suffering at all. A philosopher in the 1950s apparently pointed out that a negative utilitarian should therefore favour a benevolent world-exploder who painlessly destroyed everyone. Defenders say that is a caricature, but I am not sure how they avoid it.
So my question has two parts. Is there a version of negative utilitarianism that avoids the world-exploder? And is it really fair to say Buddhism is a kind of negative utilitarianism?