Thesis William James was wrong: an emotion is not the perception of a bodily change
Where it stands
Our psychology textbooks still teach the James–Lange theory with a kind of affection. William James's essay "What Is an Emotion?" (1884) proposes that the order we assume is backwards. We don't tremble because we're afraid; the bodily change comes first, and the emotion is our feeling of it. His famous formulation is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble.
I want to argue that James is wrong, not just incomplete.
First, emotions are about things. My fear is of the dog; my anger is at my brother. A bodily feeling isn't about anything: a racing heart doesn't point at a dog. James can't explain why the emotion has an object without bringing in an appraisal of the object, and then the appraisal is doing the work.
Second, very different emotions share similar bodily profiles. Fear and excitement both involve a racing heart and sweating. If emotion were the perception of the bodily change, they'd be hard to tell apart, yet we rarely confuse being afraid of a dog with being excited to see a friend.
Third, emotions can be assessed as fitting or unfitting. Fear of a harmless spider is mistaken. A feeling of a racing heart can't be mistaken about anything.
Thesis: the body is part of emotion, but James's theory makes it the whole, and the whole can't be right.